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L161— O-1096

PUBLIC OPINION

IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

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PUBLIC OPINION

IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949

Edited by

ANNA J. MERRITT and RICHARD L. MERRITT

With a Foreword by FREDERICK W. WILLIAMS

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

Urbana Chicago London

PUBLIC OPINION

IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

The OMGUS Surveys, 1945-1949

Edited by

ANNA J. MERRITT and RICHARD L. MERRITT

With a Foreword by FREDERICK W. WILLIAMS

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS PRESS

Urbana Chicago London

© 1970 by the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois

Manufactured in the United States of America

Library of Congress Catalog Card No. 74-94397

252 00077 3

3oiJSi ^

For Christopher, Geoffrey, and Theo —our wanderers between two worlds

CONTENTS

Foreword xvii

List of Abbreviations xxiii

PARTI: POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

THE OMGUS SURVEYS 4

Questionnaires 4

Sampling 5

Field Work 5

Analysis 8

IMMEDIATE OCCUPATION POLICIES 9

Attitudes toward the American Occupation 9

American Information Policies 12

Specific Issues of the Occupation 15

Food Rationing 15

Refugees and Expellees 18

The Currency Reform 21

The Division of Germany 23

Berlin and the Blockade 26

DEMOCRATIZING POSTWAR GERMANY 29

Nazism and Denazification 30

Attitudes toward National Socialism 30

The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials 33

Denazification 35

Re-education for Democracy 39

German Political Culture 40

Political Participation 43

FROM DEMOCRATIZATION TO ANTICOMMUNISM: THE

REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN POLICY 50

NOTES 58

PART II: THE OMGUS SURVEYS

1. Radio Listening in Germany, Winter 1946 (1 March 1946) 69

2. Who in Germany Has Read Mein Kampf? (March 1946) 70

3. Some Political Attitudes Probed on Recent Surveys (15 March 1946) 71

4. Income and Expenditures of German Families in the American

Zone, Winter 1946 (25 March 1946) 73

5. Special Political Survey, Winter 1946 (1 April 1946) 74

6. Law No. 3 (20 April 1946) 77

viii/ CONTENTS

7. Reactions to Recent Revisions in the Denazification Program

(11 May 1946) 79

8. Reactions to the New Tax Laws (1 June 1946) 80

9. Attitudes toward Religion and the Church as Political Factors

in German Life (7 June 1946) 81

10. Attitudes toward Politics as a Career for the Coming Generation

in Germany (21 June 1946) 83

1 1 . German Attitudes toward Trade Unions (27 June 1946) 85

12. Attitudes of Some Bavarian Schoolchildren (28 June 1946) 86

13. A Preliminary Study of Book Reading in Germany

(28 June 1946) 88

14. Mail to Stimme Amerikas, February and March 1946

(6 July 1946) 89

14A. German Attitudes toward the Expulsion of German Nationals

from Neighboring Countries (8 July 1946) 90

15. Relative Effects of Food Scarcity in Two Countries

(27 July 1946) 92

16. German Attitudes toward the Nuremberg Trials

(7 August 1946) 93

17. Attitudes toward International Leadership in Germany Compared

with Attitudes in Seven Other Countries (8 August 1946) 95

18. A Study of Food Consumption and Attitudes toward Rationing and General Health of the German Population

(14 August 1946) 96

19. Basic Attitudes Explored by the German Attitude Scale

(19 August 1946) 99

20. Preliminary Study of Motion Picture Attendance and Attitudes

(27 August 1946) 100

21. Attitudes toward Licensed Newspapers in Some American

Occupied Areas (25 September 1946) 102

22. A Study of Attitudes toward the Reconstruction and

Rehabilitation of Germany (25 September 1946) 103

23. The Viennese Newspapers: An Opinion Research Study

(22 October 1946) 106

24. Mannheim Attitudes toward Negro Troops (22 October 1946) 107

25. German Knowledge about and Attitudes toward Inflation

(8 November 1946) 108

26. Information about the Land Constitutions and the Intention to

Vote in the Constitutional Elections (13 November 1946) 110

27. German-American Relations in Germany: Frequencies of

Group Contacts (13 November 1946) 111

28. An Investigation to Determine Any Changes in Attitudes of Native Germans toward the Expellees in Wuerttemberg-Baden

(14 November 1946) 112

29. The Trend of Cares and Worries in Germany (21 November 1946) 114

30. Radio Listening in Vienna (14 December 1946) 115

31. The Standard of Living (14 December 1946) 117

32. Income, Expenditures, and Currency Holdings of the German Population and Attitudes toward General Economic Problems

(10 December 1946) 118

33. The Trend of Public Reactions to the Nuremberg Trials

(18 December 1946) 121

34. Attitudes toward Licensed Newspapers in Some American

Occupied Areas (28 December 1946) 123

CONTENTS / ix

35. Attitudesof Trade Union Members (5 January 1947) 123

36. The German People and Social Classes (1 1 January 1947) 125

37. Opinions of Newspaper Readers (13 January 1947) 126

38. A Preliminary Study of Changes in Job Status

(14 January 1947) 127

39. Reactions to and Penetration of Information Media in Vienna

(14 January 1947) 128

40. Austrian Economic Difficulties and Attitudes toward Economic

Problems (21 January 1947) 130

41. Attitudes toward General Economic Conditions (15 January 1947) 131

42. The Trend of Rumors (5 February 1947) 134

43. Readership of Heute, Amerikanische Rundschau and Neue Auslese

(5 February 1947) 135

44. Opinions of German Community Leaders on International Affairs

(6 February 1947) 137

45. Radio Listening in the American Zone and in Berlin

(17 February 1947) 140

46. Army Aid to German Youth Activities Evaluated by German Adults

(19 February 1947) 142

47. Opinions on the Expellee Problem (20 February 1947) 144

48. German Attitudes toward Freedom of Speech (5 March 1947) 145

49. Anti-Semitism in the American Zone (3 March 1947) 146

50. A Pilot Study on Displaced Persons (20 March 1947) 148

51. Attitudes toward Collective Guilt in the American Zone of Germany

(2 April 1947) 149

52. Attitudes toward Food, Fuel, and Building Materials Conditions

(27 March 1947) 150

53. Magazine Reading in the American Zone (8 April 1947) 152

54. Viennese Reactions to New Denazification Laws (8 April 1947) 153

55. Public Attitudes toward Denazification (15 April 1947) 154

56. German Children Appraise the Youth Program (26 April 1947) 155

57. Readership and Popularity of the Frankfurt Newspapers

(29 April 1947) 157

58. Confidence in News in Present-Day Germany (1 May 1947) 158

59. Expectations Regarding Reparations (10 May 1947) 159

60. Trends in German Public Opinion (April 1947) 160

61. Some Attitudes toward the School System in Wuerttemberg-Baden

(12 June 1947) 163

62. German Attitudes toward a Peace Treaty after the Conclusion of

the Moscow Conference (14 June 1947) 164

63. German Opinion toward the Prospective Peace Treaty

(8 August 1947) 166

64. Trends in Attitudes toward the Food Situation (25 August 1947) 167

65. Attitudes of Bavarians toward Loritz' Dismissal (27 September 1947) 168

66. German Attitudes toward Corporal Punishment (27 September 1947) 169

67. German Attitudes toward International Leadership

(10 October 1947) 170

68. Trends in Attitudes toward National Socialism (10 October 1947) 171

69. German Opinions Regarding the Organization of Europe

(16 October 1947) 172

70. German Understanding of the Reasons for the Food Shortage

(17 October 1947) 173

71. Berlin: Symbol of a National State (17 October 1947) 174

72. A Report on German Morale (November 1947) 175

X /CONTENTS

73. A Guide to Some Propaganda Problems (28 October 1947) 177

74. Attitudes of AMZON Germans toward Government and Politics

(27 October 1947) 178

75. What Berliners Expect from the London Conference (28 October 1947) 179

76. German Attitudes toward the Four Occupying Powers

(29 October 1947) 180

77. Opinions on the Press in the American Zone of Germany

(5 November 1947) 181

78. Bavarian Attitudes toward Newspapers (6 November 1947) 182

79. Attitudes toward American Capitalism (22 November 1947) 183

80. Opinions on Denazification (26 November 1947) 185

81. German Reactions to Expellees and DPs (3 December 1947) 186

82. German Sentiment for Peace and Economic Security

(8 December 1947) 187

83. Newspaper Readership and Newscast Listening

(9 December 1947) 188

84. Who Are the Expellees? And What Do They Think?

(17 December 1947) 189

85. Summary of Trends of German Public Opinion (17 December 1947) 191

86. Summary of Reactions to End of London Conference

(17 December 1947) 193

87. The Trend of German Attitudes toward Allied Cooperation

(9 January 1948) 194

88. German Opinion on the People's Part in Political Affairs

(20 January 1948) 195

89. Reception of the Pamphlet O^^en Gesagt (22 January 1948) 196

90. German Opinions on Socialization of Industry (23 January 1948) 197

91 . German Conceptions of American Bartering and Black Marketeering

(24 January 1948) 198

92. Readers of Mein Kampf (9 February 1948) 199

93. "The Cream of the Crop" Two Years Later (11 February 1948) 200

94. Contacts between Germans and Americans (24 February 1948) 202

95. Appraisal of the Content of Education and Educational Facilities

(25 February 1948) 203

96. German Youth versus Adults on Ouestions of Democracy

(3 March 1948) 205

97. Berlin Reactions to Nagy's Pamphlet Machtraub in Ungarn

(3 March 1948) 206

98. Government by Politicians, Experts, or the People? (6 March 1948) 207

99. A Report on German Youth (5 March 1948) 208

100. Trends in German Public Opinion (March 1948) 210

101. German Youth and Adults View Individual Responsibility

(24 March 1948) 213

102. Patronage of U.S. Information Centers (24 March 1948) 215

103. Readership of Political Books and Pamphlets (24 March 1948) 216

104. The Marshall Plan in Prospect (24 March 1948) 216

105. Internationalism in Germany (27 March 1948) 217

106. The Radio Audience in AMZON, Berlin, and Bremen

(27 March 1948) 219

107. Public Reception of the Bizonal Administration (29 March 1948) 220

108. Magazine Readers (29 March 1948) 222

109. The Effect of Foreign Travel on Knowledge and Attitudes

(5 April 1948) 223

CONTENTS /xi

110. Bremen Attitudes Compared with Berlin and AMZON

(15 April 1948) 224

111. Attitudes toward the Bavarian Party (9 April 1948) 226

112. Reactions to a Foreign Policy Pamphlet (12 April 1948) 227

113. AMZON Attitudes and Information about Russia

(15 April 1948) 228

114. Germans Assay Their Freedoms (23 April 1948) 229 114A. Germans Assay Their Freedoms (11 May 1948) 230

115. The "Advertising Pillar" as an Information Medium

(26 April 1948) 231

116. The Moving Picture Audience in AMZON (28 April 1948) 232

117. Berliners View the Czechoslovakian Situation (27 April 1948) 233

118. Newspaper Readership (3 May 1948) 234

119. Cumulative Impact of the Mass Media (10 May 1948) 236

120. German Opinions on Daylight Saving Time (20 May 1948) 237

121. Uniformity of Religious Preferences in AMZON Communities

(19 May 1948) 238

122. Prejudice and Anti-Semitism (22 May 1948) 239

123. Reactions to the Volkskongress Petition in Berlin and Darmstadt

(25 May 1948) 241

124. Social Characteristics of the German People in the American

Zone and in Berlin (British and American Sectors) (1 June 1948) 242

125. Berlin Radio Listeners Appraise "American Voices" (22 June 1948) 243

126. Religious Instruction in the Schools (29 June 1948) 243

127. Some Opinions on the University of Berlin (8 July 1948) 244

128. A Pilot Study of Attitudes toward the Joint Export-Import Agency

(8 July 1948) 246

129. Reactions of a Panel of Readers to the Pamphlet Mit Vereinten

Kraeften (19 July 1948) 246

130. Berlin Reactions to the Air Lift and the Western Powers

(23 July 1948) 248

1 31 . Germans View the Six Power Conference Proposals

(4 August 1948) 249

132. Some Aspects of Morale in Berlin (10 August 1948) 250

133. Reactions toward Currency Reform in the U.S. Zone of Germany

(10 August 1948) 251

134. Some Trends in Berlin Morale with Sidelights on Recreation

(2 September 1948) 253

135. Radio Listening in Berlin since the Blockade (13 September 1948) 254

136. Attitudes toward a Government for Western Germany (21 September 255 1948)

137. The Munich Movie Audience (21 September 1948) 256

138. Newspaper Reading in Berlin since Currency Reform and the Blockade

(17 September 1948) 257

139. Chief Cares and Worries since the Currency Reform (22 September 1948) 258

140. Opinions on the Proposed Withdrawal of the Four Occupying Powers

(24 September 1948) 260

141. Berlin Attitudes on the Air Lift: Further Trends (4 October 1948) 261

142. Attitudes toward JE I A (5 October 1948) 262

143. Government or Administration for Western Germany? (14 October 1948) 262

144. U.S. Zone Germans View the Air Lift (26 October 1948) 263

145. The Amerika Haus in Five German Cities (1 November 1948) 265

146. The Problem of Cleanliness in Present-Day Germany (13 November 1948) 266

xii/ CONTENTS

147. How Berliners Expect and Want the Crisis Settled: With Their Recommendations (17 November 1948) 267

148. Radio Bremen Evaluated by Bremen Listeners (30 November 1948) 268

149. Trends and Present Attitudes on the Marshall Plan

(10 December 1948) 269

150. Attitudes and Resources of Berliners as They Look Forward to a Blockaded Winter (15 December 1948) 271

151. Security versus Freedom in Blockaded Berlin (18 December 1948) 272

152. AMZON Views its Civil Service (24 January 1949) 273

153. Book Reading in the U.S. Zone, Berlin, and Bremen (26 January 1949) 274

154. Opinions on the Neue Zeitung (3 February 1949) 274

155. The Town Hall Meeting in Reilingen (3 February 1949) 275

156. AMZON Views its Civil Service (9 February 1949) 276

157. Opinions on the Work Stoppage in Bavaria (3 February 1949) 277

158. Bremen Views the Picturama America Today (4 February 1949) 278

159. Bavarian Reactions to Town Hall Meetings and Public Forums

(11 February 1949) 278

160. Germans Consider the Withdrawal of the Occupying Powers

(23 February 1949) 279

161. Some German Opinions on Occupation Costs (24 February 1949) 280

162. Characteristics of Natives and Refugees in AMZON in 1948

(4 March 1949) 281

163. Social Characteristics of the German People in Bavaria, Hesse, and Wuerttemberg-Baden (7 March 1949) 282

164. AMZON Views its Civil Service (2 April 1949) 282

165. Opinion on Fusion in Wuerttemberg and Baden (22 April 1949) 283

166. Public Attitudes toward Postwar German Police (25 April 1949) 284

167. Public Attitudes toward Postwar German Police (25 April 1949) 285

168. West Berlin's Reaction to a Single Currency (27 April 1949) 286

169. German Appraisal of Lasfe/7at/sff/e/c/j (6 May 1949) 287

170. German Attitudes toward Economic and Political Strikes (16 May 1949) 288

171. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience

(23 May 1949) 290

172. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience

(23 May 1949) 291

1 73. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience

(18 May 1949) 292

1 74. Hessians Consider the Effect of Lifting the Blockade (27 May 1949) 293

175. Trends in German Public Opinion (June 1949) 294

176. German Opinions on the "Voice of America" (27 May 1949) 298

177. Readership of Heute (15 June 1949) 299

178. Germans View the Ruhr Statute (30 June 1949) 300

179. German Desires and Expectations on Future Ownership of the

Ruhr Factories (1 July 1949) 301

180. Bonn and Berlin, German Capitals (1 July 1949) 303

181. The RIAS Audience in West Berlin (7 July 1949) 303

182. German Views on Denazification (11 July 1949) 304

183. People in Three Hessian Cities Consider Their Reconstruction Problems

(21 July 1949) 306

183A. Knowledge of the Bonn Constitution (26 July 1949) 307

CONTENTS /xiii

184. The "Voice of America" Audience (26 July 1949) 307

185. German Opinions on a Peace Treaty before Unification (29 July 1949) 308

186. German Opinions on American Aid (22 August 1949) 309

187. Current Views on a Suggested Withdrawal of the Occupiers

(23 August 1949) 310

188. Characteristics and Attitudes of the German Movie Audience

(1 September 1949) 311

189. The Public Compares Present and Past Economic Conditions

(21 September 1949) 312

190. The Marshall Plan and Western Germany (17 October 1949) 313

191. The State of German Political Interest at the Outset of the

West German Republic (9 December 1949) 314

Index 319

CHARTS

1 . Major Cares and Worries of A MZON Germans 1 6

Question: "What are your greatest cares and worries at the

present time?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 3.

2. Government Efforts to Overcome tfie Black Market 22

Question: "In your opinion, are the government off icials doing everything to

overcome the black market?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 37.

3. The Prospects for a United Germany 24

Question: "Do you believe the Allies will cooperate successfully to leave behind a united Germany at the end of the occupation?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 58.

4a. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: AMZON Views 28

4b. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: Berlin Views 29

Question: "In your opinion are the Western Powers doing all they possibly can to relieve the needs of Berlin or could they do more?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 52

5. Views on National Socialism 33

Question: "Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried

out?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9.

6. Collective German Responsibility for World War II 36

Question: "Do you think that the entire German people are responsible for the war because they let a government come to power which plunged the whole world into war?" Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 8.

7. Government and Racial Superiority 39

Question: "Do you think that some races of people are more fit to rule than

others?"

Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 194P, p. 9.

8. Economic Security vs. Guaranteed Freedoms 42

Question: "Which of these types of government would you, personally, choose as better:

A. A government which offers the people economic security and the possibility of a good income,

B. A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a free press and religious freedom?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 7.

CHARTS / XV

9. Interest in Politics 44

Question: "Are you yourself interested in political affairs or do you prefer to

leave that to others?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 13.

10. Politics as a Career 45

Question: "If you had a son who had just finished school, would you like to see

him take up politics as a career?"

Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1949, p. 15.

11. Trust in Local German Officials 46

Question: "In general, do officials in the local German government work for the good of the community or are they primarily self-interested?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 16.

12. Preference for Political Parties 48

Question: "Which political party do you belong to or prefer?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 18, 19. The following page in the same report gives preferences for the smaller parties as well as those responding "don't know."

1 3. The Reconstruction of Germany 53

Question: "Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion?

A. Germany herself should bear the responsibility for her reconstruction under the supervision of the Allies.

B. Germany should be occupied by the Allies until she is able to form a good democratic government.

C. The Americans should reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order to avoid her becoming a prey to Communism.

D. The reconstruction of their country should be left to the Germans themselves without interference from the Allies."

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 57.

14. Relative Influence of tfie United States and tfie Soviet Union 54

Question: "Which country will have the greatest influence on world affairs in

the next ten years?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 47.

1 5. The Choice between National Socialism and Communism 55

Question: "If you had to choose between Communism and National Socialism, under which government would you prefer to live?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Many people and institutions assisted us in the preparation of tliis volume. For providing us with the OMGUS survey reports, we are indebted to Professor Robert E. Lane of the Political Science Department and Mrs. Gretchen Swibold of the Pohtical Science Research Library of Yale University; Dr. Donald V. McGranahan, Research and Development Branch, United Nations; Dr. Frederick W. Williams; and the Archives Branch, Washington National Records Center. Drs. McGranahan, Wil- liams, and Leo P. Crespi of the United States Information Agency gave us words of encouragement. Pamela C. TiUing assisted in preparing some of the summaries included in Part II. Harriet Stockanes typed the bulk of the manuscript. And the University Research Board of the University of lUinois gave us a grant to faciUtate the task of summarizing the reports. We would like to express our appreciation to all these individuals and institutions.

An earlier and shorter version of Part I appeared as "Political Perspectives in Germany: The Occupation Period, 1945-1949," Social Science Information, 8:2 (April 1969), 129-140.

A.J.M. & R.L.M. Urbana, Illinois 4 March 1969

FOREWORD

I first set foot in Germany late in the summer of 1945. But acquaintance with the German people, their history and culture, had deep roots in my personal experience. That experience had been topped by nearly six months of intensive interviewing and samphng of opinion among captured German soldiers in the prisoner-of-war camps in England.

When I left England for Germany, I was assigned briefly to the Psychological Warfare Division of Supreme Headquarters, Allied Expeditionary Force. On arrival in Bad Nauheim, the assignment was transferred to Information Control Division (Office of Mihtary Government, U.S. — OMGUS). The interests and personnel of the Psychological Warfare Division and the Information Control Division overlapped closely. Both were focused upon understanding the motivations, drives and in- terests of the German people so that operations could be planned and carried out which would help to guide the German people to reacquire responsibihty for and management of their nation in freedom.

Brigadier General Robert A. McClure, the head of Informa- tion Control Division, had recommended to General Lucius D. Clay, the deputy military governor, that McClure's Intelligence Branch be authorized to establish an organization which would sample German public opinion and report regularly the analysis of such samplings. General Clay wrote in Decision in Germany: "In October 1945 a public opinion survey unit was created. We had much faith in these polls, although it was shattered somewhat by the election at home in November 1948."

