Essays in Modern Ukrainian History

Ivan L. Rudnytsky
For Alexandra

“Educated Ukrainians usually work for anything in the world except Ukraine and its people.... They must take an oath to themselves not to desert the Ukrainian cause. They must realize that every educated man who leaves Ukraine, every cent which is not spent for Ukrainian purposes, every word that is not spoken in Ukrainian, is a waste of the capital of the Ukrainian people, and that with things as they are, anything lost is irreplaceable.’’

Mykhailo Drahomanov, “Introduction” to Hromada
Ivan L. Rudnytsky
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ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY


At the time of his death, in April 1984, my father left uncompleted various projects upon which he had expended considerable labour. One of his most cherished hopes was to publish a collection of his English-language essays, complementing his earlier Ukrainian volume, *Mizh istoriiiu i politykoiu* (Between History and Politics [Munich 1973]). It is with a mixture of regret and satisfaction that I have assumed editorial responsibility for this book—regret that he did not live to do it himself, and satisfaction at being able so tangibly to pay tribute to his memory.

As all who knew him will testify, my father was a man of cosmopolitan interests and prodigious (if always lightly held) erudition. From the ancient civilizations of China to contemporary American culture, nothing human was foreign to him, and he had likely read several books on the subject. But the breadth of his learning makes all the more remarkable the central fact of his scholarly career—an exclusive concentration on problems of Ukrainian history, particularly of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.

Certainly, this dedication to matters Ukrainian did not make my father’s academic advancement any easier, inasmuch as the very existence of Ukrainian history as an independent field of knowledge was not generally recognized by his American colleagues. Only with his arrival at the University of Alberta in 1971, and the founding of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies in 1976, did he find himself in a milieu truly congenial to his intellectual vocation.

It is not necessary for me to try to summarize the contents of the following essays, but a few observations may be in order. As a historian, my father had a healthy respect for the realm of the concrete, and he did not hesitate to decide an argument with an appeal to ‘‘empirical historical reality.’’ At the same time, perhaps the deepest influence on his thought
was the philosophy of Hegel, as evidenced by his belief that "the historical process has a logic of its own which transcends the plans and wishes of the actors," his assertion that "freedom is possible only within the framework of a statist rule of law," his equation of historicity with an access of self-consciousness, and his recognition of the ineradicability of conflict in human affairs.

Within the Ukrainian tradition, my father had the highest admiration for the conservative political thinker, Viacheslav Lypynsky. He referred on a number of occasions to Lypynsky's demonstration of the pivotal role played by the nobility in the Khmelnytsky revolution of the seventeenth century in order to refute those populist historians who failed to appreciate the need for differentiation in the social structure. It is principally for his lack of a pluralistic vision that my father criticized Lypynsky's antipode, the radical theorist Mykhailo Drahomanov, whose greatness he nonetheless championed.

When essays spanning over thirty years and written for diverse occasions are assembled in a single volume, some degree of repetition is perhaps unavoidable. I hope, however, that such overlapping will be felt to be minimal, and that the effect will be rather that of a unifying intelligence trained over a wide range of interrelated topics. In the case of previously published as well as unpublished pieces, I have taken the liberty of making minor stylistic changes, always with a view to bringing out most clearly what my father intended to say. For their thematic richness, in addition to a series of programmatic essays, I would draw attention particularly to "The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents," those on a group of nineteenth-century Ukrainophile Poles—Terlecki, Czajkowski, and Duchirński—and to those addressing the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations.

A historian, despite his devotion to study of the past, is inevitably also writing with an eye on present concerns, and in the final two essays of this book, my father turns his attention directly to Soviet Ukraine. The history of Ukraine, caught between "the Russian hammer and the Polish anvil," has been a tragic one, and the contemporary situation remains perilous. Yet Ukraine enjoys the recognition of at least nominal statehood within the Soviet Union, and the recent expressions of dissidence, in Ukraine as in Eastern Europe generally, show that the dream of independence refuses to die.

In the meantime, it is clear that activities in the West are closely followed on all sides in Ukraine, and there can be no more encouraging signs of the maturation of the émigré community than the establishment of centres for Ukrainian studies both at Harvard and the University of Alberta. By perpetuating the memory of Ukraine's past, my father sought to
enhance the prospects of its future, so that the world might see, in Drahomanov’s words, “one soulless corpse less, one living nation more.”

Peter L. Rudnytsky
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Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, Scholar and "Communicator"

It is no easy task to evaluate the work of Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky, a colleague and friend whose fortunes I often shared over the course of half a century. This is especially true as he departed so very unexpectedly, without completely fulfilling his creative potential. Shortly before his death I received a letter from him concerning the publication of papers from the successful conference that he had organized to mark the centennial of Viacheslav Lypynsky's birth. This was a strange coincidence: we first met in the 1937-8 academic year in Lviv, which at that time was the centre of the Ukrainian nationalist student movement. Our friendship arose through our mutual interest in the works and ideas of Viacheslav Lypynsky, a rare phenomenon at that time. Thus our relationship began and was interrupted under the aegis of Viacheslav Lypynsky.

By nature, Ivan Lysiak-Rudnytsky was not an ivory-tower scholar. Had he lived and worked in an independent Ukrainian state, he would surely have been a leading scholar-publicist, an organizer of cultural-political events, and an ambassador of Ukrainian intellectual creativity. He might even have carried out such duties not as a university professor but possibly as a member of a council of ministers.

Yet to a great extent he did carry out all the above activities from the relatively humble position of university professor. It would therefore be unfair to limit this evaluation to his published works, and to omit his unique intellectual role in our society as (to use a contemporary American term) a "communicator" of Ukrainian intellectual values in Ukrainian, American, Canadian, and even world forums.

Ivan was a rare phenomenon in Ukrainian life. There is no doubt that he was born under a lucky star. It is difficult to imagine a more stimulating environment than that engendered by his parents and maternal uncles. His place of birth was symbolic—Vienna of 1919—one of Europe’s
most cosmopolitan intellectual centres. Between 1919 and 1921 the Viennese home of the attorney and politician Pavlo Lysiak and his wife, the educator and socio-political activist Milena Rudnytska, was, as Ivan Kedryn-Rudnytsky writes, a meeting place for the leaders of the Ukrainian political emigration. Ivan, whose intellectual interests were nurtured by his mother, probably listened to political debates before he could walk.

After his parents had returned to their homeland and subsequently separated, Ivan grew up under the intellectual tutelage of the Rudnytsky clan in Lviv. This was an unusual family. The matriarch, Olha Rudnytska, née Spiegel (1864–1950), was widowed when her husband, the notary Ivan (1855–1906), Ivan’s grandfather, died prematurely, leaving her with five children on her hands. Although she was not Ukrainian and evidently never mastered the Ukrainian language, out of devotion to her late husband she reared her children as Ukrainians and ensured that they all received a higher education in Ukrainian schools. The children later became known as the Ukrainian “group of five,” whose talents were occupied in various spheres. The eldest, Mykhailo (1889–1975), became a leading literary scholar and aesthetician who demanded that Ukrainian scholars judge Ukrainian literature by world standards; he also specialized in English, French, and Italian literatures. Volodymyr (1891–1975) was a notary by profession (like his father) and a respected civic leader both at home and in the emigration. Ivan’s mother Milena (1892–1976) distinguished herself as the head of the Ukrainian women’s movement and as a political leader who defended the Ukrainian cause both in the Polish Sejm and at the League of Nations in Geneva. Ivan Kedryn (b. 1896), the only survivor of the group, is the elder statesman among Ukrainian publicists. A longtime correspondent and later editor of Dilo, he provided valuable political reports and memoirs. The youngest of the Rudnytsky brothers, Antin (1902–75), was a musician, composer, and director of the Kiev and Kharkiv operas.

One can understand why Ivan was so possessed by the Rudnytsky charisma that he decided to use his mother’s maiden name as his main surname. This was painful to his father, who took care of Ivan’s material needs until his death in 1948. In Göttingen in the late 1940s, Pavlo Lysiak showed me the correspondence in which father and son declared their respective views, and found no common denominator. Until he was thirty, Ivan was the darling of fate. Because his parents were intellectuals, he perused books as a matter of course. Under the tutelage of the Rudnytsky clan, he became an intellectual gourmet. Until 1953, his material needs were provided for, and he was able to study whatever he liked, as well as to attend public lectures, concerts, and other cultural
INTRODUCTION

events. Even the war did not disturb him. He left Lviv University in the autumn of 1939, and in 1940 he was able to continue his studies, first in Berlin; then, from 1943 to the autumn of 1945 at Charles University in Prague; and finally, after the collapse of Germany, in Geneva, Switzerland (1946–50) and Columbia University in New York (1951). This period provided the basis of his intellectual liberalism and cosmopolitan attitude to scholarly work.

Ivan’s first intellectual interest was philosophy, especially German transcendental philosophy of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. As a result, the chief interest of his subsequent academic career was historical cognition. Ivan was basically in agreement with the evolutionary outlook of idealism, which was characteristic of German historicism. On this basis he viewed the structure of Ukrainian history within the framework of Western intellectual development, with which he was well acquainted. He applied the concept in particular to the Middle Ages, which, as far as East European history is concerned, was more or less terra incognita to Western authorities. Ivan was influenced by Stepan Tomashivsky, who felt that the medieval period in Ukraine was a unique but still integral part of West European development.

Ivan, for example, could not accept the presence of a patrimonial system in the history of Ukraine-Rus’ before the Union of Lublin (1569), and he did not fully appreciate the strength of pre-secular thought in Ukraine before the first decades of the nineteenth century. Ivan gave a systematic outline of his views during the round-table discussion on 31 May 1978 at the Ukrainian historical conference in London, Ontario. Economic, social, and even religious problems (the first two in particular) were alien to him, as he divulged both publicly and privately. He used political history, on the other hand, to establish a chronological framework. Ivan focused his attention on the study of Ukrainian socio-political thought, which had captured his interest during his student days. For Ivan, in other words, history was neither a point of departure nor an end in itself, but rather a means of understanding the development of socio-political thought. This is reflected in the title he gave to his own work published by Suchasnist in 1973, Mízh istoríiui i politykoiu. Statti do istorii ta krytyky ukrainskoi suspilno-politychnoi dumky (Between History and Politics. Essays toward the History and Criticism of Ukrainian Social and Political Thought).

Since Ukrainian socio-political thought dates from the mid-nineteenth century, Ivan’s independent research covered the period from that time to the 1930s. Although he had studied at faculties of political science in Berlin and Geneva, he never became a “Kremlinologist.” This was in keeping with Ivan’s logical preconditions for his work: after 1933 in cen-
tural and eastern Ukraine, and after the Second World War in western Ukraine, official socio-political thought had ceased to develop, so there were insufficient bases for research.

Ivan’s basic interests also determined the form of his expression. His temperament was unsuited to the writing of a monograph that required many years of “manual labour” in archives, the inclusion of lengthy explanatory material in footnotes (difficult to systematize logically), and several parallel foci. He required a quick response to his thoughts, and he needed to react quickly, in writing or orally, to interesting intellectual phenomena. He found the scholarly-publicistic essay, with its clear philosophical foundation and faultless logical structure, to be more appropriate. This factor also determined the length of his works. His most important range from ten to forty pages, and only two works exceed this limit. The first of these, his study of Mykhailo Drahomanov as a political thinker, published in the *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* in 1952, was sixty pages long. This essay was a revision of his dissertation, defended in Prague in the spring of 1945, shortly before the end of the German occupation. Secondly, he wrote an eighty-three-page silhouette of the Galician politician and journalist Osyp Nazaruk (1883–1940), which appeared in 1971 as an introduction to the well-known volume of the correspondence between Nazaruk and Lypynsky. Incidentally, Ivan knew Nazaruk, a political friend of Ivan’s mother, in Lviv and had many conversations with him.

Ivan’s largest work, a history of Carpatho-Ukraine begun during his studies at Columbia University (1951–3), remains unfinished. A typescript of 175 pages is in his archive. Over a period of four decades (1943–84), Ivan thus published a relatively small amount of work. His bibliography of over 100 titles, including reviews and encyclopaedia entries, could probably be contained in a three-volume collection of 500 pages each. But the number of pages is of less significance than the quality of what he wrote. Despite the absence of large monographs, Ivan was far removed from any pettifoggery. He chose major themes, specifically between history and politics, and made them interesting both to the specialist and the intelligent lay reader. A good philosophical background (under the influence of Vasyl Rudko), acuteness and a broad perspective, intellectual honesty, and civic courage rendered his essays exceptional.

Since he understood the outlook of the Western reader, most of his works could be presented in two parallel versions—English and Ukrainian. It would be interesting to ascertain the number of his English-language and Ukrainian-language readers. It is probable that the former outnumbered the latter. Similarly, the scholarly discussions provoked by Ivan’s essays have been conducted on the pages of English-language publications such as *Slavic Review* and *Harvard Ukrainian Studies*. Ap-
proximately ten of Ivan’s English-language essays have become firmly established in international historiography and are required reading for both students and lecturers on East European history, especially in North America. In this respect Ivan did more to spread information about the most important problems of Ukraine, and Ukrainian socio-political thought in particular, than any of his colleagues.

Ivan’s works can be divided into two categories: studies of Ukrainian socio-political thinkers and activists and selected problems in the history of Ukrainian socio-political thought.

There is a dichotomy in the first category: Ukrainian political thinkers who were in the centre of Ivan’s research, and those on the periphery. The central figures include (in chronological order): the Polish trinity with a Ukrainian program, Michał Czajkowski (Sadyk Pasha) (1804–86), Hipolit Terlecki (1808–88), and Franciszek Duchiński (1816–93); Mykhailo Drahomanov; Viacheslav Lypynsky; and Osyp Nazaruk. On the periphery of his studies were the following: Ivan Franko; Mykhailo Hrushevsky; Volodymyr Vynnychenko; Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai; Dmytro Dontsov; and Mykola Khvylovy.

He studied the following questions:

1. The concept and problem of "historical" and "non-historical" nations;
2. The intellectual origins of modern Ukraine and the structure of nineteenth-century Ukrainian history;
3. The problem of the intelligentsia and intellectual development in Ukraine in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries;
4. Galicia under the Habsburg Empire and its contribution to the Ukrainian struggle for statehood;
5. The Ukrainian revolution of 1917–21 and the Fourth Universal in the historical context of Ukrainian political thought, or autonomy vs. independence;
6. Ukraine within the Soviet system;
7. Galician Ukrainian inter-war nationalism;
8. Ukrainians and their nearest neighbours, the Poles and the Russians;
9. 1848 in Galicia: an evaluation of political pamphlets.

Ivan conscientiously studied printed (and partially manuscript) primary sources of the history of Ukrainian socio-political thought from 1848 to 1940. As noted earlier, Ivan “grew up” on West European intellectual currents and followed their development throughout his creative life. In fact, he tended to view the world through the prism of a West
European observer. He felt equally at home in Polish intellectual circles and cultivated close personal ties with Polish scholars. The Russian world, on the other hand, whether Imperial or Bolshevik, remained psychologically alien to him.

Ivan declined to evaluate the patrimonial base of the political creativity of the Slavia Orthodoxa (to use Riccardo Picchio’s term), whether the subject was Kievan Rus’, Galician-Polish Rus’, Lithuanian Rus’ until 1569, the Grand Duchy (Tsardom) of Muscovy, or the Russian Empire. Likewise, he approached East European phenomena with Western criteria, whether the subject was medieval feudalism or the intelligenstia of the nineteenth century.

Ivan’s contribution to the study of Drahomanov’s legacy has been dealt with elsewhere. It did, however, contain one fundamental defect. Ivan isolated the world of Drahomanov’s ideas from the latter’s imperial Russian milieu. It was left not to Ivan, but to our mutual friend Ievhen Pyziur (unfortunately also deceased), a talented scholar of Ukrainian and Russian politics and thought, to place Drahomanov into an appropriate framework within the structure of imperial Russian constitutionalism.

If someone were to ask which of Ivan’s essays best sums up his intellectual achievements and historical perspective, and at the same time is an important contribution to historiography, I would not hesitate to name the English-language version of his study on “The Fourth Universal and Its Intellectual Antecedents,” published in the volume on the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–21 edited by Taras Hunczak. Ivan was the first to establish the place of that great revolution in the thinking of Ukrainian political activists and theorists between March 1917 and January 1918, and to demonstrate its effect both on champions of autonomy and on those who sought independence.

One of Ivan’s first printed works was his “Conversation on the Baroque,” which appeared in the journal Novi dni (1943) in the form of a dialogue and was reprinted in the collection Mizh istoriiieiu i politykoiu. The dialogue and Ivan’s role of “communicator” of free thought remained the chief facets of his life to the end. His dialogue took on various forms, five of which were fundamental.

First, he used personal encounters with friends, old and new, native and alien. He continued these encounters in the second form of the dialogue: correspondence. Throughout his life Ivan corresponded extensively in Ukrainian, Polish, and West European languages. There, as in personal conversations, he dealt with intellectual questions. Further, he exchanged information about new books, persons, and events. He treated his correspondence very seriously, almost pedantically retaining copies of his most important letters and those of his correspondents. In his archives, donated to the University of Alberta, there are fifty volumes
of letters in alphabetical order according to the correspondents’ surnames. Covering forty years, this correspondence is an invaluable source for future historians not only of Ukrainian socio-political thought but of all Ukrainian cultural life on this continent.

A third form of dialogue cultivated by Ivan was public discussion. He tried to attend all international congresses of historians or Slavists, and participated in many scholarly conferences and symposia. Usually he would deliver a paper, but if not he would take an active part in discussions. His deliveries were often remarkable. He spoke on subjects he knew well, his formulations were characterized by clarity and logic, and although he could be polemical, he never descended to abuse. I always listened to his presentations with delight, whether or not we were in agreement.

The fourth form of dialogue consisted of conferences, symposia, and consultations that he himself initiated and carried out. When he lived on the eastern seaboard of the United States he organized most of the historical conferences of the Ukrainian Free Academy of Arts and Sciences. One of the last conferences he organized was the Ukrainian historical conference in London, Ontario, the fruit of which was the seminal collection of essays and discussions edited by Ivan under the title Rethinking Ukrainian History. He organized the conference while serving as associate director of the Canadian Institute of Ukrainian Studies, where he was also a member of the editorial board responsible for publications in history and to which he willed his large library, including numerous rarities.

Finally, his last and perhaps most important form of dialogue: no matter where Ivan lived, whether it was Berlin, wartime Prague, Philadelphia (La Salle College and Bryn Mawr), Washington or Edmonton, he always located interesting intellectuals. He had a talent for securing access to such a private club and for organizing intellectual symposia. Furthermore, he never missed an opportunity to attend presentations by distinguished representatives of the humanities or social sciences, especially those of guests from Europe.

But Ivan did not limit himself to existing forms. An inspired teacher, he always gathered around himself young talents, often his own discoveries, and initiated them into the arcana of the kingdom of the intellect. Several of his former disciples, for example, Orest Subtelny and Zenon Kohut, have become respected Ukrainian historians.

Death took Ivan precisely at the time when his private and professional affairs had found a positive resolution and he had the opportunity to devote all his energies to bringing his scholarly ideas to fruition in monographic format. He left us prematurely, survived by his wife, the poet and literary critic Alexandra Chernenko; his children, Peter Rudnytsky and Elizabeth Roslosnik; and two grandchildren. But his
legacy—his published works and the various forms of dialogue—assure him a worthy place in the pantheon of both Ukrainian and world socio-political thought.

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The purpose of the present paper is to attempt a typological characterization of Ukraine, a definition of the traits which distinguish that country as a historical entity. I am well aware of the riskiness of this task, and of the danger of facile generalizations. My intention, therefore, is to remain within the boundaries of what can be verified empirically.

Before plunging into the subject, I would like to clarify briefly my theoretical assumptions. I do believe in the existence of something which may roughly be named "national character." It must not, however, be misunderstood in a naturalistic sense. It belongs to the socio-cultural, not to the biological sphere. National character may be identified with the specific "way of life," with the complex of cultural values, patterns of behaviour, and system of institutions which are peculiar to each country. The national character is formed historically, and it is possible to determine the factors that have entered into its make-up. Once crystallized, it is likely to show considerable stability and an ability to reject, or assimilate, disruptive influences. Of great importance is the fact that a national character, or cultural type, is not something unique and original, but rather an individual combination of traits which are widespread through the world, and common to a number of peoples. This last observation may be useful methodologically. In assessing the similarities and dissimilarities that exist among nations, in applying a comparative method, we are able to define both the relative originality of a national type and the degree of its relatedness to other peoples.

The title of the present paper speaks of Ukraine as being "between East and West." But what meaning are we giving these terms, "East" and "West," in reference to Ukrainian history?

Oscar Halecki has stressed that the concept of the "West" is frequently used as a synonym for that of "Europe." According to Halecki,
this identification easily leads to an ambiguity, as it represents a *pars pro toto* reasoning. Inside Europe several zones can be distinguished, of which Western Europe is only one. The “West” in the narrower and precise sense is the Atlantic rim of the continent: England, France, the Netherlands. But the continent also includes other areas, which are no less European (and, hence, “Western,” in the wider sense) than the Atlantic zone.

In the formula “Ukraine between East and West,” the term “West” refers to Europe as a whole. Ukraine is “Western” insofar as it is an organic part of the community of European peoples. And this is not simply a fact of physical geography. For a historian, “Europe” is not just a large peninsula of the Eurasian continent, but rather a family of peoples, which, although politically divided and in the past often fiercely antagonistic, share a common cultural and social heritage. Not everything geographically located in Europe is also part of Europe in this historical sense. For instance, the late Ottoman Empire, which occupied such a large part of the continent for several hundred years, certainly did not belong to the European community. The same applies to the Moslem states of medieval Spain. There is also a consensus among historians that Muscovite Russia of the fourteenth through seventeenth centuries was essentially non-European. As everybody knows, Russia became “Westernized,” or “Europeanized,” in the wake of the reforms of Peter the Great. But the nature of this “Westernization” was felt to be problematic even by many Russian thinkers.

Ukraine has never passed through an era of violent and precipitate “Westernization” comparable to the reign of Peter in Russian history. And this is not surprising at all. A country which from its very inception was essentially European, and, in this meaning of the word, “Western,” did not need to be assimilated to Europe through abrupt, revolutionary change. However, Ukraine’s European outlook was strengthened through contacts with, and influences from, other European countries. With what part of the European community did Ukraine entertain close relations? Not with the Atlantic or West European zone. Relations with France and England existed since the times of the Kievan realm, and can be traced in all other epochs of Ukrainian history, but they always remained rather sporadic. When modern Ukrainians speak of “Western Europe,” they usually refer to the area commonly known as central Europe, i.e., to the German-speaking lands from the North and Baltic Seas to the Danubian valley. It was the destiny of the Germans to represent, for better or for worse, “the West” in the eyes of the Ukrainian people. Even closer were the ties with the countries to the east of the German ethnic territory, for which the term “East-Central Europe” (*Ostmitteleuropa*) has been coined in scholarly literature: Bohemia, Hungary
end especially Poland. Besides them, we must also mention Baltic and Scandinavian areas—Lithuania, with which a direct political tie existed for over two centuries (from the middle of the fourteenth to the middle of the sixteenth centuries), and Sweden, whence came the stimulus for the formation of the Kievan State.

Among the peoples of the eastern half of the European continent, one notices the curious, almost compulsive, habit of wanting to appear exclusively Western, and of denying any non-Western (non-West European) traits in their national make-up. "Poland—the bastion of Western, Catholic civilization"; "The Czechs—the only Slavic nation with a Western standard of living"; "Hungary—whose Golden Bull is coeval with the English Magna Carta"; "Romanians—the proud descendants of the Roman legionnaires." Such statements may be factually true—as far as they go. Still, they sometimes smack of the mentality of poor folk who like to boast of their wealthy relations.

I have stressed the essentially Western (i.e., European) character of Ukraine. But this does not imply the denial of powerful non-Western elements in the Ukrainian national type. Common European characteristics have not been abolished or superseded but modified under the impact of forces emanating from the East.

But what is the meaning of the term "the East," "Orient," in the context of Ukrainian history? The concept is used to refer to two completely different historical entities: the world of Eastern Christianity and of the Byzantine cultural tradition on the one hand, and the world of the Eurasian nomads on the other. It is obvious that these two meanings of the term "East" are completely unrelated. Moreover, although both "East" were of the greatest importance for the making of Ukraine, their influence was in each case exercised in a totally different manner.

We will start with the "East" of the Eurasian nomads. The ancestors of the Ukrainians were, from time immemorial, agriculturists. Their home was the belt of parkland stretching from the Carpathian foothills to the eastern tributaries of the Dnieper. To the south of this territory of ancient agricultural settlement were the open grasslands, the steppes, where the nomads roamed. Until the early centuries of the Christian era the nomads of the South Ukrainian steppes were of Iranian stock. It seems that a kind of symbiotic relationship existed between the Scythian and Sarmatian cattle-raisers and warriors and the proto-Slavic agricultural tribes. Ethnologists tell us that traces of this Iranian influence are still to be found in Ukrainian and Russian folklore. The situation changed radically when, in the course of the Great Migration of Peoples, the Iranian occupation of the steppes was followed by a Turkic one. From the Hunnish storm of the fifth century A.D. until the destruction of Kiev by the Mongols in the middle of the thirteenth century, several great waves of
Eurasian nomads, mostly of Turkic origin, hurled themselves against Ukrainian lands. No new nomadic people appeared in the Pontic steppes afterward. But out of the divisions of the Mongol Empire emerged, as one of its successor states, the Khanate of the Crimea, which in the fifteenth century became a vassal of the Ottoman Porte. The national industry of the Crimean Tatars was slave-hunting. This caused untold misery to Ukraine, which was exposed, almost every year, to raids. One can safely state that struggle against the Tatar menace was the central theme of Ukrainian history until the destruction of the Crimean Khanate during the reign of Catherine II.

