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NSC BRIEFING

1 December 1954

CHINESE OFFSHORE ISLANDS

I. Commie harassment Nationalist islands  
expected continue through winter.

A. Amphib assaults on even major  
islands possible any time, but  
Commies still seem uncertain  
about US intentions.

B. Moreover, assault of Tachens  
or Quemoy's costly even against  
Nats alone.

II. Of major groups, Tachens most vulnerable  
to Commie harassment, because at end of  
Taipei's longest supply line (plus 200 mi).

A. Commie air can hamper Tachens  
supply.

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[REDACTED]

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B. Commies could also hamper supply with artillery on islands north and west.

[REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

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
C. Loss of Nat DE near Tachens (14 Nov) may discourage Taipei from risking other guard vessels, make both islands and shipping more vulnerable to Commie naval fire.

D. Morale of Nats in Tachens could be weakened by capture of outlying islands (Yushans, Ichiang, Pishan, Nanchishan) most of which bombed during Nov.

E. Under such pressures, Taipei might decide withdraw Tachens garrison.

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III. Similar harassment could be extended to Matsus, Quemoy.

A.



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B. Quemoy shelled intermittently throughout November.

IV. Commie action against Wuchiu--isolated and unimportant island between Quemoy and Matsus--was greatly exaggerated by press.

A.



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B.

C. Was third such shelling Wuchiu this year.

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
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
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F. However, ~~Commies~~ believed  
have three to six subs based  
at Tsingtao.



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