The planning for the work of the survey unit was accomplished in Bad Nauheim prior to establishing its head- quarters in Bad Homburg. Essential to making the plan a reality was acquisition of personnel, transportation and a sample design. Personnel were acquired from the staff of the U.S.

xviii / FOREWORD

Strategic Bombing Survey when their assignment was completed in early fall, 1945. Jeeps for each man were acquired. The sample design was more troublesome.

Germany in 1945 was a nightmare of dislocated persons. Typically, 90 per cent of the buildings in major population centers were destroyed. Bridges were out. Roads were torn up. People lived under the rubble. Refugees streamed west from Soviet-held territories. Soldiers, released from captured armies, walked home. Wives and children who had been evacuated from the cities returned to start rebuilding. Occupying armies settled into those hotels and homes which were still in sound condition.

The scarcity of food and the highly professional adminis- tration of a food ration card system made possible the design of a practically ideal sample under nearly worst possible condi- tions. In essence, there was a current and continuously up-dated listing of all persons living within the German economy. This meant that every person was attached to an administrative center and that any community selected for interviewing could be systematically and randomly sampled by drawing cards from a card file. Selection of communities for sampling, below the largest cities, within each Land (State), was randomized by random number selection of cells within a grid applied to an enormous map which displayed all communities throughout the American-controlled area. The authority and prestige of the occupying force was such that requests made to individuals to grant an interview were almost universally honored.

The Strategic Bombing Survey staff members, heavily trained and experienced, personally drew the samples and conducted the interviews for the early studies. At the same time, they were responsible to recruit and train German interviewers to whom that particular task was assigned before the end of 1945.

Supervision of the organization, training and scheduling of the field operations was commendably handled by William Diefenbach. Within the several Laender regions, Robert Speagle, George Florsheim, Dr. Richard H. Williams, Norman Sharp,

FOREWORD /xix

Fred Brauckmann and Dr. Henry Hart directed the coordinated efforts. Dr. Max Ralis worked with these units on special assignment.

During the planning period in Bad Nauheim, skepticism was frequently heard about the possibihty of constructing an organization which could, in practice, meet strict time schedules. That skepticism was almost immediately overcome once operations were started. But skepticism was also voiced about the worth of the findings. Would the German people tell military government representatives what was really in their hearts and minds?

The determining factor, of course, was the attitude of the interviewers themselves. Given honest, thoughtful, sensitive, decent interviewers, it was reasonable to expect that individual Germans would respond in kind. Tests were made comparing responses given to the original set of American interviewers with responses given to newly trained German interviewers. But the ultimate test was to be made in elections of public officials. The first elections for city-wide positions were held in January 1946. The problem posed was to determine in advance the turnout of voters. Estimates were simultaneously drawn from all official and responsible sources channeled to the military governor's office. General Clay reports in Decision in Germany how important the size of turnout was to him: "I have listened to election returns in the United States many times and with eager interest, but never have I waited so anxiously to know how many voted. . . ." Among all the estimates reported to the mihtary governor's office, the projection from our small sample was closest to the actual proportion voting, being well within the margin of error.

The success of that one report placed the operation on a well-accepted foundation. It did not presage a flow of requests from the highest level for additional subjects to be explored.

The fact is that the Intelligence Branch had had a proud history throughout the European campaigns and had earned the highest respect for the quality of its work. It had continually brought information to the attention of commanders which was

XX /FOREWORD

believed to be critical from the point of view of behavioral scientists. That practice was continued within the military government organization. Guidance on topics to be explored through samples of German public opinion was derived from internal staff meetings in the Information Control Division's Intelligence Branch. Mr. Alfred Toombs and Dr. Alexander George provided continuous and thoughtful counsel.

Supporting the Intelligence Branch's position of pro- fessional anticipation of requirements for essential information was the emphasis given to repeating identical questions on successive surveys. Such repetition permitted subsequent re- ports of trends of public opinion.

Military government was centrally concerned with change — change interpreted as the political maturing of the German people, an increase in their readiness to accept responsibility as individuals and as a great nation, a deepening in awareness of the nature of a free society, with its strengths and weaknesses, an improvement in the peoples' knowledge of the history of their own nation and the character of the tyrants they had supported. Reports of trends of public opinion, in these respects, went far to satisfy a deep interest among miUtary government and German officials for any information which might limit speculation and guide interpretation as to changes occurring.

Reports of the surveys of public opinion were dissemi- nated to all major divisions of military government. Wider distribution was assured through incorporation of highlights of surveys into publications of the Intelligence Branch which regularly reached all top commanders and, through the intelli- gence community, all operational arms of mihtary government.

The daily contacts of the survey staff — especially its field representatives - with German officials (mayoral, administra- tive, police, for example) built, in time, good relations with the German government which was being erected parallel to mihtary government. Particular studies of public reception of the mass media opened doors to conversations with executives in radio, newspaper and magazine offices. A continuous effort

FOREWORD /xxi

was made to tell such officials informally about aspects of public opinion which were related to their areas of responsi- bility. As regards the topic of anti-Semitism in Germany, a major effort was made to bring the findings of our studies to the attention of the broadest range of German leadership so that they could, in mutual consultation, consider the implica- tions to their own fields of interest and activity.

Analysis and interpretation of the survey findings were more easily coped with in the early days of the work than later, toward 1948. Public issues, at first, appeared sharp and well-defined, the meaning of the data seemed to be clear. The addition of analytical staff, as time passed, brought fresh views from the United States, generous and warmly humanitarian in outlook toward the German people, tolerant and indulgent toward Soviet power. Important contributions toward richer interpretations and presentation of the findings were made by Dr. Hedvig Ylvisaker, Ann Schuetz, and Henry Halpem.

But all those interpretations are now historical curiosities. They tell us, perhaps, as much about the situations of the day and about the interpreter as the facts being analyzed. But the facts reported remain as given.

The reports issued by the survey unit were made enduring by the elegance of the sample design, the dedication to wholesome interview procedures and the impeccabiUty of the card counts (thanks to Louise Hopwood's insistence). The studies merit careful consideration by historians, political scientists, sociologists, psychologists, communications special- ists and other persons who seek to understand the hopes and fears, the judgments, the expectations and the response to events which characterized German outlooks after the collapse of Hitler's Reich.

Frederick W. Williams New York, New York August, 1968

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AMG American Military Government

AMZON American Zone of Occupation

CDU Christian Democratic Union

CSU Christian SociaUst Union

DM Deutsche Mark

DP Displaced Persons

DVP Democratic People's Party

ECA European Cooperation Administration

ERP European Recovery Program

IMT International Mihtary Tribunal (Nuremberg

Trials)

JEIA Joint Export-Import Agency

KPD Communist Party of Germany

LDP Liberal Democratic Party

MG Military Government

NSDAP National SociaUst German Workers Party (Nazi

Party)

OeVP Austrian People's Party

OMGUS Office of Mihtary Government of the United

States for Germany

PG Party Member (of NSDAP)

RIAS Radio in the American Sector (Berlin)

RM Reichsmark

SED Socialist Unity Party of Germany

SPD Social Democratic Party of Germany

SPOe Socialist Party of Austria

VOA Voice of America

WAV Economic Reconstruction Party

PARTI

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Throughout the years since the end of World War II, as Germany was rising from a shattering defeat to resume its position as a leading member of the international community, American pohcy makers and scholars have closely watched developments in German public opinion. Just after the first American troops penetrated the crumbling Third Reich in 1 945 came batteries of social psychologists. These men, responsible to the United States Army, were charged with the formidable task of ascertaining the potential for resistance among the population, singling out those citizens - preferably democrati- cally oriented — most likely to be most useful in restoring municipal and other services, and in keeping the Army administrators informed about the mood and concerns of the defeated Germans.

The Army quickly saw the need for formalized procedures to gather information on public perspectives. In October 1945, less than six months after the capitulation of Hitler's Germany, the Intelligence Branch of the Office of the Director of Information Control, Office of Mihtary Government for Germany (U.S.), set up its Opinion Survey Section, under the direction of Dr. Frederick W. Williams. This agency conducted 72 major surveys during the course of the next four years, an average of one every third week. The reports based on these surveys went to the highest levels of the American occupation authorities.*

Even after West Germany regained a measure of sover- eignty in September 1949, with the promulgation of the Federal Republic, American officials retained their interest in the political perspectives of its citizens. The Opinion Survey Section within the Office of Military Government, United States (OMGUS) became the Reactions Analysis Staff, Office of Public Affairs, Office of the U.S. High Commissioner for

4 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Germany (HICOG). From 1949 until 1955 this agency, too, conducted a multitude of public opinion surveys. Meanwhile the United States government had become aware of the utihty of such surveys, not for occupied West Germany alone, but for other Western European countries as well. A small survey research section within the Department of State ultimately developed into a major arm of the United States Information Agency. More than twenty times since September 1952 the USIA has commissioned extensive surveys in at least four major Western European countries.^

THE OMGUS SURVEYS

This volume deals specifically with the surveys of West German attitudes conducted under the auspices of OMGUS. Its body comprises summaries of the reports prepared by the Opinion Survey Section. These introductory remarks, after discussing some technical aspects of the surveys, will outhne some of the main findings of interest to present-day students of public policy issues.

Questionnaires. A review of its procedures by the Infor- mation Control Division's Opinion Survey Section reported:

The questionnaire is prepared in consultation with Division or Branch heads who are most closely concerned with the problem under investigation. The studies are usually designed to produce evidence which is zone-wide in its imphcation. But special segments of the population or special areas are also studied on occasion.

The questionnaire is pre-tested. That is, the questions are tried out on small groups of Germans to determine whether they are meaningful and understandable to the wide variety of types of Germans to be studied.

A set of the questionnaires is now available through the United States National Achives and Records Service.^

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 5

Sampling. The Opinion Survey Section's initial intent was to concentrate solely upon the American Zone of Occupation in the south of Germany, that is, Bavaria, Hesse, and what was then called Wuerttemberg-Baden. By March 1946, however, it had begun surveying the opinions of West Berhners, and somewhat later expanded operations to Bremen (together with its harbor city of Bremerhaven), a city-state under American control in the north of Germany. The first eight surveys, conducted between 26 October 1945 and 13 December 1945, rested upon area samples of 39 to 45 communities, with a sample size that ranged between 331 and 466 respondents. Beginning on 27 December 1945 the Opinion Survey Section interviewed approximately 1 ,000 persons in 80 communities; in April 1946 it increased this number to about 1,500 respondents in 141 communities; and by April 1947 it was surveying roughly 3,000 persons in 241 communities (Table 1).

The earliest surveys made little attempt to stratify the sample even by Land. By April 1947, when the Section formalized its samphng procedure, it could note that ". . . com- munities under 10,000 in size are systematically selected at random from lists which order all communities in [the American Zone of] Germany according to size within the eight administrative areas. Towns over 10,000 in size are weighted out in the sample as separate items." The determination of individual respondents rested upon the selection of every nXh. name from the list of rationcard holders — which, in the earlier years at least, doubtless constituted a complete enumeration of residents of American-occupied Germany. A visiting expert, Ehno C. Wilson, commented in August 1948 that the use of such hsts offered a "samplers' paradise" unparalled in the United States. He went on to characterize the Opinion Survey Section's entire sampling procedure as being "of the highest order.'"*

Field Work. The field staff carried out the interviews in the respondents' homes or offices. For surveys in October and November 1945, American service personnel who could speak German "like natives" conducted the interviews; thereafter,

6 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

TABLE 1 . THE OMGUS SURVEYS

The dates listed below are those printed on the questionnaires, and represent the days on which the field workers began interviewing. For approximate sample sizes, see the text: an asterisk (*) denotes that the entire sample was split into two halves, with each half getting a separate questionnaire.

1. 1945 26 Oct

37. 1947 7 Jan

2.

5 Nov

38.

3 Feb

3.

12 Nov

39.

17 Feb

4.

19 Nov

40.

7 Apr*

5.

26 Nov

41.

5 May

6.

1 Dec

42.

5 Jun

7.

6 Dec

43.

Jun*

8.

13 Dec

44.

8 Jul*

9.

27 Dec

45.

4 Aug

10. 1946 14 Jan

46.

25 Aug*

11.

21 Jan

47.

15 Sep*

12.

31 Jan

48.

6 Oct

13.

7 Feb

49.

10 Nov*

14.

14 Feb

50.

2 Dec*

15.

21 Feb

51. 1948 5 Jan*

16.

1 Mar

52.

IFeb

17.

8 Mar

53.

23 Feb

18.

15 Mar

54.

29 Mar

19.

22 Mar

55.

19 Apr*

20.

29 Mar

56.

17 May*

21.

5 Apr

57.

8 Jun*

22.

15 Apr

58.

30 Jun

23.

26 Apr

59.

19 Jul

24.

8 May

60.

2 Aug*

25.

7Jun

61.

23 Aug*

26.

21 Jun

62.

17 Sep*

27.

1 Jul

63.

12 Oct

28.

25 Jul

64.

1 1 Nov*

29.

9 Aug*

65.

2 Dec*

30.

Sep

66. 1949 8 Jan*

31.

4 Oct*

67.

3 Feb*

32.

3 Sep*

68.

1 Mar

33.

14 Oct

69.

15 Apr

34.

28 Oct*

70.

8 Jul*

35.

25 Nov*

71.

1 Aug

36.

10 Dec

72.

12 Sep*

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 7

Germans trained by the Opinion Survey Section carried out the field work. In all cases the interviewers informed respondents of OMGUS sponsorship of the surveys and assured them that their anonymity would be preserved.

Given the fact that Germany was an occupied country, and that the agent of the armed occupier was conducting these surveys, one might legitimately ask what influence this fact had upon the type of responses given by those polled. In November 1948 the Opinion Survey Section designed a survey specifically to determine how much bias OMGUS sponsorship introduced into the findings. Two sets of interviewers, one representing the "MiUtary Government" and the other a "German public opinion institute," asked separate samples in West Berlin a variety of questions focusing upon political attitudes, partic- ularly issues of occupation policy. In summarizing the results of this survey, Leo P. Crespi, at that time chief of the Opinion Survey Section, wrote:

Without in any way denying the importance of the sponsorship problems that were uncovered in some areas of questioning, it would not be unreasonable to hold that the major import of the present experiment is not so much the presence of sponsorship differences on MG [Military Government] questions but their relative absence. With only a third of the questions exhibiting differences at the 95 per cent level [of significance] and only 14 per cent at the 99 per cent level; with a maximum difference of 17.1 per cent and a non-significant average difference of 6.6 per cent on questions in large part selected to show up sponsorship differences if they exist, the conclusion seems fair that on the score of sponsorship MG polling is an entirely workable method of inquiry in occupied Ger- many. . . .^

The areas of greatest difference seemed to be questions bearing upon American prestige and, to a lesser extent, questions about militarism and National Socialism. In these areas, Crespi continued:

It is on the side of caution not to take the obtained per- centages entirely at face value. Perhaps a feasible suggestion

8 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

is to apply in such instances a 10 per cent safety factor— the nearest round figure to the 11.1 per cent average sponsorship difference found on questions passing the 95 per cent level. . . .^

But to this must be added the fact that sponsorship differences do not necessarily mean that the OMGUS-sponsored surveys were less valid than those conducted by the "independent" German agency. Respondents may simply have given different versions of the "truth" to interviewers from different agencies, with neither version necessarily being a more accurate reflection of the respondents' "true" perspectives than the other. ^ Those who would use the OMGUS surveys, however, must bear in mind the possibihty of bias.

Analysis. The staff of the Opinion Survey Section transferred the information from the questionnaires to punch- cards, produced sometimes elaborate cross-tabulations of the data as well as longitudinal comparisons, and wrote reports for distribution to other OMGUS agencies. Unfortunately, the punchcards for these surveys have disappeared. All that remains is the set of 194 reports based upon these data. The reports, ranging in length from two to 7 1 pages, analyze specific aspects of the data. They frequently contain tables of data broken down by demographic characteristics, or cross-tabulated accord- ing to expressed opinions on related subjects. Taken together, these reports (despite the absence of punchcard data) comprise a veritable wealth of information which social scientists have not yet begun to mine thoroughly.

The purpose of this volume is to make this material more widely available to the scholarly and pohcy-making community. Its bulk is comprised of short summaries of each of the 194 separate reports, together with an index. Where possible we have taken these summaries directly from the reports themselves. Similarly, information on sample sizes and interviewing dates stems from the individual reports. The complete set of reports, in microfilmed or xeroxed form, can be obtained from the United States National Archives and Records Service.^ The

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 9

remainder of this introductory survey will suggest some uses to which social scientists could put the information contained in the OMGUS reports of public opinion in occupied Germany, as well as some findings that emerge from the reports.

IMMEDIATE OCCUPATION POLICIES

The OMGUS surveys were oriented toward policy problems facing the American occupation authorities. Particularly at the outset of the occupation years this meant short-range policy — that seeking to deal with the day-to-day issues arising in this massive effort to control an alien population. Cardinal among these issues were the attitudes of Germans toward the occupation itself, the effectiveness of the American information policies, and a host of specific problems such as food rationing, refugees and expellees, currency control and reform, the division of Germany, and the city of Berlin.

Attitudes toward the American Occupation

Doubtless few nations relish the prospect of falling under the control of a foreign country. The remarkable thing is that Germans in the American Zone of Occupation (AMZON) and West Berhn did not regard the occupation of the late 1 940s as a national humiliation for Germany: For every person who considered it as such (an average of 30 per cent of the population), more than two (62%) did not view it as a national humiliation (#22).^ Moreover, there was a general feeling among AMZON Germans that they received better treatment, particularly with respect to food rations, than did their compatriots in other zones of occupation (#64); and they had more confidence that the Americans would treat Germans fairly than would the other occupying powers (#76).*°

Attitudes toward the American occupation forces were ambivalent. On the one hand, few Germans came into direct

10 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

contact with soldiers. A survey in September 1 946 revealed that only 28 per cent of Mannheim's citizens had struck up some relationship with white soldiers, 16 per cent with black soldiers (#24). For the American Zone as a whole, only one in seven had come to know an American soldier well or rather well, although as many as one in five had had an opportunity since the beginning of the occupation to talk with an American (#27). A year later almost twice as many AMZON Germans (27%) could claim that they had become acquainted with an American since the end of the war (#94) - a figure that rose to 32 per cent by December 1949 (#11/6).

On the other hand, the lack of direct contact did not prevent Germans from forming images of these American troops. These images were by and large positive. There seems to have been little basic hostiUty toward the soldiers: Almost three-quarters (74%), for instance, would not have expressed opposition to German girls from their circle of acquaintances or family who dated Americans (#94). And surveys taken at various times revealed the overwhelming German belief that both the behavior and the popularity of the American troops were improving rather than worsening as the occupation months progressed (#94, 110, and II/6). Minorities felt in November 1947 (#94) that the Americans enriched themselves through barter (30%), had heard that the troops wasted or destroyed food (36%), knew of cases where American negligence had destroyed German property (21%), or had had unpleasant or irritating experiences with Americans (13%). But to this must be added the fact that, among respondents who claimed to know Americans, the share reporting such negative images averaged 13 percentage points greater than among those who knew no Americans. Negro troops, although seen as friendher than white soldiers, seemed to arouse somewhat greater anxieties among Mannheim residents (#24): Most of these respondents described the behavior of black soldiers either as decent (37%) or as decent with some exceptions (33%), as opposed to a small minority (17%) characterizing their behavior as not decent; but as many as 29 per cent reported their fear of

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 1 1

black soldiers (a self-description that the interviewers' estimates, based upon the tenor of the respondents' comments, more than confirmed).

Germans in the American Zone were not sanguine about the prospects for an early end to the occupation. In April 1946, of those willing to estimate how long the occupation would last (62 per cent of the entire sample), two-thirds suggested at least a decade or "many years." Only one in nine of those willing to make an estimate thought that the occupation would end within the next three years (#22). The same question was asked a half year later of 188 community leaders in areas under American control. Three-quarters of this sample felt that the occupation would last for at least another ten years, and a quarter even thought it might last until 1966 or longer. A large majority (76%) backed up their best guesses about the duration of the American occupation with the assertion that the Americans "should" stay that long (#44). Incidentally, of those wilhng to estimate how long Germany would have to continue paying reparations (67 per cent of the entire sample), less than one in seven thought it would be under 20 years (#59).

More problematic was the German view on reconstruction. In early 1946 residents of the American Zone were optimistic despite their recognition that the road to full recovery was long. Only a seventh (14%) expected reconstruction within a decade; four times as many (57%) thought that it would take two or more decades; and a fifth (20%) anticipated that it might require at least 50 years (#22). About as many (41%) were satisfied that recovery was proceeding more quickly than expected as the number seeing it proceeding more slowly than expected (40%). Over half (56%) were nonetheless optimistic that reconstruction could be accomplished with some degree of speed and energy (with 35 per cent expressing pessimism).