These facts are well known, but our task is to draw out of them certain general conclusions. An analogy may be found between Ukraine and such Oriental countries as Egypt, Mesopotamia, and Iran, which also were subjected to periodic nomadic incursions. But the differences are more striking than the similarities. First, in contrast to these Near Eastern countries, Ukrainian agriculture was always individual farming of the European type, and not a "hydraulic agriculture" (to use an expression of Karl Wittfogel) of the arid Near East, where the survival of a settled civilization in the river valleys and oases depended on centrally regulated irrigation works. Second, there was in Ukraine no clear-cut, naturally determined differentiation between the farmer's land and the nomad's land. The Pontic steppes had a continental climate, but no more so than the American Middle West. This was a fertile plain, eminently suited for agriculture, but also offering ideal pastures for the flocks of the nomad. This caused the absence of a clear demarcation line between the settled country and the so-called Wild Fields. The line was rather a highly flexible and dynamic one. To be more precise, one should not speak of a line at all, but rather of a frontier zone, of a large belt of frontier lands. Here we encounter a suggestive parallel between Ukrainian and American historical processes. Frederick Jackson Turner proposed to study American history as a great colonization process, in the course of which the Wild West (the counterpart of the Ukrainian "Wild Fields") was gradually assimilated to a settled, civilized way of life. Turner's "Frontier Thesis" might also, I believe, be a highly fruitful approach to Ukrainian history. But, again, one must not overstrain the parallel. The balance of forces was different between the Anglo-Saxon Americans and the Indian natives, on the one hand, and the Ukrainians and the Turkic nomads on the other hand. In the case of America, the movement of westward expansion was a continuous and irreversible one. In the case of Ukraine, the frontier fluctuated back and forth through the centuries. Agricultural Slavic colonization moved time after time to the conquest of the Wild Fields, attempting to obtain a firm foothold on the shores of the Black Sea; these were conquests of the plough as much as of the sword. And
repeatedly these outposts of agricultural civilization were swept away by nomadic waves. Those who had escaped death or captivity had to seek refuge in the more secure northern and western regions, protected by forests, hills and swamps. But at times Tatar raiders were able to reach even this safer zone. This age-old epic struggle came to an end only in the latter part of the eighteenth century when, after the final destruction of the Crimean Khanate, the Pontic steppes were permanently settled by the Ukrainian peasantry.

What influence may one attribute to these relations with the Eurasian nomads in the formation of the Ukrainian national type? This was, first of all, a powerful retarding factor. Tremendous losses of human life, wealth and cultural values are obvious. What needs to be stressed particularly is the destruction of the cities. The Kievan State had already possessed an advanced city life. But these urban centres were systematically levelled by the great Mongol invasion of the thirteenth century. One must also mention the cutting off of commercial routes, which played a great role in the decline of the flowering civilization of medieval Rus'. This decline had set in even before the emergence of the Tatars, owing to the predatory activities of their predecessors, the Pechenegs and the Polovtsians.

But this is only one part of the total picture. The other side is the internal transformation of Ukrainian society under the impact of the challenge presented by the Wild Fields. Here we can return once more to the American analogy. According to Turner, the "Frontier" (meaning the transitional zone between the settled area and the Wild West) exercised a determining influence on the formation of the American national character. The frontiersman—the pioneer and the cowboy—became, in many respects, the representative American. Mores and institutions developed under the conditions of the frontier gave a colouring to the entire American way of life, including the areas of old settlement along the east coast. These ideas apply, *mutatis mutandis*, even more to Ukrainian than to American history. The Ukrainian frontiersman was the Cossack, and the Cossack became, in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, the representative man of his people. It is noteworthy that the Cossacks are exalted in countless folk songs even in those sections of Ukraine, such as Galicia, to which the Cossack movement did not actually extend. Cossackdom was, essentially, an organization of military self-defence of the population in the exposed frontier territory. The Cossacks were the advance guard of the Ukrainian peasant colonization, but, at the same time, they borrowed a number of tactical devices and customs from their Tatar enemy. (Similarly, the American pioneers borrowed from the Indians.) The military organization which had spontaneously evolved in the frontier zone began to take an increasingly leading role also in the affairs of
the settled hinterland. After the Union of Lublin (1569) Ukraine, which previously formed part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (the so-called Lithuanian-Ruthenian State), came under the rule of Poland. The Polish Commonwealth was unable to offer its Ukrainian provinces effective protection against the constant Tatar menace. At the same time, Poland imposed on Ukraine a social system which was alien and hateful to the majority of the Ukrainian people. In the constitutional framework of the Polish Commonwealth, where the monopoly of power belonged to the nobility and where the peasants were totally enslaved, there was no place for a class of free and armed farmers. Polish attempts to suppress the Cossack military order led to an increased tension which finally, in 1648, exploded in a great revolution. After the first clashes between the Cossacks and the Polish forces, almost the entire population of the hinterland rose against Polish rule. People who were by no means Cossacks in the original sense of frontiersmen, but rather were peasants, burghers, and even members of the petty Orthodox gentry, became “Cossackized.” The military organization of the frontier expanded over vast areas liberated from Polish domination and served as the foundation of a new social and administrative system. For instance, Cossack military divisions, the “Regiments” (polky) and “Centuries” (sotni), now became territorial, administrative units, and the official name of the new body politic, the Ukrainian Cossack State, was “Zaporozhian Army.” The 1648 Revolution was also instrumental in the adoption of a new national name. The word “Ukraine” (Ukraina) means “borderland,” and originally referred to the frontier zone, where the Cossack system had its roots. The extension of this system from the frontier to the hinterland helped to spread and popularize the name “Ukraine,” which was now applied, at first only in the vernacular, to all territory under Cossack jurisdiction. The new name gradually replaced the traditional one, Rus’, derived from the medieval Kievian State.

The “East” of the Eurasian nomads exercised, therefore, a twofold impact on the making of the Ukrainian national character: first, as a retarding factor in the country’s normal progress, and, second, through a strong defensive reaction by the Ukrainian people. This, however, did not make Ukraine itself Eurasian. In other words, the Eurasian, nomadic element acted on the Ukrainian people from the outside, without becoming internalized, without becoming a constituent element of the Ukrainian national type. The other great Eastern influence, that of the Greek (Byzantine) religious and cultural tradition, acted in a very different fashion, from the inside, by shaping the very mind of the society.

The Rus’ Primary Chronicle contains a charming tale about the “Trial of Faiths.” The story tells how Volodymyr the Great of Kiev sent embassies to various countries to find out about their respective religions, and
how finally the ruler and his councillors, moved by a report about the beauty of the Greek church services, decided to adopt Christianity from Constantinople. This is only a legend, or rather a wandering literary motif, probably borrowed by the chronicler from a foreign source. But still the story seems to indicate that it was the aesthetic aspect of Greek Christianity with which the people of Kievan Rus' felt a special affinity.

There are, however, some modern Ukrainian historians, such as the late Stepan Tomashivsky, an eminent medievalist and church historian, who think that Volodymyr's choice was, in secular terms, a tragic mistake. By accepting Christianity in its Eastern form, Rus'-Ukraine condemned itself to intellectual stagnation and sterility and cut itself off from full membership in the European community. This view finds an echo also in the well known theory of Arnold Toynbee. In his scheme of "civilizations" of the world, Toynbee draws a sharp line between the "Western" civilization, encompassing the Catholic and Protestant nations of Europe, including the overseas offshoots, and the "East Christian civilization," i.e., medieval Byzantium and its modern heir, Russia.

What are we to make of these theories? One has to remember, first of all, that Volodymyr's choice was not an arbitrary one. It was determined by the fact that Ukrainian lands had belonged to the sphere of influence of Greek and Hellenistic culture for more than 1,500 years prior to his time. The coast of southern Ukraine and the Crimea was dotted with Greek colonies from the seventh century B.C. Commercial and cultural ties existed between the coastal city states and the proto-Slavic tribes of the interior. Most of these Greek communities perished during the Great Migration of Peoples, but some survived. The nascent Kievan State entertained, from the very beginning and long before its conversion to Christianity, manifold relations with the Byzantine world.

Moreover, the Eastern Empire was, both politically and culturally, at its peak in the tenth century, under the rule of the great Macedonian dynasty. In that period Byzantium had, probably, more to offer to nascent Rus' than contemporary Latin Christianity was able to give to the newly converted peoples of northern and eastern Europe. The sudden cultural flowering of Kievan Rus', which put that country at once on a level with the relatively advanced sections of Europe, was due to the transplantation of the rich Greek-Byzantine culture (in part taken over directly from Constantinople, and in part adopted in its Bulgarian version) to the fresh and receptive soil of a young Slavic country. It is true that, in the long run, Byzantinism, for all its brilliance and sophistication, had certain striking drawbacks. It was rather static; it lacked the tremendous dynamism and creativeness which Latin Christendom began to display after the year 1000 in its Romanesque and Gothic Age. Still, we are entitled to make the following hypothetical statement. It seems
likely that, but for the nomadic invasions, Kievan Rus’ would have been capable of overcoming Byzantine immobility and of moving along with the general European progress. These surmises find support in the fact that pre-Mongol Rus’, although under the ecclesiastical jurisdiction of Constantinople, was by no means isolated from or intellectually hostile to the Latin West, in spite of some occasional theological polemics.

At this point we may pick up the thread of our previous argument concerning the Western element in the Ukrainian national type. The remarkable thing about the Kievan State was the following: it combined a predominantly Eastern, Greek, Byzantine religious and cultural tradition with a predominantly Western social and political structure. Most significant is the fact that political Byzantinism remained totally alien to Kievan Rus’. (Byzantine theocracy later found a reception in the rising state of Moscow, where it united with an organizational framework moulded in the pattern of the Golden Horde’s oriental despotism.) In pre-Mongol Rus’, as in the medieval West—and in contrast to Byzantium and Moscow—political and ecclesiastical authority were not fused, but remained distinct, with each of the two autonomous in its own sphere. A social system characterized by contractual relations, a strong regard for the rights and the dignity of the individual, limitation of the power of the prince by a council of boyars and a popular assembly, autonomous communal city life, territorial decentralization of a quasi-federative nature—all this gave the Kievan polity a distinct libertarian imprint. And this libertarian, essentially European spirit also characterizes Ukrainian state organizations of later epochs. The Galician-Volhynian state of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries evolved toward a feudal structure, and a full-fledged feudalsim, including feudal parliamentarianism, may be found in the Lithuanian-Ruthenian state of the fourteenth through sixteenth centuries. The Cossack State of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries possessed a system of estates (Ständestaat). It was not a coincidence that in the nineteenth century, during the epoch when Ukraine was politically assimilated to the Russian Empire, all-Russian liberalism and constitutionalism found its strongest support in the Ukrainian provinces of the empire. Had an independent Ukrainian state, re-born in 1917, succeeded in surviving, it would have certainly fitted into the Western pattern of constitutional forms. The majority of the Ukrainian community favoured a democratic republic, with a socialistic tinge, while a conservative minority leaned toward a constitutional monarchy.

The ethos and the aesthetic sensibility of the Ukrainian people are rooted in the spiritual tradition of Eastern Christianity. But as the country was also, in its political and social structure, a part of the European world, the Ukrainians searched after a synthesis of East and West. In the spiritual field this rendered Ukraine the classical country of the Uniate
tradition. But the same striving also characterized Ukrainians who were not Catholics of the Eastern rite. It existed strongly among the Ukrainian Orthodox majority, and even the Ukrainian Protestants as well. The seventeenth century, the time of great flowering of the Ukrainian Orthodox Church, was also the epoch when it became permeated with Latin influences. This was exemplified by the Kiev Academy, a creation of the Metropolitan Peter Mohyla, which was the leading intellectual centre of the entire Greek Orthodox world, and whose organization and curriculum were patterned on the model of Western universities. In the field of arts, the same tendency found an expression in the style of the so-called Ukrainian or Cossack Baroque, which fused Byzantine and Western elements in a highly original manner.

We arrive at the following conclusion. Ukraine, located between the worlds of Greek Byzantine and Western cultures, and a legitimate member of both, attempted, in the course of its history, to unite the two traditions in a living synthesis. This was a great work, although it must be admitted that Ukraine has not fully succeeded in it. The synthesis has been approached in the great epochs of Ukrainian history, in the age of Kievan Rus' and in seventeenth-century Cossack Ukraine. In both cases, although these epochs were rich in promise and partial achievement, the final synthesis miscarried, and Ukraine succumbed to excessive pressure from the outside, as well as to internal disruptive tendencies. In this sense, it may be said that the great task, which appears to be the historical vocation of the Ukrainian people, remains unfulfilled, and still lies in the future.
The Role of Ukraine in Modern History

The Setting of the Problem

A striking difference between the historical development of the countries of Western Europe and that of those of the eastern half of the continent has been often observed. The former, particularly France and England, have enjoyed, in spite of some periods of revolutionary upheaval, a millennium of continuous growth. Germany’s fate has been much less favourable, and farther to the east it is impossible to find any country which has not experienced, at one time or another, a tragic breakdown and an epoch of a national capitis deminutio, sometimes extending for centuries. Here one can consider the subjugation of the Balkan peoples and Hungary by the Turks, the crushing of Bohemia by Habsburg absolutism, and the partitions of Poland.

Ukraine is a typically East European nation in that its history is marked by a high degree of discontinuity. The country suffered two major eclipses in the course of its development. Medieval Rus’ received a crippling blow from the hands of the Mongols, was subsequently absorbed by Lithuania, and finally annexed to Poland. In the middle of the seventeenth century Ukraine rose against Polish domination, and a new body politic, the Cossack State, came into existence. By the second half of the eighteenth century, however, the autonomy of Cossack Ukraine was destroyed by the Russian Empire. A new upward cycle started in the nineteenth century. The movement of national regeneration culminated in the 1917 Revolution, when a Ukrainian independent state emerged, to succumb soon to communist Russian control. This third, last great division of Ukrainian history, which lasts from the 1780s to the Revolution, and in a sense even to the present, forms what may be defined as “modern Ukrainian history.”

When nationalist movements got under way in nineteenth-century
Eastern Europe, they were of two different types. In one, the leadership remained with the traditional upper class (nobility), into which newcomers of plebeian background were infused only gradually. Their programs were characterized by a historical legitimism: their aim was the restoration of the nation’s old state within its ancient boundaries. In movements of the second type, leadership had to be created anew, and the efforts were directed toward the raising of a “natural,” ethnic community to a politically conscious nationhood. These latter movements had a slower start than the former, but they drew strength from their identification with the strivings of the masses, and they were able to profit from the inevitable democratization of the social structure. When the territorial claims of nations of the two types clashed, as happened frequently, those of the second category usually prevailed in the long run. The two categories are referred to as “historical” and “non-historical” nations respectively. If these concepts are to serve as useful tools of historical understanding, the following things are to be kept in mind. “Non-historicity,” in this meaning, does not necessarily imply that a given country is lacking a historical past, even a rich and distinguished past; it simply indicates a rupture in historical continuity through the loss of a traditional representative class. Second, the radical opposition that appears between these two types when they are conceived as sociological models by no means precludes the existence in historical reality of borderline cases, as for instance the Czechs.

Prima facie evidence assigns Ukraine to the category of “non-historical” nations. The modern Ukrainian nation is not simply a continuation or restoration of the Cossack Ukraine of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, or, of course, even less of Kievan and Galician Rus’. On the other hand, one must not overlook the links that connected the nineteenth-century national risorgimento with the Cossack epoch. The modern nationalist movement started in those areas of Ukraine where the Cossack traditions were the strongest, and originally most of the leaders came from the descendants of the former Cossack officers (starshyny) class. Symbols and ideas derived from the Cossack tradition played an important role even as late as the 1917 Revolution.

Ukrainian history of the nineteenth century may mean two different things: a history of the nationalist movement on the one hand, and a history of the country and the people on the other hand. The two are closely interrelated, but they do not coincide.

Beginning with the 1840s and until the 1917 Revolution, there was an uninterrupted chain of groups and organizations, formal and informal, that were committed to the idea of Ukraine’s cultural and political regeneration as a separate nation. Combated and persecuted by tsarist authorities, the movement was irrepressible. At times it demonstrated a
great vitality (as in the 1870s); at other times it seemed to have gone into hibernation (as in the 1880s). It would be a fruitful task, which has not yet been fully accomplished by historical scholarship, to trace the course of the Ukrainian nationalist movement, somewhat as the course of the Russian revolutionary movements has been traced by Jan Kucharczewski and Franco Venturi.

It is clear, however, that until the eve of the 1917 Revolution, Ukrainian nationalism retained the character of a minority movement. (This refers to Russian Ukraine only; the situation was different in Austrian Galicia.) The peasant masses were, until 1905, little touched by the nationalist movement. Thoroughly Ukrainian in all their objective, ethnic traits, they had not yet adopted a modern national consciousness, and generally remained politically amorphous. The members of the upper classes were mostly Russified and, except for those engaged in the Ukrainian movement, regarded themselves as belonging to the Russian nation. The question arises whether under such circumstances the student is entitled to include in "Ukrainian history" everything that happened on Ukrainian soil.

A memoirist has noted the following observation. If the train from Kiev to Poltava which carried delegates for the unveiling of the monument to the poet Kotliarevsky in 1903 had crashed, this would have meant, it was said jokingly, the end of the Ukrainian movement for a long time; nearly all the leading personalities of the movement travelled in two cars of that train. But how is one to explain a movement that at the turn of the century had only a few thousands of self-professed adherents, by 1905 began to assume a mass character, and after another twelve years erupted, in 1917, as a nascent nation of over thirty million? The answer can be only this: there were at work among the population of Ukraine other forces which, without being identical with the nationalist movement, were pointed in the same direction, and finally, as if drawn by an irresistible attraction, merged with it. The nationalist movement played the role of the catalyst, and in this sense it was extremely important. But we cannot historically explain the origins of the modern Ukrainian nation if we concentrate on the nationalist movement alone. We must also take into account various other forces: for instance, the activities of the Ukrainian zemstvo or those of the Ukrainian branches of "all-Russian" revolutionary organizations, from the Decembrists, through the populists, to the Marxist and labour groups at the turn of the century. All of them made their contributions to the formation of modern Ukraine. Moreover, a closer scrutiny shows that these movements, though not endowed with a fully crystallized Ukrainian national awareness, usually possessed it in an embryonic stage in the form of a "South Russian" sectionalism, or "territorial patriotism."
Thus it may be stated that the central problem of modern Ukrainian history is that of the emergence of a nation: the transformation of an ethnic-linguistic community into a self-conscious political and cultural community. A comprehensive study of this subject would have to include an investigation into the factors that shaped the nation-making process, either by furthering or by impeding it. The interrelation with all the other forces active on the wider East European scene would have to be taken into account.

The character of modern Ukrainian history changes definitely after 1917. The making of the nation was basically completed during the revolutionary years 1917–20. For the last four decades the central issue of Ukrainian history has been the nation’s struggle for survival under foreign rule and for the restoration of its liberty and independence. The struggle was—and is to the present day—primarily directed against Soviet Russia. But in the inter-war period it was, in the western portion of Ukraine’s territory, directed also against Poland, and during the years of World War II against Nazi Germany as well.

Methodological Approaches
In studying Ukrainian prerevolutionary history, stress ought to be placed primarily on socio-economic developments and on the evolution of social thought; a politically oriented historical investigation would be relatively unproductive.

Not having an independent state or even such a semi-independent autonomous body politic as, for instance, the Poles possessed in the Congress Kingdom, the Ukrainians were unable to participate in politics on a governmental level: they were not directly connected with the great world of diplomacy and military affairs. The international order established in Ukrainian lands in the last third of the eighteenth century by the Russian annexation of the Black Sea coastal areas as well as of the Right Bank (i.e., of the territories west of the Dnieper), and by the annexation of Galicia to the Austrian Empire, remained basically unchanged until 1914. This long period of stability made any idea of international change seem remote and unrealistic to contemporaries.

Conditions in the Russian Empire were such that an overt political life on a non-governmental level was also impossible, at least until 1905. In this respect, Ukrainians in Austria had a great advantage over the majority of their compatriots, who lived under Russian rule. After the 1848 Revolution, Galician Ukrainians took part in elections, possessed a parliamentary representation, a political press, parties, and civic organizations. In Russian Ukraine political strivings could be expressed only through illegal channels, namely, through underground groups, whose activities were necessarily of limited scope. In the long run it was, how
ever, inevitable that changes of social structure and intellectual trends were to have political effects.

The two great stages in prerevolutionary Ukraine’s social development were the abolition of serfdom in 1861 and the rise of modern industrialism toward the end of the century. Neither movement was limited to Ukraine but rather was common to the Russian Empire as a whole. Still, the Ukrainian lands possessed certain socio-economic peculiarities of their own, and the idea, generally held by Western scholars, of Ukraine’s complete integration into the economic fabric of the empire, “like Pennsylvania’s in the United States,” is incorrect. The Ukrainian peasantry had never known the system of the “repartitional commune,” and they were undoubtedly more individualistically minded than the Great Russian muzhiks. Ukrainian agriculture was connected through the Black Sea ports with the world market; most of Russia’s agricultural exports came from Ukraine. The rapid development of Ukrainian mining and heavy industries was due to a massive influx of foreign investments. The economic connections of Ukraine were in many respects closer to the outside world than to Central Russia.  

Agrarian overpopulation and the harsh lot of industrial workers led to a sharpening of social tensions in Ukraine. A characteristic of the Ukrainian scene, a phenomenon to be found also in other “non-historical” countries, was the overlapping of social and national conflicts. The great landowners, capitalists, and industrial entrepreneurs were predominantly members of the local Russian, Polish, and Jewish minorities, or foreigners. Thus the coming revolution was to be simultaneously a social and a national one. The Ukrainian national movement was not limited to any one social class. It had individual supporters among members of the upper classes, and it reached into the class of industrial workers. Still, it found the strongest response among the middle strata: the prosperous peasantry, the rural intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia, the emerging native petty bourgeoisie of the towns. Close links existed between Ukrainian nationalism and the co-operative movement, which was growing at great speed in the years preceding World War I. The larger cities retained a predominantly Russian character, and this was to be a great handicap to Ukraine during the Revolution. But, judging by the example of other countries with a similar social structure, the “Ukrainization” of the urban centers would have been a question of time.

The impact of the economic policies of the Russian government on Ukraine must also be considered. Some economic historians active during the early Soviet period (M. Slabchenko, M. Iavorsky, O. Ohloblyn, M. Volobuiev) used the term “colonialism” to define Ukraine’s position in relation to the former Empire. This concept, borrowed from the Marxist arsenal, was not altogether well chosen. Tsarist Russia possessed gen-
Ukrainian colonies, such as Transcaucasia and Turkestan, but Ukraine could not be counted among them. The administration looked rather on Ukraine as belonging to the core of the "home provinces" of European Russia. The economic progress of Ukraine ("South Russia") was in many respects faster than that of the Great Russian center. Nevertheless, the economic policies of the government were mostly adverse to Ukrainian interests. Ukraine, for instance, carried an excessive load of taxation, since the revenues collected in Ukraine did not return to the country but were spent in other parts of the empire. The construction of railroad lines, which was dominated by strategic considerations, as well as the existing system of freight rates and customs duties, failed to take Ukrainian needs into account. Contemporaries were well aware of the issue. It is noteworthy that the industrial groups of the "South"—who were of non-Ukrainian background and had no connections with the nationalist movement—tended to form regional syndicates and associations for the defence of the area's economic interests, neglected by the government of St. Petersburg.

The other major field of prerevolutionary Ukrainian history was social thought. It is a well-attested historical rule that in countries that lack political liberty there exists a tendency toward an "ideologization" of politics and, simultaneously, toward a politicization of cultural and intellectual life. Where civic strivings cannot be expressed through overt, practical activities, they are diverted toward the realm of theoretical programs and ideologies. Under such circumstances, creators and carriers of cultural values tend to develop a strong feeling of civic vocation. This applies to both the Russian and Ukrainian nineteenth-century societies, but there was an important difference between the two. The Russians, as members of an independent and powerful nation, even if subordinated to a despotic regime, had few grievances of a specifically national nature. Thus the mental energies of Russian intellectuals were mostly concentrated on the construction of social or theocratic utopias. Ukrainian intellectuals, on the other hand, were bound to vindicate the claims of their country as a separate national entity.

The magnitude of the task facing Ukrainian intellectuals can hardly be exaggerated. The consistent policy of the tsarist government—which, in this respect, found full support in Russian public opinion, including its left wing—was to deny the very existence of a Ukrainian nationality. Those elements of the Ukrainian heritage which could be assimilated were declared to belong to the "all-Russian" nation, of which the "Little Russians" were a tribal branch; the other elements of the Ukrainian heritage, which were unfit for such an expropriation, were systematically suppressed and obliterated. For instance, determined to relegate the Ukrainian language to the level of a peasant dialect, the Russian govern-
ment imposed in 1876 a general prohibition of all publications in Ukrainian. Against these tremendous pressures, Ukrainian linguists and ethnographers defended the idea of a Ukrainian ethnic individuality on an equal footing with the other national groups of the Slavic family; Ukrainian historians, from Kostomarov to Hrushevsky, demonstrated the continuity of their country’s past development from prehistoric times to the present.

A national consciousness implies not only a system of ideas of a more or less rational, cognitive nature but also an emotional commitment, which is more likely to be stimulated by poets and writers than by scholars. It is not fortuitous that the representative hero of nineteenth-century Ukraine was not a statesman or a soldier, but a poet—Taras Shevchenko. His historical significance is not to be measured by purely literary standards. The Ukrainian community saw and continues to see in him a prophetic figure, whose inspired word touches and transforms the very hearts of his people.