American Zone Germans expected and felt that they were getting more assistance in reconstruction from the United States than from joint Allied efforts (#22, 76, 100). Satisfaction with the American contribution declined, however, from November 1945, when as many as 70 per cent of AMZON respondents

12 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

expressed the view that the United States had furthered rather than hindered the reconstruction, to September 1946, when this percentage stood at 44 per cent; after remaining at this level until the following August, it rose again to 55 per cent in January 1948 and 63 per cent in August of that year (#60, 85, 175).

The Marshall Plan evidently played a large role in increasing German confidence in the United States. In August 1949 as many as 69 per cent of the AMZON Germans were aware of this aid program, and all but a handful of these knew that Germany was to benefit through it (#190). Asked what underlay the Marshall Plan, the bulk of the respondents saw America's self-interest: Almost two-thirds (63%) felt that America wished to prevent Western Europe from becoming communist, and almost half (48%) thought that America wanted to win friends in Western Europe so that it would have allies in the event of a war with the Soviet Union. Purely altruistic motives found third place in this ranking, with 45 per cent stating that America was earnestly anxious to help homeless and starving people. A few saw sinister motives — a desire to use the Marshall Plan to dump surplus goods (18%), to achieve dominance over Western Europe (7%), or to penetrate the European market (6%).

On all these points — attitudes toward American soldiers, the American contribution to German reconstruction, views of the Marshall Plan — West Berliners were consistently more ready to express an opinion and more likely to take a pro-American position. This trend was in evidence even before the crises that led up to the Berlin blockade of 1948-1949. During and after the blockade, however, West Berliners were even more predis- posed to look upon the Americans as their friends in an otherwise hostile environment.

American Information Policies

The occupation authorities were quite naturally interested in the effectiveness of their information program. This program

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 13

included the licensing and publication of newspapers and magazines, radio programs, pamphlets, special programs, and the facihties of the so-called Amerika-Haeuser, or United States information centers.

Although newspaper readership was high in all segments of the German population under American control, with roughly 70 per cent consistently reporting themselves as regular readers (#175), it was nonetheless higher among the more educated, men rather than women, and city dwellers, particularly West Berliners. The American-sponsored newspaper, Neue Zeitung, found its greatest readership in West BerUn, where 20 per cent of the sample reported reading it regularly, in contrast to ten per cent in the American Zone. Of present and past readers, 63 per cent said that they liked the paper; 22 per cent felt that it was one-sided (#154). More generally, AMZON Germans felt that the licensed press contained fair and trustworthy news, particularly when compared with newspapers published during the war (e.g. #58).

Other written media reached smaller audiences. Less than a quarter of the respondents in the American Zone, and 42 per cent of those in West Berlin, reported that they regularly read magazines (#53, 108). Together, the American-sponsored //ewr^, Neue Auslese, and Amerikanische Rundschau accounted for about half of the magazine readership (#43). In February 1946 as many as 55 per cent of the respondents in the American Zone reported that they did not read books at all, but by October 1948, 50 per cent (64 per cent in West Berlin) said that they did (#13, 153). Generally, Germans claimed to prefer novels, fiction, and short stories to other types of books; specifically, they hsted the Bible (71%), the Prayer Book (27%), and the works of Goethe as their favorites. Occasionally the American Military Government published information pam- phlets on political issues for sale to the general public. Studies among those who had received these pamphlets as gifts revealed that the readership ranged between 35 and 75 per cent, although it was higher among men, upper socioeconomic groups, and the better educated (#89, 97, 103, 112, 129). In most cases only minorities claimed to have learned something

14 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

new from these pamphlets. Majorities nonetheless felt that they presented a fair rather than one-sided picture of the facts.

Slightly more than half of the American Zone Germans described themselves as regular radio listeners (#175). Most preferred the radio station located in their own Land (or state), particularly in West Berhn where RIAS (Radio in the American Sector) had to compete with programs beamed from the Soviet Zone of Occupation (#45). The most popular type of program in both AMZON (72%) and West Berhn (85%) was musical. Regarding political controls, substantial majorities in both the American Zone (64%) and West Berlin (72%) felt that the AUies had censored the programs; but in contrast to West Berlin, where 58 per cent thought that the programs contained too much propaganda, in the American Zone 66 per cent did not think that this was the case (#45). The share of the AMZON public listening to the "Voice of America" varied, from 63 per cent in January 1946 to 75 per cent in October of that year and 41 per cent in May 1949 (#1, 45, 176).*^ Again, those most likely to listen to VOA programs were men, upper socio- economic groups, the better educated, and Protestants. Al- though the bulk of VOA listeners (56%) considered the programming good, criticism focused on its propagandistic tendencies and its dullness (#176). More generally, however, Germans tended to rely upon the radio rather than the newspapers as their chief source of news: In January 1946, almost two-thirds (65%) thought the radio more truthful than newspapers (#1); but by the spring of 1947 only 24 per cent were more inchned to rely upon the radio, with eight per cent preferring the press and another 37 per cent finding them equal in their trustworthiness (#68).

The movie audience was not large, fluctuating around a quarter of the population (#20, 116, 171). Love themes were most popular. Allied policies sharply restricting the number of pre- 1945 films that theaters could show, and the absence of extensive German production companies in the immediate postwar period, meant that foreign films, and particularly those made in the United States, dominated the

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 15

market. Germans nonetheless indicated that they would have preferred German films, in large part simply because they corresponded more closely to traditional German culture.

An important aspect of the United States information policy was the establishment of information centers. Almost every major city had its own Amerika-Haus, where its citizens could read books and see films about the United States, hear lectures relevant to American foreign policy interests, and participate in other activities. It is remarkable that, although a majority of the people knew of these information centers and about four in ten knew what they offered, only four per cent had ever been in one. And most of these were the better educated, especially community and opinion leaders (#145).

A study conducted in early 1948 on the cumulative impact of all mass media revealed that 12 per cent of the AMZON population seemed to have no source of information whatever, and another 1 7 per cent had no regular source of information (#192). The more sources of information a person had, it turned out, the more hkely that he had a favorable attitude toward the United States and its government and economics. Similarly, the more information the respondent had about the Soviet Union, the more likely it was that his attitude toward American capitalism was favorable.

Specific Issues of the Occupation

The number of specific issues on which the occupation authorities wanted to know German attitudes was too great for each of them to be discussed here. A few, however, deserve special attention: rationing, expellees, currency problems, the division of Germany, the question of Berlin, and more specifically, the Berhn blockade.

Food Rationing. Questions about food rationing pro- duced mixed reactions among AMZON Germans. On the one hand, they definitely felt that they were suffering from the

16 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Fig. 1 . Major Cares and Worries of A MZON Germans

Question: "What are your greatest cares and worries at the present time?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 3.

shortages, particularly in the earlier part of the occupation (see Figure 1). Even before a cut in rations, which took place in April 1946, three in five respondents (61%) stated that they were not getting enough food to be able to work efficiently; by late April this proportion had reached 72 per cent, and it remained at 71 per cent in the following month (#15, 18). Only one in eight (12%) was satisfied with his food allotment, and another two in eight (24%) considered it adequate. Even as late as January 1 949, four in ten continued to feel that they were getting insufficient food to permit efficient work (#175).*^

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 17

On the other hand, rationing evidently did not pose an overwhelming hardship for most Germans in the American Zone. For one thing, the rationcard system seemed to be equitable (although the number seeing it carried out unjustly rose from three per cent in November 1945 to slightly under a third in January 1948 before dropping off to about a fifth in February 1949). For another, eight out of ten AMZON Germans were able to supplement their rations by canning foods from their gardens, obtaining food from friends or relatives who lived on farms, or securing special supplements

18 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

because of the nature of their work (#18). Third, and what may have been most important, they saw themselves in a good position compared to that of the residents of other zones. In May 1946, two-fifths (41%) beheved that food rations were largest in the American Zone, with 29 per cent citing British Zone residents as the best fed. Less than a half of one per cent felt that rations were smallest in the American Zone, with 22 per cent naming the Soviet Zone and 18 per cent the French Zone (#18).

An interesting shift occurred in the perceived causes of food shortages. Asked in May 1946 why rations had been reduced, the responses given most frequently stressed either food shortages in Germany and/or the world (41%) or else insufficient stocks and poor crops (27%). In third place (15%) stood perceptions that available supplies had to feed others in Germany, that the country was overcrowded, or that too many occupation forces were in the country (#18). General causes, however, soon became specific. In November 1946 and July 1947, the reason given most frequently for food shortages (46 and 44 per cent, respectively) was overpopulation due to displaced persons, evacuees, and so forth (#70). Other causes listed included the loss of the war or wartime destruction (22 and 10 per cent, respectively), the loss of the eastern territories (20 and 22 per cent), an imbalance between imports and exports (19 and 17 per cent), and the black market (8 and 26 per cent).

Refugees and Expellees. The data on underlying causes of food shortages are indicative of growing hostihty in postwar Germany toward refugees and expellees. The October 1946 census revealed that no less than 16.2 per cent of the entire AMZON population comprised refugees from the Soviet Zone of Occupation, expellees from Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and elsewhere in Eastern Europe, and other displaced persons. By the end of the occupation period their numbers amounted to one-fifth of the total population in the American Zone. In most of their characteristics and political attitudes the evacuees did

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 19

not differ greatly from the natives. Exceptions were that the evacuees were more likely to be CathoUc, adherents of the Social Democratic Party, and from unskilled occupational groups (#84, 162). Integrating these masses of refugees and expellees proved to be one of the most serious problems that the Western Allies, and later the Federal Republic, had to face.

The native inhabitants of the American Zone resented the circumstances that had led to the influx of the refugees and expellees. In March 1946, before food shortages seriously hit the AMZON Germans, as many as 14 per cent of them saw some justification in the expulsions; thereafter, only about three per cent did so, as well over 90 per cent felt them to be unjust (#14A, 175). Asked who was responsible for the expulsions, over half (51%) attributed them to the Allies, to a desire for revenge against the Germans, to antipathy in Eastern Europe toward Germans. About three in ten (29%) blamed the defunct Nazi government or Hitler himself, one per cent said that the Germans themselves were responsible, and a quarter would not or could not assign responsibility (#14A). But the question of responsibihty raised the further question of who should care for the expellees. In March 1946, about two-thirds of the AMZON respondents (63%) felt that Germans should perform this task, almost half (48%) that it should be up to the Allies or the countries which expelled them (#14A). By November of that year respondents were inclined to place the main burden on the state expelling them (46%), rather than either the Germans (28%), or the Allies (14%), although it must be added that West Berliners were considerably more willing to place the burden on Germans (#47). Somewhat less than a year later, in September 1947, almost half of those asked (48%) thought that Germany should provide for the expellees; a quarter continued to feel that the native countries of the expellees should bear the costs, and 13 per cent continued to name the Alhes (#81).

These native inhabitants were not much less resentful toward the expellees themselves. Throughout the occupation period, whereas about half expected the expellees to be able to

20 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

get along with the native population, a solid third expected trouble (#14A, 28, 47, 175). In November 1946, at the height of the food crisis, as many as 46 per cent foresaw trouble, in contrast to a more optimistic 47 per cent. In March 1946, substantial majorities despaired of finding solutions to food (71%) and housing (64%) problems. More than a third (35%) thought the matter of jobs insoluble. In November of that year, 78 per cent of a sample in Wuerttemberg-Baden expressed their conviction that the expellees constituted an economic burden for the American Zone.^^

It was a burden that the native residents were nonetheless willing to accept, if sometimes begrudgingly. Large majorities agreed in March 1946 that the expellees should have both economic equality (81%) and full political rights (74%). In November of the same year five in six Wuerttemberg-Badeners (83%) wanted to permit the expellees to participate fully in politics. The share of native residents seeing the expellees as German citizens rose from 49 per cent in early 1946 to 67 per cent in late 1947, during which period those viewing them as foreigners dropped from 28 to 18 per cent. Even so, throughout the entire occupation years roughly 90 per cent expected that the expellees would return to their homelands if they were permitted to do so.

The perceptions of the expellees themselves differed sharply in important respects. To be sure, most expressed a desire to return to their homelands, but the percentage expressing this desire declined steadily, and it was persistently lower than the percentage of native inhabitants expecting the expellees to return to their homelands if given a chance.^* Moreover, almost three in four (73%) viewed themselves in September 1947 as German citizens. By June 1947 almost two-thirds (64%) were expressing the expectation that they would not get along with the native Germans. The share of those expressing actual dissatisfaction with their treatment by local populations rose from seven per cent in March 1946 to 50 per cent in June 1948. And majorities persistently felt that the Land governments were not doing all within their power to assist the expellees. To all this, however, must be added the fact

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 21

that, after the severe food and economic crises were over, the level of latent hostility among the expellees dechned.

The Currency Reform. The key to ending the economic crises that contributed so much to such problems as mounting tensions between the expellees and the native residents was the currency reform, carried through in June 1948. In their earhest surveys the American occupation authorities focused on popu- lar perceptions of inflationary trends, the standing of the Reichsmark, rent and price controls, rationing, the black market, and still other problems emanating in part from the Allied inabiUty to cooperate fully on currency reform.

The first two years of the occupation saw increasing desperation among AMZON Germans. In January 1946, 67 per cent of the respondents reported that their incomes were adequate; two years later only 57 per cent felt this way (#100). Between January and June 1946 half the population believed that anti-inflationary measures would not succeed (#60). Confidence in the Reichsmark fell to the point where, in June 1947, about as many persons felt that it would maintain its then-current value as thought it would not (#100). We noted earlier a declining belief in the fairness of the rationcard system, accompanying increasing worries about the adequacy of food rations. Meanwhile, there was a growing recognition of the importance of the black market in German economic life. Although in February 1946 over half (51%) denied the existence of a black market in their community, two years later 71 percent knew of one (see Figure 2). A more general mood of pessimism underscored all these trends: Whereas in December 1945 nearly eight in ten thought that economic conditions would improve, by April 1947 only 45 per cent thought so (#100).

There was a measure of confusion about the sources and solutions of their economic woes. Asked why ten times as much currency was in circulation in July 1946 as before the war, most attributed it either to black market dealers (66%) or Nazis and war profiteers (33%), and 17 per cent were unable to suggest a reason. And yet pluraUties of 40 per cent in the

22 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Fig. 2. Government Efforts to Overcome the Black Market

Question: "In your opinion, are the government off icials doing everything

to overcome the black market?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 37.

American Zone and 52 per cent in West Berlin opposed a currency reform at that time (with 36 and 40 per cent respectively, favoring it). Presented with alternative schedules for carrying out such a reform, however, a plurality in the American Zone (44%) favored an immediate adjustment rather than delaying it until economic conditions should improve (12%) or until a new government should be formed (16%). In the meantime, most of those with opinions preferred to keep their reserves in goods rather than cash or bank accounts (#32). Once instituted, the currency reform received hearty approval (#133). Nine in ten termed it necessary, and over half (53%) thought that it should have taken place earher. It tended to create an optimistic mood: Over half (54%) expected the new currency to retain its value, 58 per cent believed that they would get along better during the coming year because of the currency reform, seven in ten intended to make additional

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 23

purchases, and most expected the reform either to Hmit (71%) or overcome (14%) the black market. There was nonetheless some dissatisfaction. It focused particularly upon the ten to one conversion ratio which, according to more than a third (35%) of the AMZON Germans, treated the small savers more harshly than the rich. And 77 per cent expected — correctly, as it turned out — that the currency reform would lead to greater unemployment (see Figure 1).

The actual effect of the currency reform was a bag of blessings mixed with curses. On the one hand, after some temporary dislocations, it permitted the three western zones of Germany and the three western sectors of Berlin to get their economies moving again. That these West Germans could, before another decade was over, establish themselves as the economically strongest state in Europe is in no small measure an indication of the success of the currency reform and similar decisions made during the occupation. But, on the other hand, for Germans throughout the occupied territories it was a symbolic step that sealed the division of Germany into East and West.

The Division of Germany. The occupation years witnessed growing uneasiness about the prospect for ending the "temporary" division of Germany. Germans in territories under American control saw clearly a split emerging along east-west lines, due in large part to the inabihty of the victorious wartime Allies to agree upon the course of Germany's future. The percentage seeing the AUies as having furthered the reconstruc- tion of Germany increased from a quarter in September 1 946 to a half in January 1948, with the share of more optimistic responses declining from four to three in nine (#100). By January 1948 some 85 per cent of the respondents thought that the Four Powers were not cooperating successfully in the recon- struction (see Figure 3). Four in five did not think that a unified Germany would survive the end of the occupation (#175).

The failure of successive conferences of foreign ministers in 1947 enhanced this pessimistic mood. AMZON Germans thought that the Soviet Union had torpedoed the Moscow

24 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

5

25

5

JUN

AUG

JAN

1947

1948

Fig. 3. The Prospects for a United Germany

Question: "Do you believe the Allies will cooperate successfully to leave behind a united Germany at the end of the occupation?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 58.

Conference (10 March-24 April). A substantial plurality (49%) did not expect the Allies to conclude a peace treaty by the summer of 1948 (#62, 63). To be sure, Berliners in the American-controlled borough of Neukoelln hoped that the London Conference (25 November- 16 December) would pro- duce such a peace treaty, but only 14 per cent dared to beheve that it would (#75). A spot survey after the breakdown of this conference revealed an overwhelming sentiment among West Berliners that the Soviets were to blame (#86). One in three (32%) felt that it meant the final division of Germany, another 26 per cent expected a continuation of the status quo, and as many as one in seven (15%) said simply that conditions would deteriorate or that war would ensue.

By the spring of 1948 Germans were prepared to accept a government for the three western zones of occupation. Ameri-

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 25

can, British, and French representatives, together with their colleagues from Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg, met in London during the first half of 1948 to lay the groundwork for such a government. Of the relatively few respondents who later claimed to know anything about the London proposals, the bulk favored them (#131). And, when apprised of these proposals, 78 per cent of all respondents in the American Zone (89 per cent in West Berhn, 93 per cent in Bremen) reacted positively. Support dropped to 72 per cent, however, when the interviewers pointed out the possibility that only representatives from the western zones would be able to help set up the government. A subsequent survey in August 1 948 found 70 per cent favoring the creation of a provisional government for western Germany, with only one in eight (12%) opposed to the idea (#136).

In agreeing to a West German government, the respondents were evidently well aware that it meant a continued, and perhaps permanent, division of their country. The comment made most frequently by informed respondents (26%), when asked about the disadvantages of the London proposals, was "the division of Germany" but, it must be added, more either expressed no opinion (35%) or saw no disadvantages (8%). Told that, according to the London proposals, the French Zone would be added to the bizonal (American-British) economic arrangements, 72 per cent of the entire sample saw it as a step toward unification, six per cent as a step backward (#131). A more exphcit question in August 1948 seemed to clarify this apparent ambiguity: Almost half (47%) of the respondents in the American Zone thought that the establishment of a provisional government for western Germany would widen the East-West split, with only two-thirds as many (33%) feehng that it would make no difference (#136).

The reasons for favoring a West German government were diverse. Asked what advantages the London proposals meant for western Germany, 36 per cent of the respondents who knew what these proposals were pointed to better living conditions and another 14 per cent mentioned that they were a step toward independence. Five times more respondents either saw

26 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

no advantages ( 1 8%) or had no opinion (24%) than the number (8%) mentioning that the proposals would constitute a bar to communism (#131). And yet, as subsequent questions and surveys revealed, a fear of communism was very prevalent. ^^ In July 1948, 95 per cent of all AMZON respondents expressed a preference for a democratic government in western Germany alone and only one per cent for a communist central govern- ment for all of Germany. More generally, Germans were becom- ing increasingly outspoken in asserting their dislike of the Soviet Union and distrust of its intentions (e.g. #185). Throughout the period from January 1947 to February 1949 approximately half agreed with the proposition that "The Americans should reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order to avoid her becoming a prey to Communism" (#175).

We shall return later to the question of German attitudes toward communism and the Soviet Union. The point to be stressed here is that these negative views helped induce Germans in the western zones of occupation to accept a specific policy. This policy sought to strengthen the abiUty of these areas to resist pressure from the East, at the cost of steps aimed at restoring German unity. And perhaps in no place in that portion of Germany under Western controls and at no time was this hostihty to the East more prevalent than in West Berlin during the blockade months from June 1948 to May 1949.

Berlin and the Blockade. The breakdown of interallied cooperation, the currency crisis, and the competition to create a Germany that would be an ally in the raging Cold War all met in June 1948 on the banks of the Spree River in BerHn. Using the Western currency reform as its justification, on the 24th of that month the Soviet Union closed the roads and canals leading to the western sectors of the city. The West's response was quick to come. American officials agreed that it would be technically feasible, however difficult, to airUft sufficient supplies to the two and a quarter miUion West Berliners. But the effectiveness of this tactic in countering the blockade would rest upon the morale of the city's leadership and its people. Ernst Reuter and

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 27

other leaders gave their assurances immediately. But what about the mass of West Berliners?

Spot surveys, bolstered by more substantial investigations later, revealed that Berhners in the western sectors stood soUdly behind the West and the Allied air lift. Four weeks after the imposition of the blockade 98 per cent of a Berlin sample expressed the view that the West was pursuing the correct policy (#130). From the very outset and throughout the blockade about nine in ten were confident that the Americans would stay in Berlin as long as they remained in Germany. This is not to say that they were without worries. Although three in four (77%) felt that the Western Powers were doing their utmost to relieve distressed conditions in Berlin (see Figure 4) and five in six (84%) thought that the air lift could provide them with sufficient food, more than half (52%) doubted that the air Uft could carry them through the winter months.

Confidence grew as the air lift proved increasingly success- ful. By September 85 per cent — and by October 89 per cent — expected the air hft to provision them adequately during the winter months (#141, 150). Meanwhile, however bad their circumstances were, 88 per cent of the West Berhners preferred them to uniting their city under the communists (4%). And the percentage of those reporting that, if given an opportunity, they would leave Berlin dropped from 43 per cent in July to 30 per cent in October. Respondents in the American Zone were somewhat less sanguine about the Berhn situation. Only seven in ten were convinced that the Americans would remain in Berhn, nine in ten thought the Western position to be the correct one, and only somewhat over half (56%) thought that the air Hft was providing sufficient food to maintain rations at their preblockade levels (#144, 175).

Ultimately, of course, the air hft exceeded all earlier hopes. The Soviet hfting of the blockade in May 1949 was widely seen as a triumph both for the American policy of hardness and the West Berhners' firmness. It is this perception that West Berhners celebrate down to the present day in their loyalty to the West in general and the United States in

28 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Fig. 4a. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: AMZON Views

particular. ^^ But the blockade also left a divided Berlin in its wake - a divided Berlin that symbolized the division of Germany as a whole. What is more, the Federal RepubUc that emerged in West Germany no longer had Berlin as the focal point of its attention. If 58 per cent of the residents of the American Zone agreed in August 1947 that Berlin should be Germany's capital, it remains a fact that the founding fathers of the Federal Republic located their capital in Bonn, a choice in which two out of three AMZON Germans with opinions concurred (#71, 180). Berlin itself became a symbol - a symbol of the united Germany that used to be, a symbol of the united Germany that many hope for in the future.

In their concern with these and a plethora of other issues stemming both from the need to make immediate policy decisions and from changes in the environment of interaUied cooperation, the researchers of the Opinion Survey Section did not lose sight of the long-range issues that had brought them,

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 29

Fig. 4b. The Allies' Efforts to Aid Blockaded Berlin: Berlin Views

Question: "In your opinion are the Western Powers doing all they possibly can to relieve the needs of Berlin or could they do more?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 52.

and indeed the entire structure of the military occupation, to Germany in the first place.

DEMOCRATIZING POSTWAR GERMANY

Among the purposes announced by Churchill, Roosevelt, and Stalin when they were formulating plans for the postwar occupation of Germany, the democratization of the country was particularly important. This policy implied several things. Most immediately, of course, it meant the punishment of those guilty of the Nazi excesses, the removal of Nazi sympathizers from important posts in governmental or private life, the effective disarmament of the country, and, more generally, the elimination of symbols of the Nazi past. More problematic was a second task — democratizing Germany's political culture.

30 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Removing the leaders and reminders of the past was one thing, but revising the predispositions, perceptions, and values of an entire population was quite another. For the Opinion Survey Section it meant, on the one hand, an assessment of the state of German pohtical culture and, on the other, a continual evaluation of the effectiveness of Alhed programs aimed at changing this culture.

Nazism and Denazification

Many Americans, no less than Europeans, harbored deep resentments toward their wartime enemy, Germany. What explained the fact, many asked themselves, that Germany had initiated major wars of expansion three times within the past century? Was it something inherent in German national charac- ter? A common assumption was that in the breast of every German beat the heart of a Nazi. It was this assumption on which rested some of the early wartime policies for the postwar occupation — the Morgenthau-White plan, which called for a demilitarized, dismembered, and pastoralized Germany, and even Joint Chiefs of Staff Paper 1067 (JCS 1067), which set down guidelines for the American Military Government to follow. And one even sees it in the initial questions and reports emanating from the offices of the OMGUS Opinion Survey Section. But how true was it? To what extent were Germans bUnd adherents of National Socialism?

Attitudes toward National Socialism. It is not entirely clear how thoroughly mobilized in their support of Adolf Hitler the German population was. Few (7%) claimed to have read his Mein Kampf in its entirety, although another 16 per cent remembered reading part of it (#2; cf. #92). Only one in eight (12%) recalled trusting Hitler as a leader up to the end of the war; over half claimed either never to have trusted him (35%) or to have lost their faith in him by the time war had broken out in 1939 (16%). Asked whether they would like to have seen

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 31

Hitler before the International Military Tribunal at Nuremberg, interestingly enough, 72 per cent of AMZON Germans re- sponded positively in October 1946, and only 12 per cent felt it better that he had spared himself this ignominy.*''

Attitude toward Hitler notwithstanding, large numbers of postwar Germans in the areas under American control con- tinued to express perceptions characteristic of National Socialist ideology (#19). To cite some examples, nine per cent agreed that "a civihan is an unworthy (lower) person compared to a member of the army"; ten per cent that "in all probability foreign nations and races are enemies; therefore, one should be prepared at all times to attack them first," and that "if a pure German marries a non-Aryan wife he should be condemned"; 1 2 per cent that "the horrors committed by the Germans are an invention of the propaganda of our enemies"; 15 per cent that "the Communists and the Social Democrats should be sup- pressed"; 18 per cent that "only a government with a dictator is able to create a strong nation," and that "this war was caused by a conspiracy between the International Bankers and the Communists"; 19 per cent that "the German people were the victims of a conspiracy by other nations"; 20 per cent that "it would have been much better for the Allies to have had a war with Russia instead of with Germany"; 29 per cent that "the publication of no book that criticizes a government or recommends any changes in government should be permitted"; 30 per cent that "Negroes are members of an unworthy (lower) race"; 33 per cent that "Jews should not have the same rights as those belonging to the Aryan race"; 37 per cent denied that "extermination of the Jews and Poles and other non-Aryans was not necessary for the security of Germans"; and 52 per cent agreed that "territories such as Danzig, Sudetenland, and Austria should be part of Germany proper." Two caveats are important in interpreting these findings. First, we must wonder whether these response patterns are typically German or whether, to the contrary, Americans, Frenchmen, and citizens of other industrialized countries might not agree to similar propositions. Second, these data say nothing about the extent

32 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

to which such perceptions antedated the emergence of Nazism in Germany.

The Opinion Survey Section made an interesting attempt to test the latter point. Using the split-sample technique, it sought to find out what differences would emerge on perspec- tives according to whether assertions were explicitly identified as stemming from Hitler. Thus half of a sample responded to the question, "Before the war it was often said that parts of Europe with considerable German minorities (e.g. Sudetenland) should be legally reincorporated in Germany; did you agree to that or not?" and the other half got the question, "Before the war Hitler often said that parts of Europe with considerable German minorities (e.g. Sudetenland) should be legally rein- corporated in Germany; did you agree to that or not?" In response to the questions, 36 per cent of the first sample reported having agreed, as did 39 per cent of the second sample. A similar pair of questions dealt with the prewar sentiment that "international Jewry alone would profit from the war." In this case 14 per cent agreed with the generalized proposition and 1 1 per cent were willing to identify themselves with Hitler in accepting it. A third pair of questions asked about the putative superiority of the "Nordic race," with results similar to the second. In short, there were no statistically significant dif- ferences in the responses to differently-worded questions. This in turn suggests that Hitler may merely have tapped a set of underlying perspectives while, to be sure, reinforcing them at the same time through his propaganda.

Further indications of this are to be found in the postwar population's unwilhngness to reject Nazism completely. In eleven surveys between November 1945 and December 1946, an average of 47 per cent expressed their feehng that National Socialism was a good idea badly carried out; by August 1947 this figure had risen to 55 per cent remaining fairly constant throughout the remainder of the occupation (#60, 68, 175). Meanwhile, the share of respondents thinking it a bad idea dropped from 41 to about 30 per cent (see Figure 5).^^ A breakdown of the August 1947 survey revealed that the respondents most likely to describe National Socialism as a

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 33

Fig. 5. Views on National Socialism

Question: "Was National Socialism a bad idea, or a good idea badly carried out?' Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9.

good idea badly carried out were those with nine to twelve years of schooUng (64%), people under the age of 30 (68%), Protestants (64%), former NSDAP members (67%), West Ber- liners (62%), and Hessians (61%). They also tended to be more critical than others of the postwar news media, to be more likely to find fault with democracy, and to prefer a government offering security rather than one stressing liberty. Moreover, asked to choose between National Socialism and Communism, the number opting for the former increased from 19 per cent in November 1945 to well over twice that figure in February 1949, with the number preferring the latter alternative declining from 35 to 3 per cent (#60, 175).

The Nuremberg War Crimes Trials. The relatively cool attitude that postwar Germans displayed toward Hitler carried over to other leaders of the Nazi state. This view came out clearly in their reactions to the trial of the major war criminals before the International Military Tribunal in Nuremberg. Originally, the IMT brought an indictment against 24 top Nazi leaders, three of whom ultimately did not stand trial. After sessions lasting from November 1945 to October 1946, the Tribunal handed down 1 1 death sentences (plus another death sentence for Martin Bormann, tried in absentia), seven prison

34 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

sentences ranging from ten years to life, and three acquittals. The Tribunal also declared the leadership corps of the Nazi Party, the Gestapo and the State Security Service, and the SS to be "criminal organizations."

Generally speaking, popular interest in the trial was high. In January 1946, 78 per cent of German respondents in the American Zone of Occupation indicated that they had read newspaper articles about the trial. Subsequent surveys, however, revealed both a declining interest in following the press treatment (67 per cent in March and 72 per cent in August) and that less than half of these read the reports in their entirety (34 per cent in March and 3 1 per cent in August). In October 1946, 93 per cent of the respondents claimed to have heard about the judgments (#16, 33). Confidence in the completeness and reliabiUty of the press also dropped, from 79 per cent in October 1945 to 67 per cent in August 1946. In October, after the trial's completion, 48 per cent indicated that the newspaper reports had been complete, 65 per cent reliable (45 per cent complete and reUable), and six per cent thought that they had been neither.

The trial increased AMZON Germans' knowledge of the Nazi era. In December 1945, 84 per cent of these respondents indicated that they had learned something new from the trial: 64 per cent specified the concentration camps, 23 per cent the extermination of Jews and other groups, and seven per cent the character of the Nazi leaders; one out of eight (13%) said that he had known nothing about the evils of National Socialism prior to the trial. ^^ In October 1946, the share of Germans saying that they had learned something new had dropped off to 71 per cent, and the number claiming that they had not learned anything new doubled to 27 per cent from 13 per cent in December 1945.

Asked about the guilt of the accused, AMZON Germans gave increasingly differentiated answers. The share of respon- dents holding all the accused to be guilty rose from 70 per cent in December 1945 to 75 per cent in the following March, only to drop to 52 per cent by August 1946. (In March, 71 per cent indicated that all the accused shared guilt for the preparation of

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 35

the war, with another ten per cent wanting to except some of them; 59 per cent did not feel that the accused could defend themselves in the face of the charges levied against them.) Conversely, the share holding none to be guilty dropped from five per cent in December 1945 to one per cent in March 1946 and to less than a half of one per cent by August. After hearing the verdicts, the respondents were generally satisfied: 55 per cent felt that the sentences had been just, but 21 per cent felt them to be too mild and nine per cent too harsh. ^*^ Well over half felt it proper that organizations should be indicted for their criminal activity; the percentages varied from 56 per cent in October 1945 to 60 per cent in December 1945 to 59 per cent in October 1946.

Most AMZON Germans with opinions felt that the trial was being conducted fairly (an average of 79 per cent in seven surveys conducted from October 1945 to August 1946, as opposed to four per cent who saw them as unfair). To this, however, must be added the fact that the perception of unfairness crept up slowly over this period. In October 1946, after the conclusion of the trial, 78 per cent of the respondents thought that it had been fair, and six per cent thought it unfair.

These data lend themselves, of course, to varying interpre- tations. One possible interpretation is that the postwar Germans were truly desirous of seeing those responsible for the Nazi excesses punished by the International Mihtary Tribunal. Others may see in these findings a large body of politically apathetic and irresponsible Germans looking for scapegoats to exonerate themselves of any blame for the crimes of the Nazi era (see Figure 6). Either interpretation clearly needs additional infor- mation (such as that provided by close readings of the German press, the works of postwar publicists, and memoirs) before it can be accepted. Another hne of collateral data stems from public attitudes in postwar Germany toward the extensive denazification proceedings.

Denazification. Set up under JCS 1067, the denazifica- tion proceedings aimed at removing from "public office and from positions of importance in quasi-public and private

36 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

10 5

NOV JAN. 1947 1948

Fig. 6. Collective German Responsibility tor World War II

Question: "Do you think that the entire German people are responsible for the war because they let a government come to power which plunged the whole world into war?" Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 8.

enterprises" those Germans who had been "active supporters of Nazism or militarism and all other persons hostile to AlUed purposes." This meant searching the records of some 1 3 million residents of the American Zone of Occupation, and ultimately processing some 3.5 million cases. By the beginning of 1947 the American authorities had removed 292,089 such persons from public or important private positions and excluded an addi- tional 81,673.^1

Unlike the war crimes trials, which focused upon a handful of very prominent Nazis, the denazification proceedings affected the AMZON population more directly. In principle, at least, every fourth citizen was subject to punishment. The immensity of the task of trying all such persons, together with the imphcations for the efficient operation of German industry and government should this many people be removed from positions of responsibility, soon led the occupation authorities to lower their sights. ^^ Even so, the potential disruption of German life was great.

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 37

What at first glance is most surprising is the fact that Germans in the American Zone seemed to endorse the idea of denazification. Indeed, in January 1949, when the hearings were coming to a close, two-thirds (66%) thought it important to hold to account "such people as furthered National Sociahsm in any way" (#182). Significantly enough, however, the most ardent opponents of the idea of denazification were the highly educated and the upper middle and upper socioeconomic groups.

Acceptance in principle did not imply acceptance in practice. The number of respondents satisfied with the way in which denazification was being carried out declined from roughly half in the winter of 1945-1946, when the idea was new and relatively untried, to about a third from October 1946 to the following September, to about a sixth in January 1949 (#7, 60, 182). The dissatisfied respondents (65%) were almost equal in number to those approving of the idea of denazification (66%).^^ And again the more socially mobilized groups within the population were the most likely to express criticism.

The most frequently heard objection to the denazification procedures was that they dealt too harshly with minor party members in comparison with the major ones (#7, 182). The second most persistent complaint was that the proceedings were too arbitrary and the judgments too inconsistent. Only from those who thought the program too easy did interviewers hear the view expressed that some punishments should be harsher.

Those directly affected by the proceedings, because of their past affiliation with the NSDAP, did not share this latter view. In contrast to respondents without such connections, only five per cent of whom had been dismissed from their jobs once or more times between January 1945 and September 1947, well over a third of the former members had suffered such a fate (#80). Over four in five reported that they were either much worse off (69%) or somewhat worse off (13%) in their current jobs than they were formerly. Half (51%) of the unaffected but as many as 78 per cent of those who claimed former membership in the NSDAP expressed dissatisfaction with the denazification proceedings. Asked what the most serious con- sequences of these proceedings were, former Nazi adherents most frequently named the lack of governmental and business

38 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

experts, as well as the economic stress suffered by those removed from their jobs.

All this bitterness notwithstanding, few Germans were wilhng to take denazification entirely out of the hands of American occupation authorities. In March 1946 only one in eleven wanted primary German responsibility, a position held by every sixth respondent a year later (#7, 55). The reason most frequently given for this was the expectation that the Americans would be more impartial than Germans in meting out justice. But underlying this was the simple unwilhngness to assume full responsibility for an unpopular program.

Summing up, the views on National Sociahsm, the Nurem- berg trials, and the denazification proceedings uncovered by the OMGUS surveys point to a persistent pattern. On the one hand, there were relatively few wholehearted Nazis in the American Zone. Our impressionistic judgment, based on a review of all the surveys reported in this volume, is that roughly 15 to 18 percent of the adult population were unreconstructed Nazis in the immediate postwar period.^"* The bulk of Germans emphati- cally rejected the specifically Nazi aspects and leaders of their recent history. And it seemed unlikely, at least for the near future, that they would again follow a pied piper of Hitler's caliber — especially if he were garbed in explicitly Nazi robes.

un the other hand, however, AMZON Germans were far from unanimous in turning their backs on National Socialism, They increasingly expressed their view that National Socialism was basically a good idea, although carried out poorly (see Figure 5). Substantial numbers continued to subscribe to sentiments closely tied up with Nazi ideology (as well, of course, as with other racist and reactionary ideologies, such as shown in Figure 7). And not only did they refuse to accept responsibility for the crimes of the Nazi era, but they objected when denazification boards levied stiff penalties upon the lesser supporters of the NSDAP.

Even if the Nazi Party and its leaders were discredited, then, it was by no means certain that their underlying principles were. The eradication of the outward manifestations of Nazism seems not to have eliminated the potential for movements

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 39

10

12

10

5

DEC.

MAY

NOV.

JAN.

1946

1947

1948

Fig. 7. Government and Racial Superiority

Question: "Do you think that some races of people are more fit to rule

than others?"

Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1948, p. 9.

equally totalitarian in their aims although explicitly eschewing the "brown" past. But what about the more positive aspects of the American occupation policy — those seeking to change, or democratize, German political culture?

Re-education for Democracy

Crucial to any attempt to change German political culture was a determination of what, in fact, its chief characteristics were. Although this is a topic that has interested writers since the time of Tacitus, the possibihty of investigating it in an objective, systematic manner did not really exist before World War II. The OMGUS surveys came at a time when social scientists were developing the necessary concepts and tools. It is not surprising, therefore, that these surveys sometimes seem naive to the modern scholar: The hypotheses are occasionally primitive, the questions used to test them often not very sophisticated and the conclusions rather overly simpUfied.

40 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Moreover, given the preoccupation of American occupation authorities with the heinous interlude of Nazism, it is also not surprising that some of their research suffered from an underlying tendentiousness. These caveats notwithstanding, the surveys provided some material basic both to the occupiers trying to change the perspectives on which German pohtics rested as well as to subsequent investigators interested in the actual impact of the occupation upon Germany's political culture. ^^

German Political Culture. There are, of course, many aspects of German poUtical culture that deserve mention. Of most importance here are the views of Germans on authority and democratic processes, no less than aspects of their political behavior.

"Two souls, alas, do dwell in my breast!" lamented Goethe's Faust. And roughly the same is true of the postwar German body politic (although not necessarily of individual Germans). Living amongst a sizable proportion of "democrats" was a goodly number of "authoritarians," conceivably suscep- tible to the sirens of yet another demagogue promising an ordered society.

As suggested earlier, it is not difficult to demonstrate the persistence in postwar Germany of perspectives closely associated with National Socialist ideology: 15 per cent of the AMZON Germans and West Berliners wilhng to suppress leftwing parties; 18 per cent agreeing on the importance of a dictator in creating a strong nation; 29 per cent amenable to censorship of publications critical of the government; 33 per cent feehng that Jews should not have the same rights as others (#19). Perhaps one in six could be said to have held explicitly Nazi orientations. In December 1946 the Opinion Survey Section classified 21 per cent of its AMZON respondents as anti-Semites, and another 18 per cent as intense anti-Semites — a total of 39 per cent (#49).

And yet to write off the mass of postwar Germans as authoritarians and racists would most surely be an injustice. Indeed, the main finding of the extensive survey cited in the

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 41

previous paragraph is that most Germans had perspectives that were by and large democratic. An average of three in ten responded in a democratic direction on each of the eleven scales included in the survey; an additional third answered in a democratic direction on all but one question in each scale (#19). Similarly, the later survey on anti-Semitism found a fifth (20%) of the AMZON population to have little bias and another fifth (19%) to be nationahsts but not racists - again a total of 39 per cent (#49).

Other signs of a predispositional duahty in German society are scattered throughout the OMGUS surveys. Consider, for example, German views on the purpose and means of education. In January 1948, respondents considered the chief purpose of the schools to be a comprehensive education (37 per cent in West Berhn and 52 per cent in Stuttgart); the second most frequently mentioned purpose in West Berlin (28%) was discipline and, in Stuttgart (20%), job training; and only one in six opted for the response "to teach children to think for themselves" (#95). An earlier survey revealed that 65 per cent in the American Zone and 51 per cent in the American and British sectors of Berhn approved of granting teachers the right to whip or beat "very disobedient and very unruly children" (#66). (It must be added, however, that those opposing such a right were much more vehement in expressing their views than were those favoring it.)