As far as the Ukrainian political program is concerned, its foundations were laid in 1846–7 by a circle of young intellectuals in Kiev, known under the name of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society. Gradually revised and elaborated, it remained the platform of the Ukrainian movement until the Revolution. Its classical exposition is to be found in the writings of the outstanding Ukrainian thinker of the second half of the nineteenth century, Mykhailo Drahomanov. Divergencies of views between individuals and groups were inevitable, but there was in the Ukrainian movement a far-reaching consent on essentials. These included: a strong insistence on radical social reform, but without the spirit of fierceness and exclusiveness of many Russian revolutionaries; emphasis on political liberty and Western-style constitutionalism; a program of federalist reconstruction of the Empire as a means of satisfying Ukrainian national aspirations without necessitating a complete break with Russia. However, from the 1890s on, there existed an alternative program of separatism and state sovereignty of Ukraine. It gained the acceptance of the Galician Ukrainian community, but in Russian Ukraine the majority of the spokesmen remained faithful to the traditional federalist programme. They depended on the hope that a future democratic Russia would be able to divest itself of the tsarist traditions of imperialism, centralism, and national oppression. The final conversion to the idea of Ukraine’s independent statehood was effected in 1917, under the impact of experiences with Russian “revolutionary democracy.” The evolution of Ukrainian political thought from federalism to separatism resembles the development of the Czech national program from Palacký to Masaryk.

It is important to take notice of the ideological terms in which Ukrainian thinkers defined their nation’s opposition to the Russian Empire. The first to formulate the issue was the former leader of the Cyrillo-
Methodian Society, Mykola Kostomarov: he contrasted the Kievan tradition of liberty and individualism with the Muscovite tradition of authoritarianism and of the subordination of the individual to the collective. Stripped of Kostomarov's romantic terminology, the problem was repeatedly restated by later Ukrainian publicists and political theorists. They saw Ukraine, because of its deeply ingrained libertarian attitude, as an organic part of the European community of nations, of which despotic Muscovy-Russia had never been a true and legitimate member. "Most of the national differences between Ukraine and Muscovy can be explained by the fact that until the eighteenth century [i.e., until the establishment of Russian rule] Ukraine was linked to Western Europe. In spite of the handicaps caused by the Tatar invasions, Ukraine participated in Europe's social and cultural progress." These words of Drahomanov, a left-wing liberal and socialist, are paralleled by those of a conservative thinker, V. Lypynsky: "The basic difference between Ukraine and Moscow does not consist in language, race or religion, ... but in a different, age-old political structure, a different method of organization of the elite, in a different relationship between the upper and the lower social classes, between state and society." Ukrainian thinkers believed that the emancipation of their country, whether through federalism or separatism, would accelerate the liberalization of Eastern Europe as a whole. According to their conviction, the centralistic structure of the empire was the base on which tsarist despotism rested. The break-up of this monolithic unity, whose maintenance required a system of universal oppression, would release the creative, libertarian forces of all peoples, not excepting the Russians.

An investigation of Ukrainian pre-revolutionary intellectual history should not omit those scholars of Ukrainian origin who worked at Russian universities, published their works in Russian, and are therefore usually regarded as Russian. Let us name but a few of these men: the philosophers P. Iurkevych (Iurkevich) and V. Lisevych (Lesevich); the economists M. Ziber, M. Iasnopolsky, and M. Tuhan-Baranovsky (Tugan-Baranovsky); the sociologist M. Kovalevsky; the jurist B. Kistiakovsky; the linguist O. Potebnia; the literary scholar D. Ovsianiko-Kulikovsky; the military theorist M. Drahomyrov (Dragomirov). The list could easily be expanded. The question arises: with what right can these "luminaries of Russian science" be claimed for the Ukrainian intellectual tradition? In studying the lives of these men we find that while skirting an overt identification with the Ukrainian cause, which would have been catastrophic for their careers, they remained in touch with the nationalist movement, as its "secret disciples." If that were all, their Ukrainian connection would be of only biographical relevance. More important is
the fact that the structure of thought of these scholars betrays their Ukrainian bias, although it is often expressed in a subtle way, not immediately perceptible to an outsider. One example which illustrates the point must here suffice. It refers to F. Mishchenko (1848–1906), the brilliant student of ancient history who was particularly concerned with the questions of Greek communal self-government and federalism. According to a recent Soviet study, "in this stubborn insistence on the federalist principle we can detect the influence of the ideas of Ukrainian bourgeois nationalism."13

The emergence of the modern Ukrainian nation may be understood as the outcome of an interaction of social forces and ideas. The social transformation taking place in Ukrainian lands in the course of the nineteenth century prepared the people for the acceptance of the nationalist ideology elaborated by several generations of intellectuals. The policy of tsarist Russia consisted in containing the activities of the intellectual circles while upholding a system of paternalistic supervision over the masses, which was to protect them from "contamination" and to keep them in a state of perpetual civic infancy. This policy was relatively successful in that the formation of the modern Ukrainian nation was delayed for decades. But it could not be prevented, as the emergence of an independent republic in 1917 was to prove.

Regional Variations
Pre-revolutionary Ukraine did not possess territorial unity. In each of the two great empires, Russia and Austria-Hungary, several Ukrainian lands with strongly developed sectional traits may be distinguished. An historical investigation into the origins of the modern Ukrainian nation must take these regional variations into account.

We may differentiate between those principal Ukrainian lands in which the nationalistic movement had taken root in the prerevolutionary era and those which were passive in the process of nation-making. We shall call the latter category marginal Ukrainian lands. The difference between the two was not determined by size, as some of the principal territories (e.g., Bukovyna) were smaller than some of the marginal group.

Limitations of space do not permit a discussion of the marginal lands, which included the Kuban territory of Northern Caucasus, the Chelm (Kholm) area in the Congress Kingdom of Poland, and Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Ruthenia) in Hungary. There are the following principal Ukrainian territories: in Russia, the Left Bank, Slobodian Ukraine, Southern Ukraine, and the Right Bank; in Austria, Galicia and Bukovyna. Since Ukrainian history is so often approached from a centralistic Moscow-St. Petersburg perspective, an attempt will be made to
give special attention to those Ukrainian lands which do not fit into the framework of Russian history and which for this reason are often overlooked by Western scholars.

Left-Bank Ukraine (i.e., the Ukrainian territory east of the Dnieper) corresponded with the area of the former autonomous Cossack State, the so-called Hetmanate. Vestiges of the old institutions survived here until the reign of Nicholas I: the governor-generalship of Little Russia was dissolved in 1835, and the traditional Ukrainian civil law abolished in 1842; the self-government of the towns, based on the Magdeburg Law, had been suppressed in 1831. The Left-Bank nobility, descendants of the Cossack officer class, repeatedly attempted to revive the autonomous order. The Napoleonic invasion of 1812 and the Polish insurrection of 1830 offered opportunities, and these autonomist strivings survived into the 1840s. However, in contrast with Poland and Hungary, historical legitimism was not to remain the platform of Ukrainian nationalism. The Left-Bank nobility did not possess enough strength and solidarity to determine the course of the nation’s renaissance. As a corporate entity the class loses importance after the middle of the century. Ukrainian nationalism took shape, ideologically and organizationally, under the auspices not of historical legitimism but of populism. Nevertheless, the Left-Bank provinces of Poltava and Chernihiv continued to be the geographical core of the Ukrainian movement. No other section of Ukraine provided such a large proportion of nationalist leaders, and here the movement had succeeded in making considerable headway among the masses some years before the outbreak of World War I.

The Ukrainian cultural revival found its first important centre further to the east, in Slobodian Ukraine (Slobozhanshchyna). In the seventeenth century this territory belonged to Muscovy, but was largely uninhabited. It was settled by refugees from Dnieper Ukraine, who brought with them the Cossack system. The Cossack regiments of Slobodian Ukraine remained under the direct control of the central government, and did not share in the turbulent political history of the Hetmanate. But Kharkiv, the capital of Slobodian Ukraine, was to become in 1805 the seat of the first modern university in Ukrainian lands. This was achieved with contributions from the local gentry and burglers. In the 1820s and 30s, a group of writers and scholars connected with Kharkiv University laid the foundations of Ukrainian vernacular literature and of Ukrainian ethnographic and folkloristic studies. The motive was non-political, but the enthusiasm for the “folk,” inspired by the Romantic school of Kharkiv, was to become a constituent element of modern Ukrainian nationalism, one of an importance hardly inferior to the traditions of political autonomy which originated in the Left Bank.

Southern Ukraine (the steppes) consisted of the former territory of the
Zaporozhian Sich and the possessions of the Crimean Tatars and Turkey. In the eighteenth century this was still largely an uninhabited 'no man's land,' and until well into the nineteenth century the territory preserved the character of a frontier country. Besides Ukrainians, the territory attracted numerous other settlers: Russians, Germans, Greeks, Bulgarians. No other section of Ukraine had so many ethnic minorities as the South. The Ukrainians of the steppes and of the Black Sea coast, most of whom had never known serfdom, displayed a spirit of self-reliance and enterprise. It was no accident that during the Civil War peasant anarchism, represented by Nestor Makhno, found many supporters in the South. The South's participation in the nationalist movement was relatively small; its contribution to the making of modern Ukraine was predominantly economic. Under the Old Regime the Right Bank was economically, as well as politically, connected with Poland, while the Left Bank and Slobodian Ukraine were turned toward Muscovy. The frontier on the Dnieper separated the western and the eastern half of the Ukrainian ethnic area. This changed with the opening of the Black Sea ports. Now the trade of both the Right and the Left Banks became oriented toward the South. This was a decisive step toward the economic integration of Ukrainian lands and toward the formation of a unified Ukrainian national economy. The South also became, from the 1880s on, the scene of a mighty development of mining and heavy industry in the Donets and Kryvyi Rih basins, which induced some writers to call that territory—with some exaggeration—a "Ukrainian America." The South became the economic center of gravity of modern Ukraine.

The historic individuality of the Right Bank (territory west of the Dnieper) was determined by the fact that even after the Russian annexation of 1793 the Polish nobility remained the socially dominant element in the land, and to a large extent preserved this position until 1917. Indeed, the landowners as a class rather profited by the change of the regime, since their domination over the peasantry was more effectively backed by the police and army of an absolute monarchy than by the inefficient administration of the late Commonwealth. The magnates, masters of huge latifundia, adopted an attitude of loyalty toward the Empire. The middle and petty gentry, on the other hand, did not abandon hopes for the restoration of the Polish state, stretching to its historical frontier on the Dnieper. The two insurrections of 1830 and 1863, which originated in Congress Poland, spilled over into Right-Bank Ukraine. The local Polish conspirators made attempts to win the Ukrainian peasants to this cause, using the Ukrainian language in their proclamations and promising that in the future reborn Poland Ukraine-Rus' would form an autonomous body. This agitation met no favourable response. The memories of old Poland were hateful to the Ukrainian masses, who had not forgotten the
Cossack wars and to whom the very word "Poland" was a symbol of oppression. The spokesmen of the young Ukrainian nationalist movement consistently rejected Polish claims to the Right Bank, as this implied a partition of Ukraine between Russia and Poland. This may be regarded as a striking example of the incompatibility of "historical" and "ethnic" nationalism. The inability of the Poles and the Ukrainians to settle their differences and to evolve a common policy toward Russia fateful determined the further development of both nations. In spite of this failure the Polish-Ukrainian entanglement in the Right Bank had some positive aspects from the point of view of Ukraine's progress toward nationhood. Polish influence in nearly half of Ukrainian ethnic territory served as a counterbalance to Russian domination. Throughout the nineteenth century the western part of Ukraine remained a zone of tension, where Russian and Polish forces competed for supremacy. In the long run, this strengthened Ukrainian self-awareness as a nation distinct from both Poland and Russia. The Polish nobility of the Right Bank consisted in large measure of the Polonized descendants of the old Ukrainian aristocracy, and even the originally Polish families had, in the course of generations, become acclimatized to the Ukrainian environment and felt strong "territorial patriotism." For instance, Polish writers from that area used local motifs and formed a "Ukrainian school" in Polish literature; some of them were bilingual and belonged as much to Ukrainian as to Polish literature. Polish-Ukrainian scholars made valuable contributions to the study of the country's history and ethnography. The Ukrainian community definitely rejected the program of a "Jagiellonian federation," dear to the hearts of the Polish-Ukrainian minority; still, certain concepts formulated by the publicists of the Right Bank had an impact on the growth of Ukrainian political ideologies. Some members of the Polish minority in Ukraine, "not wishing to be alien colonists in their native land" (to use an expression of one of them), crossed the borderline separating the two nationalities and identified themselves fully with the Ukrainian cause. They were few, but from their number came some of the outstanding leaders of modern Ukrainian nationalism. Being thoroughly Western in their cultural background, they led the Ukrainian movement away from the Russian connection.

In turning to the Ukrainian territories of the Habsburg Empire, we shall first mention Bukovyna. This small land, acquired from Moldavia by Austria in 1774, had a diverse population. The Ukrainians predominated in the north, the Romanians in the south; there were also numerous Germans and Jews and a sprinkling of Armenians and Gypsies. German served as a lingua franca among Bukovyna's motley inhabitants. The easternmost university with German as a language of instruction was at Chernivtsi, the capital of Bukovyna; the city itself seemed a cultural out-
post of Vienna. Some local Ukrainian writers started their literary careers in German. On the eve of World War I the Ukrainians of Bukovyna enjoyed more favourable conditions of national development than those of any other territory: they had achieved a share in the province’s government proportionate to their numbers.

Perhaps the most striking feature in the rebirth of Galician Ukraine was the unique role played by the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church. "This is the only national church which is not a state church, the only one which, while a branch of the Church Universal, is, at the same time, entirely national. . . . Even unbelievers love the national church, which they regard as a vehicle of incomparable efficacy in the political struggle."18 The Eastern Rite drew a clear-cut demarcation line that separated its adherents from the Poles, and the allegiance to Rome was a bulwark against Russian influence.19 At the beginning of the nationalist movement, the clergy provided a ready-made leadership for the Ukrainian community. This was clearly displayed during the 1848 Revolution, when the Galician Ukrainians (Ruthenians, in the terminology of that time), guided by their bishops and priests, made their political debut. Of utmost sociological importance was the fact that the Greek Catholic clergymen were married, and formed a quasi-hereditary class; in their style of living they resembled a lesser gentry.20 In later times, toward the end of the century, this ecclesiastical hegemony was felt to be inadequate to the needs of a modern society, and was increasingly resented; this led to a strong anti-clerical, secularist trend. But the lay intelligentsia, who gradually assumed the leadership of the nationalist cause, were largely sons of clerical families. A handicap of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia was the poverty and economic backwardness of the land, and even more crippling was the circumstance that political power had rested, since the 1860s, in Polish hands. In a settlement comparable to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, the Viennese government turned over the administration of Galicia to the Polish ruling class, sacrificing the interests of the Ukrainian nationality.21 The Poles used their dominant position to block, by all possible means, the progress of the Ukrainian community. For instance, Polish resistance prevented the creation of a separate Ukrainian university, although at the University of Lviv (Lemberg) there were several Ukrainian chairs. Still, Austria was a constitutional state, and this enabled the Galician Ukrainians to apply civic self-help. In this they achieved signal successes. The country was covered with a dense and ever-expanding network of economic, educational, and gymnastic associations, branching out to every village. The peasant masses, who owed to this work not only an improvement of their living conditions, but also a new feeling of human dignity and civic pride, became deeply imbued with the nationalist spirit. The discipline and mili-
tancy of the movement were hardened through stubborn, protracted political warfare against the dominant Polish administration. Gradually, the balance of forces between the two communities began to shift. A turning point was the introduction of universal manhood suffrage by the Austrian electoral reform of 1907; a large Ukrainian representation appeared for the first time in the Vienna Parliament, and the central government was forced to adopt a new policy toward the Polish-Ukrainian dispute. Polish control over the Ukrainian majority in eastern Galicia could no longer be maintained, short of physical violence, and the reform of the province’s constitution appeared to be only a question of time. In contrast with Russian Ukraine, where the nationalist movement, although advancing quickly, had not yet succeeded in encompassing the whole people, the Galician Ukrainians were already, before 1914, a fully crystallized national community.

The fact that nineteenth-century Ukraine lacked territorial integration was a sure sign that a Ukrainian nation, in the full meaning of the word, did not exist at that time. But there were many symptoms indicating that the historical trends of the various sections were converging.

All parts of Ukraine (excepting the “marginal” lands) passed through the same stages of growth, which might be labelled the “Age of Nobility,” the “Populist Age,” and the “Modernist Age.” No full presentation of this periodization scheme will be attempted here. But one or two points might be stressed. During the first epoch, which lasted approximately until the middle of the century, the leadership of the society rested with the nobility of Cossack descent on the Left Bank and in Slobodian Ukraine, with the Polish-Ukrainian nobility on the Right Bank, and with the Greek Catholic clergy, which also formed a sort of hereditary gentry, in Galicia. Populism was strongest in the Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper, where it partly overlapped with Russian revolutionary populism; but analogous currents existed also in the Polish-Ukrainian society of the Right Bank, in the shape of the khlopomany (peasant-lovers) movement, and in Galicia, where its first wave was represented by the narodovtsi (national populists) of the 1860s and 70s, and the second by the Radicals of the 1880s and 90s.

As time went on, co-operation among various Ukrainian lands increased steadily. The founding of the first modern nationalist organization, the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, in 1846 was the result of an interpenetration of the autonomist tradition of the Left Bank with Slobodian Ukraine’s cultural revival. The integrating economic function of the South has been mentioned. By the turn of the century, the old sectional differences among the Ukrainian lands in the Russian Empire had either disappeared or lost most of their importance.

Differences remained between Galicia and Dnieper (Russian) Ukraine
as a whole, and they were deep enough to create considerable political friction during the Revolution. Nevertheless, the relations between Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia offer eminent examples of inter-regional cooperation. Galicia was intellectually rather arid. The ideas which inspired the Ukrainian rebirth in Galicia came almost without exception from Dnieper Ukraine. The work of outstanding leaders of east Ukrainian origin, such as M. Drahomanov and M. Hrushevsky, was closely associated with Galicia and had profound, durable impact there. On the other hand, after the ukase of 1876, which suppressed all overt Ukrainian activities in the Russian Empire, Galicia became the sanctuary of the entire Ukrainian nationalist movement. Works of eastern Ukrainian writers were published in Galicia and smuggled into Russian Ukraine. Tangible nationalist achievements in Galicia served as an encouragement and model to Ukrainian patriots under Russian rule. Galician Ukrainians, while fighting for equality of rights with the Poles, were thinking not only of themselves: they believed that their homeland was destined to become the ‘‘Piedmont’’ of a future independent Ukraine.

No issue facing the Ukrainian people in the nineteenth century was more portentous than the dilemma of choosing between assimilation in an all-Russian nation or assertion of separate national individuality. The far-reaching Russification of Ukraine was an obvious fact, and it could not be explained entirely by the repressive measures of the tsarist government. Russia radiated the tremendous prestige of a great power and of a brilliant imperial civilization. Many Ukrainians, dazzled by this glory, were eager to participate in it. How humble and pitiful appeared what the Ukrainian patriots dared offer in opposition to the splendid juggernaut! How preposterous was the disproportion of forces between those which stood at the disposal of a huge and despotic state and those of a handful of dreamers, armed with nothing but faith! Little wonder that the spokesmen of the Ukrainian movement instinctively adopted a protective colouring and tried to appear as harmless as possible. They often presented their cause as a non-political, cultural regionalism, comparable with the Provençal Félibrige. When formulating a political program, they did not go beyond the demand of a federalistic reorganization of the Russian Empire, which, after all, might have been acceptable to some Russians. Ukrainian patriots were, certainly, sincere in these protestations of political innocence. But the tsarist administration saw the situation in a different light: firmly convinced that the rebirth of Ukraine presented a deadly threat to the future of Russia as a great power in Europe, it waged a war of annihilation against even the most innocuous expressions of Ukrainian nationalism, while at the same time offering to ‘‘loyal Little Russians’’ tempting opportunities of career, recognition, and material rewards. The spell of Russia reached those Ukrainians living outside the
frontiers of the Empire. In Galicia there existed, in the second half of the nineteenth century, a pro-Russian current. The Galician Russophiles (called ‘‘Muscophiles’’ by contemporaries) favoured the adoption of Russian as the language of literature. At one time the majority of the land’s intelligentsia seemed to lean to the Russophile side. The contest between the Russophiles and the nationalists dealt with apparently trivial questions of language, grammar, and orthography, but in truth the entire future of the Ukrainian cause hinged on the outcome. Galicia was the proving ground where the partisans of national abdication and of national self-assertion measured their strength. The issue was of course relevant to the whole Ukrainian people, but only outside Russia could the contest be waged overtly, and by means of persuasion, without the tsarist police officer appearing on the scene. To both Galician currents came aid from beyond the frontier: the Russophiles received subsidies from St. Petersburg, while the nationalists had the moral support of Dnieper Ukraine. In a slow, tenacious effort the Russophile group was pushed back, gradually reduced to an impotent faction, and at last completely absorbed by the growing nationalist movement. This was a turning point in the history of Russo-Ukrainian relations, and the effects were soon felt also in Dnieper Ukraine. The trend toward Russification was reversed. By 1917 the entire Ukraine was swept by the torrent of national revolution.

Notes

1. It is significant that the Third Universal (Manifesto) of the revolutionary Ukrainian parliament, the Central Rada, which proclaimed the formation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (20 November 1917), and the Fourth Universal, which declared Ukraine a sovereign state completely separate from Russia (22 January 1918), avoided any reference to historical rights and were completely based on the principle of democratic self-determination. Since the president of the Rada and the originator of these two acts was the dean of Ukrainian historians, Mykhailo Hrushevsky, this omission was not fortuitous. It reflected an essential trait of the ideology of the Ukrainian movement.

2. A parallel situation may be found at the transition from the first to the second epoch of Ukrainian history. The Cossack state was not a direct continuation of the Kievan state, but neither was it without connections with this predecessor. The Ukrainian (‘‘Ruthenian,’’ in the nomenclature of the time) gentry, burghers, and clergy, among whom the traditions of Kievan Rus’ remained alive even under Polish domination, provided the Cossack military organization with a religious-political program, and partly also with a leading personnel, which lifted the anti-Polish revolt of 1648 to the level of a war of national liberation. This is the point in which the Ukrainian Cossacks radically differed from similar Russian communities of frontiersmen, the Don and Ural Cossacks.
4. Limitations of space do not permit bolstering these statements with proper references. Two short examples must suffice: the memoirs of V. Debagori-Mokrievich and the first part of those of I. Petrunkevich, the former for a presentation of revolutionary populism, and the latter for one of zemstvo liberalism, in Ukraine of the 1870s. Both men were of Ukrainian descent, but regarded themselves as members of the Russian nation, and wrote in Russian. Nevertheless, they were quite aware that the people among whom they were working differed in many essential respects from the Great Russians and had to be approached in a different way. An unmistakable Ukrainian aura pervades these reminiscences.
5. Only in some backward areas, such as Carpatho-Ukraine (Subcarpathian Ruthenia), was the crystallization of a modern national consciousness delayed until the 1930s.
6. It is, however, to be noted that each of the major international conflicts in which the Russian Empire was involved—the Napoleonic, Crimean, Balkan, and Japanese wars—had definite repercussions in Ukraine. In each case movements arose which attempted to take advantage of Russia’s predicament for the betterment of Ukraine’s position.
7. An early Ukrainian Marxist, Iulian Bachynsky, developed in his essay Ukraina irredenta (1895) the thesis that while the industries of Congress Poland were working for and dependent on the Russian market, Ukrainian industry was rather competitive with that of central Russia. From this he drew the prognosis that Ukraine was more likely than Poland to secede from Russia. This reveals the shortcomings of a purely economic interpretation of historical events, and for this Bachynsky was criticized by such outstanding contemporaries as M. Drahomanov and I. Franko.
8. Still, the facts pointed out by Bachynsky were certainly significant.
9. One may recall that Prague and Riga preserved well into the nineteenth century a predominantly German outlook.
10. The greatest wrong which tsarist Russia committed against the Ukrainian people in the field of socio-economic policies was the introduction of serfdom in 1783. As long as the Cossack officers showed an inclination toward political separatism, the tsarist policy was to pretend the role of “defender” of the common people against the local upper class. Later, when the danger of separatism had diminished, the interests of the peasantry were sacrificed in order to reconcile the Ukrainian gentry with the loss of their country’s political autonomy. Russian-style serfdom was introduced in Ukraine at a time when it was already on the way toward extinction in other parts of Eastern Europe, and when even in Galicia it was being restricted by the policies of the Austrian “enlightened despots,” Maria Theresa and Joseph II.
12. M. P. Drahomanov, Vybrani tvory (Prague 1937), 1:70. The passage quoted is from his “Avtobiografiia,” originally published posthumously in 1896.
13. V. Lypynsky, Lysty do brattv-khliborobiv (Vienna 1926), xxv.
15. The founders of Kharkiv University came from a circle influenced by the ideas and example of the philosopher and spiritual reformer Hryhorii Skovoroda (1722–94).
16. The case of Finland might be used here as an illuminating contrast. The upper classes of Finland were Swedish. But they did not try to bring the country back, in the name of “historical rights,” under the rule of Sweden. Rather they united their forces with those of the native Finnish majority for the common defence of the liberty of the homeland. This co-operation was to be eminently beneficial to both Finland and Sweden, and to the Swedish-Finnish minority as well.
ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY

16. An example of this is the idea of a Polish-Ukrainian political writer, F. Duchiński, according to whom the Russians were not really a Slavic people, since they were of Ugro-Finnic stock which had become linguistically Slavicized; this implied a deeper ethnic difference between the Russians and the Ukrainians than the close affinity of the two East Slavic languages would suggest. This conception, whatever its scholarly merits, enjoyed considerable popularity in Ukrainian circles.

17. Three men merit mention in this context: Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), historian and archaeologist, the founder of the "Kievan historical school," the leader of the secret organization Hromada and of the Ukrainian movement in Russia during the most difficult period of reaction in the 1880s and 90s; Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931), eminent historian, political philosopher, and conservative leader; and the Metropolitan Andrii Sheptytsky (1865–1944), for forty-four years the head of the Greek Catholic Church in Galicia and the outstanding Ukrainian ecclesiastical figure of the century.

18. S. Smolka, Les Ruthènes et les problèmes religieux du monde russein (Berne 1917), 225 and 228.

19. The Uniate (Greek Catholic) Church had been suppressed in Right-Bank Ukraine by the Russian government in 1839. Tsarist Russia at all times showed an implacable hostility to Ukrainian Catholicism of the Eastern Rite, and this attitude has been inherited by Soviet Russia.

20. In works of fiction dealing with the Anglican clerical milieu, for instance, in Oliver Goldsmith's The Vicar of Wakefield, one encounters an atmosphere strikingly similar to that which used to prevail in the patriarchal homes of the Galician priests. There was, however, one major difference: the clergymen of the Church of England were the social allies of the English aristocracy, while those of the Greek Catholic Church stood in radical opposition to Galicia's Polish aristocracy.

21. The crownland "Kingdom of Galicia and Lodomoria" also included, besides the territory of the Old Rus' principality of Halych (from which its name was derived), an ethnically Polish area, west of the river San. In the Ukrainian, eastern part of Galicia there existed, as in Right-Bank Ukraine, a socially privileged Polish minority of landowners and town dwellers. In the province as a whole the numerical strength of the Polish and the Ukrainian groups was approximately equal, but the aristocratic character of the Austrian constitution and Vienna's policy favoured the Polish element. From 1848, and to the last days of the monarchy, the Ukrainians strove for a partition of the province on ethnic lines, but in vain.

22. A new electoral law for the Galician Diet was adopted early in 1914, but the outbreak of the war prevented its implementation. The Ukrainians were to receive some 30 per cent of the seats in the Diet and a share in the autonomous provincial administration. This still fell short of what the Ukrainians demanded on the basis of their numerical strength, but the Polish monopoly of power was at last broken.


24. The Russophile movement emerged in the 1860s as a reaction to the hegemony which the Poles had achieved in the province. It was also fed by conservative sentiments which saw a special value in the traits of the cultural heritage common to all Eastern Slavs: the Slavonic liturgy, Cyrillic script, Julian calendar, and the traditional name of Rus', which could easily be identified with Russia.
Reply*

I am grateful to the commentators for their thoughtful consideration. Professor Arthur E. Adams compliments me for my "courageous assessment of the insignificance of Ukraine as a political entity prior to 1917." I am appreciative of the compliment, but I am sorry to say that it is based on a misapprehension of my point of view. As the problem is a historically important one, I will try to restate my argument.

The strength of a political movement must be measured in relative terms, taking into account specific circumstances. If one uses Western standards, all non-governmental, societal political forces in nineteenth-century Russia may easily give the impression of being "insignificant." This refers not only to Ukrainian nationalism but also to Russian revolutionary and oppositionist movements, all of which had a narrow stratum of active supporters. This was the outcome of a system in which a despotic, hypertrophic state faced an atrophied, politically inarticulate, and cowed society. The outward expressions of the pre-1917 Ukrainian national movement may have been modest, and the number of persons actively engaged in it limited. Still, its strength should not be underestimated by a historian. Its vitality was proven by the fact that it survived systematic repression by a powerful state; and it always bore within itself the potential for a radical transformation of the political structure of Eastern Europe as a whole.

Perceptive contemporary observers were able to assess the political significance of the Ukrainian problem. Here are the comments of a German traveler, Johann Georg Kohl, who visited Ukraine in the 1830s:

Such is the aversion of the people of Little to those of Great Russia that it may fairly be described as a national hatred, and the feeling has rather strengthened than diminished since the seventeenth century, when the country was annexed to the Moscovite empire.... Before their subjection, all the Malorossians were freemen, and serfdom, they maintain, had never been known among them. It was the Russians, they say, that reduced one-half of the people to slavery. During the first century after the union, Little Russia continued to have her own hetmans, and retained much of her ancient constitution and privileges, but all these have been swept away by the retrograde reforms of the last and present century.... To this day, the battle of Poltava is remembered throughout Little Russia with feelings similar to those with which the battle of the White Mountain is remembered in Bohemia.... Should the colossal empire of Russia one day fall to pieces, there is little doubt but the

* A commentary on this essay by Arthur E. Adams appeared in the original publication (Slavic Review 22, no. 2 (June 1963), 217–23). Rudnytsky's rejoinder follows.
Malorossians will form a separate state. They have their own language, their own historical recollections, seldom mingle with their Moscovite rulers, and are in number already more than 10,000,000.

It is noteworthy that these striking observations and predictions were made before the emergence of modern Ukrainian nationalism as an organized movement. The following excerpts are from a report which the Austrian consul in Kiev, Eduard Sedlaczek, submitted to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Vienna in 1893:

The Little Russian national movement continues to grow, although the greatest caution is being observed.... I know personally many a civil servant and teacher whose attitude in office is regarded as blameless who, however, in an intimate circle betrays a frame of mind far from friendly toward the government.... The present time is characterized by a substantial increase in studies on Little Russian history and ethnography, published in Russian. This is the natural outcome of censorship, which deals severely with Little Russian publications.... These [informal] groups, which are spread throughout the entire country, have a purely literary and scholarly outlook, and so offer nothing palpable to the police, but in fact they serve to strengthen the Little Russian patriotic awareness.

This report illustrates the condition of the Ukrainian movement during the era of reaction. To obtain a notion of the impressive progress it was able to achieve in the subsequent twenty years, there is no better witness than S. N. Shchegolev, a member of the Russian Black Hundred. He was the author of a thick work on Ukrainian nationalism, published in 1912, which has been called "a handbook for the police." Regardless of the author's tendency and purpose, the book is rich in factual information drawn from the contemporary press. The reader gets the distinct impression that all of "South Russia" was, on the eve of the First World War, honeycombed by the activities, overt or covert, of the Ukrainian national movement. A study of Shchegolev's work reveals the deep roots out of which blossomed the Ukrainian "miracle" of 1917; it also shows the erroneousness of the view of Professor Adams, according to whom the Ukrainian revolutionary parliament, the Central Rada, was "a tiny and isolated group of nationalist intellectuals." In reality the Rada was the crest of a powerful mass movement. The Rada's main problem and difficulty was not lack of popular support, as Professor Adams implies, but, quite to the contrary, the inadequacy of leadership: the national elite was neither numerous enough nor sufficiently experienced politically to
master the spontaneous rising of the masses and to grasp power firmly in
a large country under complicated and trying internal and international
conditions.

In writing my paper, I deliberately limited myself to the prerevolution-
ary epoch. Professor Adams’ contribution, however, is mainly devoted
to the Revolution of 1917–21. This puts me in an awkward position. I
lack space to offer a concerted discussion of the history of the Ukrainian
Revolution, while, at the same time, I cannot leave some of Professor
Adams’ statements unchallenged.

Professor Adams’ conception of the Ukrainian Revolution is basically
one of a wild and chaotic peasant revolt, of a jacquerie. This picture,
which may have been induced by his scholarly interest in the Makhno
movement of southern Ukraine, is an extremely one-sided one, almost to
the point of caricature. I do not think of denying the existence of those
anarchistic features, but they were not the dominant ones in the history of
the Ukrainian Revolution.

Let us, for instance, refer to the conservative regime of 1918, headed
by Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky. According to Professor Adams, Skoro-
padsky was simply a “puppet of the Germans.” I contend that this view
is a gross oversimplification. General Skoropadsky, a scion of a family
distinguished in Ukrainian annals, returned during the Revolution to the
service of his homeland, in very much the same manner as his former
comrade-in-arms, General Mannerheim, returned to the service of Fin-
land. Skoropadsky played an important role in the events of 1917 in
Ukraine, long before the coming of the Germans. It is true that the Het-
manate of 1918 needed German protection for its survival, but it also
found support among the conservative and moderate Ukrainians. During
its short duration, the Hetmanate could show a number of creditable
achievements, including the foundation of two Ukrainian-language uni-
versities, in Kiev and Kamianets-Podilskyi, and of an Academy of
Sciences, of which the present Academy of Sciences of the Ukrainian
SSR is a lineal continuation. Skoropadsky’s political life did not end with
the fall of the Hetmanate. Actually, he gained moral stature during the
years of exile, and a considerable segment of the Ukrainian community
outside the borders of the USSR continued to look upon him, during the
inter-war period, as the legitimate pretender to Ukraine’s throne. All this
is not intended as an apologia for Skoropadsky or the regime headed by
him in 1918, but is meant as a warning against simplistic clichés in the
treatment of the history of the Ukrainian Revolution.

The failure of the Ukrainian Revolution is obvious: it did not succeed
in giving permanence to an independent, democratic national state. A
perceptive student, however, whose vision is not limited to success and
failure, might feel the obligation to weigh the causes of this failure and to try to discern what, in spite of defeat, the permanent achievements of the Ukrainian Revolution have been.

Among the new nations emerging in Eastern Europe at the end of World War I none had greater handicaps than Ukraine. The country’s normal development had been warped and retarded by the dead hand of Russian tsarism. There was, in 1917, a staggering backlog of unfulfilled tasks, which had to be shouldered all at once, whereas other stateless nations had been able to solve these preliminary problems gradually, over decades. For instance, there did not exist in old Russia one single school with Ukrainian as the language of instruction. Ukraine was faced simultaneously with the task of creating a network of elementary schools and of forming an independent government, an army, and a diplomatic service. One may also add that imperial Russia, in whose shadow the majority of the Ukrainian people had lived for such a long time, was a very poor training place for self-government and civic maturity. There was a standing joke in Ukrainian circles: ‘‘Why won’t Britain annex us as a colony? Then we would be ready for independence in ten years.’’ The social tensions in the country were acute. In Ukraine, in contrast with Great Russia, the movement of social protest did not flow in orthodox Bolshevik channels; still, it offered favourable ground for subversive propaganda coming from Moscow, and it impeded the consolidation of the democratic Ukrainian People’s Republic.

Internationally, Ukraine had first to shoulder, in 1917, the unwelcome heritage of the war against the Central Powers, then, in 1918, the burden of the German occupation, and finally, in 1919, to face the lack of recognition and the political hostility of the victorious Entente. Isolated and deprived of any outside support, Ukraine had to sustain a war on three fronts: against Soviet Russia, against the White Army of General Denikin, and against Poland. The Polish-Ukrainian struggle merits special mention, as it is usually overlooked by Western historians, who approach the Ukrainian Revolution as a part of the Russian Civil War. The Polish-Ukrainian conflict was by no means a local affair affecting Galicia only; it exercised a fateful impact on the whole development of the Ukrainian cause. Galicia was the section of Ukraine with the highest level of national consciousness. In civic discipline and public order the territory compared favourably with all the other East European countries of that time, and the population was impervious to communist propaganda. It was the intention of the Ukrainian leaders to use Galicia as the stronghold and the base in the struggle against Soviet Russia. This was prevented by the Polish attack, which diverted the best Ukrainian forces from the anti-Bolshevik front in the critical months of the winter and spring of 1919. On the other hand, the political obtuseness and rigid centralism of the
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White Army prevented the coalition of all anti-communist forces. Despite these tragic circumstances, Ukraine offered a stubborn, protracted resistance and kept on fighting. Viewed in this light, even "peasant anarchism," by which Professor Adams has been so impressed, may be understood as an elemental groping of the Ukrainian masses after liberty, independence, and a just social order.

Professor Adams is right in stressing that Ukrainian patriots also worked in the Soviet camp. Nevertheless, the Soviet regime occupies a very different place in Russian and Ukrainian history. In Russia, the victory of the Bolsheviks was over their internal opponents; Soviet Russia is, for better or worse, the legitimate heir of the traditional Russian state. The position of Ukraine is, in this respect, analogous rather with that of the "people's democracies" established after World War II. The Soviet regime was imposed on the country from the outside; the weak local communists (among whom ethnic Ukrainians formed only a minority) would never have been able to secure power in Ukraine without outside intervention. The Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic represents a compromise between the fact of Russian domination and those conquests of the Ukrainian Revolution which could no longer be obliterated. It speaks for the far-sightedness and political flexibility of Lenin that he, modifying his original centralistic program, perceived the necessity of neutralizing the forces of Ukrainian nationalism by appropriate concessions.

The permanent achievements of the Ukrainian Revolution were, first, a profound "mutation" of the collective mind of the Ukrainian people, their crystallization into a modern nation, and, second, a shift in the international power structure of the eastern half of the continent. "The East European upheavals of 1917–20 have led to three great results: the victory of Bolshevism, which entered into the historical inheritance of Muscovy-Russia, the re-establishment of Poland, and the re-emergence of Ukraine as the third great force of the East European area, alongside Great Russia and Poland." It is noteworthy, for instance, that the changes which took place in Eastern Europe after the Second World War represent not only an expansion of Moscow's imperial sphere, but also the fulfillment of the territorial program which the Ukrainian movement advocated for generations: the consolidation of all lands of Ukrainian speech in one Ukrainian body politic. This, in turn, has brought a shift in the balance of forces between Ukraine and Russia, whose full impact only the future will be able to tell.

Professor Adams informs us that he has "often clashed with Ukrainian nationalist scholars," and he complains that "nationalistic dross has long hampered effective investigation in this area" of modern Ukrainian history. Professor Adams graciously exempts me from this criticism, but I cannot help feeling that his complaints are out of place. Ukrainian
scholars in Western lands are few, and there is little danger that they will be able to "brainwash" anyone. As far as modern Ukrainian history is concerned, it is difficult to see what "nationalistic dross" has impeded its study. Is it not rather true that Ukrainian history, modern or old, has not yet been discovered as a separate area of studies by Western scholars, and is treated, if at all, only incidentally, on the margin of Russian history? The expression "nationalist scholars," as used by Professor Adams, implies a judgment of value. I have not heard that a historian of Russian background, working in the United States, has been ever labeled "nationalistic," even if he displays obvious symptoms of Russian patriotic fervour. Why this difference in treatment? The answer, I think, is that views and interpretations traditionally expounded by Russian scholarship have received wide currency and are given credence, without questioning of their premises. Conceptions which run counter to this orthodoxy are not weighed for their scholarly validity but are automatically ruled out of court as allegedly biased and "nationalistic." I do not, of course, expect that views defended by Ukrainian historiography should be accepted uncritically; but they merit a proper hearing.

A great Russian statesman, Sergius Witte, once said:

We have not yet fully realized that since the times of Peter the Great and Catherine the Great there has been no Russia, but a Russian Empire. If some 35 per cent of the population are ethnic minorities, and the Russians are divided into Great Russians, Little Russians, and Belorussians, it is impossible to conduct in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries a policy which disregards this historical fact of capital importance, which disregards the national traits of the other nationalities composing the Russian Empire, their religion, language, etc.⁷

The "historical fact of capital importance" stressed by Witte nearly half a century ago has even now not been fully digested by many American scholars in the field of East European and Slavic studies. The history of "Russia" is usually approached as one of an essentially homogeneous area rather than one of a multinational empire, comparable, in this respect, to the former Ottoman and Austrian empires. This results, I believe, in a one-sided and inadequate understanding of the East European historical process. To correct this would require a profound revision of the traditional historical perspectives, and this is opposed by the great force of intellectual inertia. "Nationalist historians," of whom Professor Adams complains, may be given credit for performing a useful function—that of gadflies, who awaken sluggish thought from its dogmatic slumber.

The commentary of Professors Omeljan Pritsak and John S. Reshetar,
Jr., raises many questions, particularly that of the classification of Ukraine as Eastern or Western, and that of historicity and non-historicity. On the first point, I am inclined to agree with Oscar Halecki that Ukraine is Eastern and European; the second question was treated in the article. These, and other issues raised by Professors Pritsak and Reshetar, are worth substantial debate at some time, but further comment does not seem appropriate in an article on modern Ukraine. The reader of the commentary will see that there are many interesting topics for discussion in the field of Ukrainian history, and I am appreciative of Professors Pritsak and Reshetar’s intensive study.

Notes

1. J. G. Kohl, *Russia: St. Petersburg, Moscow, Kharkoff, Riga, Odessa, the German Provinces of the Baltic, the Steppes, the Crimea, and the Interior of the Empire* (London 1844), 527–9.


4. A test of strength of the Ukrainian movement was the election to the Russian Constituent Assembly in the late fall of 1917. “The five million votes obtained in the clear by the various Ukrainian lists constitute an impressive showing from any point of view, and must be augmented by at least another half million votes as the Ukrainian share of the joint lists agreed upon with other parties. . . . In the face of such a clear-cut demonstration of strength, it is simply not possible to contend that the Ukrainian movement was a weak and artificial thing, concocted by a group of hyper-nationalistic intellectuals.” O. H. Radkey, *The Election to the Russian Constituent Assembly of 1917* (Cambridge, Mass. 1950), 18 and 30. The validity of this test was explicitly recognized by Lenin himself. Rosa Luxemburg, like Professor Adams, believed that the Central Rada was without a mass base, and she criticized Lenin for the “coddling” of Ukrainian nationalism. In justifying his policy Lenin referred to the results of the election to the Constituent Assembly as a proof that the Ukrainian movement was a force to be reckoned with. It is to be noted that in the eight provinces of Ukraine the Bolsheviks obtained only 10 per cent of the votes. Cf. J. Borys, *The Russian Communist Party and the Sovietization of Ukraine* (Stockholm 1960), 159–60.

5. The background of the Skoropadsky coup has been recently studied by Oleh S. Fedyshyn from German archival sources. It appears that Skoropadsky was not hand-picked by the Germans. The right-wing conspiracy against the socialistic Rada government was formed by Skoropadsky on his own initiative. German military authorities arrived independently at a decision to get rid of the “unco-operative” Central
Rada. The two parties reached an agreement only a few days before the coup of 29 April 1918. See O. S. Fedyshyn, *Germany's Drive to the East and the Ukrainian Revolution, 1917–1918* (New Brunswick, N.J. 1971).


Observations on the Problem of "Historical" and "Non-historical" Nations

There is a problem I wish to raise in connection with George G. Grabowicz's comprehensive, erudite, and penetrating analysis of A History of Ukrainian Literature by the late Dmytro Chyzhevsky, "Toward a History of Ukrainian Literature," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 1, no. 4 (December 1977). In that review Professor Grabowicz denies the validity of the distinction between "historical" and "non-historical" nations made by many scholars, including Chyzhevsky. He states: "the differentiation, and, necessarily, evaluation of nations according to superior and inferior, historical and non-historical, complete and incomplete, is in the realm not of scholarship but of, say, political propaganda" (510).

I beg to disagree. Leaving aside for the present the question of superiority and inferiority, I consider the concepts of historicity and non-historicity—or, alternatively, of completeness and incompleteness—of nations legitimate categories of historical cognition. They are relevant in the context of East European and particularly Ukrainian history.

Professor Grabowicz approaches the problem from the perspective of literary history. My chief concern is the broader socio-political connotations of historicity and non-historicity. But, following Grabowicz's lead, I will begin the discussion with some remarks about the literary aspect.

Grabowicz insists that the literature of each nation should be studied in terms of that nation's unique cultural experience and not through the application of extraneous criteria. He pointedly asks "why a literature expressing one culture, one set of historical experiences and influences, should be a yardstick for another" (511). Rejecting Chyzhevsky's characterization of Ukrainian literature as the "incomplete literature of an incomplete nation," Grabowicz cites the example of Oriental literatures—Persian, Turkish, Chinese—which nobody calls incomplete although they lack certain genres found in West European literatures. He adds:
Theorically, one could reverse the process and claim that a Western literature, say, French, is ‘incomplete’ because it does not have a feature, a genre of a non-Western literature, for example the Ukrainian *duma*’ (511).

But the relationship of Ukrainian literature to other European literatures is not the same as that of Turkish, Persian, or Chinese literature. The latter are products of altogether different cultural traditions and Western criteria are, indeed, inapplicable to them. There exists, however, a European cultural community, based on the shared heritage of classical antiquity and Christianity and strengthened by centuries of intensive cultural-literary exchange. Ukraine is undeniably a member of the European cultural community, albeit a somewhat marginal one. This impels us to apply to Ukrainian literature the common European standards and criteria. A Ukrainian literary critic defined this position in terms opposite to those proposed by Grabowicz:

To criticize means to compare; we compare two magnitudes to assess their value. For decades our literature, and for centuries our whole national life, could not afford comparisons. Like a growing child, struggling for sheer physical survival, we considered ourselves a self-subsistent value. Nowadays, no one among us can doubt any longer that the spiritual strength of a people must be measured by the same procedure as the spiritual (and physical) strength of an individual: by setting it off against the strength of those whose measure is already known. . . . Just as the entire future of our nation depends on its relations with the peoples and states of Europe, so the development of our literature is bound up with the literatures of the [other] European peoples—the smaller and the larger, those near us and those distant, those neighbouring and related, those hostile and those friendly.1

The genres and features of any European national literature are hardly ever peculiar to that one literature alone. As a rule, they are widely distributed throughout the entire world of European culture (including its overseas offshoots), and they appear within a national literature not as something absolutely unique, but rather as original variations on a common theme. Now, if certain genres or features are conspicuously missing or underdeveloped in a nation’s literature, a sense of incompleteness is difficult to avoid. Such a deficiency is often keenly felt by the members of that nation themselves. For instance, most European literatures possess a medieval epic tradition, but some do not; Czech literature is among the latter. This circumstance induced Vaclav Hánka to perpetrate his notorious forgeries: he wished to supply his countrymen with the medieval epic that history had denied them.
The incompleteness of a literature becomes particularly glaring when its missing features have been, so to say, transplanted to neighbouring literatures. Let us use a Ukrainian example. It is commonly accepted that classicism is but poorly developed in Ukrainian literature, being represented mostly by the "low" genre of travesty. This does not mean, however, that classicism was unknown in Ukraine. Writers of Ukrainian background made signal contributions to Russian classicism: they include I. Bohdanovych, M. Hnidych, V. Kapnist, and V. Narizhny. But this very fact demonstrates the fragmentary and incomplete nature of the Ukrainian literary process of that age.

The problem may be approached from a different angle. What determines the completeness or incompleteness of a literature is not the presence or absence of certain features, but rather whether a literature can satisfy all the essential cultural needs of its own society during a given historical period. Applying this criterion, we would have to say that Ukrainian literature of the Kievan period was complete (despite its heavy dependence on Byzantine models), whereas Ukrainian literature of the second half of the eighteenth and most of the nineteenth century was patently incomplete. This, of course, has nothing to do with the artistic value of individual works, but refers only to the social function of a literature as a whole.

The incompleteness of nineteenth-century Ukrainian literature was perceived by contemporary Ukrainian observers. Thus Mykhailo Mak-symovych wrote in 1840 to a Galician correspondent that in Russian Ukraine "there can be no [complete] literature in the South Russian [Ukrainian] language, but only individual works," such as those of Kot-liarevsky, Kvitka, Hrebinka, and a few others. According to Mak-symovych, the main vocation of the Ukrainian language and oral folk poetry was to enrich the Russian literary language that he considered common to North and South Russia.\(^2\) These ideas were voiced not by a Russian chauvinist, but by a man profoundly dedicated to the Ukrainian national-cultural revival, of which he was a founding father.

Later generations of nineteenth-century Ukrainian intellectuals were less complacent about this state of affairs. Writers, literary critics, and publicists of the middle and second half of the century—Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish, Ivan Nechui-Levytsky, Mykhailo Drahomanov, and others—explicitly recognized the reality of the problem and discussed various strategies for dealing with it. (This could be the subject of a fascinating study in literary sociology.) Ukrainian literature rose above the level of a "literature for domestic consumption" and began to emerge as a complete national literature only at the turn of the twentieth century. This resulted, on the one hand, from a marked intensification of the literary process and the appearance of a galaxy of gifted
writers who broadened the thematic and stylistic scope of Ukrainian literature. On the other hand, of no less significance was the emergence of Ukrainian scholarly and journalistic prose and the ever-expanding use of the Ukrainian language in schools and for public and official functions in the Austrian provinces of Galicia and Bukovyna. In the much larger lands of Dnieper (Russian) Ukraine, the breakthrough of the Ukrainian language into education and public life occurred only after the fall of tsarism, in 1917.

The thesis that the completeness or incompleteness of a literature is determined by its social function implies that the problem is not purely literary, but rather primarily sociological and political. Chyzhevsky was quite right in stating that an incomplete literature reflects an incomplete nation. I will continue the discussion on the plane of socio-political history, concentrating on the distinction between historical and non-historical nations.

The concept of a non-historical nation may appear to be a contradiction in terms: the nation, like every other social group, exists in time and therefore is necessarily historical. This objection can be met on two levels. First, not every duration in time possesses the quality of "historicity." The evolution of a natural species, or the life of a colony of social insects, cannot be considered historical because they lack the specifically human element of consciousness. Man is a being endowed with mind and consciousness; consequently, every human community is to some extent historical. However, the mode of existence of primitive tribes and ethnic groups possesses only a rudimentary, embryonic historicity. The potential for historicity becomes actual only when a community achieves self-consciousness. Second, in the context of nineteenth-century East European and Balkan history, the distinction between historical and non-historical nations has a specialized, technical meaning which will be clarified below. One could substitute other terms for "non-historical nations": thus Mykhailo Drahomanov spoke of "plebeian" nations and classified Ukraine among them. I consider the terms "plebeian," "incomplete," and "non-historical" more or less interchangeable, but I prefer the last, along with its antonym, "historical nation."