Another example focuses upon the freedoms that Germans thought necessary. Asked whether they preferred a government offering "economic security and the possibility of a good income" or else one guaranteeing "free elections, freedom of speech, a free press and religious freedom," six out of ten persistently opted for economic security from February 1947 to January 1949, with half that number preferring guaranteed liberties (#175; see Figure 8). Asked in June 1947 which of a hst of four freedoms they considered most important, a plurality (31%) selected commercial freedom. Of the remainder, 22 per cent chose religious freedom, 19 per cent free elections, and 14 per cent free speech (#82). Close to a third indicated that they would give up certain rights "if the state would

42 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

FEB 1947

Fig. 8.

5

19

B

1*^1

APR

JUN

1946

Economic Security vs. Guaranteed Freedoms

Question: "Which of these types of government would you, personally, choose as better:

A. A government which offers the people economic security and the possibility of a good income,

B. A government which guarantees free elections, freedom of speech, a free press and religious freedom?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 7.

thereby promise economic security" (#175). About half of those wiUing to give up some rights were wiUing to do without the right "to vote for the pohtical party" of their choice; almost a third the right "to read all the books and magazines" they wished to read; almost a quarter the right "to work in the place" they liked; about a tenth the right "to express [their] opinion freely"; and roughly a twentieth the right "to bring up [their] children according to [their own] view." Regarding freedom of speech, although 77 per cent were willing to grant it to all Germans, only 55 per cent agreed that it should be applicable for communists (#48).

Still another area in which this duality appears in the survey data comprises German attitudes toward leadership. On the one hand, large majorities felt that the people should

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 43

determine what direction the government should follow: In response to one question, 78 per cent of the AMZON residents thought that the people, rather than the pohticians, (14%) should perform that task; in response to another question they expressed their preference for the people (70%) over the "experts" (23%) to perform it {#9d>)}^ On the other hand, in a situation close to them, AMZON youth displayed a different predisposition (#96, 99, 101). Two-fifths of those in youth clubs reported having appointed leaders rather than elected leaders (51%). Roughly the same percentages (41 and 58 percent, respectively), preferred the different modes of selec- tion. In the event of a difference of opinion on the day on which their club should meet next, 43 per cent felt that they should meet on the day the leader wanted, and 56 per cent wanted to meet on the day chosen by the majority.

In evaluating these data, several points must be borne in mind. First, although they suggest a duality, this duahty did not permeate all aspects of social Ufe or politics. There were many areas which enjoyed high degrees of consensus. It nonetheless does seem that there was a sharp split in occupied Germany on some of the more crucial aspects of political Ufe. Second, this duahsm was not spread evenly throughout the areas of Germany under American control. Typically, the more democratic individuals were those living in large cities, respondents with 12 or more years of schoohng, professionals rather than workers or employees, adherents of the Social Democratic Party, and middle income groups. Third, the data presented above say Uttle about either the salience of the issues to the respondents or the hkelihood that they would translate their perspectives into action. Finally, the data also tell us nothing about the middle groups — the sometimes substantial numbers of Germans hover- ing between democratic and authoritarian perspectives. In what circumstances, for instance, would they swing their support in one direction or another?

Political Participation. The first surveys conducted by the American mihtary authorities revealed a fairly low interest in political activity: Only half felt themselves sufficiently in- formed about political events, and most of the remainder

44 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Interest in Politics

Question: "Are you yourself interested in political affairs or do you prefer

to leave that to others?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 13.

indicated that they were making no effort to get more information (see Figure 9); over three-quarters were not and did not intend to become members of a poUtical party; whereas seven in ten knew that political meetings were allowed, less than a third of these claimed to have attended one; and about two-thirds of those eligible to vote in elections held in January 1946 had in fact done so (#3). In April 1946, 76 per cent flatly said that, if they had a son leaving school, they would not Hke to see him choose politics as a profession (#10; see Figure 10). Typical of the comments made by those respondents were "politics is a dirty business" and "one is a poUtician for ten years and then lands in a concentration camp" (see also Figure 1 1). The percentage seeing politics as a worthy profession (14%) was considerably lower than that in England (25%) or the United States (21-25%). In September of the same year, just before referenda on the state constitutions and elections to the state parhaments, a series of questions demonstrated that only

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 45

100% 90% 80% 70% 60% 50% 40% 30% 20%

^^^^SSSms^msmarj^JorMsmi

io%-

0-

0ESli

15 APR. 1946

7 APR. 1947

S JAN. 1948

Fig. 10. Politics as a Career

Question: "If you had a son who had just finished school, would you like to see him take up politics as a career?" Source: OMGUS Report 100, March 1949, p. 15.

one in five persons was sufficiently interested to have even the barest of information on the issues at stake (#26).

Similar findings emerged from surveys in the middle of 1947, more than two years after the beginning of the occupation. About two in five (42 per cent in May, 40 per cent in August) felt sufficiently well informed about current pohtical events; of the remainder almost four in five either had not bothered to seek further information or did not care to (#72, 74). Levels of political information varied. Although 88 per cent knew the name of their town's mayor, only 47 per cent could name the minister president of their Land and 60 per cent could adequately define a secret ballot. Two-thirds (67 per cent in May, 64 per cent in August) preferred to leave politics to others rather than to concern themselves personally with it. And, indeed, few were active politically. In May, 90 per cent of the AMZON respondents indicated that they were personally doing everything possible to help rebuild Germany - but only seven per cent reported voluntarily helping with the census of October 1946, six per cent did any sort of volunteer work in

46 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

1

9

7

DEC

AUG

JAN

1945

1946

1947

1^

JAN 1948

fIb

1949

Fig. 1 1 . Trust in Local German Officials

Question: "In general, do officials in the local German government work for the good of the community or are they primarily self-interested?" Source: OMGUS Report 175. June 1949, p. 16.

their local community, and four per cent were members of a political party. As many as 40 per cent claimed no preference for any political party — a figure half again as great as for the occupation period as a whole (see Figure 12). More generally, they were inclined to see the responsibihty for government lying with officials rather than with voters: Asked about poor government, 38 per cent held government officials responsible, 26 per cent the voting pubhc, with 12 per cent assigning responsibility to both; regarding good government, 48 per cent

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 47

were willing to give credit to government officials, 21 per cent to the voters, and 13 percent to both equally.

Two years later, on the eve of the promulgation of West Germany's Federal Republic, political participation continued at relatively low levels (#191). Few were well informed about politics: Less than one in six could venture a guess as to whether or not their state constitutions contained provisions for initiatives and referenda (and of these only somewhat over half gave the correct answer), 58 per cent could name the minister president of their Land, and as few as 39 per cent knew that the Parliamentary Assembly, which had met in Bonn since the fall of 1948, had drawn up a constitution for West Germany (but less than half of these could claim any familiarity with this constitution). Nor was interest in politics much greater. Two-thirds (67%) continued to prefer leaving poUtics to others (see Figure 9), only 38 per cent perceived any great interest in politics among their contemporaries, and, when asked the cause of low participation in the affairs of government, 61 per cent indicated a general lack of interest, 20 per cent a lack of opportunity. Whereas 76 per cent expressed a willingness to work an hour daily without pay for the economic reconstruc- tion of Germany, only a third of that number (24%) were prepared, if asked to do so, to take a responsible position in the political Ufe of their community.

These findings, taken together, reveal two key aspects of German pohtical participation during the occupation period. First, it was not high. And yet, compared to other countries, as subsequent surveys have indicated, levels of political participa- tion in Germany are not inordinately low. There is nonetheless an interesting stylistic difference in political behavior. In their survey of the late 1950s, Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba found West Germans more interested in and knowledgeable about politics than citizens of four other democracies. The German sample ranked about midway between Americans and Englishmen on the one hand, and, on the other, Italians and Mexicans with respect to their behef that individuals should participate actively in the life of their community, their feeling that their activity could influence the course of pohtical events,

48 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Fig. 12. Preference for Political Parties

Question: "Which political party do you belong to or prefer?"

and their expectation that they would receive serious considera- tion both in a government office and from the police. Almond and Verba concluded that, in West Germany "Awareness of politics and political activity, though substantial, tend to be passive and formal. Voting is frequent, but more informal means of poHtical involvement, particularly pohtical discussion

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 49

JAN FEB FEB MAR APR

-=^:

SPD

JAN FEB FEB MAR APR

^^

^^^^^^^^^y

1

1

1

1

1

II

■

8 4 25 6 10 S 1 23 29 19 8 1 2 23 17 12 II 2 8 3

JOl AUS AUG OCT NOV JAN FEB FEB MAR APR JUN JUL AUG AUG SEP OCT NOV DEC JAN FE

1947 ' 1948 L1949J

B

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 18, 19. The following page in the sanne report gives preferences for the smaller parties as well as those responding "don't know."

and the forming of political groups, are more limited . . . And norms favoring active political participation are not well developed. Many Germans assume that the act of voting is all that is required of a citizen," West Germans were satisfied enough with what their government was doing for them — but otherwise they felt no strong emotional ties to the West German

50 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

political system. ^'^ The OMGUS data of the late 1940s suggest a similar detachment from politics. But whether this detachment is a long-standing characteristic of German poUtical behavior, or whether it stemmed from a feehng that too much pohtical activity in the past had led to too many burnt fingers, these data cannot tell us.

Second, the level of participation in the American-con- trolled areas remained fairly constant throughout the occupa- tion years. (And, judging by data currently available, this level has not changed substantially in the two decades since the formation of the Federal Republic!) This finding raises a serious question about the overall effectiveness of the democratization program pursued by American occupation authorities — at least in terms of its measurable effects. Germans proved wilhng to go along with the destruction of Nazi symbols, including the last remnants of Nazi leadership. They were also agreeable to the principle of removing Nazi party members and sympathizers from important public and private jobs (provided, of course, that the denazification proceedings did not impinge upon their own families or circles of friends). But they did not adopt most of the new patterns of democratic behavior fostered by the mihtary governments.

FROM DEMOCRATIZATION TO ANTICOMMUNISM: THE REORIENTATION OF AMERICAN POLICY

The total picture presented by the OMGUS surveys is therefore paradoxical — a population that was, potentially at least, pliable and yet did not change dramatically. Social psychologists tell us that the moods of entire publics are slow to change. The concatenation of traumatic experiences and official pohcy shifts, however, can shake all but the most deep-seated aspects of political culture. ^^ For Germans, the physical and psychological destruction of the lost war was such a trauma; the pohcies enunciated by the Alhes and the resurgence of voices suppressed during the Nazi period lent a tone to pohtics that Germans had not heard for well over a decade. Together, they could have meant a great watershed in the course of German history.

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 51

The existence of a population that was receptive to reorientation, if we are to judge from the available survey data, enhanced the AlHes' opportunity to help shape German history. First of all, respondents in the American Zone were responsive to the occupiers: They recognized that the occupation would last for some time; they accepted American troops, without, however, ignoring their misdeeds; and they were not particu- larly hostile toward (although apparently few had great interest in) American information programs. Second, these respondents were by and large willing to cooperate with fundamental Allied policies aimed at eradicating remnants of the Nazi past — pro- vided, of course, that these measures did not strike too close to home. And, third, the respondents reported finding conditions under the occupation tolerable. They seem to have expected much worse. Perhaps many of them had believed the all-too- credible Nazi propaganda about the Allied intention to imple- ment the Morgenthau Plan, which would have reduced Germans to shepherds in a disarmed, de-industrialized, and dismembered land. This all-in-the-same-boat acceptance nonetheless changed as the occupation continued. The cumulation of shortages, the influx of refugees who taxed severely Germany's capacity to feed and clothe its citizens adequately, and possibly even the realization that the military government's bite was far less frightening than its bark led to rising grumbUng despite the fact that the objective condition of the population (for example, in regard to caloric intake) was improving.

The four wartime AlUes proved unable to reaUze this opportunity to test the extent to which they could actually change Germany's political culture. Although the Cold War surely did not originate in the years from 1945 to 1949, it was during this period that it blossomed. And the battleground was, to a very large measure, Germany. Disputes among the AHies about reparations, boundaries, transit rights, denazification, currency, economic and poUtical reconstruction, and numerous smaller issues replaced interallied practices and institutions with bitter- ness and separate pohtical systems. Here is not the place to assay the causes or history of the Cold War. Suffice it to say that, as early as the summer of 1945, Germans were feehng its effects.

LIBRARY UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS AT URBANA- CHAMPAIGN

52 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

The OMGUS surveys make clear the fact that these Germans saw what was happening to their country. They increasingly expressed alarm about the breakdown of East-West cooperation in Germany. They estimated a diminishing prob- ability that the Allies would be able to work together to reconstruct the country in its 1937 or even its 1945 borders (see Figure 3). And they increasingly began to take sides. As Opinion Survey Section analysts wrote in August 1946 (#17): "It has been said that the world is becoming polarized toward either Russia or toward the United States, that these two countries are attracting a decision on the part of other people to line up with one or the other great nation. The data indicate that such a situation, if true, is further advanced in Germany than in countries such as France or Denmark." As the months rolled on, and particularly after the Soviet delegate walked out of the Allied Control Council meetings in March 1 948 and the Soviet imposition of the Berlin blockade three months later, German hostility toward the USSR became even more pro- nounced.

Changes in American policy toward occupied Germany accompanied the deepening of the Cold War.^^ It became less interested in creating a new German society than in establishing Germany as a bulwark against communism. This had several practical imphcations. Of particular importance was the belief that revitalized economic and poHtical institutions needed competent staffs (see Figure 13). But many of those whose training and abihties made them most desirable had records that were, according to current principles of denazification, dubious at best. The solution to this dilemma was a relaxation of the standards of personnel screening committees as well as the exoneration of Germans in wholesale lots from any impUcation in Nazi criminal activities. The changing policy also meant turning over more functions to German institutions. And it meant efforts to win over the German population.

Better living conditions and greater autonomy as instru- ments in the ideological battle over Germany were accompanied by heavy barrages of propaganda, aimed both at improving the image of the United States and sullying that of the Soviet

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 53

Fig. 1 3. The Reconstruction of Germany

Question: "Which of these statements comes closest to your opinion?

A. Germany herself should bear the responsibility for her reconstruction under the supervision of the Allies.

B. Germany should be occupied by the Allies until she is able to form a good democratic government.

C. The Americans should reconstruct Germany as soon as possible in order to avoid her becoming a prey to Communism.

D. The reconstruction of their country should be left to the Germans themselves without interference from the Allies."

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 57.

Union. The "Voice of America," the information centers, and the American-controlled mass media saw to this latter task. And it is remarkable how receptive AMZON Germans were to publications decrying Soviet pohcies (e.g. #89 and 97). To some extent, interestingly enough, even the OMGUS surveys served in

54 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Fig. 1 4. Relative Influence of the United States and the Soviet Union

Question: "Which country will have the greatest influence on world affairs

in the next ten years?"

Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 47.

the propaganda battle. In December 1947, for instance, interviewers asked a small panel of Berliners why the London Conference had broken up (#86). The report, after noting diminished morale because of "a feeling that events are occurring apart from the German people and in a direction over which they have no control," went on to make a pohcy recommendation:

It is suggested that mterpretation of the London Con- ference should attempt to make clear to the public what the principles are which have guided American diplomats in their negotiations during the Conference. . . . These princi- ples can be affirmed in such a way as to make room for the German people to associate themselves with the mainte- nance of such tenets. It might well be possible, thus to induce some Germans to consider that, instead of Alhed disagreements bringing the Conference to an end, it was Russian refusal to accept principles (which everyone else

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 55

25

NOV 1946

1947

25

5

k

3

AUG

JAN

JUN

FEB

1948

1949

Fig. 1 5. The Choice between National Socialism and Communism

Question: "If you had to choose between Communism and National Socialism, under which government would you prefer to live?" Source: OMGUS Report 175, June 1949, p. 9.

recognizes as necessary to maintain) which caused adjourn- ment.

It was not difficult to follow this advice. By then Germans were quite receptive to anti-Soviet propaganda. A report in April 1948 (#\\3) noted that, although AMZON Germans "have very strong opinions about Russia and the Russians, their factual information about what country is in general at a fairly low level." Moreover, "when in doubt, they tend to select the 'fact' least favorable to Russia." It would seem, then, that Western interpretations of Soviet behavior merely activated a latent antibolshevism in the German population (see Figure 14).3o

The all-out effort to enUst Germans on the side of the West in the Cold War, however successful, had its costs. Most immediately, as suggested earher, it meant a partial abandon- ment of efforts to root out the remnants of Nazism. We do not mean to suggest that American occupation authorities were no longer concerned with this task. They were, both in their emotions and their behavior. It is merely that anti-Nazism had to take second place to anticommunism. It must have been with considerable ambivalence that these officers read reports show- ing that AMZON Germans, asked to choose between a National

56 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Socialist and a communist form of government, increasingly . chose the former (#60, 175; see Figure 15). Were their efforts to discredit communism producing a "brown" reaction in postwar Germany?

The OMGUS surveys indicate that the danger of resurgent Nazism, viewed with alarm by some observers even today, was in fact highly overrated. The bulk of Germans had already rejected the National Socialist movement. The movement itself had had many faults, its leaders had proved themselves to be less than heroic, and both, moreover, had led Germany to disaster. Relatively few, perhaps a sixth, seemed to continue espousing a complete set of Nazi images and values.

More ominous was the possibility of recreating those conditions that had given rise to the Nazi version of extremism in the first place. Some of these were to be sure the consequence of external circumstances: resentment about pro- visions of the Versailles Treaty, the virtual withdrawal from world politics of the Soviet Union and the United States, and the world economic crisis that began in 1929. But other European countries, too, winners and losers alike, had felt the disastrous effects of World War I and subsequent changes in the international environment. The events themselves do not provide much of an explanation for domestic changes. More important were the perspectives of those who had to deal with these events — perspectives that found their roots in German pohtical culture. Groups with different perspectives, after all, can interpret the same set of events and behavior as hostile or friendly, as threatening or nonthreatening. This suggests, then, that we must pay more attention to domestic conditions.

Several aspects of pohtical culture are important in this regard. Some can be explored through surveying techniques. To the extent that we can project postwar German political perspectives backwards into an earlier era, it would seem that among the conditions prevailing when Nazi extremism emerged and seized power were an ethic of passive participation, reliance upon administrative rather than political procedures, the pre- sence of authoritarians and democrats in the midst of the relatively uncommitted majority, a strong strain of anti-

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 57

Semitism and, more generally, a lack of tolerance of people and ideas that were different. Ralf Dahrendorf has pointed to still other aspects of pre-Nazi political culture in Germany: a high degree of industrial concentration, a low degree of social mobility, a social chasm between the elites and the masses, and principles of decision making that prevented basic conflicts from coming into public discussion.^' Above all, a traditional political eUte relied upon these popular orientations and the structural rigidity of German Hfe to maintain themselves in power. Whatever its evils, and these should never be forgotten or underplayed, the Nazi regime under Hitler made great strides in destroying this traditional, relatively closed political culture.

Taking charge of a Germany with discredited pasts — the traditional political culture that had led to the breakdown of the Weimar Republic, as well as the revolutionary but unsuc- cessful politics of the National Socialists — presented the AlHes with their unheard-of opportunity to help guide the nation in its choice of alternative futures. Coordinated persistence on the part of the Allies might have produced extensive cultural change. But there was neither coordination nor, in the Western zones at least, persistence. As the Cold War descended upon Europe, the Soviet Union devoted ever more of its attention to the establishment of a loyal satellite in its zone of occupation, and the West to the recreation of an anticommunist pohtical system modelled upon the Weimar pattern.

In the American Zone in particular growing anticom- munism got in the way of policies aimed at cultural change. AMZON residents were caught in the mill. Promised education for democracy, they ended up getting pushed off on another ideological crusade. Promised democratic procedures, they got an Allied occupation interested more in setting up bulwarks against communism than a clean sweep of the past, interested more in propaganda against the new enemy than in the critical self-appraisal and sometimes painful search for the truth that accompany democratic processes. Promised new democratic leadership, they got a reentrenchment of leaders from the discredited Weimar period, together with those too clever or lucky enough to avoid entanglement in the webs of either

58 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Nazism or denazification. The OMGUS survey data summarized in this volume cannot, of course, demonstrate conclusively the accuracy of these assertions. They nonetheless show that the changes toward a more democratic pubhc consciousness initially intended by the occupiers did not materialize: On the level of individual perspectives and behavior, there were few major changes to be noted; on the level of attitudes toward public events, a new set of frequently Uberal perspectives merely replaced the old set.

Perhaps the restoration of practices and leaders ambivalent toward democracy, as well as the accompanying propagandistic distortions, were necessary to protect democracy against a communist threat. We do not deny it, although we also fail to see as much concrete evidence as was assumed at the time to exist. The point here is somewhat different: Having pounded anticommunism into receptive Germans, all the while giving impetus to the reemergence of ilHberal predispositions, the United States and its allies prepared to leave the country to its own devices. What was left was for the United States and the rest of the world to reap the fruits of this restoration sown in the late 1940s.