Where did this distinction originate? I have made no special study of the problem, but I am convinced that Professor Grabowicz errs in ascribing its paternity to Herder (510); this attribution is most unlikely, because of Herder's anti-statist attitude and his glorification of folk and folk culture. Nor has the concept anything to do with Gobineau's fanciful racial theories, as Grabowicz suggests. It seems that the differentiation of nations into historical and non-historical, though first theorized by Hegel, took on independent importance in the legal and administrative
practice of the Habsburg Empire. By the time of the 1848 Revolution, the terms were already current in publicistic literature. It was inevitable that in the heat of political controversy they were often misused for polemical and propagandistic purposes. Among those who sinned on this count we find the co-founder of so-called scientific socialism, Friedrich Engels. However, such abuses do not detract from the objective historical validity of the concept. Robert A. Kann, the outstanding authority on nationality problems in the Habsburg Empire, classifies the peoples of Austria-Hungary into two categories: "the national groups with independent national history" and "the national groups without independent national history." Among the former he counts the Germans, Magyars, Czechs, Poles, Croats, and Italians; among the latter, the Slovaks, Serbs, Slovenes, Romanians, and Ruthenians (Ukrainians). Hugh Seton-Watson draws a similar distinction between "the old continuous nations" of Europe and the "new nations," among which he classifies Ukraine.

But in what did the difference actually consist? Was it determined by the presence or absence of an independent national state? Professor Grabowicz comments: "By the reason of the loss of political indepen-
dence the Polish nation in the nineteenth century would also have to be called incomplete..." (510). Here Grabowicz comes close to the core of the problem, but he misses the essential point.

It is true, of course, that no independent Polish state was to be found on the political map of nineteenth-century Europe. We must not forget, however, that Polish statehood did survive in part in the form of Napoleon's Grand Duchy of Warsaw and, later, as the Congress Kingdom. From the 1860s the Poles enjoyed extensive political and cultural autonomy, approaching a sort of substitute statehood, in Galicia. The existence of the Polish nation was explicitly recognized by the great powers in the Treaty of Vienna of 1815, and it was at all times accepted as a matter of course by European public opinion. More important, the Polish community itself had a continuous sense of its national identity, expressed in an uninterrupted chain of political actions and in a rich, variegated cultural life.

I conclude that the decisive factor in the existence of the so-called historical nations was the preservation, despite the loss of independence, of a representative upper class as the carrier of political consciousness and "high" culture. Usually, as in the cases of Poland and Hungary, this upper class consisted of the landed nobility. However, in the Greek Phanariots we find a stratum of merchant patricians fulfilling the same function. Conversely, the so-called non-historical nations had lost (or had never possessed) a representative class, and were reduced to an inarticulate popular mass, with little if any national consciousness and with a
culture of predominantly folk character. This differentiation is not an arbitrary theoretical construct, for it is grounded in empirical historical reality.

Professor Grabowicz denies the validity of this criterion. According to him its acceptance would imply the absurdity that "every nation that ever 'lost' an elite or ruling class through war or revolution (the Czech, the French, the Russian, the Chinese, etc.) would be incomplete" (510). Here Grabowicz confuses two altogether dissimilar historical situations: a change in the composition of a national elite resulting from an internal revolution, and a total (or near total) elimination of a national elite resulting from foreign conquest. In studying the history of the French, Russian, and Chinese revolutions, we see a traditional elite overthrown and superseded by a new elite of the same nationality. Moreover, the revolutionary elite, as a rule, absorbed a considerable portion of the traditional elite (what comes to mind is Viacheslav Lypynsky's observation that only those revolutions succeed that are supported by a dissident segment of the former ruling class). Thus in the case of internal revolutions, whatever one may think of their merits or demerits, there is no cause to speak of a break in the basic continuity of national existence or of a loss of a nation's "historicity." In his classic L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution (1855), Alexis de Tocqueville irrefutably demonstrated the continuity between the old French monarchy and the modern French nation born from the Revolution. The same applies, as Richard Pipes and Tibor Szamuely have recently argued, to pre- and post-revolutionary Russia. There can be little doubt that the Soviet state, in both its internal and international aspects, is the heir and continuator of imperial Russia.

The Czech case is radically different, and there is no justification for bracketing it with the nations that underwent a change of elite through an internal revolution. After the White Mountain calamity in 1620, nearly the whole of the traditional Czech upper class was wiped out by the conquering Habsburgs, and the Czech nationality found itself reduced to the peasantry and the lower social strata in the towns. The Germanization of Bohemia had advanced so far that the great Czech scholar Josef Dobrovský is reported to have predicted, in 1791, that the Czech language was doomed to extinction. However, this tendency was checked and reversed by several countervailing factors which cannot be discussed here. The reconstruction of a politically self-conscious, socially and culturally mature Czech national community occurred relatively early in the nineteenth century. Thus the disruption in the continuity of the national existence of the Czechs was less deep than, say, that of the Bulgarians. The Czechs may be regarded as a borderline case between the non-historical and historical nations of Eastern Europe.

The results of the preceding analysis can be summarized as follows. In
the post-Napoleonic era, the whole of Eastern Europe, including the Balkans, was divided among three great empires—the Russian, the Austrian, and the Ottoman. (The Ottoman Empire gradually crumbled in the course of the nineteenth century, but Russia and Austria-Hungary remained intact until World War I, discounting the separation of Lombardy and Venetia from Austria in 1859–66.) The three empires included many nationalities, which can be roughly differentiated into two categories: those which even under foreign imperial rule had a recognized status, and those which lacked it. The determining factor was the presence or absence of a traditional representative class. Among the nationalities of the second type, those labelled non-historical, new elites evolved in the form of the intelligentsia. National movements of that type had a populist colouring, and in time they were to display a remarkable vitality. Still, the national strivings of the two categories showed clearly different characteristics throughout the entire era. Traces of these differences are noticeable in the social make-up and the collective mentality of East European nations even today.

Let us now look at the emotionally charged question of the superiority and inferiority of nations, which I have deliberately set aside until now. It is undeniable that initially the historical nations enjoyed strong political and cultural advantages over their plebeian neighbours. However, "superiority" and "inferiority" ought to be perceived in relative terms. No group, no more than any individual person, can actualize all values simultaneously. Strength in certain areas is always compensated by deficiencies in other areas, and vice versa. In the course of time, an initial advantage can turn into a handicap, and a dialectical reversal can occur (Hegel's celebrated discussion of the master-slave relationship is an analysis of such a reversal). It is possible to demonstrate that "historicity" was not always an unmixed blessing. In certain cases, it burdened a nation with an undesirable legacy. The Romanians, for instance, possessed a national historical existence of sorts in the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia, semi-autonomous entities under Ottoman suzerainty. This helped the modern Romanian state to emerge relatively early, in the middle of the nineteenth century. But another consequence was that Romanian public life was infected by an unfortunate tradition of Ottoman and Phanariot mores. Thus, those Romanians who until 1918 lived under Hungarian rule, as an oppressed minority and a typical non-historical nationality, were superior in civic culture to their compatriots in the autonomous principalities and in the later united Romanian Kingdom.

While the non-historical nationalities were striving to construct modern national communities on a popular base—from the bottom up, socially speaking—the historical nationalities were faced with the opposite problem: the extension of the national community from a pre-existing
elite to the common people. (Magyar-speaking and Polish-speaking peasants stood outside the pale of, respectively, the historical Hungarian and Polish nations; these nations coincided with the corporately organized nobility.) The process of social democratization made it imperative to endow the nation with a broad popular base and to transform the former serf into a citizen. This was not an easy or painless task, as illustrated by the tragic experience of the 1846 Polish national uprising in western Galicia, when the patriotic insurgents were massacred and delivered into the hands of the Austrian administration by the Polish peasantry of the region. The problem proved particularly intractable and, indeed, insoluble whenever the bulk of the population differed ethnically from the local upper class who were members of the historical nation.

The political ideologies of the historical nations were dominated by the concept of state rights and historical frontiers; the plebeian nationalities that happened to live within these historical boundaries were to be kept in a dependent position and, if possible, assimilated. Such overly ambitious, unrealistic territorial programs exacted a heavy price. The great Hungarian national revolution of 1848–9 was handicapped by the resistance of minorities (in fact, regional majorities)—the Serbs, Romanians, and Slovaks. Owing to a favourable political constellation and the skill of their leaders, the Hungarians achieved a brilliant success in 1867 (the so-called Austro-Hungarian Compromise): the recognition by the dynasty and the Vienna government of Hungarian statehood and its full internal autonomy within the historical boundaries of the Lands of Saint Stephen’s Crown. However, half a century later, at the post-World War I peace settlement, the Hungarian state suffered dismemberment and all non-Magyar areas were detached from it. The Poles, too, strove to restore the old Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth within its pre-partition frontiers. Polish claims were opposed by the spokesmen for the newly emerged Ukrainian, Lithuanian, and later also Belorussian national movements. This issue aggravated relations between the Poles and their eastern neighbours. In the end, the Poles were forced to reconcile themselves, however reluctantly, to the permanent loss of the eastern borderlands of the historical Commonwealth. The neo-Byzantine dreams of the Greeks—their “Great Idea”—were the cause of enduring Greek-Bulgarian hostility; they also enticed the Greeks, in 1920–22, into an adventurous policy in Asia Minor, with the known catastrophic results. Finally, one historical nation totally disappeared from the face of the earth—the Baltic Germans, who for centuries had ruled the native Latvians and Estonians, but lacked a popular base of their own.

The gist of the preceding discussion is that the concepts of national superiority and inferiority are relative. I disagree with Professor Grabowicz’s view that these concepts can be dispensed with altogether.
In dealing with a specific historical problem, we are obliged, by the strength of the evidence itself, to acknowledge the superior or inferior performance of communities interacting together. For instance, in studying the history of a war we can, quite objectively, conclude that the military effort of one state was superior to that of another. This applies to all spheres of social and cultural life. Confusion occurs only if criteria which are adequate for one sphere are uncritically extended to other spheres, or are generalized.

Let me now probe into the underlying theoretical assumptions of Professor Grabowicz’s rejection of “the differentiation, and, necessarily, evaluation of nations according to superior and inferior, historical and non-historical, complete and incomplete.” Grabowicz charges Chyżhevsky with “evolutionist thinking” derived from nineteenth-century anthropologists (Grabowicz mentions Morgan, Tylor, and Bachofen) “who shared the basic premise that all human cultures follow the same path and pass through the same stages in their cultural evolution” (512). Evolutionism leads to the establishment of an arbitrary hierarchy in which nations are ranked according to how far they have advanced along the path of universal progress. In contrast, Grabowicz, apparently influenced by modern structural anthropology, recommends that each culture be comprehended “as a functioning whole” (512). Being a whole, a nation and its culture, including literature, by definition cannot be incomplete. According to Grabowicz, Chyżhevsky’s evolutionism and his application of ostensibly universal—in fact, West European—standards to the history of Ukrainian literature causes him to slight its “uniquely Ukrainian ‘substance’” (509).

I am no apologist for unilineal, universal evolutionary schemes which tend to blur the specific character of historical epochs, nations, and cultures. I think, however, that Grabowicz’s holistic approach contains the danger of an opposite fallacy: it exaggerates the uniqueness of nations to the point where they begin to appear as isolated, autarchic monads. It is painful to find a scholar of Professor Grabowicz’s erudition and sophistication in the compromising proximity of “the ethnocentric, parochial and ahistorical perspective” against which he himself inveighs in a different context (506). I share Grabowicz’s conviction that each nation possesses a unique “substance” (character, essence, or quality). But I know of no other way to define this unique substance than by the use of comparative methods. It is not that one nation should serve as a “yardstick” for another, but that nations must be matched against each other. The cognitive work of the historian is here grounded in the reality of the historical process itself. History means a constant confrontation, interaction, and interpenetration of communities and cultures. The uniqueness of a nation actualizes itself through this very process.
There remains one last question which is related to the problem of the completeness and incompleteness of nations. This question possesses considerable theoretical interest and, in the case of Ukraine, great practical relevance. Grabowicz states: "When some classes or groups disappear or are 'lost' there occur changes in internal make-up, in institutions, in social stratification, but the nation does not therefore die or become incomplete" (510). I wish I could share Professor Grabowicz's optimism. But a nation is an articulate community of consciousness and will, not just an aggregate of individuals who happen to share a common language and certain ethnic traits. In past ages, when the carrier of national self-consciousness was a representative class, that class's disappearance—through physical destruction or a loss of nerve—indeed amounted to "the death of a nation." What remained was an amorphous ethnic mass, at best an incomplete nation. Such national decapitation occurred twice in Ukrainian history, each time followed by a rebirth: the first in the seventeenth century and the second in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Of course, modern nations have become democratized, extending in principle to the whole people. This broadening of the social base makes the "death" of modern nations unlikely, short of actual genocide. But the Ukrainian case has some unusual features. Owing to the repressive policies of tsarist autocracy, the process of what can be called "primary nation-building" was much delayed in Ukraine. It made great strides during the Revolution and the 1920s, but it was never carried through to completion. In fact, the process of nation-building was checked and partly reversed during the quarter of a century of Stalin's rule. It is debatable whether Ukraine even today can be considered a complete nation—and here I refer to more than the absence of political independence. As I have argued elsewhere, the present masters of Ukraine seem determined to perpetuate this condition of national incompleteness. I point to this fateful problem, but its full discussion transcends the limits of the discussion set forth here.
Notes

3. See the title of his Italian-language essay, “La letteratura di una nazione plebea.” *Rivista internazionale del socialismo*, no. 4 (1880), listed in the “Spys prats M. P. Drahomanova,” in M. Pavlyk, *Mykhailo Petrovych Drahomanov, 1841–1895: ieho iubylei, smert, avtobiohrafiia i spys tvoriv* (Lviv 1896), second pagination, xvi. The contrast and conflict between the “aristocratic” and “plebeian” nations of Eastern Europe is fundamental to Drahomanov’s political thought, and it is analyzed in several of his treatises and major articles.
4. Cf. I. Berlin, *Vico and Herder: Two Studies in the History of Ideas* (New York 1977), 157–8: “His [Herder’s] national feeling was not political and never became so. . . . He believed in kinship, social solidarity, Volkstum, nationhood, but to the end of his life he detested and denounced every form of centralization, coercion, and conquest, which were embodied and symbolized both for him, and his teacher Hamann, in the accursed state.”
8. V. Lypynsky, *Lysty do brativ-khiborobiv: Pro ideiu i organizatsiuiu ukraïnskoho monarkhizmu* (Vienna 1926), 38–9 and passim.
11. Cf. the observations of the Ukrainian sociologist Olgerd Bochkovsky: Among peoples that possessed their own states, or the so-called historical peoples, the development of national self-determination proceeded from the top to the bottom. . . . Several centuries were needed to transform the corporate, estate-bound society [of the feudal age] into a modern class society, while nationalization gradually expanded into depth and breadth. Modern democracy favoured the national awakening and rebirth of the so-called non-historical peoples that represent the second type of genesis of European nations. Among them, the process of self-determination proceeded from the bottom of society upwards. O. I. Bochkovsky, *Nauka pro natsiu ta ii zhyttia* (a reprint of two pamphlets, *Narodzhennia natsii* and *Zhyttria natsii*, which originally appeared in Lviv in 1939) (New York 1958), 26. Bochkovsky defines the concept of historical nations too narrowly, restricting it to those endowed with continuous statehood.
12. In 1977, the Soviet Ukrainian dissident Iurii Badzo wrote in an open letter: “Owing to the circumstances of our history, the process of the national consolidation of our people still remains unfinished. . . . As a legacy of the Russian Empire, we received a disorganized national organism. Our national rebirth did not have the opportunity to establish itself firmly.” “Iurii Badzo hovort: ‘Pravo zhyty.’ ” *Svoboda*, 1 Septem-
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ber 1979, 4.
In the all-too-narrow land between two seas sits the headstrong Ruthenian with his implacable enemy of the past one thousand years—the Pole, the Liakh. And the rage fed by centuries of delusion has put them both into a bedeviled frenzy. They are like two lions, two lions that once made tremble Christendom’s awesome foe on the Bosphorus. Distressed by what has been and passed, and desperate before what surely is to come, the two lions—the Ruthenian and the Pole—tear into each other’s breasts to the very heart. Their eyes, shot through with blood and malice, can see, nonetheless, the joy their feuding brings to common enemies. Yet, on this abominable duel they spend the last of their strength, the last of their resources. They are like gladiators in a Roman coliseum as they face each other among the nations. Each prepares the other’s destruction, but of this not one of their descendants will be proud.

P. Kulish, Krashanka rusynam i poliakam na Velykden 1882 roku (Lviv 1882).

The first known episode in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations is the expedition of Prince Volodymyr the Great of Kiev against the “Liakhs,” recorded in the Tale of Bygone Years under the year 981. The chronicler’s brief entry has given rise to a lively and unabating scholarly controversy with which we need not concern ourselves here.¹ We ought, however, to keep in mind the fact that in a few years’ time we shall be able to celebrate a millennium of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

It is obviously impossible to epitomize a historical development of a thousand years’ duration within the narrow limits of a paper. Thus a narrative approach would be altogether unsuitable for the treatment of our
subject. I shall, therefore, concentrate on a few salient problems, referring in particular to the early modern and modern eras, from the sixteenth through the nineteenth centuries. The legacy of those centuries has also determined the shape of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the twentieth century. I shall make some observations about the present when I come to the conclusion of this paper.

My first contention is that the Polish-Ukrainian relationship has to a large extent set the course for the respective historical destinies of both peoples. My second contention is that—in spite of the numerous valuable contributions which the two peoples have made to each other, and in spite of the numerous instances of mutually beneficial co-operation—the Poles and the Ukrainians have failed in the past to establish their political relations on a firm and satisfactory foundation. This failure, and the protracted Polish-Ukrainian conflicts which ensued, have had catastrophic results for both peoples. Polish-Ukrainian conflict was, indeed, a major cause of both Ukraine’s and Poland’s loss of national independence on two separate occasions, in the seventeenth-eighteenth as well as in the twentieth centuries.

The above two contentions are not likely to meet with much criticism. The issue becomes more controversial should we attempt to assess responsibility for the unfortunate and destructive direction that Polish-Ukrainian relations have taken over the centuries. I am well aware of the difficulty of maintaining objectivity and scholarly detachment in dealing with such an emotionally charged topic. Still, the question cannot be avoided, not only because it is legitimate from the point of view of historical inquiry, but also because of its important practical implications for the present and the future.

My third contention, then, is that the party mainly responsible for the past failures in Polish-Ukrainian relations is the Poles. As a rule, the stronger side always takes the lead in determining the character of a relationship between communities. The stronger side, consequently, bears the larger share of responsibility. The historical record shows unmistakably that Poland, since the late Middle Ages, has generally been stronger and more advanced than Ukraine. Poland’s strength vis-à-vis Ukraine was not derived from any inherent inferiority of the Ukrainians or inherent superiority of the Poles, but rather from weighty geopolitical factors, such as Ukraine’s exposed position on the steppe frontier, and later its proximity to the rising power of Muscovy-Russia. The Poles, regrettably, have used their relative advantage over their Ukrainian neighbours with slight display of statesmanship or foresight.

In attributing to the Poles the major onus of responsibility for the catastrophic development of Polish-Ukrainian relations, I do not intend altogether to exonerate the Ukrainians. For they, too, committed many
blunders and errors of judgment, and missed their share of opportunities. As a matter of fact, when surveying the record of Polish-Ukrainian interaction, one is often struck by the great similarity in attitudes and behaviour of the two communities. Since, however, the Poles were usually stronger, they were in the better position to perpetrate mischief.

Poland and Rus’ (the predecessor of modern Ukraine) emerged as independent realms simultaneously, in the tenth century A.D. The medieval development of the two countries ran fairly parallel courses. For instance, both Poland and Rus’, after an era of initial unity, passed through a stage of fragmentation into a number of appanage principalities. Social conditions in both countries were similar, although it cannot be denied that until the thirteenth century the culture of Kievan Rus’ was richer than that of contemporary Poland. In one most important aspect, however, the ways of Poland and Rus’-Ukraine diverged from the outset: Poland accepted Christianity in its Latin, and Rus’ in its Byzantine form. The long-range impact on Polish-Ukrainian relations of this difference in religious allegiances, and in the concomitant cultural traditions, cannot be overestimated. This does not mean that we have to postulate, in Toynbee’s terms, the existence of a “Western Civilization” and an “Eastern Orthodox Civilization” separated in two watertight compartments. Throughout its history, Ukraine has been extremely receptive to Western cultural influences. Nevertheless, it remains true that religion has at all times separated Poles and Ukrainians by an indelible line of demarcation. The question is not one of “Catholicism” and “Orthodoxy” in the technical sense: the Eastern-Rite Catholic (Uniate) Ukrainian shares a common spiritual-cultural tradition with his Orthodox compatriot, and clearly feels distinct from his Polish neighbour, a Catholic of the Latin Rite. (Such a formal demarcation line has been missing in Ukrainian-Russian relations, and this is one reason why Ukrainians have found it more difficult to differentiate themselves nationally from the Russians than from the Poles.)

The religious differences did not preclude close ties between medieval Poland and Rus’; there were, after all, frequent marriage alliances between members of the Piast and Riurik dynasties. Stefan Kuczyński aptly observes that “during the first centuries of the existence of the Polish state and Kievan Rus’, the Polish and the Ruthenian communities—despite the many bilateral military expeditions, suggesting a state of continual warfare—did not actually engage in wars in the strict sense, and did not harbour mutual feelings of lasting hostility and hatred.” These were princely feuds of a local and transient nature. It was quite common for a Ruthenian ruler to ally himself with a Piast against a fellow Riurikid, and vice versa. The boundary between Poland and Rus’ hardly
changed for some three hundred years, and the relationship between the two countries can be characterized as one of essential parity.

The balance between Poland and Rus'-Ukraine was permanently upset by the great Mongol invasion of the mid-thirteenth century, which brought disaster to Ukraine, marked by the destruction of cities, including Kiev, the devastation of the countryside, and incalculable losses in wealth and human lives. And this was only the beginning of the calamity. Out of the divisions of the Mongol Empire emerged the Tatar states, first the Golden Horde and later the Crimean Khanate. The latter became, in 1475, a vassal of the Ottoman Empire, and thus the greatest military power of the age stood behind it. The national industry of the Crimean Tatars was slave-hunting, and Ukraine found itself exposed to continual raids. Under pressure from the steppe, the Ukrainian area of settlement shrank drastically. Generally speaking, the late Middle Ages were for Ukraine an era of political and economic regression and of cultural stagnation. During the same period, however, Poland was taking remarkable strides forward in all spheres, especially during and after the reign of Casimir the Great (1333–70).

The simultaneous strengthening of Poland and weakening of Rus’ was bound to encourage the former’s expansion at the cost of the latter. The first major step in this direction was the annexation of the Principality of Halych by King Casimir (1340). Thus Galicia became the first East Slavic, Ukrainian territory to fall under Polish domination. In this connection one should note that the Galician-Volhynian state of the thirteenth-fourteenth centuries occupies an important place in Ukrainian history. The eminent medievalist, Stepan Tomashivsky, has called it “the first Ukrainian state.” What Tomashivsky meant to say, of course, was not that Galicia-Volhynia was the first state organization in Ukrainian lands; rather, he meant that Galicia-Volhynia had the opportunity to play in the history of the Ukrainian people a role analogous to that of Suzdal-Vladimir, and later Moscow, in the history of Russia, namely the role of the nucleus of a nation-state. (According to this interpretation, Kievian Rus’ was a common East Slavic state, comparable to the Carolingian Empire in Western Europe.) The Mongols crippled the Galician-Volhynian state, but it survived for another century. It received its death blow from Poland.

Diplomacy and political maneuvering rather than conquest allowed Poland’s further expansion into the east. The Union of Krevo (1385) created a dynastic link between the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania; the latter included, in addition to ethnic Lithuania, all Belorussian and most Ukrainian lands. Nearly two centuries later, Poland and Lithuania merged into an organic federation, the so-called
Commonwealth of the Two Nations. The memorable Union of Lublin (1569), which accomplished this, was a landmark in the history of four peoples: Poles, Lithuanians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians. In this paper, I shall deal only with the Polish-Ukrainian dimension of the Union.\textsuperscript{7}

The Lublin settlement offered some undeniable advantages for Ukraine. It reunited the country, previously divided between Lithuania and Poland, thus making possible a more effective defence against Tatar incursions. Joint Polish-Ukrainian military efforts protected the country from foreign enemies, especially Turkey and Muscovy. Incorporation into the Polish Crown opened Ukraine to greater penetration by Western cultural influences. Whiffs of the Renaissance and the Reformation reached Ukraine and stimulated a cultural revival, ending a long era of stagnation. The late sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century witnessed in Ukraine the establishment of printing presses and schools, the development of theological and secular learning, the beginning of a new, "middle-Ukrainian" literature, and noteworthy achievements in the area of architecture and the fine arts. During that era, all-European culture entered Ukraine mostly through Polish channels. An expression of the Ukrainian revival was the Kievan Academy, founded in 1632, the first institution of higher learning in the entire East Slavic and Orthodox world.\textsuperscript{8} On the political side, Ruthenian noblemen obtained, by the terms of the Union of Lublin, rights equal to those enjoyed by the Polish nobility. In matters of religion, sixteenth-century Poland-Lithuania was one of the most tolerant states in Europe. There was no discrimination against Orthodox and Protestant noblemen, although institutionally the Catholic Church maintained a privileged position.

In the post-Lublin era, Polish influences on Ukraine were accompanied by Ukrainian influences on Poland. The peculiar way of life and the ideology of the Polish gentry, the so-called Sarmatism (sarmatyzm), stemmed largely from changes that Polish society and culture experienced under the impact of association with the Ukrainian (and Lithuanian) east.\textsuperscript{9} Sarmatism became an organic part of Poland's national tradition, and we can still discern traces of this legacy today.

One can easily understand why Poles take pride in the formation, under their leadership, of a large body politic, the Commonwealth of the Two Nations, which at one time occupied a paramount position in Eastern Europe. Many look upon the Union of Lublin as a high point in Poland's history. Still, it is an undeniable fact that the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth ultimately failed. And it is questionable whether this failure can be explained exclusively by later mistakes in policy and by the malice of foreign adversaries. One can make a strong argument that the failure was inherent, the consequence of basic structural deficiencies. There exists a consensus among historians that serious symptoms of in-
ternal decay, of growing political and social disorganization in the Commonwealth, were already multiplying during the decades immediately following the brilliant success of Lublin. It is hard to doubt that here a cause-and-effect relationship was at work. The comments of a Polish historian, Eugeniusz Starczewski, shed light on this problem:

The union of Poland and Lithuania has often been called a masterly move executed by the Polish oligarchy (możnowładstwa polskiego) on the political chessboard. Nevertheless, the results of this masterly move proved themselves disastrous for the future of Poland. Having obtained easy access to the huge expanses in the Ruthenian and Lithuanian east, Poland gradually abandoned her ethnic boundaries [in the west]; she left her ancient domain, Silesia, in German hands. Instead, she diverted her population, not overly numerous to begin with, and all her resources, toward the newly acquired territories. Whatever, in the late fourteenth century, the Polish state gained in power, the Polish people lost by diluting themselves in the Ruthenian east, and by losing ground in their ancestral Silesia. In their own homeland, the life of the Polish people assumed an anemic, sickly character. If the union with Lithuania was to become, in the long run, pernicious to Poland, the negative aspects of this connection were augmented by the manner in which the union was realized and implemented in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. We are referring to the separation of Volhynia, Podillia, and Ukraine from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania [in 1569], and their incorporation into the Province of Little Poland [Małopolska, Polonia Minor]. Not granting Ukraine autonomy, at least such as Lithuania enjoyed, was conducive to its treatment as a land where nobles, and especially magnates, could get rich quickly. Then the Cossacks emerged. Also in dealings with them, one mistake was piled upon another.

For geographical, sociological, and cultural reasons, Ukraine did not fit comfortably into the structure of the Commonwealth of the Two Nations. The unitary nature of the Crown, the Polish half of the Commonwealth, bred endless friction and frustrations, exacerbated by the victory of the Counter-Reformation in Poland and by the growth of religious bigotry during the first half of the seventeenth century. There was only one potential remedy for these ills: the reconstruction of the Commonwealth on tripartite lines by the addition of an autonomous Ruthenia-Ukraine to Poland proper and Lithuania. However, this necessary reform, which would have established a federal union of the peoples between the Baltic and Black Seas, remained unrealized.
POLISH-UKRAINIAN RELATIONS

The responsibility for this mortal sin of omission must be ascribed, in about equal proportions, to the Polish and the Ukrainian leading classes. Ever since the establishment of the original dynastic link between Poland and Lithuania in 1385, the Polish aristocracy and gentry, motivated by the lure of wealth, had striven to detach the Ukrainian provinces from the Grand Duchy, and to annex them to the Crown. After Lublin, the Ukrainian borderlands attracted many Polish fortune hunters, and their greed prevailed over any considerations of statesmanship. The central government under the elective kings was too weak and too short-sighted to prevent the formation of huge latifundia in Ukraine. The prevailing social system, represented by the magnates and their latifundia, was hateful to the masses of the Ukrainian people—not only to the enserfed peasantry, but to the burghers and segments of the petty gentry as well. The defence of Orthodoxy provided a common ideological platform for the forces of the Ukrainian resistance.

The Ukrainian aristocracy, the descendants of the princes and boyars of medieval Rus’, failed to come forward, at the time of the Union of Lublin and after, with a constructive political program. They were satisfied to accommodate themselves to the existing structure of the Commonwealth and to share the benefits of the “golden liberty” of the Polish nobility. The attraction of the Polish aristocratic way of life and Baroque culture was so powerful that, in the course of some two generations following 1569, nearly all Ukrainian aristocratic families and a large portion of the middle gentry converted to Catholicism, thus accepting Polish nationality. This loss of nerve on the part of Ukraine’s traditional elite poisoned Polish-Ukrainian relations. The leadership of the Ukrainian national cause in the Commonwealth, deserted by the old representative class, was willy-nilly taken up by a new element, the Cossack military-political organization, the Zaporozhian Army. As Pawel Jasienica correctly emphasized, Polish and Ukrainian aristocrats could deal with each other as social equals, but Polish aristocrats and Ukrainian Cossacks could not; the compounding of national-religious and social factors doomed the prospects for solving the thorny Ukrainian problem within the framework of the Commonwealth.11

Modern Ukrainian historians of the populist school have viewed the Polish-Cossack wars of the seventeenth century as a contest between aristocracy and democracy. We cannot accept this simplistic interpretation without considerable reservations. In the first place, petty Ukrainian noblemen had entered Cossack ranks in great numbers; Cossack officers, or “elders,” came largely from that background.12 Secondly, the Cossack order as a whole tended to form an estate distinct from the peasants. The Cossack state that emerged from the 1648 Revolution became a society composed of estates, and the Cossack officers eventually, in the eigh-
teenth century, crystallized into a new hereditary landed aristocracy. Nevertheless, there is an element of truth in the populist interpretation of Ukrainian history. Under frontier conditions, Ukrainian society in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries followed a path of evolution markedly different from that taken by central Poland. Ukrainian peasants, accustomed to defending their lives and possessions against Tatar raiders, would not submit passively to the yoke of serfdom. All the energetic elements of the peasantry wished to become "Cossackized." The Zaporozhian Army had repeatedly rendered signal services to the Commonwealth against foreign enemies. But within the legal framework of the Polish-Lithuanian state there was no place for a self-governing body of plebeian warriors; the interests of the magnates required its destruction. Thus the coming Polish-Ukrainian confrontation was to be at once national-religious and social. This explains the irrepressibility and the ferocity of the conflict.

The great Cossack Revolution of 1648, led by Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky, was a pivotal moment in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations. All strata of the Ukrainian population, excepting the magnates and their retainers, participated in the uprising, an indication of how deep was resentment against the Polish regime in Ukraine. The revolution amounted to the Ukrainian people's repudiation of the Lublin settlement. Khmelnytsky and his lieutenants did not at first envision secession from the Commonwealth. Their original objectives focused on redress of Cossack and Orthodox grievances, and on winning for Ukraine some form of limited autonomy. But no compromise solution was possible, because the magnates would not acquiesce to the loss of their latifundia, seized by insurgent Cossacks and peasants. From about 1650 on, Khmelnytsky's policy aimed at a complete break with Poland. But neither side was able to achieve a decisive military victory, and the destructive war dragged on. Thus Khmelnytsky was obliged to seek foreign support, first from Turkey and afterwards from Muscovy. By the memorable Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654), Ukraine accepted the protectorate of the Russian tsar. Hegemony in Eastern Europe shifted to the Tsardom of Muscovy, soon to be transformed into the Russian Empire, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth lost forever its stature as a great power.

Khmelnytsky's successor, Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, reacting to Muscovite subversion of Ukrainian autonomy, attempted once again to reach an accommodation with Poland. According to the terms of the Union of Hadiach (1658), Ukraine, under the name of the Grand Duchy of Ruthenia, was to become the third member of a tripartite Polish-Lithuanian-Ukrainian Commonwealth. But after a decade of fierce warfare, mutual enmity and distrust had grown too strong. Moreover, under Cossack auspices a new political and social system had come into existence in
Ukraine, a system incompatible with that prevailing in Poland. The tripartite experiment came at least a half century too late, and the Union of Hadiach entered history stillborn.\(^5\)

It is tempting to consider the hypothetical question of what might have been. Assuming that a solution of the Ukrainian-Cossack problem was impossible within the framework of the Commonwealth, would it not have been more advantageous for both parties if Poland had acquiesced in Ukraine’s separation? In the mid-seventeenth century there was a chance for the establishment of an independent Ukrainian Cossack state. This would, obviously, have implied territorial loss for Poland. But such a state, by its very existence, would have shielded Poland from the Ottoman Empire and Russia. From the point of view of Poland’s internal development, the amputation of the Ukrainian provinces would have undermined the power of the magnates, whose domains were located mostly in the eastern borderlands. This might have halted the process of the Commonwealth’s internal decay and made possible salutary reforms.

But Poland took the contrary course and strove by all available military and diplomatic means to regain the lost Ukrainian lands. Unable to reconquer Ukraine, Poland preferred to partition the country with Russia rather than allow it independent existence. By the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667), Russia and Poland divided Ukraine along the Dnieper River.\(^6\) This effectively destroyed the chances of Ukrainian independence in the seventeenth century. It is true that an autonomous Cossack body politic, the so-called Hetmanate, survived under Russian suzerainty on the Left Bank, i.e., on Ukrainian territory east of the Dnieper, for another century. But the Left-Bank Hetmanate was too puny to resist in the long run the levelling and centralizing pressures of the Russian Empire. As George Vernadsky has observed, the preservation of Ukraine’s territorial integrity, at least within the frontiers achieved under Bohdan Khmelnytsky, was a precondition for the country’s ability to maintain itself against Russia.\(^7\) (One should remember that Khmelnytsky’s Cossack state did not include all ethnic Ukrainian territory, but only the three former palatinates of Kiev, Chernihiv, and Bratslav. The western Ukrainian regions of Galicia, Volhynia, and Podillia still remained under Polish domination.)

Polish rule did not return to the Right Bank immediately after Andrusovo. A desperate resistance continued for decades. In fact, in the early years of the eighteenth century Hetman Ivan Mazepa succeeded in reuniting temporarily the Left and the Right Bank. Taking advantage of the Great Northern War, Mazepa attempted, in alliance with Sweden, to free Ukraine from Russian overlordship. But Swedish and Ukrainian forces suffered a decisive defeat at Poltava (1709). This sealed the fate not only of the Left-Bank Hetmanate, but also of the disputed territory.
The operation of populardom last Poland confrontation west ESSAYS Targowica name the the ferried Commonwealth. Ukraine Polish a the unrest source under wealth largest wealth of Ukraine. Plagued of the former Cossack organization, did not reconcile themselves to serfdom and the hated overlordship of the Polish nobility. A whole series of popular uprisings, the so-called Haidamak revolts, culminated in 1768 in a large-scale peasant rebellion known under the name of Koliivshchyna. The tragic events of 1768 left a deep imprint on the minds of both communities, and were still to preoccupy the imagination of Ukrainian and Polish writers in the nineteenth century. Continued unrest in Polish Ukraine offered Russia opportunities to intervene in the affairs of the Commonwealth. Russia, on the one hand, assumed the role of protector of Orthodoxy, persecuted under Polish rule, and, on the other hand, proffered military aid against popular insurgency. Russian troops suppressed the Koliivshchyna.

Another memorable episode connected with Right-Bank Ukraine was the Confederation of Targowica, in 1792. The Confederation took its name from the Ukrainian town of Torhovystsia (Targowica). The Confederation, composed of selfish and reactionary oligarchs who owned latifundia in Ukraine, defied the new reformist constitution of 3 May 1791, placed itself under the protection of Catherine II, and invited Russia’s armed intervention in Polish internal affairs. The Confederation of Targowica precipitated the Second Partition and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth’s demise. The magnates of the borderlands, for whose sake Poland had sacrificed chances of reconciliation with Ukraine, repaid this debt by bringing about the destruction of Polish independence. One is tempted to see in this an act of historical justice.

In surveying the truly tragic course of Polish-Ukrainian relations from the Union of Lublin to the late eighteenth century, when almost simultaneously the Partitions of Poland and the abolition of the remnants of Ukrainian Cossack autonomy took place, it is possible to make the following concluding observations. A free Ukraine—either completely independent, or federated with Poland and Lithuania on a footing of
genuine equality—would have energetically, and perhaps successfully, opposed Russia's westward expansion. There is factual support for this hypothesis. The pre-Lublin Grand Duchy of Lithuania, of which Ukraine was an organic part, had fought a whole series of at least partially victorious wars against Muscovy from the fourteenth through the sixteenth centuries. But the Grand Duchy was a predominantly East Slavic state, in which the Ruthenian (Ukrainian-Belorussian) language and culture were supreme. The Orthodox aristocracy and nobility of the Grand Duchy showed but little sympathy with Moscow. Even after the Treaty of Pereiaslav, which placed Cossack Ukraine under the suzerainty of the tsar, the country continued to resist Muscovite encroachments stubbornly. But when the issue was reduced to a brutal alternative—either Polish or Russian domination—Ukraine preferred Russia to Poland. A variety of factors account for this choice, including religion, the shared traditions of medieval Kievan Rus’, and Russia’s greater political flexibility and dexterity, in such contrast to Poland’s habitual clumsiness. By denying Ukraine an equal partnership, or, alternatively, complete independence, Poland effectively drove the Ukrainian people into Russia’s arms. By this short-sighted policy Poland not only did great injury to Ukraine, but also prepared its own downfall.

During the entire nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century, Poland and Ukraine appeared to be in similar situations, inasmuch as both countries lacked national independence, and both were under the domination of the same alien powers, Russia and Austria. It may seem that these shared circumstances should have fostered Polish-Ukrainian cooperation. In fact, however, a Polish-Ukrainian entente never materialized, at least not to any politically significant extent. Sporadic attempts at agreement between Polish and Ukrainian groups were completely overshadowed by deep mutual distrust and unrelenting strife.

The similarity in the situations of dependent Poland and Ukraine was close to the surface. More deep-seated, and weighing more in the historical balance, were the great disparities between the two nations—in social structure, in cultural heritage, and, deriving from these, in their treatment at the hands of the dominating powers. Although nineteenth-century Europe knew no independent Poland, no one ever questioned the existence of a separate Polish nation. European public opinion, and the partitioning powers themselves, took for granted the existence of a distinct Polish nationality. The governments of Russia, Austria, and even Prussia made important political and cultural concessions to the Poles at various times. In contrast, tsarist Russia consistently denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nationality, and treated the “Little Russians” as a tribal branch of the Russian nation. Consequently, the tsarist government suppressed even quite innocuous, non-political expressions of Ukrainian

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cultural identity, considering them subversive of the unity of Russia. The Austrian government, it is true, recognized, from 1848, the existence of a "Ruthenian" nationality. But Vienna usually paid scant attention to its Ukrainian subjects, and was inclined to sacrifice their rights and claims to those of the more powerful Poles. In the West, only a few scholars knew of the ethnic differences between the Ukrainians and other Slavs. European statesmen and the public at large knew nothing of the Ukrainian problem.

This striking disparity in the status of the two peoples had sociological causes. The traditional Polish upper class survived the shipwreck of the old Commonwealth. The Polish aristocracy and landed gentry continued, well into the second half of the nineteenth century, to represent the national cause. Ukraine, on the other hand, owing to unfavourable historical circumstances, had lost its upper classes, whose descendants had become Russified or Polonized; the Ukrainian nationality found itself virtually reduced to the peasantry. One has to remember that in the Austrian Empire serfdom persisted until 1848, and in the Russian Empire until 1861. Only toward the end of the nineteenth century and in the early years of the present century did the Ukrainian masses begin to emerge, slowly and painfully, from the dismal condition of disenfranchisement, social and economic oppression, illiteracy, and the absence of a modern civic and national consciousness. The cities of Ukraine formed alien, Russian-Jewish or Polish-Jewish, enclaves. The deficiencies of the Ukrainian social structure found some compensation in the richness and vitality of Ukrainian folk culture, which was probably superior to Polish folk culture. The ease with which hundreds of thousands of Polish peasant colonists imperceptibly assimilated to the Ukrainian environment corroborates this notion.

Thus, as in the seventeenth century, a social factor complicated relations between Poles and Ukrainians. Of course, not all Poles were noble landowners, and not all Ukrainians were peasants. But in those regions where Poles and Ukrainians did come into contact—in eastern Galicia and the Right Bank—antagonistic social classes represented the two nationalities. The legacy of the gentry tradition has left a profound imprint on the mores and the mind of the Polish middle class and intelligentsia, which gradually assumed the leadership of the Polish community. The emerging Ukrainian intelligentsia, on the other hand, was predominantly of plebeian origin, and infused with a populist ideology. Educated Poles and Ukrainians, whose actual living standards were often quite similar, differed sharply in life styles and values. The Polish inteligent tended to consider his Ukrainian counterpart boorish, and the Ukrainian inteligent thought his Polish counterpart conceited and arrogant. Thus the traditional hatred between the Polish szlachcia and the Ukrainian Cossack and
haidamak continued to colour the relations between the two nations. These emotions intensified, thanks to writers on both sides who liked to evoke, although from contrary viewpoints, the memories of past Polish-Cossack conflicts. It is enough to recall, on the one hand, Shevchenko’s poems and Gogol’s Taras Bulba and, on the other, the immensely popular historical romance of Henryk Sienkiewicz, With Fire and Sword.

The greatest obstacle to Polish-Ukrainian understanding was the basic incompatibility of the respective national-political programs. Modern Ukrainian political thought rested on the concept of ethnic nationality and of ethnic-linguistic frontiers. This did not necessarily imply political separatism. Most nineteenth-century Ukrainian political thinkers and publicists did not go beyond the postulate of cultural self-expression and limited home rule for the Ukrainian people within the framework of the existing empires, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Once, however, Ukrainian political thought made the transition to the idea of independent statehood, it envisioned the future Ukrainian state as encompassing all lands where the majority of the population spoke the Ukrainian language. Polish political ideologies, by contrast, were predicated on the concept of historical legitimism. Polish patriots were unanimous in considering the partitions, which terminated the old Commonwealth, intolerable acts of violence and rapine. It followed logically, then, that these patriots understood the future rebirth of Poland as a restitutio ad integrum, i.e., as a restoration of the historical Commonwealth in its pre-1772 frontiers. Ukrainian and Polish territorial claims collided too roundly to allow reconciliation through some pragmatic compromise.

Polish patriots of varied political hues shared the same program of restoring Poland’s historical frontiers. “Despite their own sincerely held linguistic nationalism, the Polish democrats did not recognize that the cultivation of a separate language might eventually lead Lithuanians, Latvians and Ruthenians to put forward political claims of roughly the same character as their own.”26 A polemical article in a conservative Polish émigré journal admonished the spokesmen of the Ukrainian movement in the late 1850s to restrict their efforts to the Left-Bank area: “Ukraine on this side of the Dnieper, conquered and defended by Polish arms, and inhabited by a people that has produced the [Polonized] gentry, is and, God permitting, will never cease to be Polish.”27

Polish practice was consistent with this philosophy. The two great uprisings, of 1830–31 and of 1863, stemmed from the determination to assert Polish claims to the “eastern borderlands.”28 Russia was at times willing to grant far-reaching autonomy to Poland proper, the Congress Kingdom, but refused to concede to the Poles the disputed Lithuanian-Belorussian-Ukrainian lands. The failure of both uprisings brought about the loss of the autonomous status previously enjoyed by the Congress
Kingdom. This signified a radical deterioration of the position of the Polish people in its own homeland. Nevertheless, even after these tragic experiences, the unrealistic concept of "historic frontiers" continued to haunt Polish minds.

Some Polish leaders did understand that Ukrainians were potential allies in a struggle against Russian tyranny. Prince Adam Czartoryski, the head of the conservative wing of the post-1831 Polish émigrés, fostered various schemes aimed at enlisting Ukrainian support.29 The 1863 insurgents, who were men of democratic convictions, issued a manifesto, the "Golden Charter" (Zolota hramota), that pledged on behalf of the future independent Poland various benefits to "the village people of Podillia, Volhynia and Ukraine."30 But the Golden Charter and similar appeals met with no positive response. Mykhailo Drahomanov cogently explained the reasons: for Ukrainian peasants, the very name "Poland" was a symbol of serfdom. And Ukrainian intellectuals who thought in political terms were bound to ask: granting that the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth were acts of injustice, why should Ukrainian patriots fight for a restoration of the old Russo-Polish boundary, which amounted to a partitioning, a halving, of Ukraine? "If Ukrainians are to shed blood..., then only for the autonomy of their whole people."31 In other words, no Polish-Ukrainian alliance was feasible as long as the Poles remained unwilling to abandon the platform of "historical frontiers."

There were some positive aspects to Polish-Ukrainian relations in the nineteenth century. The members of the Polish minority in Right-Bank Ukraine often possessed a sense of territorial patriotism: they loved their Ukrainian homeland and its people. A memoirist, Stanisław Stempowski, expressed this dual allegiance in his confession that "the Pole and the Ukrainian lived in him in perfect harmony."32 Local Polish writers and scholars readily worked on topics inspired by the Ukrainian landscape, folklore, and history. A "Ukrainian School" flourished in Polish literature, a testimony to the symbiosis of the two peoples.33 Some poets of Polish background went a step further, and began to use the Ukrainian language in their creations.34 It is regrettable that this potential for Polish-Ukrainian co-operation did not come to fruition in the political sphere. Such co-operation would certainly have accelerated the Ukrainian renascence and would also have conformed to long-range Polish national interests. There is an illuminating parallel case in the Swedes of Finland. The Swedish minority made a crucial contribution to the development of modern Finland. But imagine if the Finnish Swedes, in the name of "historical rights," had striven to restore Swedish domination over Finland instead of uniting with the native Finnish majority in a common defense of their homeland's liberty. There would probably be no in-
dependent Finland today, no Swedes left in Finland, and Sweden itself would have become a Russian satellite. But in reality, the Swedes avoided this fundamental political error, just as the Poles perpetrated it.

One understands the Poles’ attachment to the traditions of the old Commonwealth: this was, after all, the epoch of their nation’s greatness. But it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that by their rigid adherence to an anachronistic ideology the Poles did harm both to themselves and to the Ukrainians.

Galicia occupies a special place in the history of nineteenth-century Polish-Ukrainian relations. Issues whose overt expression was stifled by tsarist autocracy could emerge into the open under Austria-Hungary’s constitutional regime. Moreover, the crownland of Galicia at one time played the role of a “Piedmont,” a national sanctuary, in the life of both peoples. Thus Polish-Ukrainian relations in Galicia affected the relationship between the majorities of the Poles and Ukrainians who lived within the confines of the Russian Empire.

The first confrontation between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia occurred during the 1848 Revolution. The events of that critical year revealed the incompatibility of the two communities’ respective political programs. The majority of the Polish spokesmen refused even to recognize the existence of a Ukrainian (Ruthenian) nationality; they considered the Ukrainians’ emergence on the political scene an artificial phenomenon spawned by the anti-Polish machinations of Austria or Russia. The Poles sought to preserve the unity of Galicia, which they considered essentially Polish territory, destined to return in the future to a restored and independent Poland. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, advocated a partition of the province on ethnic lines, the separation of predominantly Ukrainian eastern Galicia from Polish western Galicia.

As a side effect of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, political control over an undivided Galicia passed into Polish hands, and this state of affairs was to continue, with some modifications, until the fall of the Habsburg Monarchy. The two Galician nationalities were about equal in numerical strength, but the aristocratic bias of the Austrian constitution and the policies of Vienna favoured the Polish element. The Poles used their dominant position to deny the Ukrainians parity and to impede their civic, economic, and cultural advancement. For instance, the Polish-controlled Diet (provincial legislature) deliberately neglected Ukrainian elementary education and blocked the expansion of Ukrainian secondary schools; the Poles succeeded in preventing the creation of a Ukrainian university, which was one of the Ukrainians’ chief demands and would also have had profound repercussions in Russian Ukraine. It is true that over the decades the Ukrainians were able to improve considerably their position in Galicia: they built up a dense network of voluntary
economic, political, and educational associations; they developed a vigorous periodical and non-periodical press, and a burgeoning intellectual life; and they gradually increased their representation in the Vienna parliament and the provincial Diet. But all these were achievements won in a stubborn struggle against Galicia’s Polish administration, which attempted to thwart or delay Ukrainian efforts at every step.

Outside the sphere of national politics, Ukrainians and Poles could, on occasion, come together. From the 1870s through the 1890s left-wing Ukrainians and Poles frequently collaborated to oppose the province’s conservative establishment. 37 Also, some enlightened members of the Polish aristocracy desired a reconciliation with the Ukrainians. 38 Around the turn of the century, Polish and Ukrainian modernist writers developed close ties. 39 Galicia’s two nationalities lived in physical proximity, and largely intermingled; this was conducive to innumerable personal contacts and frequent intermarriage.

Still, the basic political issue dividing the two communities remained unresolved. A contemporary Polish observer noted:

The Ruthenians strive with all strength toward full development as a separate, completely independent nation. They wish to dislodge us from the preponderant position which we have occupied until now. They want to prevent the higher strata of our social structure from being based on the lower, popular strata of their social structure, from using them, and from blocking their progress.... Our prospects in eastern Galicia are unfavourable. The fate of the English nationality in Ireland, of the German nationality in the Czech lands, and the probable, in a more distant future, fate of the German nationality in Upper Silesia are a bad prognosis for us. 40

To compensate for their relatively weak political leverage, Ukrainian leaders relied increasingly on mass actions—electoral campaigns, agrarian strikes, popular rallies, and demonstrations. On the Polish side, the rise to prominence of the chauvinist National Democratic Party (endecja) made the Polish community more intransigent in its attitude toward the Ukrainians. The vehemence and acerbity of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict mounted from year to year, and conditions in Galicia approached latent civil war. The February 1914 compromise concerning the reform of Galicia’s provincial statute and the law on elections to the Diet partly satisfied Ukrainian demands, and might have initiated a new era in Polish-Ukrainian relations. But the outbreak of the war prevented implementation of the compromise. Despite the strong anti-Russian sentiments shared by both Poles and Ukrainians, the two nationalities proved unable to harmonize their policies for the coming confrontation with the tsarist empire.
The revolutionary era that followed in the footsteps of the First World War led to a thorough transformation of Eastern Europe. From the perspective of Polish-Ukrainian relations, three episodes of the years 1917–21 are particularly significant: the national-cultural autonomy of the Polish minority in Ukraine in 1917, the Polish-Ukrainian war for the possession of eastern Galicia in 1918–19, and the 1920 alliance between Piłsudski’s Poland and Petliura’s Ukraine against Soviet Russia.