NOTES

Cf. General Lucius D. Clay's stress on their importance in Decision in Germany (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1950), p. 283. The British, French, and Soviet military governments also sought to create organizations to conduct survey research, evidently not too success- fully in the Soviet case. Cf. Henry Halpern, "Soviet Attitude Toward Public Opinion Research in Germany," Public Opinion Quarterly, 13:1 (Spring 1949), 117-118. The Soviet Military Government viewed American operations as espionage, subsequently infiltrating the Opinion Survey Section itself and turning over at least some of its findings to the press in East Berhn. On the occupation in the western zones, cf. also W. Friedmann, The Allied Military Government of Germany (London: Stevens and Sons, 1947); Hajo Holbom, American Military Government: Its Organization and Policies (Washington,

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 59

D.C.: Infantry Journal Press, 1947); Carl J. Friedrich et al., American Experiences in Military Government in World War II (New York: Rinehart and Co., 1948); Edward H. Litchfield et al., Governing Postwar Germany (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 1953); John D. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free: The Artificial Revolution in Germany and Japan (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1957); Harold Zink, The United States in Germany, 1944-1955 (Princeton, N.J.: D. Van Nostrand Co., 1957); W. Phillips Davison, The Berlin Blockade: A Study in Cold War Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1958); Eugene Davidson, The Death and Life of Germany: An Account of the American Occupation (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959); Raymond Ehy^oxXh, Restoring Democracy in Germany: The British Contribution (London: Stevens and Sons; New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1960); F. S. V. Donnison, Gvil Affairs and Military Government: North-West Europe, 1944-1946 (London: Her Majesty's Stationery Office, 1961); John Gimbel, A German Community under American Occupation: Marburg, 1945-52 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1962); Harry L. Coles and Albert K. Weinberg, Civil Affairs: Soldiers Become Governors (Washington, D.C.: Department of the Army, Office of the Chief of Military History, 1964); and John Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany: Politics and the Military, 1945-1949 (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1968). For a recent German view, see Caspar Schrenck-Notzing, Charakterwaesche: Die amerikanische Besatzung in Deutschland und ihre Folgen (Stuttgart: Seewald Verlag, 1965). Basic to an understanding of the occupation, of course, is some insight into the Nazi period itself. Perhaps the best brief introduction is Alan Bullock, Hitler: A Study in Tyranny, rev. ed. (New York: Harper and Row, 1964); in addition to numerous, more specific monographs, an excellent body of German documenta- tion exists, as catalogued in Gerhard L. Weinberg and the War Documentation Project Staff, under the direction of Fritz T. Epstein, Guide to Captured German Documents, War Documentation Project, Study No. 1, Research Memorandum No. 2, Vol. 1 (Maxwell Air Force Base, Ala.: Air University, Human Resources Research Institute, December 1952); and the series initiated by the American Historical Association's Committee for the Study of War Documents, Guides to German Records Microfilmed at Alexandria, Va. (Washington, D.C.: The National Archives, National Archives and Records Services, General Services Administration, 1958- ).

60 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

The reports summarized in this volume also include five on aspects of the American occupation of Austria, particularly Vienna. Since they deal primarily with mass communications media, we shall not analyze them in this brief introductory section.

2. For a compilation of the USIA data from France, West Germany, Italy, and the United Kingdom, covering the years from 1952 to 1963, as well as for a series of methodological and substantive articles using these data, see Richard L. Merritt and Donald J. Puchala, Western European Perspectives on International Affairs: Public Opinion Studies and Evaluations (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1968).

3. Inquiries should be addressed to: Archives Branch, Washington National Records Center, Washington, D.C., 20409. The files are in Box 233-3/5 and 233-5/5 (#1243) at the Washington National Records Center's office in Suitland, Maryland.

4. Elmo C. Wilson, "Report on ICD Opinion Surveys," memorandum prepared for Colonel Gordon E. Textor, Director, Information Control Division, Office of Military Government for Germany (U.S.), 4 August 1948 (dittoed), p. 9.

5. Leo P. Crespi, "The Influence of Military Government Sponsorship in German Opinion Polling," International Journal of Opinion and Attitude Research, 4:2 (Summer 1950), 167-168.

6. Ibid. pp. 168-169.

7. Cf. Aaron M. Bindman, "Interviewing in the Search for 'Truth'," Sociological Quarterly, 6:3 (Summer 1965), 281-288.

8. Inquiries should be addressed to: Archives Branch, Washington National Records Center, Washington, D.C., 20409. The cost is five cents per page on 35 mm. microfilm (positive or negative) or 20 cents per page for electrostatic (xeroxed) prints. The summaries contained in this volume show the number of pages in each report; the total number, excluding extraneous material, is about 2,081 pages.

9. Cf. Report No. 22, "A Study of Attitudes Toward the Reconstruc- tion and Rehabilitation of Germany" (25 September 1946). Hence- forward the numbers in parentheses, e.g. (#22), will refer to the reports summarized in the next section of this volume; report numbers prefaced by II refer to Series 2 (HICOG) of the American- sponsored surveys of German attitudes, summaries of which will be published in due course.

10. In June 1950, almost half (46%) of a nationwide sample reported that their experiences during the occupation had been unpleasant

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 61

(23%) or very unpleasant (23%); ten per cent recalled that their experiences were pleasant, and another 28 per cent did not remember noticing anything in particular (the remainder, 16 per cent, had not been in Germany). Broken down by occupation zones, those who had been in the British Zone were least negative (37 per cent unpleasant, 16 per cent pleasant, and 47 per cent not noticing), followed by residents of the American Zone (49, 15, and 36 per cent, respec- tively), the French Zone (65, 7, and 28 per cent, respectively), and the Soviet Zone (95, 1, and 4 per cent, respectively). Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, 1947-1955 (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1956), p. 146.

11. Ibid., p. 74. Among radio listeners in the Federal Republic as a whole, the share listening regularly to VOA declined from 22 per cent in March 1950 to 14 per cent in March 1955, those listening occasionally from 33 to 27 per cent.

12. In July 1955, only a quarter (27%) of a nationwide sample felt that at the time of the currency reform seven years earlier they had been undernourished, and two-thirds (67%) denied this. The items they reported most often having to purchase on the black market were, first, bread, flour, and potatoes, and, second, fats, butter, and cooking oil, followed by clothing, meat, sugar, and eggs. Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, 1957 (Allensbach am Bodensee: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1957), p. 226.

13. In February 1953, almost two-thirds (63%) of a nationwide sample felt that the refugees had adjusted satisfactorily to life in the Federal Republic (with 18 per cent taking the opposite position), but only 36 per cent felt that enough was currently being done for refugees from the German Democratic Republic (with 28 per cent saying that not enough was being done). Asked whether the Federal Republic should continue to accept refugees from the German Democratic Republic, 25 per cent were unconditionally positive in their response, 57 per cent specified conditions that should be met (such as proof that flight had resulted from political persecution), and 15 per cent responded negatively. Noelle and Neumann, editoTs, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, pp. 199-200.

14. A decade later, in April 1959, 38 per cent of the expellees from the Oder-Neisse territories reported that they would definitely return if the area were restored to German control, 27 per cent that they

62 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

would perhaps return, and 30 per cent said that their return was out of the question. Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, 1958-1964 (Allensbach and Bonn: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1965), p. 505.

15. Over the course of the next two decades, reunification and economic issues vied for top position in Germans' view of the most important problem facing their country. As economic prosperity overcame the country in the mid-1950s, the reunification question took first place with unprecedented consensus (45 per cent in Janaury 1959), but the economic crisis that began in 1965 again raised the issue of prosperity to first place (62 per cent in January 1967). Ibid., p. 482, Elisabeth Noelle and Erich Peter Neumann, editois, Jahrbuch der oeffentlichen Meinung, 7965-7967 (Allensbach and Bonn: Verlag fuer Demoskopie, 1967), p. 387.

16. Cf. Richard L. Merritt, "West Berlin - Center or Periphery?" in Comparing Nations: The Use of Quantitative Data in Cross-National Research, eds. Richard L. Merritt and Stein Rokkan (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1966), pp. 321-336.

17. Hitler's image suffered during succeeding years. In January 1950 as much as a tenth of a nationwide sample rated Hitler as the statesman who had done most for Germany, but in April-May 1967 only two per cent did so. In July 1952 a tenth agreed that Hitler was the greatest statesman of the century whose true greatness would be recognized only later, with another 22 per cent feeling that, although he had made a few mistakes. Hitler was nonetheless an excellent chief-of-state. The percentage claiming that, except for the war. Hitler would have been one of Germany's greatest statesmen declined from 48 per cent in May 1955 to 32 per cent in April-May 1967; the number denying this assertion rose from 36 to 52 per cent. The percentage reporting their willingness to vote again for a man such as Hitler dropped from 14 per cent in 1953 to 6 per cent in 1968 (although in 1965 and 1967 it had been still lower, at four per cent); interestingly enough, in 1968 34 per cent of the adherents of the new rightist National Democratic Party (NPD) indicated that, if the opportunity arose, they would vote for a man like Hitler. Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, pp. 144-145; and EMNID- Institut, Informationen 20:8-9 (August-September 1968), p. A- 18.

18. Of a nationwide sample of university students in July 1966, 44 per cent reported that they could think of something positive about Hitler and the Third Reich (with over three-fifths of these mentioning

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 63

the resolution of Germany's economic crisis of the early 1930s), and

38 per cent could find nothing good to say. Noelle and Neumann, editois, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, p. 368.

19. Some of these data are from summary sheets not included in the OMGUS reports and hence differ slightly from data reported elsewhere (e.g. #16). This special collection is to be found in the Library of the University of Illinois under the title "Some Results of Public Opinion Polls of the German Republic" (q940.9343, G3125s).

20. Asked in September 1952 about five defendants still serving prison sentences, an average of 14 per cent of a nationwide sample thought it just that they were still there, with 52 per cent considering it unjust. Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, p. 202. More generally, Germans have grown increasingly impatient with discussions of German war crimes: In 1966 well over half (58%) of a nationwide sample and 51 per cent of the university students questioned thought that the time had come to stop such discussions. Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967 pp. 204, 368. An indication of the bitterness on this point came in November 1952, when 46 per cent reported liking a recent speech containing the sentence, "The real war criminals are those who made this unholy peace alone, who destroyed entire cities without military reasons, who dropped the bombs on Hiroshima, and who are producing new atomic bombs" ; 29 per cent did not like the speech, and 25 per cent gave no response. Noelle and Neumann, editors, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, p. 276.

21. Meanwhile, Soviet military authorities had removed 307,370 and excluded 83,108 Germans from jobs; the British had removed 186,692 and excluded 104,106; and the French had removed and excluded 69,068 Germans. Friedmann, The Allied Military Govern- ment of Germany, p. 332.

22. Gimbel, The American Occupation of Germany, pp. 101-110, 158-162, 246-252. Cf. Montgomery, Forced to Be Free; and John H. Herz, "The Fiasco of Denazification in Germany," Political Science Quarterly, 63:4 (December 1948), 569-594.

23. The independent Institut fuer Demoskopie found still greater opposition in August 1948: 14 per cent felt that denazification had accomplished its goals (17 per cent in November 1953), contrasted to

39 per cent who felt that the proceedings had been necessary but incorrectly conducted (63 per cent in 1953), and 40 per cent who expressed outright opposition (40 per cent in 1953). Asked in

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September 1951 what the greatest mistake made by the occupiers was, denazification ranked seventh (having been mentioned by six per cent), right behind the war crimes trials (8%) and well behind the response "dismanthng, destruction, and holding down of industry" (21%). Noelle and Neumann, editois, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, pp. 142, 140.

24. Evidence summarized by Karl W. Deutsch and Lewis J. Edinger, Germany Rejoins the Powers: Mass Opinion, Interest Groups, and Elites in Contemporary German Foreign Policy (Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press, 1959), p. 40, suggests that, in the mid-1950s, about one in eight Germans was a hardcore Nazi or partial sympathizer. Public opinion data from the late 1960s indicate that this proportion has dropped by about half.

25 . For a recent summary of some studies of German perspectives, see Sidney Verba, "Germany: The Remaking of Political Culture," in Political Culture and Political Development, eds. Lucian W. Pye and Sidney Verba (Princeton, N J.: Princeton University Press, 1965), pp. 130-170. See also W. Phillips Davison, "Trends in West German Public Opinion, 1946-1956," in West German Leadership and Foreign Policy, eds. Hans Speier and W. Philhps Davison (Evanston, 111., and White Plains, N.Y.: Row, Peterson and Co., 1957), pp. 282-304.

26. Surveys in the early 1950s nonetheless revealed that about a quarter of the population (33 per cent of the women and 21 per cent of the men), if given a choice, would have preferred a monarchy to any other form of government for Germany; Noelle and Neumann, Qdiiots, Jahrbuch, 1947-1955, p. 132. In the winter of 1962-1963, 18 per cent were in favor of having a monarch on the British or Swedish model; Noelle and Neumann, ediiois, Jahrbuch, 1965-1967, p. 137.

27. Gabriel A. Almond and Sidney Verba, The Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1963), particularly pp. 428-429. Other cross- national surveys are to be found in William Buchanan and Hadley Cantril, How Nations See Each Other: A Study in Public Opinion (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1953), and Merritt and Puchala, Western European Perspectives on International Affairs.

28. See Karl W. Deutsch and Richard L. Merritt, "Effects of Events on National and International Images," in International Behavior: A Social-Psychological Analysis, ed. Herbert C. Kelman (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1965), pp. 132-187.

29. More properly speaking, as Gimbel in The American Occupation of

POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES IN OCCUPIED GERMANY / 65

Germany has pointed out, the conflict among American decision makers was resolved in favor of General Clay and others favoring a rapid rehabilitation of Germany; the effect from the point of view of the outside observer, however, was the same, since the American Military Government began to express views that sounded like policy changes.

30. For a graphic indication of the increasing polarity of German images of the United States and the Soviet Union, see Richard L. Merritt, "Visual Representation of Mutual Friendliness," in Western European Perspectives on International Affairs, eds. Merritt and Puchala, pp. 11 1-141, particularly p. 134.

31. See Ralf Dahrendorf, Society and Democracy in Germany (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1967), who stresses the antiliberal elements of Germany's pre-Nazi history. See also David Schoenbaum, Hitler's Social Revolution. Class and Status in Nazi Germany, 1933-1939 (New York: Doubleday and Co., 1966).

PART II

THE OMGUS SURVEYS

Report No. 1 (1 March 1946)

RADIO LISTENING IN GERMANY, WINTER 1946

Sample: 964 households in the American Zone. Interviewing dates: 21 January 1946. (21 pp.)

Fifty-six per cent of the population in the American Zone listened to the radio, either on their own or someone else's set. Only 42 per cent of the families interviewed had sets in working order. Nearly all sets picked up middle-wave lengths, and one-third also received short- and long-wave broadcasts.

Audience composition differed at different times of the day, with the median group Ustening to the radio about two hours daily. Among those most frequently tuning in one of the three American-sponsored stations, both Radio Munich and Radio Stuttgart had audiences that listened for rather long periods of time. An appreciable number (37%) restricted their daytime hstening to save electricity. The largest audiences were during the evening hours from 6 to 10 p.m., but significant numbers were also at their radios at 7 a.m. and at noon. Listeners with above average-sized families seemed to use the radio socially, as the center of the evening at home. Listening habits varied with the size of the community: except in Bavaria, the larger the community, the more people who listened to the radio.

Most radio hstening occurred among groups with the following characteristics: male; aged 18 to 29; twelve or more years of education; upper-middle-class status; former member- ship in the NSDAP; irregular churchgoing Catholics; profes- sionals, government officials, or self-employed; and weekly income of 70 RM or more.

Listeners preferred the American-licensed station in their own Land, although they also listened to stations from other Laender in AMZON. For the Zone as a whole. Radio Leipzig and Radio Berhn ranked fourth and fifth respectively in the

69

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competition for listeners, behind Radio Munich, Stuttgart, and Frankfurt.

In regard to the type of program preferred, 65 per cent of the respondents hsted musical programs. Second most popular were news programs (25%). Differences of taste for types of programs were related to sex, age, and education variables.

Among radio listeners, 65 per cent were confident that the radio presented the news more truthfully than did the news- papers. A majority of listeners, however, admitted that news- papers have the advantage of being able to present more complete news. Respondents seemed to feel that news broad- casting in English was more complete than that in German, but only 1 1 per cent claimed to listen to broadcasts in Enghsh. Radio listeners also indicated a preference for personalized news presentation.

Almost two-thirds (63%) of the listeners said that they listened to the "Voice of America." Fifty per cent said that they heard the program from German stations only; the remainder heard it sometimes on German stations, sometimes from London or New York. Among radio Usteners, those who listened to the "Voice of America" were more likely to be male, Protestant, middle or upper class, and to have had only eight years of schooHng rather than much more or less. Those who listened to the "Voice of America" on German stations were also those who most frequently listened to Radio Frankfurt or Radio Stuttgart,

Report No. 2 (March 1946)

WHO IN GERMANY HAS READ "MEIN KAMPF"?

Sample: 954 residents of the American Zone. Interviewing dates: 14 February 1946. (3 pp.)

Almost a quarter (23%) of the adult population in the American Zone had read at least part of Hitler's Mein Kampf. Of this group, seven per cent had read the entire book. The largest

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 71

percentage of readers were among the following groups: former NSDAP members (18 per cent completely, 28 per cent in part); upper social class (14 and 31 per cent, respectively); 12 or more years of education (31 and 41 per cent respectively); young people under the age of 30 (5 and 22 per cent, respectively); men (1 1 and 21 per cent, respectively); prisoners of war (12 and 24 per cent, respectively); and those preferring the Communist Party (13 and 18 per cent, respectively). Religious affiliation was not a significant variable for discriminating readers from nonreaders.

Report No. 3 (15 March 1946)

SOME POLITICAL ATTITUDES PROBED ON RECENT SURVEYS

Sample: from 364 to 996 American Zone residents. Interviewing dates: 14 surveys from 26 November 1945 to 15 March 1946. (9 pp.)

A third (33%) of the respondents polled in March 1946 preferred the SPD to other parties then in existence. Asked which party they would choose in the event of a merger between the SPD and the Communist Party, a third of these SPD adherents indicated support for the new party, but 37 percent said that they would switch either to the CDU (19%) or the CSU (18%), and another three per cent thought that they would support one of the smaller, right-wing parties in that event.

Regarding pohtical awareness, the number feeling that the Germans had learned in recent months how to govern them- selves better varied from 61 per cent in January to 47 per cent in March. Roughly half felt themselves sufficiently informed about political affairs; and somewhat over a third of the remainder indicated that, although they were not sufficiently informed, they were making an effort to inform themselves. Only 15 per cent could name an outstanding German' who, in

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their opinion, could hold an important position at the Land level.

Regarding political participation, in March only seven per cent claimed membership in a poHtical party, although another 16 per cent indicated their intention to join one. About two-thirds (63%) in March wanted to exclude all but three or four political parties, and as many as 1 1 per cent wanted to exclude all but one. A solid majority, ranging from 60 per cent in November 1945 to 72 per cent in March 1946, felt that political meetings were desirable. By March as many as 25 per cent of the entire population said that they had attended such a meeting. Three in five respondents (60%) thought that some categories of individuals should not be permitted to enter pohtics, as opposed to another fifth (20%) favoring no such discrimination: Almost all of those opting for a discriminatory policy hsted former NSDAP members or functionaries as the most undesirable. Support for the SPD grew and for the conservative parties (CDU, CSU, LDP) declined with the population size of the town. Of the former NSDAP members, somewhat over a quarter (28%) supported leftist parties (SPD, KPD) in early 1946, almost twice that number (52%) favored conservative parties.

Those least likely to vote in elections taking place in early 1946 were individuals without party affiliation (54%), former Nazi Party members (58%), men (36%), and persons under the age of 30 (45%). Most voters in the January elections were able to give a reason for having voted. Vaguely defined issues were alluded to by a majority, while a sizable minority said that they had voted merely out of a sense of civic duty (35%) or just to express an opinion once again (4%). Issues referred to indirectly included leadership (23%), reconstruction (12%), interparty rivalry (10%), voting against the Communist Party (5%), and political reorientation (7%).

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 73

Report No. 4 (25 March 1946)

INCOME AND EXPENDITURES OF GERMAN FAMILIES IN THE AMERICAN ZONE, WINTER 1946

Sample: 2,448 families in 70 communities in the American

Zone.

Interviewing dates: second week in January 1946. (10 pp.)

In the American Zone, the absolute labor force was at least twice as large as the percentage of those actually working. While 28 per cent of family members interviewed were working, an additional 30 per cent were adults capable of working but holding no income-producing jobs; another ten per cent were incapable of working. Almost two-thirds (63%) of the labor force were male. People with jobs were, on the average, almost as likely to be over 40 as younger. Most of the workers (77%) had no more than 8 years of education.

The average income of famihes in the Zone was about 35 RM per week. Almost all of this income came from wages or salaries. Nearly 15 per cent of all families interviewed said they had no income. Their standard of living, however, approximated that of the average German family. This group was most likely temporarily dislocated and was living on its savings. Over a third (35%) of all families were drawing on savings for necessary living expenditures. Although 85 per cent of those with no income were using savings for current expenses, this percentage decreased as income rose.