In 1917, the revolutionary Ukrainian parliament, the Central Rada, undertook to win the national minorities’ confidence and support by granting them generous cultural autonomy. In July of that year, the Central Rada invited representatives of Ukraine’s three largest minorities—Russians, Poles, and Jews—to join the Rada. Within the framework of the first Ukrainian government, the Secretariat-General, the Rada created a Secretariat (Ministry) for Nationality Affairs: one of its three divisions was reserved for a Polish Deputy Secretary. After the proclamation, on 20 November 1917, of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, the Polish division of the Secretariat-General for Nationality Affairs became a separate Ministry which was to preside over a network of Polish schools and cultural institutions. A Polish eyewitness stated that the Ukrainian government’s attitude toward the Polish minority’s educational and cultural concerns was such that “a better could not be imagined.” Members of the Polish minority in general looked favourably on Ukraine’s national rebirth and statehood. The social question, however, did cause friction. The radical social policies of the Central Rada evoked apprehension and protests on the part of Polish proprietary elements. The spread of agrarian disorders in the fall of 1917 affected Polish landowners in Right-Bank Ukraine. Only leftist and socialist Poles, therefore, a minority within their own community, actively collaborated with the Central Rada regime. In spite of these difficulties, the policy of the Central Rada toward national minorities constitutes a beautiful page in the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations.

The disintegration of Austria-Hungary precipitated a Polish-Ukrainian war over eastern Galicia. This was a direct continuation of the political contest between Galician Poles and Ukrainians which had started seventy years earlier, in 1848. On 1 November 1918, Ukrainians seized power throughout eastern Galicia, now officially named the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. But the Poles refused to accept the fait accompli. In the land’s capital, Lviv (Lwów, Lvov, Lemberg, Leopolis), where the Polish element was locally preponderant, the Poles rose in arms against the Ukrainian state. Street battles in Lviv soon escalated into a full-fledged Polish-Ukrainian war. Operations lasted until July 1919, when the Ukrainian Galician Army was forced out of western and into east-central or Dnieper Ukraine, formerly part of Russia.
What was the function of the Polish-Ukrainian conflict in the general history of the Ukrainian Revolution? A noted Polish publicist of the inter-war era, Adolf Bocheński, proposed the following answer: "The Polish-Ukrainian war was undoubtedly one of the main reasons for the failure of the Ukrainian cause in those years [1918–19]. If even a part of the forces and resources that the Ukrainians wasted in eastern Galicia had been used on the Dnieper, these would have sufficed to create there a fairly solid Ukrainian state." Bocheński is right to the extent that a two-front war was beyond the strength of the Ukrainian nation. The circumstance that Ukraine, without any outside support, had to wage war simultaneously against Soviet Russia and Poland (and in addition against the White Army of General Denikin) was the principal reason why the Ukrainian bid for independence failed. Bocheński, however, does not take into account two points. First, the Ukrainians did not themselves choose to go to war against Poland. Poland imposed war on the Ukrainians by its aggression, by its determination to incorporate a territory, eastern Galicia, where the Ukrainians, without any doubt, formed a strong majority. Second, if Bocheński implies that the Ukrainians, for political reasons, should have sacrificed Galicia in order to concentrate all their forces against the major adversary, Soviet Russia, then his argument underestimates the crucial importance of Galicia in the life of the Ukrainian nation as a whole.

The history of the Ukrainian Revolution is usually approached, for obvious reasons, from the perspective of Ukrainian-Russian relations. However, the apparently secondary western front was not in fact secondary. Owing to the relatively high level of national consciousness and civic discipline of its population, little Galicia represented at that time the "hard core" of the entire Ukrainian nation. Therefore, the preservation of the Galician base was a conditio sine qua non of Ukrainian independence, especially if Ukraine's confrontation with Russia was to have any prospect of success. The intervention of the Ukrainian Galician Army, which was quite impervious to communist subversion, in east-central Ukraine might, in all probability, have tilted the balance of power in the war between Ukraine and Soviet Russia. The opportune moment for such an intervention was the winter of 1918–19, or the early spring of 1919. The two Ukrainian states, the Ukrainian People's Republic (east-central Ukraine) and the Western Ukrainian People's Republic (eastern Galicia), had proclaimed a union on 22 January 1919. But western Ukrainian forces could not fight on the anti-Russian front, because they were tied down in defence of their Galician homeland against the Polish invasion. When the Ukrainian Galician Army finally appeared in east-central Ukraine, in July 1919, it was still to play an important military role there.
in the course of the next few months.\textsuperscript{45} It was, however, already too late for a Ukrainian victory: the Red Army and Denikin’s White Army had grown too strong in the meantime. Moreover, Poland had conquered the Galician stronghold of Ukrainian nationalism and, therefore, Galicia could no longer serve as a political and strategic base in Ukraine’s struggle against the Russias of Lenin and Denikin.

The gist of the preceding argument is that Polish aggression against and occupation of eastern Galicia signified more to Ukraine than simply the loss of a province. Actually, it amounted to the destruction of the very foundations on which an independent Ukrainian state might have been built in the post-World War I period. This point needs to be stressed because even today many do not appreciate the true historical function of the Polish-Ukrainian war of 1918–19.

Let us turn now to the third memorable episode of Polish-Ukrainian relations during the revolutionary era. On 22 April 1920, the Polish Republic and the Ukrainian People’s Republic, whose respective heads of state were Józef Piłsudski and Symon Petliura, signed in Warsaw a treaty of alliance directed against Soviet Russia.\textsuperscript{46} The subsequent course of events is common knowledge. After a dramatic campaign, which first brought Poland’s and Petliura’s forces to Kiev and soon afterwards the Red Army to the outskirts of Warsaw, and after the “Miracle on the Vistula” had saved Poland, Poland and Soviet Russia reached a compromise settlement: by the Treaty of Riga (18 March 1921), the two powers divided Ukraine (and Belorussia as well). Poland retained eastern Galicia and Volhynia, the latter province a former possession of the Russian Empire. Most of the remaining Ukrainian lands, constituted as the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic, reverted to Moscow’s domination.

One may draw comfort from the thought that for at least one brief moment in the present century Poles and Ukrainians were allies and comrades-in-arms. But such sentimental considerations do not excuse the necessity of taking a critical view of the Treaty of Warsaw and its political implications.

A Polish émigré historian, Kamil Dziewanowski, has recently advanced the following apologia for Piłsudski’s policy in 1920:

Piłsudski’s plan was to paralyze Bolshevism by splitting its territorial base, the former Tsarist Empire, by means of a strict, literal application of President Wilson’s and Lenin’s principles of self-determination for all nationalities of the former Tsarist Empire. It aimed at nipping Soviet Russian expansion in the bud by dividing its territorial base, the Communist Empire then \textit{in statu nascendi}, along vertical or national lines. By this means, Piłsudski hoped to create a new balance of power in Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{47}
The obvious answer to this is that Poland, which strove to annex vast ethnocally non-Polish territories, was not credible as an advocate of "a strict, literal application" of the principle of national self-determination. An insuperable internal contradiction vitiated Piłsudski's policy: on the one hand, he wished to maintain an independent Ukraine as a barrier against Russia, while, on the other hand, by his conquest of eastern Galicia he had destroyed the chances of Ukrainian independence. At the root of this contradiction was the circumstance that Piłsudski, himself a Pole from the eastern borderlands, was an epigone of the old Commonwealth. As for Piłsudski's vaunted federalism, its true meaning has been correctly assessed by the well-informed Polish journalist and political commentator, Stanisław Mackiewicz, himself an ardent Piłsudskiite:

[Piłsudski] believed that the countries neighbouring Poland, and liberated from Russia by Poland, would easily fall under Polish influence, and that the Poles would in due time be able to Polonize them in the same manner as the Polish nobility of the old Commonwealth had Polonized Lithuania and Rus'. . . . Piłsudski believed that the peoples federated with us would quickly turn into Poles. 48

The anachronistic Commonwealth tradition, which implied Poland's great-power position and its dominion over Lithuania, Belorussia, and half of Ukraine, stood in the way of a sincere reconciliation and cooperation between the Poles and their immediate eastern neighbours. The program of Piłsudski's political adversaries, the National Democrats, however unrealistic and even morally repulsive in other respects, had at least the advantage of consistency. The National Democrats advocated an ethnically homogeneous Polish nation-state, to be achieved through assimilation of the Slavic minorities and expulsion of the Jews; in respect to the Ukrainians, to whom they denied the status of a nation, the National Democrats favoured partitioning their country between Poland and Russia. 49 In Polish political practice, the program of the National Democrats prevailed over the grandiose, but hazy and self-contradictory, quasi-federalist schemes of Piłsudski.

The Polish-Ukrainian alliance of 1920 came at a time when Ukraine was already exhausted after three years of revolution and civil war. The Treaty of Warsaw was not a partnership between equals; rather, it established a Polish protectorate over Ukraine. By the terms of the treaty, Petliura was forced to sign away Ukrainian claims to eastern Galicia and Volhynia. Many Ukrainian patriots apprehended at the time that this arrangement might lead to a tripartite division of their country; Galicia and Volhynia annexed to Poland, Ukrainian lands east of the Dnieper still included in the Russian orbit, and a small Ukrainian Republic on the Right Bank surviving precariously under Polish protection. 50 Little wonder that
these prospects did not elicit an enthusiastic response from the Ukrainian community. Virtually all Galician Ukrainians considered the Treaty of Warsaw a betrayal of their homeland, and leftist eastern Ukrainians—including such former luminaries of the Central Rada as Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Volodymyr Vynnychenko—preferred an orientation toward proletarian Moscow to an orientation toward a Warsaw of landowners and capitalists. It is telling that in 1920 Ievhen Konovalets—a staunch anti-communist, a military commander with a distinguished record during the Ukrainian struggle for independence, and the future founder of the influential Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists—advised Ukrainian neutrality in the war of two imperialisms, Soviet Russian and Polish, for the possession of Ukraine. Konovalets expected that a victory of Soviet Russia over Poland would result in a consolidation of all Ukrainian lands within one body politic, in a Sovietization of Poland itself, and in an overthrow and revision of the Versailles settlement in Europe—as a matter of fact, a situation strikingly similar to that which actually emerged out of the Second World War a quarter of a century later.51 In conclusion, the most merciful thing one can say of the Polish-Ukrainian alliance of 1920 is that—like the Union of Hadiach (1658), with which it has sometimes been compared—it came too late.

In discussing the unfortunate course of Polish-Ukrainian relations during the revolutionary era of 1917–21, I placed the main onus on the Polish side. But the Ukrainians, too, contributed to the failure to reach a viable settlement. The Ukrainians were essentially “right,” as against the Poles, in basing their territorial program on the ethnic principle rather than on dubious historical claims. The entire drift of historical development in Central and Eastern Europe pointed toward a victory of ethnic self-determination over historical legitimism. But even a “correct” principle needs to be applied judiciously and flexibly, taking into account the actual balance of forces. Ukrainian leaders of the revolutionary era sinned by excessive rigidity and a doctrinaire mentality. There were several occasions when Ukrainians spoiled chances for a compromise with Poland.

Thus it was a grave error that, during the peace negotiations at Brest-Litovsk in January-February 1918, Ukrainian delegates pressed for the inclusion of the region of Chełm (Kholm) in the Ukrainian People’s Republic. The territory, located west of the Buh river, had a Ukrainian ethnic majority, but Polish influence was paramount there. The possession of the Chełm region was of no vital importance to Ukrainian statehood, while it was obvious that even moderate Poles could not reconcile themselves to the loss of a territory which for the past hundred years had been an organic part of the Congress Kingdom. Polish public opinion unanimously denounced the Brest-Litovsk settlement (in which the Poles had
no part), and this issue added fuel to Polish-Ukrainian hostility.\(^5^2\)

One year later, on 28 February 1919, an Inter-Allied Mission, headed by the French General Berthélémy, proposed an armistice which would have terminated the war between Poles and Ukrainians in Galicia. Ukrainian forces were to withdraw to an armistice line. In return for this, the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic was to be recognized by the Allies, and was to receive aid for the struggle against Soviet Russia. These terms implied a heavy sacrifice for Ukraine: the abandonment of about one-third of ethnically Ukrainian eastern Galicia, including the capital city of Lviv; most of that territory was at the time actually under Ukrainian control. Still, in view of the desperate general situation—Ukraine’s diplomatic and strategic isolation, a two-front war against Poland and Soviet Russia, and lack of ammunition and supplies—it was rash, if not outright suicidal, for the Western Ukrainian government to reject Berthélémy’s proposals. A Ukrainian military historian aptly comments:

The Poles were willing to leave a large part of Galicia’s territory in Ukrainian hands as a base for the Galician Army’s operations in Dnieper Ukraine. Since the prospects of the Galician Army’s victory [over Poland] were nil . . . , the logic of history demanded that the Ukrainian side accept the terms proposed by General Berthélémy’s mission. The rejection of these terms and leaving the resolution of the conflict to “blood and iron” proved fatal, for “blood and iron” could not decide the issue otherwise than they actually did.\(^5^3\)

The third opportunity for a Polish-Ukrainian compromise occurred in early 1921. Eastern Galicia had been under Polish occupation since the summer of 1919, but it was not yet legally incorporated into the Polish Republic, inasmuch as the Allied Powers had reserved to themselves the final decision concerning the future status of that land. Poland’s international situation was precarious, owing to the still unfinished Polish-Soviet war and conflicts with Germany over Upper Silesia and Eastern Prussia. Under these circumstances, the Polish government secretly approached the Western Ukrainian government-in-exile in Vienna, headed by Ievhen Petrushevych. The Poles proposed to Petrushevych comprehensive autonomy for eastern Galicia within the framework of the Polish state provided that the Ukrainian leadership accept this arrangement and desist from further embarrassing Poland internationally. Petrushevych’s government rejected this offer out of hand, because it expected that the all-powerful Entente would in the end force Poland to recognize the Ukrainian people’s right to full independence.\(^5^4\) Such unrealistic hopes
could not fail to be frustrated: on 14 March 1923, the Council of Ambassadors in Paris, acting for the Allied Powers, awarded sovereignty over eastern Galicia to Poland. There is, of course, no telling whether Poland would in fact have honoured the promises made to Petrushevych; in view of the historical record, Ukrainian suspicion of Polish intentions was, perhaps, not altogether unfounded. But it must also be acknowledged that Ukrainian intransigence played into the hands of Polish chauvinist elements, those opposed to any concessions to and understanding with the Ukrainians.

It is time to draw some conclusions. There exists a striking and disturbing parallelism between the course of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the seventeenth-eighteenth and in the twentieth centuries. The Treaty of Riga (1921) resembled the Treaty of Andrusovo (1667), inasmuch as both amounted to a partitioning of Ukraine between Russia and Poland. The parallel can be drawn further. We have seen that Right-Bank Ukraine was a millstone around the Commonwealth’s neck in the eighteenth century. The same can be said of Galicia-Volhynia in the 1920s and 30s. The final outcome was also similar in both cases: Poland, which had stubbornly denied western Ukrainian lands to a free Ukraine, was in the end forced to hand them over to the Russian Empire, and later to the Soviet Union; Poland itself also fell under Russian domination. Thus the inability of the Poles and the Ukrainians to compose their differences amicably has already twice caused the destruction of Ukraine and Poland, in that order, and has paved the way for Russia’s triumph.

I will not attempt to discuss the history of Polish-Ukrainian relations during the inter-war era. So far no scholarly studies have appeared on the policies of the Second Polish Republic toward its involuntary Ukrainian citizens or on developments within the Ukrainian community in Poland between 1919 and 1939. The subject is too important and too painful to deal with in a casual manner; rather, it must be left to the labours of future historians and political scientists. I cannot, however, refrain from quoting Talleyrand’s well-known bon mot: “This is worse than a crime, it is a stupidity.” These words could well serve, I believe, as a motto to a history, still to be written, of Polish-Ukrainian relations between the Treaty of Riga and the end of World War II.

As we have seen, the first step in Poland’s eastward expansion was the occupation of the Principality of Halych in 1340. Three centuries later, the Khmelnytsky Revolution signalled the beginning of the Polish retreat from Ukraine. This withdrawal was completed, after another three hundred years, in 1939–45. Thus an epoch in Polish-Ukrainian relations, which lasted six hundred years, has clearly come to a close, and we stand
now at the beginning of a new epoch. What is it going to bring to both nations? Will Poles and Ukrainians be able to draw lessons from the tragic experience of the past?

Objective circumstances seem propitious to a Polish-Ukrainian entente in our time. The present frontier between the Polish People’s Republic and the Ukrainian SSR coincides with the ethnic frontier. The remaining minuscule minorities on both sides no longer constitute a serious political problem. It is noteworthy that the post-1945 frontier approximates, with some changes in Poland’s favour, the one that existed in the Middle Ages, prior to 1340. Poland’s recent geopolitical reorientation to the west, the regaining of territories lost centuries ago to Germany, has ended, let us hope permanently, the traditional Polish drive to the east. Thus the main cause of former conflicts between the Polish and Ukrainian nations has disappeared.

Sociological and cultural changes also point in the direction of a better mutual Polish-Ukrainian understanding. The growth of secularism, on the one hand, and the spread of an ecumenical spirit, on the other, have diminished the importance of the religious barrier between Poles and Ukrainians. At the same time, both communities have grown more alike in their social structures. The Ukrainians have become largely industrialized and urbanized, and can no longer be considered a peasant nation. The Poles, for their part, have shed many traits derived from the gentry tradition. Thus class conflicts and resentments should no longer complicate the relationship between the two nations. The removal of these impediments will facilitate a more generous appreciation of the shared elements in the cultural heritage of the two nations, and will contribute to more intensive future cultural exchanges.

Most important of all, Poland and Ukraine have today, and will probably have for a long time to come, obvious and urgent common political interests. Systematic, long-range co-operation between Poles and Ukrainians offers hope for a change in the present power structure in Eastern Europe. This is not the place to discuss practical details. I refer in this connection to the program so brilliantly formulated by the late Juliusz Mieroszewski.56

One final cautionary word. As so often in the past, Poland is today again in a relatively (although only relatively) more advantageous position than Ukraine. Both Poland and Ukraine are captives of Soviet Russia’s imperial system, but the status of the Polish People’s Republic is clearly superior to that of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic. As at the time of the great Mongol invasion, the very survival of the Ukrainian people is in jeopardy in the USSR, while Poland, although controlled by and subordinated to Moscow, still enjoys the outward attributes of sovereignty and a near-fullness of national life. There exists a potential danger
that, as in the past, Poland might be tempted to abuse its superior strength by reviving territorial claims against Ukraine at the very moment when all the energies of the Ukrainian people will be needed for a decisive reckoning with Russia. Let us hope and pray that there will never be a repetition of the old mistakes, mistakes that have already cost so dearly both the Ukrainian and the Polish nations.

Notes

1. The controversy is over the original status of “Peremyshl (Przemyśl), Cherven, and other towns” annexed by Volodymyr the Great. For a brief summary of the diverse views of Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian historians, see F. Sielicki’s introductory essay to his translation of Powieść minionych lat (Wrocław, Warsaw and Cracow 1968), 92–6. A recent treatment of this problem is by Ia. D. Isaievych, “Terytoriia i naselennia ‘Chervenskykh hravid’ (X–XIII st.),” Ukrainskyi istoriko-heohrafichnyi zbirnyk 1 (1971):71–83.

2. On Polish-Ukrainian relations during the medieval era, see: B. Wlodarski, Polska i Rus’ 1194–1340 (Warsaw 1966); B. A. Rybakov, ed., Polsha i Rus’: Cherty obshchnosti i svoeobrazia v istoricheskom razvitii Rusi i Polshi XII–XIV vv. (Moscow 1974).

3. The notion expressed by Adam Bromke in his essay, “Ukraine and Poland in an Interdependent Europe,” in Poland and Ukraine: Past and Present, ed. P. J. Potichnyj (Edmonton 1980), that there was a chance in history for the Poles and Ukrainians to merge into one nation must be rejected. Professor Bromke refers to the era when the Poles and the Ukrainians were politically united within the framework of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Such political coexistence, however, could not expunge profound ethnic-linguistic and religious-cultural features that permanently differentiated the two peoples. Individuals and even entire social groups could cross over this barrier and assimilate to the other side, but this did not obliterate the barrier itself. The question of the viability of a federated political arrangement is an altogether different issue.


5. G. Rhode, Die Ostgrenze Polens (Köln and Graz 1955). Unfortunately, only the first volume of this erudite work has appeared, covering developments up to the year 1401.


8. A recent monograph on this subject is by A. Sydorenko, The Kievan Academy in the Seventeenth Century (Ottawa 1977). Polish intellectual influences on the Kievan Academy have been investigated by R. Lužny, Pisarze kręgu Akademii Kijowsko-Mohylańskiej a literatura polska (Cracow 1966). On the subject of the Ukrainian cultural revival in the late sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth century, see: M. Hrushevsky, Kulturo-natsionalnyi rukh na Ukraini v XVI–XVII viisi, 2d ed.
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10. E. Starczewski, Widma przeszłości (Warsaw and Cracow 1929), 14–16. It is to be noted that Starczewski applies the term “Ukraine,” according to the old Polish usage, to the Kievian region only. The same usage is also to be found, further below, in the quotation from the “Golden Charter” issued by the Polish insurgents in 1863.

11. P. Jasienica, Rzeczpospolita Obojga Narodów (Warsaw 1967), 1:211–21, and pas-
sim.


13. Probably the best discussion of the political and social structure of Cossack Ukraine is found in L. Okinsevych, Lektsii z istorii ukrainskoho prava. Pravo derzhavne: Doba stanovoho suspilstva (Munich 1947).

14. The Treaty of Pereiaslav is a highly controversial topic in historical literature. John Basarab has analyzed this historiographical controversy in his Pereiaslav 1654: A Historiographical Study (Edmonton 1982).

15. The tragic fate of Iurii Nemrych, the advisor of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky and the architect of the Union of Hadiach, is discussed by S. Kot, Georges Niemiryecz et la lutte contre l’intolérance au 17e siècle (The Hague 1960).


20. Taras Shevchenko devoted to this subject his narrative poem, Haidamaky (1841). The bloody popular revolt of 1768 also inspired Polish writers of the Romantic school, notably the poets Juliusz Słowacki and Seweryn Goszczyński and the novelist Michał Czajkowski.


22. For a general discussion of Polish-Ukrainian relations in the nineteenth century, see: M. Demkovych-Dobriansky, Ukrainsko-polski stosunki u XIX storichchi (Munich 1969); and the appropriate sections in P. S. Wandycz, The Lands of Partitioned Poland, 1795–1918 (Seattle and London 1974).


24. This statement requires some qualification. In the Left-Bank provinces of Chernihiv and Poltava, and in that of Kharkiv (Slobodian Ukraine), the local landed nobility consisted of descendants of the former Cossack officers. In spite of their adjustment to the Russian imperial system, members of that class retained a sense of their Ukrainian identity; many of them played an important role in the early stages of the Ukrainian national revival.

25. Peasants of Polish origin who adopted Ukrainian language and customs usually retained their allegiance to the Roman Catholic Church. For this reason, they were referred to as latynyky ("people of Latin Rite"). The number of latynyky who inhabited Ukrainian ethnic territory within the frontiers of Poland in 1939 has been


38. The anonymous pamphlet, *Kwestya ruska* (Livyv 1871), eloquently expressed this point of view. See also S. Kieniewicz, *Adam Sapieha* (1828–1903) (Livyv 1939), chap. 9.


42. Cited ibid., 58.
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44. A. Bocheński, Między Niemcami a Rosją (Warsaw 1937), 83.

45. L. Shankovsky, Ukrainska Halytska Armii (Winnipeg 1974).


47. Dziewanowski, 351.

48. S. Mackiewicz (Cat), Historja Polski od 11 listopada 1918 do 17 września 1939 r. (London 1941), 106.


50. See the contemporary comments of A. Margolin, Ukraina i politika Antanty (Berlin 1921), 151—2.


52. Documents from Austrian State Archives pertaining to the Chełm (Kholm) problem at the Brest-Litovsk peace conference and during the German and Austro-Hungarian occupation of Ukraine in 1918 have been published in T. Hornykiewicz, ed., Ereignisse in der Ukraine 1914—1922 (Philadelphia 1967), 2:229—311. See also D. Doroshenko, Istoriia Ukrainy 1917—1923 rr. (Uzhhorod 1932), 1, chap. 12.

53. Shankovsky, 65.

54. This little-known episode is described in the memoirs of T. Voinarovsky: (T. Voinarovsky and I. Sokhotsky), Istorychni postati Halychyny XIX—XX st. (New York and Paris 1961), 66—9. Fr. Foinarovsky, an eminent Ukrainian clergyman and civic leader, was the intermediary who transmitted the Polish offer to Petrushevych.

55. For a short treatment of the subject, see the chapter “Western Ukraine under Poland,” by S. Vytyvtsy and S. Baran, in Ukraina: A Concise Encyclopaedia, 2 vols. (Toronto 1963—71), 1:833—50. The memoirs of I. Kedryn, Zhyttia — podii — liudy. Spomyny i komentari (New York 1976), are rich in pertinent information. Two recent Polish works which deal respectively with the social and political structure of inter-war Poland and devote special sections to national minorities, especially the Ukrainians, are: M. M. Drozdowski, Spółceństwo, państwo, politycy II Rzeczpospolitej (Cracow 1972) and J. Holzer, Mozaika polityczna Drugiej Rzeczypospolitej (Warsaw 1974).