Lowest incomes were reported in small towns and Baden- Werttemberg (median family income of 35 RM). Cathohcs were slightly better paid than Protestants (41 RM as opposed to 38 RM). Home owners (40 RM) and the better educated (92 RM) received more income than renters (36 RM) or those with only 7 years of education (46 RM). Former NSDAP members (45 RM) were relatively well paid compared with those who had no Party affiliations (36 RM). The difference in income between men and women was not great, nor was it consistently greater

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for men. Workers between the ages of 30 and 39 tended to receive more income (42 RM) than younger (29 RM) or older people (39 RM for those aged 40-49, 38 RM for those over 50 years of age).

On the average, incomes were higher than expenditures. Respondents reported making expenditures only for necessities. Even the best paid spent very httle for education, entertain- ment, or luxuries. The greater the income, the more money spent. The greatest difference between income groups was in the amount spent for food; families earning 10-29 RM weekly paid about 8 RM for food, whereas those earning 80 RM or more weekly spent about 18 RM for food. Rents had hardly increased since May 1945 for those in the average renting brackets, and were stable for those paying high rents. Home owners, who made up 46 per cent of the population, expected to spend large sums in 1 946 for the repair of their homes.

Report No. 5 (1 April 1946)

SPECIAL POLITICAL SURVEY, WINTER 1946

Sample: 162 community leaders in the American Zone. Interviewing dates: end of February 1946. (17 pp.)

The 162 persons questioned in this survey were all community leaders — politically alert and sophisticated — living in villages and cities throughout AMZON. The majority were over 50 and mostly of higher socioeconomic groups. The overwhelming majority preferred to be personally involved in politics rather than leaving politics to others. The dominant impression given by the respondents was nonetheless a general disillusionment with party pohtics.

Those who admitted the need for democratic methods and democracy in general regarded them only as preparation for the mere function of voting without any reference to or indication of their appreciation of democratic social attitudes or democ-

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 75

racy's functioning within a community. When asked what the fundamentals of a democratic form of state were, most answered from a classical point of view, giving short definitions. A large percentage mentioned equality as a fundamental requirement, but only two specified racial equahty among other forms named. About two in five (43%) of the 162 respondents felt it was generally possible to estabhsh democracy in Germany based on western democratic principles, a third (34%) felt it was generally not possible to do so, and 23 per cent were uncertain. Many respondents, fearing a political situation in which there would be a number of parties, felt democracy would encourage this situation. Accordingly, many felt the number of pohtical parties should be limited, especially during the period of reconstruction. Many felt the British system should be emu- lated, but with a president rather than a monarch.

When asked if the Military Government could do anything to foster democracy, respondents most frequently demanded unification, the immediate abolition of the Zone system, and the reestablishment of economic prosperity. The next most frequent demand was for a humane execution of denazification. Many stressed that the occupation itself should be an example of democracy. All favored the gradual trend by the Military Government to give more power to the Germans themselves; almost all, however, felt that the Military Government should retain final control and decision.

Of the 162 respondents, 67 preferred the CSU or the CDU, 47 the SPD, nine the KPD, seven the LDP and two the Deutsche Arbeiterpartei which exists in the British Zone. Most of the former Nazi Party members preferred the CDU or the CSU. Continuity in pre-1933 and postwar political allegiance was noticeable mainly among the Social Democrats and, to a lesser extent, the Communists. Sixty per cent of those who preferred the CSU or the CDU were former members of the Center Party, the Bavarian People's Party, or the German National People's Party.

When questioned about responsibility for the Nazi rise to power, 90 per cent concentrated on the factors which in their view had lead to dictatorship; only about ten per cent gave

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opinions as to what positive steps could have been taken to prevent the Nazi rise to power. Rephes to this question, the question of collective guilt of the German people, and the responsibihty of the individual to obey his government divided sharply according to the party preferences of the respondents.

These community leaders were sharply divided on the possibility that the Nazis or some similar group might emerge and attempt to seize power. Nearly all respondents thought that such a seizure could not happen while the occupation lasted. But the conditions that might favor a Nazi resurgence included material difficulties and misery, unjust and harsh occupation policy, nationalist reaction, together with division of Germany, licensing of reactionary parties, and the problem of homeless refugees and unemployed former prisoners of war. Conditions hindering such a resurgence included the presence of occupation troops, the fact that the Nazi regime and the war taught a lesson to everyone, the existence of strong leftist parties, and stricter international interdependence and surveillance in the frame- work of the new international organization.

If the Nazis or some similar group attempted to seize power, the majority of the respondents felt that civil war would follow. A majority also thought that, after the Nazi experience, the democratic parties would prevent any development which might lead to such a coup. At least half the respondents believed that the Allies would immediately intervene, and an appreciable minority thought that it would be the duty of an international organization to act. About five per cent hoped that United States forces would not leave until, in the respondents' words, "democracy is safely estabhshed."

When questioned about the main duties of the state toward its citizens and what the respondent expected from his government, about 75 per cent said that the satisfaction of essentially material needs is the first duty of the state. Only about 25 per cent mentioned individual freedom of conscience, of expression, of religion, and freedom from secret police. Respondents expected Germany to rebuild its cities, renew its export trade, provide raw materials, more homes, and better

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 77

health services. A large percentage of respondents named the establishment of friendly international relations as the chief demand of the people on their government. On the one hand, many felt that the government should not intervene in social and economic life; on the other hand, many expected compre- hensive social services from cradle to the grave.

Report No. 6 (20 April 1946)

LAW NO. 3

Sample: unspecified (c. 985) in American Zone. Interviewing dates: third week in February 1946. (4 pp.)

Over three-quarters of the sample (76%) had heard of Law No. 3, which obliged workers to register at the local labor office. Approval of the law was almost unanimous: 87 per cent of the entire population approved of the law and thought that it would facilitate reconstruction, as opposed to only two per cent who disapproved of the law or thought that it would hinder reconstruction. A firm majority (62%) approved and a quarter (25%) disapproved of the provision that workers could not leave their presently-held jobs.

Attitudinal differences among groups within the popula- tion indicated that areas where conditions were more difficult were also more discontented with the regulation. Bavarians, who were best off of all people in the American Zone, were more in agreement than those in the other Laender. In the large cities of Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich there was a relatively lower degree of approval than in other city-sized communities. Towns with populations between 10,000 and 100,000 gave the highest degree (70%) of approval of the law.

Seventy per cent of those interviewed allowed that many

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people who could work did not do so because they could not find appropriate positions. Indications of particular group worries were found in the fact that more young people (81%) than middle-aged (70%) said that many people were looking for suitable jobs, and that more residents of the three large cities (88%) than those of smaller cities (69%) also thought that many were seeking work cut to their interests.

Among all those working, however, a sohd majority was definitely well (63%) or fairly well (23%) satisfied with their jobs and only ten per cent expressed dissatisfaction. The middle-aged were more satisfied (83%) than were people under the age of 30 (73%). Dissatisfaction stemmed largely from the fact that respondents were engaged in work for which they had not been trained. Some white-collar workers, for instance, pointed out that circumstances forced them to accept ordinary labor tasks. Others complained that their work was too hard, and former Nazi Party members, particularly, said that their work was frequently humiliating. Still another complaint was that income was too low in view of the high taxes.

Those who did not work gave various reasons for their lack of steady employment. Nearly half (44%) were housewives who did not contemplate seeking any job. A quarter (24%) of the unemployed reported that they were either unable to work because of their age or the state of their health or did not have to work because they were already pensioned. One in ten (9%) nonworkers said that denazificiation had led to refusals of jobs. About the same number (12%) asserted that there was no work to be found in their area or that the work they sought could not be found.

A substantial minority (31%) of workers considered that they were not working as hard as they had during the war. About half (51%) of all those who had worked during the war and were still working reported no change in the pressure of their work. About a fifth (18%) claimed that the times and special hardships encountered made their work more difficult than had previously been the case.

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 79

Report No. 7(11 May 1946)

REACTIONS TO RECENT REVISIONS IN THE DENAZIFICATION PROGRAM

Sample: 992 residents of the American Zone. Interviewing dates: 15 March 1946. (6 pp.)

Although 59 per cent of those interviewed in AMZON had heard of the changes in the denazification program made just prior to the survey, only 28 per cent had a reasonable idea of what the changes were. Recognition of the provisions of the new law was more widespread than recall of the changes instituted, yet only 35 per cent were able to recognize these changes.

Only four per cent of those who had heard of the new law felt the changes to be for the worse. Over a third (36%) said that the law would allow for a better implementation of denazification, since it would permit individual treatment and punishment. Others viewed the new law with misgivings. Criticism from both those satisfied and dissatisfied with the denazification program centered about suggestions for more discrimination in judgments imposed and regarding each case on its individual merits.

Over half (54%) of the population could give a compar- ative estimate of the way denazification was being carried out in all four zones. Of the 26 per cent who perceived a difference, 13 per cent said denazification was best carried out in the American Zone, 12 per cent felt it was most rigorous in the American Zone. An appreciable minority felt denazification to be harshest in the Soviet Zone.

Well over half (57%) of the adult population said they were satisfied with the manner in which denazification was being carried out. This figure indicated an increase in satisfac- tion over the level expressed in previous surveys. Three in four of those who preferred to have the Americans handle the program without any German help expected that this situation would

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produce justice and impartiality. Those who would like to see some German assistance while still leaving the main job in the hands of the Americans argued that, despite the need for cooperation, the responsibility and supervision should be American (28%), or that the Germans could not be trusted to do a fair and impartial job (22%). Another fifth (20%) frankly admitted that the Americans were more just and impartial.

Satisfaction of former NSDAP members with the new program or with denazification generally did not differ mark- edly from that of the general population. Respondents with relatives who were former Party members, however, criticized the denazification program more sharply.

Report No. 8(1 June 1946)

REACTIONS TO THE NEW TAX LAWS

Sample: 99 1 residents of 80 communities in the American

Zone.

Interviewing dates: 1 March 1946. (5 pp.)

Of the 68 per cent of those interviewed in the American Zone who had heard of the new tax law, almost all thought that its effect would be to raise taxes. There was evidence of a lack of knowledge about the new law. More than two in five (43%) were unable to guess any amount when asked to estimate their taxes. Lower income groups made up a higher percentage of those who were uninformed than did higher income groups. Income groups varied Uttle in the percentages which agreed that the new taxes would make it impossible to meet necessary expenses. When grouped by social class, however, there was appreciable variation.

A plurality (43%) cited reparations when asked to account for the increase in taxation. Almost three-quarters (72%) saw a

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 81

justification for the higher taxes. Reasons for favoring the new tax law were the prevention of inflation (56%) and the economic reconstruction of Germany (61%).

In commenting on the abolition of the social bonuses paid under National Socialism to parents with many children, 62 per cent expressed their opposition to the Nazi bonus plan and only 22 per cent endorsed it. More than half (55%) felt that the new law abrogating the bonus system would actually prevent people from having as many children as they might have had. As many as a third (33%) felt this was the purpose of the new law. Those who denied this intent to the law (47%) said, rather, that the law was designed to raise money for Germany's reconstruction (24%), to give equity to small families (7%), to raise money for reparations (4%), or to help prevent inflation (3%).

Report No. 9 (7 June 1946)

ATTITUDES TOWARD RELIGION AND THE CHURCH AS POLITICAL FACTORS IN GERMAN LIFE

Sample: 996 persons in the American Zone. Interviewing dates: 8 March 1946. (1 1 pp.)

The survey focuses upon the attitudes of four major groups in the AMZON population: regular churchgoing Catholics and Protestants, and irregular churchgoing CathoUcs and Protes- tants. Some of the characteristics of these groups are important in that they shed light on the attitudinal patterns of their representatives. Among Catholics, 65 per cent said they attended church regularly. Fifty per cent of the Protestants claimed regular attendance. Seventy-one per cent of the regular churchgoing Catholics preferred the CSU or the CDU. Among regular churchgoing Protestants, 38 per cent supported the SPD; 40 per cent, the two Christian parties (CDU and CSU). The

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irregular churchgoing members of both faiths were predomi- nately SPD supporters. Sixty-three per cent of the LDP supporters were irregular churchgoers. More of those who regularly attended church (74%) took part in the previous elections than nonchurchgoers (59%).

Former Nazis tended to be nonchurchgoers. Of the regular churchgoers interviewed, 12 per cent formerly belonged to the NSDAP; 17 per cent of the nonchurchgoers were former members. Hence, former NSDAP members, who were not allowed to vote, increased disproportionately the size of the nonvoting groups reported. Forty-nine per cent of regular churchgoing Catholics had seven or less years of education. About one-fourth of the other groups were similarly educated. Twenty per cent of the regular churchgoers of both faiths had attended nine or more years of school, while 28 per cent of the irregular churchgoers had been similarly educated.

Members of each of the two major religious faiths generally refrained from criticism of the other church's lack of opposition to the Nazis. Criticism that did develop stemmed mostly from irregular churchgoers of both faiths. While 70 per cent of the regular churchgoing Catholics stated that the Church had done its utmost to offer resistance to the National Sociahsts during their regime, only 47 per cent of regular churchgoing Protestants made a similar claim. Only among regular church- going Catholics did a majority believe that the clergy had warned them of the dangers of voting for National Sociahsm. Among irregular churchgoing Catholics a plurality (35%) stated that there were still Nazis among the clergy. Most members of the other three groups denied this fact. It appears that a fairly large percentage of respondents replied in a prejudiced fashion in an attempt to stem criticism of their own church.

Important groups in the population felt that religion was a real force in the reconstruction of Germany. But support of religion as a moral force in life was distinguished from support of the church when it plays a political role. A plurahty (43%) of the entire population believed that the church was taking part in political affairs at that time. Seventy per cent, however, felt

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 83

that the church should be less interested in political affairs. Major opposition was also expressed to instruction by the clergy in regard to voting in an election or support for particular political parties. Support for the reconstitution of another Zentrum party was found among 32 per cent of regular churchgoing Catholics. As many Catholic women favored as opposed the suggested move. But all other characteristic groups expressed strong opposition. Underscoring the minimal inter- church rivalry found, more members of all groups studied thought that Catholics and Protestants would be able to cooperate successfully in a "Christian" political party than denied this possibility.

A large majority of the general population felt that the

military government had given sufficient and appropriate

support to the church.

Report No. 10 (21 June 1946)

ATTITUDES TOWARD POLITICS AS A CAREER FOR THE COMING GENERATION IN GERMANY

Sample: 1,515 adults in the American Zone and the

American Sector of Berlin.

Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (9 pp.)

A very large majority (76%) of the German public thought of politics as no career for their sons. Two important variations in these attitudes occurred within the class structure of the society. The very uppercrust was relatively more disposed, and the upper-middle class relatively less disposed, toward such a career than was the average German. Disillusionment with politics was apparent not only among those who participated in the Nazi government but also among those groups that closely identified themselves with National Socialist aims and ideals.

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The most important of these latter groups were the returned prisoners of war, and the young men and women under 30 years of age. Significantly greater respect for pohtics as a worthy profession existed among supporters of left-wing political parties and among trade union members.

Important differences were recorded among residents of various sized communities. Farmers least favored (5% favored) a political career for their sons. Residents of the large cities of Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich, and of the American Sector of Berlin, seem to have overcome political apathy to an appreciable degree.

Comments made by interviewees exemplified the patterns of public thinking on this subject. Those not favoring a political career for their sons remarked on the crooked nature of politics, the belief that it is not a profession, and its demand for maturity. Many respondents indicated horror and repugnance at the thought of their sons taking up politics. Reasons for favoring a political career included taking care of the needs of the people, making things better, the need for greater attention to pohtics, working for peace, freedom from militarism and fascism, and becoming good democrats.

In contrast to the AMZON population, only 14 per cent of which would favor pohtics as a career for their sons (76% against), cross-samples of the American population revealed 21 per cent in favor and 68 per cent against in January 1945, and 25 per cent in favor and 65 per cent against in the spring of 1946. Among the British population in January 1945, 25 per cent favored and 48 per cent opposed such a career for their sons. In the United States the lower class was more inclined than the upper class to be favorable; in England the reverse was true.

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Report No. 11 (27 June 1946)

GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD TRADE UNIONS

Sample: 1,600 adults in the American Zone and in the

American Sector of Berlin.

Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (11 pp.)

The general public was divided on whether the Nazis' denial of collective bargaining and the right to strike was good or not. Thirty-five per cent of the respondents viewed positively the Nazi labor policy, asserting that strikes were bad and the standard of living had been good. Thirty-eight per cent opposed the Nazi policy on the grounds that the workers had lost all their rights under the Nazi system. Opinion was also split on the German Labor Front's record. Thirty-seven per cent said that the DAF did an unsatisfactory job of representing workers' interests, while 22 per cent thought it had done a good job representing these interests. Some were wilhng to recognize the DAF's pohcies on social benefits even though they did not think that the DAF satisfactorily represented the workers. More people (42%) opposed the reestablishment of collective bargain- ing after the occupation than favored it (34%). Most people (71%) favored an advisory voice for workers in management, such as the Workers Councils (approved by 66 per cent) recently authorized by the Allied Control Council provide. Fifty-five per cent favored the Military Government's wage fixing pohcy; 24 per cent opposed it.

Unionists in the American Zone were oriented toward the Western democracies rather than toward the Soviet Union. The bulk of leftist sentiment among unionists favored the SPD rather than the KPD. Certain authoritarian features of a government-controlled economy attracted a surprisingly large minority of unionists. Pre-1933 unionists (68%) and current unionists (74%) were nonetheless more democratic than the population as a whole (49%) in favoring free trade unions with collective bargaining rights.

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Nazism made some inroads among the pre-1933 unionists, but the compromised unionists tended to remain outside the free trade unions now being organized. The new trade unions attracted the more democratic of the pre-1933 unionists (for example, 56 per cent of pre-1933 unionists active in 1946 thought the Nazi wage control policy bad). The new generation of unionists without pre-1933 experience was not appreciably less democratic than the old generation of pre-1933 unionists who resumed their union activity.

Report No. 12 (28 June 1946)

ATTITUDES OF SOME BAVARIAN SCHOOLCHILDREN

Sample: 250 schoolchildren between the ages of 12 and 18 in Regensburg, Welheim, Pirkensee, and Burglengenfeld. Interviewing dates: not specified. (6 pp.)

Although 88 per cent of the children had belonged to Nazi youth organizations, only 1 2 per cent were members of a new youth organization. Thirty-seven per cent of their parents had belonged to the NSDAP, a figure about average for the American Zone. Eighty-four per cent of the youth were CathoHc. Most (48%) would vote for the CSU if they were old enough, 18 per cent for the SPD, and three per cent for the KPD. Almost a third (29%), however, said they would not vote even if they could.

Their principal concern was obtaining food. Thirty per cent said that the type of aid Germany most needed was food, and 26 per cent reported that their greatest wish was for more food. They also desired peace and freedom for their brothers who were prisoners of war. Their secondary concern were jobs, clothing, and shoes. The children seemed to be in good health. Reading, sports, and handicrafts provided recreation.

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 87

Almost all the children (98%) claimed to like school. Most (66%) thought themselves to be average students. About one-third considered themselves to be good students. Only a few (3%) admitted that they were bad students. Although they were interested in a wide variety of subjects, they liked best mathematics, German, geography, history, biology, and English. Seventy-four per cent preferred to learn English rather than some other foreign language.

The employment aspirations of the youth were generally low. The girls wanted to be saleswomen, dressmakers, clerks, teachers, and hairdressers. The boys wished to be bakers, electricians, or carpenters. None of the boys wanted to teach. More girls (7%) than boys (3%) hoped to become physicians or dentists.

The most common reason given (36%) for Germany's loss of the war was the overpowering strength of the enemy. Second (30%) was Germany's lack of material. When asked to name the three greatest Germans, about ten per cent named Hitler, a quarter mentioned monarchs, and a third poets. When ques- tioned as to what the respondent would do if he alone knew the secret of the atom bomb, the most common answer given (36%) was to keep it a secret. Democracy to these youths meant freedom for the people (23%) and government by the people (10%). Forty-eight per cent, however, had no opinion when asked what democracy meant.

Almost as many (35%) liked the American soldier as disliked him (39%). More than half of those who disliked the American soldier mentioned his general behavior as a reason.

Most of the youth expected a good, lasting, or just or wise peace from the Allies. Fifty-nine per cent did not expect another war soon. Of the 41 per cent who did expect war, most thought it would be with the Soviet Union.

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Report No. 13 (28 June 1946)

A PRELIMINARY STUDY OF BOOK READING

IN GERMANY

Sample: approximately 1 ,000 adult Germans in the Ameri- can Zone. Interviewing dates: late February 1946. (5 pp.)

Over half the sample population (55%) stated that they did not read books at all. The remaining 43 per cent read for various amounts of time. Eleven per cent read up to two hours a week; 14 per cent between two and six hours per week. Most readers had recently been reading for amusement and diversion. Kitsch, sentimental love stories, novels, mysteries, and detective stories were most popular.

Although book readers came from widely diverse back- grounds, they were most likely to be from better educated circles, the younger adult age groups, and from middle-sized cities rather than from very small communities (under 2,000 inhabitants) or very large cities (over 300,000 inhabitants). Almost as many women read as men; men, however, tended to read many more hours per week than women. Former Nazis read a great deal more than those who had not been Nazis. Twenty-two per cent of the readers who were former Nazis read eight hours or more weekly, while only eight per cent of those who had not been Nazis read this amount.

Only a very small number (five per cent of the total adult population, nine per cent of all book readers) used local libraries. Many books were personal loans. The opportunity to purchase new books was still very limited.

Novels, fiction and short stories were by far the most popular, both with groups that read up to four hours per week (71%) and with those who read over four hours per week. Book readers felt that forthcoming books on Germany's problems should deal with reconstruction, the future of Germany, and Europe. When asked what types of books and authors they

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 89

would like to see on sale as soon as possible, book readers expressed greatest interest in books and authors forbidden during the Nazi regime. Second choice comprised new books by German writers living in Germany.

Report No. 14(6 July 1946)

MAIL TO "STIMME AMERIKAS," FEBRUARY AND MARCH 1946

Sample: 3,466 pieces of mail written to the "Voice of

America."

Interviewing dates: 29 January 1946 through 1 April

1946. (10 pp.)

Over half the mail to the "Voice of America" came from the American Zone (52 per cent in February; 54 per cent in March). Within AMZON there was an increase in the mail from the Bavarian audience (17 per cent in February; 21 per cent in March). Proportionate to the population of the three Laender in the American Zone, more hsteners living in Hesse wrote to VOA than listeners in the other two Laender. During the period of this survey, nearly 85 per cent of the population lived in towns or villages with fewer than 100,000 inhabitants. At the beginning of the survey, 70 per cent of the mail came from communities of this size. In later weeks, this percentage dropped to about 60 per cent. Although 60 per cent of the inhabitants of AMZON were women, well over half of the letters written to the "Voice of America" came from men. More letters were mailed to VOA on Monday (20%) than on any other day of the week. This percentage declined as the week progressed, falling to 6 per cent on Sunday.

In the period considered, a smaller percentage of letters raised considerations of personal problems abroad, such as

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requests for aid in returning prisoners of war from the United States, than in earher periods. A large percentage of the mail concerned personal problems in Germany (45 per cent in February; 38 per cent in March). About an eighth of the mail ( 1 1 per cent in February; 13 per cent in March) contained denials of the war guilt of all the German people or pointed out the guilt of specific segments of the population, such as Hitler or the SS. About half that number (six per cent in February; seven per cent in March) criticized the denazification program. In March, there was a sharp increase in mail containing references to the reconstruction of Germany (eight per cent in February; 17 per cent in March). About a tenth (11 per cent in February; nine per cent in March) of the letters requested information about leaving Germany.

The letters contained very few critical remarks. Such criticism as there was concerned the commentators, the time at which broadcasts took place, and a dishke for the jazz music broadcast. The commentators remained the most popular feature mentioned in this period. Second most popular were discussions and speeches. About two per cent requested more material about hfe in the United States or reported liking VOA for its presentation of various aspects of American life.

Report No. 14A (8 July 1946)

GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE EXPULSION OF GERMAN NATIONALS FROM NEIGHBORING COUNTRIES

Sample: 964 persons in the American Zone (nine per cent of whom identified themselves as evacuees). Interviewing dates: 1 1 March 1946. (16 pp.)

Although 60 per cent of the evacuees expected to get along with the resident German population, only 50 per cent of the resident population had a similar expectation. Even this group made reservations. For example, the resident Germans thought that the evacuees would get along if they were decent,

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 91

or if they did their part and cooperated. A quarter (25%) of both the evacuees and the resident Germans did not expect to get along. More members of the higher social classes had met with evacuees than had members of the lower social classes. More former NSDAP members (48%) had developed conversa- tional contacts with evacuees than nonmembers of the Party (32%).

The population of the American Zone was basically unaware of the mass migrational character of the movement of evacuees. Only 34 per cent thought that at least one million evacuees would come to the American Zone, and 42 per cent were unable to suggest any number at all.

Most people projected responsibility for the move upon groups other than the general German population. One-half (51%) blamed the Allies for a policy of hatred and revenge; 29 per cent blamed the Nazis and their misdeeds; and 25 per cent of those questioned were unable to judge who or what was responsible for the evacuations. More people (48%) felt the Allies should be held fully, or at least partly, responsible for the care of the evacuees than accepted the problem as a responsi- bility of the German nation or communities (40%). Almost half (46%) of the residents of Hesse were ready to accept the responsibihty for the evacuees themselves. In the other two Laender, there were more who wanted to escape the responsi- bihty (45%) than were willing to accept it (37%). In general, Protestants, the better educated, former NSDAP members, the higher social classes, and residents of the largest cities demon- strated a greater sense of responsibihty for the evacuees. There was greatest resistance to German efforts to care for evacuees in cities of between 100,000 and 250,000 population. Four-fifths (81%) were ready to give economic equality to the evacuees, but only 74 per cent were willing to give political equality. Primary opposition to giving pohtical equality stemmed from supporters of the CSU. A sohd majority of all those questioned despaired of finding a solution for the lack of food (71%) and housing (64%), but only a third (35%) thought the matter of jobs to be insoluble.

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A large majority (72%) felt that the evacuations were not justified. Those most likely to support the policy (14 per cent of the whole population) were SPD supporters (18%), irregular churchgoers (18%), nonmembers of the NSDAP (16%), the lower classes (17%), residents of the larger cities (25%), and inhabitants of Hesse (19%).

Report No. 15 (27 July 1946)

RELATIVE EFFECTS OF FOOD SCARCITY IN TWO COUNTRIES

Sample: a representative sample of 992 (March), 1 ,5 1 5 (April), and 1 ,698 (May) adults in the American Zone and, in May only, in the American Sector of Berlin. Interviewing dates: 15 March 1946; 15 April 1946; and 8 May 1946. (3 pp.)

In the American Zone, 61 per cent of the respondents stated in March 1946 that they were not getting enough food to be able to work efficiently. There was a cut in rations which took effect in AMZON on 1 April 1946. After this cut, 72 per cent of the population reported insufficient food. In May 1946, 70 per cent reported insufficient food. Eighty-eight per cent of the Berhn respondents, questioned for the first time in May, reported food scarcity. Within the American Zone, an even larger percentage (93%) of the residents of towns between 100,000 and 250,000 reported such hardship. Eighty-five per cent complained of scarcity in towns between 50,000 and 100,000 population and in the large cities of Frankfurt, Stuttgart, and Munich. The percentage reporting scarcity dechned to 75 per cent in communities from 2,000 to 50,000 and to 60 per cent in villages under 2,000 population.

In England, a survey in late November 1945 and another in March 1946 produced identical results: Exactly half the people

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 93

questioned said that they felt they were not getting enough food to be able to work efficiently; and almost as many (47%) said that they were procuring sufficient food.

Report No. 16 (7 August 1946)

GERMAN ATTITUDES TOWARD THE NUREMBERG TRIALS

Sample: summary of eight surveys, with sample sizes rang- ing from 331 in November 1945 to 2,969 in August 1946. Interviewing dates: not specified; relevant surveys from 26 October 1945 to 9 August 1946. (6 pp.)

The results of a survey shortly after the International Military Tribunal convened in November 1945 revealed that, in the intervening few weeks, 65 per cent of the German people had learned something from the proceedings. In later polls the percentage of people having gained some information rose to 87 per cent. When asked at the time of the survey what they had learned, 29 per cent reported first learning about the concentra- tion camps. At the time of the second survey, 57 per cent reported first learning of the concentration camps. In this second survey, 30 per cent of the respondents said they first learned of the annihilation of the Jews from the Trials. No one on the first survey reported having gained this knowledge.

The number of respondents beUeving that the Nazis would receive a fair trial never dropped below 75 per cent. The average for the eight surveys showed the belief by 80 per cent that the Nazi leaders would receive a fair trial; four per cent thought that the trial would not be fair, and 16 per cent held no opinion.

A majority of the population felt that the war leaders on trial were guilty. Seventy per cent thought all to be guilty. Among the nine per cent who named someone they considered

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to be not guilty, Hess was mentioned most frequently. Sixty per cent of the respondents felt that the indictment of whole organizations — such as the Reich Cabinet, the leadership corps of the Nazi Party, the SS, the SA, the Gestapo, and the General Staff and High Command of the Army - was justified. A quarter (25%) saw no justification for such an indictment.

Nearly half the respondents believed that the accused would receive the death sentence. The sampled group split sharply on the question of whether all defendants would receive the same punishment. Over a third (37%) thought that they would; and nearly all of these thought that the punishment would be death. Almost half (46%) felt that the punishment would vary according to the individual defendant.

Seventy per cent thought that there were others guilty of war crimes in addition to the 21 then on trial. Respondents most frequently named Nazi Party members and lesser leaders as being guilty. Almost 60 per cent felt that those guilty should be charged after the Nuremberg Trials, but a similar percentage did not know which of these groups would be charged. And although they expected further trials to be held at the conclusion of the trial of the 21 major defendants, 82 per cent of the people did not know that the political leaders then in prison camps were expected to be tried.

The series of surveys showed that a majority of the readers found newspaper reports of the Trials to be complete and trustworthy.

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 95

Report No. 17 (8 August 1946)

ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL LEADERSHIP IN GERMANY COMPARED WITH ATTITUDES IN SEVEN OTHER COUNTRIES

Sample: 1 ,5 1 5 residents of the American Zone. Interviewing dates: 15 April 1946. (5 pp.)

A solid majority (58%) thought that the United States would chiefly influence world history in the coming decade. About one in 20 more (60%) was ready to assume that the United States and Britain would act together as one power. Only about one in ten AMZON Germans (11%) looked to the Soviet Union as the most important country in the ten years to come, but a small group (6%) could not distinguish between the relative strengths of the United States and Russia. Only a very tiny proportion (2%) held that Britain was the country which would influence future world decisions. About one in seven respon- dents (15%) was unable to express a judgment on this matter.

The reasons given in support of the replies emphasized the fundamental distinction made by Germans when they thought of the future reorganization of their own country under the direction of the Allies. Practically half of those thinking that America would dominate the world scene, for instance, held that its great economic strength, rich resources, and great stocks of food would place America in the supreme position. About one in five thought that its political ideology and leadership directed toward peaceful ends would carry America forward in a dominant role. Only about one in seven referred to the military might of the United States - its army and navy, and the atomic bomb.

By way of contrast, nearly six in ten of those who thought that the Soviet Union would occupy the leadership position referred to the revolutionary drive of Bolshevism. Another one in seven spoke respectfully about the ideological leadership and

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need for peace which would determine Soviet behavior in the future.

Britain's force, said most people who chose this nation, lay in her political strength. Some also mentioned Britain's naval and military power as well as the overseas economic resources of the British Empire.

The rankings by eight countries seeing the United States exerting future leadership were: the United States (63%), AMZON Germany (58%), Austria (50%), Sweden (50%), Great Britain (48%), France (43%), Canada (36%), and Denmark (21%). The rank orders for countries envisioning future Soviet leadership were: France (41%), Great Britain (31%), Austria (26%), the United States (24%), Canada (24%), Sweden (21%), Denmark (19%), and AMZON Germany (11%). Only Austrians and Canadians (19%) saw the future importance of Britain to be high, followed by the British (14%), Danes (9%), Swedes (8%), Americans (5%), French (4%), and AMZON Germans (2%).

Report No. 18(14 August 1946)

A STUDY OF FOOD CONSUMPTION AND ATTITUDES TOWARD RATIONING AND GENERAL HEALTH OF THE GERMAN POPULATION

Sample: 1,698 interviews (1,504 in the American Zone

and 194 in the British and American Sectors of Berhn)

plus 526 additional cases to build up the sample to permit

more detailed breakdowns, making a total of 2,224

respondents.

Interviewing dates: 8 May 1946. (53 pp.)

Two-fifths (41%) of the AMZON respondents and a fifth (22%) of the Berhners beheved that food rations were largest in the American Zone; 29 per cent of the AMZON Germans and 16

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 97

per cent of the Berliners felt rations to be largest in the British Zone. A fifth (22%) of the AMZON sample and a third (32%) of the Berliners saw residents of the Soviet Zone getting the smallest rations. Almost nine in ten (89%) of the respondents in the American Zone, but only 37 per cent of the Berliners, said that the food rationcard system was fair. Respondents in Berhn aimed their complaints about the rationcard system at those who they thought obtained more food than they deserved rather than at actual food shortages. Respondents in both AMZON (41%) and Berlin (31%) nonetheless blamed an actual shortage of food for the food reduction of 1 April 1946. A majority of the Berliners (61%) but only a minority of the AMZON residents (37%) felt that the food situation would improve. More generally, not a single BerUner and only 12 per cent of the AMZON respondents indicated satisfaction with the food ration, although 21 per cent in Berlin and 24 per cent in the American Zone reported that their rations were adequate.

AMZON residents, on the whole, ate much better than did BerUners. Bread and potatoes led the hst of foods eaten in the American Zone in the 24 hours immediately preceding the interview, while most Berliners had had cereal and bread. Greater food scarcity in Berlin was demonstrated by the fact that Berhners (25%) received substitutes for unavailable ra- tioned food items more frequently than did residents of AMZON (12%), whereas more of the latter (25%) than of the Berliners (5%) had received special food rations in the week preceding the interview.

To supplement their food ration, 40 per cent of the AMZON respondents had homemade preserves as did only 1 1 per cent of the Berhn respondents. Over half (53%) of the Berlin respondents and 21 per cent of those in AMZON said that they were able to obtain food in addition to the rationed items purchased at the store. In Berhn, 15 per cent said they obtained their supplementary food on the black market. The median interval at which both Berhners and residents of AMZON obtained supplementary food is, for the majority, one meal for one person per week. About a sixth (18 per cent in

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AMZON; 15 per cent in Berlin) went to the country to obtain supplemental food. Only 1 1 per cent of the AMZON and 12 per cent of the Berliners ate in restaurants. Eight per cent in AMZON and ten per cent in Berlin indicated that they gave food away, most often to members of the immediate family or relatives. Considering all additional sources, 80 per cent of those interviewed in the American Zone and 90 per cent of the Berhn sample were able to obtain some food in addition to the authorized ration.

Every respondent interviewed in Berlin said that a black market existed in that city. In the American Zone, 43 per cent of the respondents reported the existence of a black market in their community, 29 per cent said that there was no black market in their community, and 28 per cent did not know whether or not a black market existed. Substantial majorities (56 per cent in AMZON, 82 per cent in Berlin) blamed the black market for shortages in food, clothing, shoes, and tobacco as well as other items. Even larger majorities (67 per cent in AMZON; 91 per cent in Berlin) believed that the black market exerted an unfavorable influence on economic conditions. The respondents directed their complaints particularly at farmers who, they felt, were keeping their produce from the open market. Over three in five (63 per cent in AMZON; 62 per cent in Berlin) perceived the authorities to be doing everything possible to eliminate the black market.

Regarding general health, 66 per cent of the AMZON respondents and 76 per cent of the Berlin respondents reported having lost weight between January 1946 and the time of the interview. In the American Zone, the median number of kilograms lost was four to five; in Berlin, six to ten. Seven- tenths (71%) of the AMZON respondents and 88 per cent of the Berhners said that they did not get enough food to work efficiently. Over a quarter (30 per cent in AMZON; 26 per cent in Berlin) had suffered at least one cold in the month prior to the time of the interview.

Regarding prospective supplementary food sources, 50 per cent of the AMZON and 3 1 per cent of the Berhn respondents

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 99

expected to make preserves during the coming summer. Sixty per cent in AMZON and 24 per cent in Berlin planned to have a garden that summer. Most respondents (92 per cent in AMZON; 91 per cent in Berhn) did not expect to receive food parcels from friends or relatives outside Germany.

Report No. 19 (19 August 1946)

BASIC ATTITUDES EXPLORED BY THE "GERMAN ATTITUDE SCALE"

Sample: 1,470 persons in the American Zone, 182 in the American Sector of Berhn, 295 youths aged 17 to 27 in Wuerttemberg-Baden, 84 political prisoners to be detained in camp, 95 political prisoners to be released, and 214 Marburg University students. Interviewing dates: not specified. (55 pp.)

The questionnaire used in this survey comprised eight sets of questions (with a total of 110 items), each of which probed attitudes in a generally defined area. Eleven scales focused on: family, women, and children; ethics and justice (social responsi- bihty); anti-Semitism; projection of guilt; future of Germany (supervised responsibility); flattery (questions to which respon- dents could give answers flattering to the occupation powers; replies providing a test of the sincerity of the individual's responses); war and mihtarism; and four aspects of government, democracy, authority — the necessity of pohtical information and interest, independent thinking as a value, the falhbihty of leadership, and independence and rights of others.

On the average, about three in ten AMZON Germans replied in the democratic direction on all eleven scales. An additional third answered in a democratic direction on all but

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one question within each scale. Those most likely to give democratic responses were Hessians, residents of cities over 100,000 in population, those with more than 12 years of schooUng, those between 50 and 59 years of age, men, married persons, SPD supporters, those who had a professional occupa- tion, middle income groups, pohtical prisoners, and the Marburg students. Those who were usually undemocratic were residents of towns under 10,000 in population, those with less than seven years of schooUng, those who had a former member of the NSDAP in the family, those under the age of 20, women, the widowed, those with no party preference, farmers, low income groups, and youth in Wuerttemberg-Baden.

Report No. 20 (27 August 1946)

PRELIMINARY STUDY OF MOTION PICTURE ATTENDANCE AND ATTITUDES

Sample: in the American Zone, 331 respondents in November 1945, 414 in December, 964 and 993 in January 1946, and 985 in February 1946. Interviewing dates: 19 November 1945, 1 December 1945, 21 January 1946, 31 January 1946, 21 February 1946. (28 pp.)

In the period covered by this series of surveys, between 23 and 45 per cent of the respondents reported attending the movies. When asked in February 1946 how often they had been to the movies since the beginning of the occupation, most (17%) had been to the movies from one to five times. Most (16%) walked to the movies. The respondents who did not attend the movies were also asked in February what their reasons were: Most (26%) said that there were no movies in their town; 20 per cent indicated that they had no time; and 13 per cent had no interest in the movies.

THE OMGUS SURVEYS / 101

Of the 23 per cent who attended movies at the time of the February 1946 survey, about half (12%) felt that the films were good or very good. Seven per cent gave answers ranging from "all right" to "awful." Among moviegoers in the February survey, 94 per cent stated they would like to see an old German film again, as did 55 per cent of the nonmoviegoers. The two main reasons for wanting to see an old German film were: a preference for films emphasizing things German, that is, German films made more sense, were more beautiful, or were more personal; and because of the language, and particularly a dislike of subtitles.

Of the 23 per cent who went to the movies at the time of the February 1946 survey, 18 per cent had seen the newsreel Die Welt im Film {The World in Film). Most (11%) thought the newsreel good, all right, or interesting. Most (10%) gave as the main reason for liking the film the fact that it brought news from the outside.

Only 12 per cent of the 31 January 1946 respondents in Bavaria (less than one third of the moviegoers in this Land) had seen the concentration camp film Todesmuehlen {Mills of Death). Nineteen per cent of all Bavarians interviewed (70 per cent of the Bavarian moviegoers who had not seen the film) said they would not have been deterred from going to the movies if they had known ahead of time that a concentration camp film was to be shown. Twelve per cent in Bavaria would not go to the movies if they knew that such a film was being shown. Most of those who saw the film (11%) thought the film an accurate account of conditions in concentration camps; and most (9%) said they had learned something from the film.

Of the American films seen by Germans, they liked Madame Curie best and Todesmuehlen least. The old German film which respondents would most like to see again was Die Goldene Stadt {The Golden City).

102 / PUBLIC OPINION IN OCCUPIED GERMANY

Report No. 21 (25 September 1946)

ATTITUDES TOWARD LICENSED NEWSPAPERS IN SOME AMERICAN OCCUPIED AREAS

Sample: 8,029 adults in the American Zone and West Ber- lin. Interviewing dates: last three weeks of June 1946. (13 pp.)

This survey examined the attitudes toward 33 American-licensed newspapers on the part of residents in the cities where the newspapers were published; appendices appear in Report No. 34 of 28 December 1946.

The more education a person had, the more likely he was to read newspapers: In Bavaria, 27 per cent of those with less than seven years of schooling said that they did not read papers and 1 5 per cent of this group in Wuerttemberg-Baden were in the same category; only four per cent of those with 12 or more years of schooling, however, said that they did not read newspapers. Very few men (5%) did not do so, whereas nearly three times as many women did not. Those able to name a political party that they preferred were more likely to read newspapers than were those who could not choose a party. Those under 20 and those over 70 had the least number of readers in their ranks, although in Hesse it was only the very old who were nonreaders; Hessians under the age of 20 claimed to read papers as frequently as their parents.

An average of 49 per cent felt that their local paper was either "very good" or "good." Greatest dissatisfaction was shown by the residents of Hesse, usually a fairly critical population on any issue. There was only a slight positive correlation between disapproval of the German press and the feeling that it was hampered by American censorship. There was some indication that dissatisfaction rested upon the