56. J. Mieroszewski, Materiały do refleksji i zadumy (Paris 1976), especially the article “Rosyjski ‘kompleks polski’ i ULB.”
When Pieter Geyl, the eminent Dutch historian, was prevented from pursuing archival research during the Second World War, he embarked on a project on the basis of secondary sources. This was the origin of *Napoleon, For and Against*, a brilliant study of the emperor's changing image in French historical literature.

Western students of Ukrainian history face a situation similar to that of Geyl, namely a lack of access to primary sources. Foreign scholars rarely have the opportunity to work in the archives and libraries of the Ukrainian SSR. Thus, when Dr. John Basarab, author of the present work, resolved to re-examine the Khmelnytsky era in seventeenth-century Ukraine, and its crucial episode, the Pereiaslav agreement of 1654, he chose the historiographical approach as the most practicable.

Historiographical studies may offer a double scholarly benefit. First, they provide a better insight into and understanding of the subject by looking at it from the various standpoints taken by previous researchers. Second, they serve as contributions to intellectual history, inasmuch as they illustrate the evolution of historical thought and social ideologies.

The Khmelnytsky era, including the Pereiaslav agreement, lends itself well to a historiographical treatment. It gave rise not only to lively, often passionate, scholarly controversies, but also to certain ideological constructs which have played, and continue to play, a significant role in the life of Ukraine and Russia. Therefore, in approaching the subject, a historian will have to differentiate between problems on two distinct, though connected, levels: on the one hand, the seventeenth-century events themselves, which, obviously, must be studied within the context of their own time, and, on the other hand, the latter-day ideological outcroppings, which reflect contemporaneous social conditions and political interests. To elucidate this essential distinction one can refer to the ex-
ample of the Magna Carta, which also presents itself under a double aspect, as an episode in the early thirteenth-century struggle between King John and the barons, and as an issue in English constitutional conflicts of a later age.

The Khmelnytsky era and the Pereiaslav agreement have preoccupied a number of Ukrainian, Russian and, to a lesser extent, also Polish historians, but so far they have hardly attracted the attention of Western specialists. It is hoped that Dr. Basarab’s critical discussion of the relevant literature will bring this important topic within the purview of Western scholarship. The purpose of the following remarks is to provide an introduction to the two levels of the Pereiaslav problem, considered as history and as myth.

The year 1648 is memorable in European history. It marked the Peace of Westphalia that ended the Thirty Years’ War in Germany and gave international recognition to the independence of Switzerland and the United Netherlands; it was also the year of the Second Civil War in England and the Fronde in France. In the eastern half of the continent, it saw the beginning of the Ukrainian Cossack uprising against the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, under the leadership of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky. A protracted Polish-Ukrainian conflict ensued, and six years later, by the so-called Pereiaslav agreement (named after a town east of the Dnieper river), Ukraine accepted the overlordship of the Muscovite tsar.

There exists a consensus among historians that the Khmelnychchyna (Khmelnytsky era) gave a new shape to Eastern Europe and constituted a turning point in the history of three nations: Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. This crisis inflicted irreparable damage to the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, deprived it permanently of the position of a great power, and began the irreversible decline which culminated, more than a century later, in the Partitions. And Poland’s loss was Russia’s gain. Before the Cossack revolution, Poland-Lithuania had the upper hand militarily over Muscovy. The breakthrough to the Baltic Sea attempted by Tsar Ivan IV in the Livonian War (1557–82) was repulsed by the Commonwealth. In the early years of the seventeenth century, during Russia’s Time of Troubles, Moscow even found itself temporarily under Polish occupation, with a Polish prince about to ascend the tsar’s throne. Russia suffered another setback in the Smolensk War of 1632–4. Ukrainian Cossack forces played a prominent role in these Commonwealth victories. A radical shift in the balance of power occurred when Hetman Khmelnytsky placed Ukraine “under the high hand” of Tsar Aleksei Mikhailovich, the second ruler of the Romanov dynasty. Moscow’s control of Ukraine, it is true, remained tenuous for decades, and it
was effective in the eastern half of the country only, the so-called Left Bank. Still, this provided the tsarist state with a base for future expansion into the Black Sea, Balkan, and Central European areas. Thus, Pereiaslav was the crucial step in the rise of the landlocked Tsardom of Muscovy to the position of a European great power. This applies also to the internal transformation of semi-Asiatic Muscovy into the modern Russian Empire. Ukraine became Russia’s first “window on the West”: Ukrainian cultural influences helped prepare the ground for Peter I’s modernizing reforms.

But what place does the Khmelnychchyna occupy in the history of the nation most directly affected, Ukraine? One major consequence of the mid-seventeenth-century upheaval is obvious: it transferred Ukraine from the Polish to the Russian orbit. Pereiaslav was the beginning of the Ukrainian-Russian association which, for better or worse, still endures today. This, however, does not exhaust the significance of the Cossack revolution in Ukrainian history. In the course of the struggle against Poland, the Zaporozhian Army was transformed into a body politic which exercised control over a considerable territory, established a system of administration, and created a government. Thus there emerged a Ukrainian Cossack state which for some years enjoyed de facto independence. Pereiaslav did not terminate the existence of that state: the agreement contained assurances of Ukraine’s extensive autonomy. In practice, Hetman Khmelnytsky continued to act as an independent ruler after 1654.

There is room for legitimate disagreement concerning the juridical nature of the link established between Ukraine and Muscovy in 1654. This question has been much debated, and John Basarab’s monograph provides a lucid survey of the spectrum of scholarly opinions. One thing, however, may be considered reasonably certain: Pereiaslav did not amount to a “reunification” of Ukraine with Russia, a submersion of Ukraine into the Russian state. The point needs to be stressed, because this highly implausible interpretation has been elevated in the Soviet Union to the level of an official dogma. This, however, belongs to the domain of the Pereiaslav myth, about which more will be said below.

To comprehend what Pereiaslav actually meant in the setting of its time, one has to compare it with the Zaporozhian Army’s similar treaties with the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the Ottoman Empire, both before and after 1654. The Pereiaslav agreement did not differ from them in substance. Like them, it was a response to a specific situation, and motivated not by the Ukrainian people’s imaginary yearning for union with their Russian brethren, but by the Cossack elite’s understanding of their country’s current political self-interest. It was only natural
that Ukraine’s partners, in this case Moscow, also pursued their own objectives and tried to secure for themselves the maximum advantages, usually at Ukraine’s expense.

This is not the place to enter into a detailed discussion of Hetman Khmelnytsky’s complex policies. It may suffice to say that he had an acute sense of Ukraine’s vulnerable geopolitical position and that, like Bismarck, he was haunted by *le cauchemar des coalitions*. Khmelnytsky’s chief concern seems to have been to prevent a situation in which Ukraine would have to fight a war on two fronts simultaneously. In order to achieve this objective, Khmelnytsky was willing to pay a high price. For instance, he clung for a number of years to the Crimean alliance, despite the Tatars’ depredations and notorious unreliability, and the unpopularity of this policy with the Ukrainian people. But as long as the contest with Poland was still undecided, Khmelnytsky preferred to keep the Tatars as fickle allies, lest he have to deal with them as overt enemies in the rear. Similar considerations induced Khmelnytsky to ally his country with Moscow in 1654. He wished to check the imminent danger of Ukraine’s encirclement, resulting from a rapprochement between Poland and the Crimean Khanate. Furthermore, he hoped to break with Russian aid the military deadlock in the war against Poland and to bring under the Zaporozhian Army’s control the western Ukrainian and southern Belorussian territories, still held by the Commonwealth. The price for this was the acceptance of the tsar’s suzerainty or protectorate. There is plenty of evidence to show that Khmelnytsky did not think that the Pereiaslav agreement limited his freedom of political movement in any essential way.

Soon after Pereiaslav, frictions and frustrations erupted in the relations between the Zaporozhian Army and its nominal overlord in Moscow. In response to this, Khmelnytsky embarked on a new course of foreign policy. While avoiding a premature break with the tsar, his plan was now to ally Ukraine with the bloc of Protestant powers, consisting of Sweden, Brandenburg-Prussia, Transylvania, and the Calvinist, anti-Commonwealth party in Lithuania. Simultaneously, he renewed his former ties with the Porte and its vassals, Moldavia and Wallachia. The international system envisaged by Khmelnytsky was directed primarily against Poland, but potentially also against Russian ambitions. The great hetman’s early death, in 1657, prevented the realization of his bold design. Still, Khmelnytsky’s alliance with Charles X Gustavus of Sweden served as a precedent for that of Hetman Ivan Mazepa with Charles XII against Peter I in 1708.

Bohdan Khmelnytsky has been both praised and blamed as the reputed architect of Ukraine’s union with Russia. Thus, the tsarist government, during the most reactionary reign of Alexander III, erected a monument
to Khmelnytsky in Kiev, and, for the same reason, he is now being highly honoured in the Soviet Union. On the other hand, the bard of the nineteenth-century Ukrainian national renascence, Taras Shevchenko, cursed Khmelnytsky as the man responsible for his people’s enslavement by Russian despotism. In fact, however, both praise and blame are unfounded. They do not express the historical reality of the Khmelnychyna, but reflect rather the Pereiaslav myth. The latter arose in a later era out of the shipwreck of Ukrainian Cossack statehood. This imparted ex post facto a new meaning to the 1654 agreement, a meaning not intended and not foreseen by Khmelnytsky and his contemporaries.

After the turmoil of the second half of the seventeenth century, the so-called Ruina (Time of Ruin), and especially after the defeat of Charles XII and Mazepa at Poltava in 1709, Ukraine found itself permanently incorporated into the Russian imperial system. The bid for independence had failed, and the pro-Russian orientation had prevailed over the pro-Polish and pro-Turkish alternatives. The Ukrainian Cossack body politic, officially named Little Russia and popularly known as the Hetmanate (Hetmanshchyna), was now territorially reduced to the regions east of the Dnieper, the Left Bank, and lowered in status to the position of a subordinate entity within the framework of the Russian Empire. Still, Little Russia remained for several decades administratively distinct from Russia proper, retained its own laws and customs, and local government was in the hands of the Cossack officers’ stratum, the starshyna. The makeshift, ad hoc Pereiaslav agreement assumed retrospectively the character of a constitutional charter defining Left-Bank Ukraine’s position in the Russian Empire. Although periodically revised in an ever more restrictive manner, it was considered legally binding in principle. This constellation gave birth to the Pereiaslav myth, which served the political needs of both the imperial government and of those segments of Ukrainian society which, making a virtue of necessity, wished to co-operate with the imperial system.

From St. Petersburg’s point of view, the Pereiaslav myth legitimized the annexation of Ukraine by the Russian Empire. This was the obvious and most important reason why “The Articles of Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky” were later included in the Complete Collection of Laws of the Russian Empire and remained on the statute books until the 1917 Revolution.

But the Pereiaslav myth was also adaptable to the needs of the Hetmanate’s starshyna, who were searching for a political concept capable of combining loyalty to the Russian monarchy with the defence of the autonomy of their country and their own social privileges. To reconcile these two goals entailed rejecting, as inconsequential instances of indi-
individual "treason," the compromising memories of those hetmans—Vyhovsky, Doroshenko, and Mazepa—who had overtly risen against Moscow. The positive counterpart of this renunciation of separatism was the transformation of the Pereiaslav event into a juridical and political concept legitimizing Cossack Ukraine's traditional "rights and liberties." This elevation into mythology is easily traceable in the eighteenth-century Cossack chronicles. But perhaps its clearest formulation can be found in the versified historical-political tract, "A Conversation between Great Russia and Little Russia," written in 1762 by Semen Divovych, a clerk in the Hetmanate's military chancery. Little Russia addresses Great Russia, both personified as ladies:

Khmelnitsky took cognizance of [the wishes of] his Army and, feeling encouraged, approached the Russian monarch (gosudar) and submitted to him the [Zaporozhian] Army together with all Ukraine. To that effect, he took at Pereiaslav an oath of eternal allegiance in the presence of the Russian boyar Buturlin. Aleksei Mikhailovich, the ruling autocrat (samoderzhets), seeing this manifest sign of my [Little Russia's] voluntary submission, granted a royal charter of liberties, wherein he confirmed and restored all former articles. I have subjected myself not to you [Great Russia], but only to your monarch.... Do not think that you yourself are my mistress; the monarch is our common ruler.¹

Divovych stresses the parity of Little Russia with Great Russia, united in loyal service to the common monarch; at the same time, Little Russia enjoys self-government, as guaranteed by the "'royal charter of liberties,'" i.e., the terms of the Pereiaslav agreement. It is to be noted that at this stage of the myth's evolution, about one century after the event, what in fact had been a bilateral, negotiated settlement, a treaty, had assumed the character of a unilateral, and therefore revocable, act of tsarist munificence.

The myth did not lose its relevance after the suppression of Left-Bank Ukraine's autonomy, which occurred in several stages from the 1760s to the 1780s. It allowed the descendants of the Cossack starshyna, transformed into Russian dvoriance, to regard themselves not as a subjugated people, but as a part of the imperial elite. The fiction of the ancestors' "'voluntary oath of allegiance'" enabled Little Russian nobles to serve the monarch and the empire honourably, without loss of self-respect. Such conformism did not preclude the survival of a sense of Ukrainian ethnic identity and regional patriotism. The latter inspired, during the first half of the nineteenth century, historical and folkloristic research and literary works, some of which were written in Russian, but some in the Ukrain-
ian vernacular. In this manner the beginnings of the Ukrainian cultural revival were rooted in the tradition of the Cossack era.

Dreams about the restoration of an autonomous Hetmanate lingered on until approximately the middle of the century, and the thinking of Left-Bank aristocratic circles still focused on the Pereiaslav concept. A well-informed contemporary observer recorded that during the post-Crimean War “thaw” rumours were abroad in Ukraine that mentioned specific personalities as candidates to the hetmancy and other traditional Cossack offices. This situation was not to last, however. The tsarist government showed no inclination toward making concessions to Ukrainian autonomism, even of a conservative and loyalist type, but rather persisted in its policy of centralization and Russification. Left-Bank nobles became increasingly assimilated to the imperial establishment, with a concomitant weakening of their Ukrainian attachments. As for the Ukrainian national movement, it assumed a decidedly populist character from the 1860s on. Ukrainian populism stressed service to the peasantry and the idea of ethnic nationality; it had no interest in historical legitimism and state rights, which appeared archaic and tainted with aristocratic privilege. These developments undermined the Pereiaslav myth as a relevant political concept.

One might have assumed that the Pereiaslav myth would have been finally laid to rest by the 1917 Revolution. The myth was strongly tinged with traditional monarchism, an idea for which, obviously, neither the new Bolshevik rulers of Russia nor the leftist founding fathers of the Ukrainian People’s Republic had any use. We know of only two instances in the First World War and the revolutionary era when Ukrainian leaders referred to Pereiaslav in official pronouncements. The manifesto issued upon the outbreak of war, on 3 August 1914, by the Supreme Ukrainian Council, the political representation of the Galician Ukrainians, proclaimed that “the Russian tsars violated the Treaty of Pereiaslav by which they undertook the obligation to respect the independence of Ukraine”; the manifesto called for support of the Central Powers’ war effort and expressed the hope that the coming defeat of Russia would bring liberation to Ukraine. The second reference is in a speech of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky delivered on 21 June 1918 to a delegation of school teachers. Skoropadsky stated that Ukraine united with Muscovy at Pereiaslav “as an equal with an equal” (a formulation reminiscent of Divovych), but that the union resulted in a “250-year-long heavy national bondage for the Ukrainian people.” These two mentioned cases were exceptional. Neither the Galician leaders, raised in the atmosphere of Austrian constitutionalism, nor Skoropadsky, the conservative scion of the Left-Bank aristocracy, were typical of the populist and socialist mainstream of the Ukrainian Revolution. It is noteworthy that the
Ukrainian People’s Republic’s declaration of independence on 22 January 1918 contained no reference to historical rights and the breach of the Pereiaslav agreement by Russia; the act was based exclusively on the democratic principle of national self-determination. After the Soviet regime became firmly established in Ukraine in 1920–21, any reasonable observer would have predicted that Pereiaslav had forever lost all practical significance and that henceforth it would preoccupy solely professional historians.

The above prognosis was belied by post-Second World War developments. The tercentenary of the Pereiaslav agreement in 1954 was celebrated throughout the Soviet Union with unprecedented pomp. On that occasion, the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union issued a lengthy doctrinal statement outlining the official interpretation of the 1654 event and of Russian-Ukrainian relations, past and present. The 1954 “Theses” retain their binding force in the USSR to this day. The anniversary of Pereiaslav was again solemnly commemorated in 1979, though on a more modest scale than twenty-five years earlier.

What is the meaning of this surprising resurrection of an old-regime myth under communist auspices? Soviet Russia, like its tsarist predecessor, is faced with the problem of legitimizing Russian domination of Ukraine. The decisive factor in the establishment of Soviet rule in Ukraine was the armed intervention of the Russian Red Army; local communists, the overwhelming majority of whom were ethnically non-Ukrainian, played only an auxiliary role. The fact of military conquest, however, was politically camouflaged as the fraternal aid of Russian workers and peasants to their Ukrainian brethren. The ideology of revolutionary Marxism and proletarian internationalism provided the legitimizing function. The façade of a technically independent Ukrainian republic was maintained for some years after the Soviet victory. When the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics was formed in 1923, this step was rationalized by the necessity of a closer alliance of free and independent socialist states threatened by capitalist encirclement. The Union was deliberately given a supranational name in order to avoid the impression that it was a continuation of the tsarist empire. It was even assumed at the time that in the event of successful communist revolutions in other countries, outside former Russian imperial boundaries, they, too, would join the USSR. The constituent republics retained, on paper, the right of secession from the federation, and hence nominal sovereignty. Furthermore, genuine concessions were made to the non-Russian nationalities in the linguistic and cultural sphere.

Lenin’s brilliant nationality policy, which combined centralized political control with flexibility in matters of administrative structure and lan-
language, was a key factor in the restoration of a unified Russian imperial state in a new form. It permitted Ukrainian and other non-Russian communists to serve the regime in good faith, without the sense of being traitors to their own nations. (Ukrainian Bolsheviks were few in number, but they were politically important if Soviet rule in Ukraine was to be given a local colour.) This policy also had a confusing and divisive effect on the forces of the Ukrainian national resistance. Lenin’s apparent broadmindedness compared favourably with the rigid chauvinism of the Russian “Whites” and the non-recognition of Ukraine by the Western powers. In such circumstances, many sincere patriots who had originally supported the independent Ukrainian People’s Republic were inclined to accept the “Soviet platform,” if not as an ideal, at least as a tolerable solution. The essential point in the context of the present discussion is the fact that in all these political dealings of the post-1917 revolutionary era there cannot be found the slightest hint of reference to the Pereiaslav tradition. Why, then, we may ask, was this obsolete concept revived with great fanfare in 1954?

The answer to the question is that, after the Second World War, the old Leninist ideological devices no longer sufficed to legitimize the subordinate status of Ukraine within the Russian-dominated Soviet Union. The argument of the so-called capitalist encirclement lost its plausibility. Owing to the extension of Soviet control over East Central Europe, the Ukrainian SSR no longer bordered on any capitalist country. Its western neighbours—Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and Romania—had all become members of the socialist bloc. There was nothing in the theoretical tenets of Marxism-Leninism that could justify the inferior position of Ukraine in comparison with the socialist countries outside the USSR. Two solutions would have been logical on Marxist-Leninist premises: either the incorporation of the states of East Central Europe into the Soviet federation or the dissolution of the Soviet Union in its present form and the creation of a new alliance system of technically independent socialist nations. For obvious reasons, neither alternative appealed to the Kremlin.

Furthermore, a gradual and unacknowledged but undeniable erosion of Marxist-Leninist ideology had taken place in the Soviet Union. The utopian faith in an imminent world revolution, international solidarity of the proletariat, and the future socialist paradise on earth, which during the early post-1917 years had exercised a genuine fascination, and which, by a quasi-religious fervour, had bound together Russian and non-Russian communists, lost much of its actual motivating power. The decline of revolutionary Marxism-Leninism was paralleled by a resurgence of Russian nationalism. Beginning in the 1930s, and particularly during the war years, Stalin made a deliberate appeal to Russian national emotions and
state traditions. The Russification of the Soviet system entailed an undesirable and dangerous side effect: it was bound to provoke a nationalist reaction among the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union. In the case of the smaller nationalities, their disaffection could be held in check by the sheer physical preponderance of the Russian massif. Because of the size of its population, its economic resources, and its strategic geographical location, Ukraine presented a special and most sensitive problem. The resuscitation of the Pereiaslav myth is to be understood as an attempt to find a solution to this predicament.

The official revival of the Pereiaslav concept in the Soviet Union occurred in the 1950s. There exists, however, a pre-Second World War precedent that is worthy of attention, inasmuch as it provides a link between the tsarist and Soviet versions of the myth. In 1938 there appeared in Belgrade, Yugoslavia, a pamphlet by Vasilii Vitalievich Shulgin entitled Anschlus i my (We and the Anschluss). Before discussing its content, a few words should be said about the author. Shulgin played a fairly prominent political role during the last decade of imperial Russia as editor of the Kiev daily, Kievljanin, as a gifted and prolific publicist, and as a leading spokesman of the right-wing Nationalist party in the Duma. A native of Ukraine, Shulgin was a dedicated advocate of “one-and-indivisible” Russia, and he specialized in combating the Ukrainian movement. (A second cousin of Vasilii Vitalievich, Oleksander Mykolaiovych Shulhyn—the Ukrainian form of the name—was to serve as minister of foreign affairs in the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and later became a noted émigré Ukrainian scholar. Such divisions within one family were not uncommon.) In his 1938 pamphlet, Shulgin compared Hitler’s recent Anschluss of Austria to Germany with the Pereiaslav event as examples of the voluntary unification of two previously separated branches of one people in a single state. What matters is neither Shulgin’s misinterpretation of the historical Pereiaslav agreement nor his questionable reading of the Anschluss, but the underlying political thesis. He argued that the decisive factor in the relations between North and South Russia (i.e., Russia and Ukraine) was national consciousness. Provided that the South or Little Russians possessed a pan-Russian awareness, they would be drawn irresistibly toward a merger with the North, as the Austrian Germans were drawn toward a union with the Reich. In that case, a temporary political separation of the Russian South from the North—resulting, for instance, from a foreign occupation—would have no lasting effect. If, on the other hand, “the southern Russians were to become Ukrainians, the cause of Oleksander Shulhyn would win,... the wheel of history would be turned back, and northern Russia would become again what it was before Bohdan Khmelnytsky, that is, Russia would be reduced to the level of Muscovy.”
Shulgin’s subsequent personal fate is of symptomatic interest. Apprehended by Soviet security organs in Yugoslavia at the end of the war, he was taken to Moscow and tried for counter-revolutionary activities. Upon his release in 1956, Shulgin addressed several open letters to the Russian émigrés, advising them to accept the regime which had brought greatness to the Motherland. Thus the former admirer of Stolypin and ideologue of Denikin’s Volunteer Army ended his long career as an apologist for Soviet communism. One can only wonder to what extent this conversion was facilitated by Shulgin’s lifelong commitment to Russian nationalism and virulent anti-Ukrainianism.

There is no telling whether Shulgin’s ideas actually influenced the shaping of Soviet policy regarding Ukraine, but the similarity is unmistakable. The gist of the 1954 “Theses” is the concept of a preordained unity of fate of the Ukrainian and Russian peoples, rooted in the common tradition of Kievan Rus’ and extending through all historical epochs, with the Pereiaslav agreement as the pivotal, symbolic event. The Ukrainian people are to be educated in the spirit of complete, unconditional solidarity with the Russians, sharing with the latter a common political consciousness and “high” culture. Assuming the existence of a total Russian-Ukrainian solidarity, the question of specific Ukrainian values and interests, which perchance might not coincide with the Russian, is prevented from arising: the Ukrainians are not to be concerned with the status of their nation, but rather are to glory in Russia’s achievements as their own. It is true that the Soviet regime recognizes in principle a distinct Ukrainian nationality, which tsarist Russia denied, and a Ukrainian SSR continues to exist as an administrative entity which even retains some ornamental trappings of statehood. But the difference is perhaps more apparent than real, inasmuch as the Soviet regime is careful to drain Ukrainian national identity of all independent, vital substance and denies the Ukrainian republic any sphere of meaningful self-government. A Ukrainian nation whose entire destiny is to play forever the role of younger brother and accomplice of Russia differs little from prerevolutionary Little Russia—a tribal branch of a single Russian nation.

The effectiveness of the Pereiaslav myth requires eradication of the incompatible features of the Ukrainian historical tradition, those contradicting the dogma of perennial Russian-Ukrainian harmony. The historical memory of the Ukrainian people is to be pressed into a prefabricated mould: a large part of the record is to be expunged, while other parts undergo various more or less subtle manipulations. National consciousness always possesses a historical dimension. This is the reason for the Soviet regime’s extraordinary watchfulness in all matters pertaining to Ukrainian historical studies and writing, both academic and popular, including historical fiction.
Under Soviet conditions, it is impossible to challenge official doctrines overtly. This does not mean, however, that Ukrainian society, and especially the intellectual circles, have accepted the Pereiaslav myth and all that it implies. In this connection, it is worth quoting a long passage from a recent statement by a Soviet Ukrainian dissident, Iurii Badzo:

The falsification of Ukrainian history in contemporary Soviet historiography is not limited to an individual period, but encompasses the entire history of the Ukrainian people. It negates our historical development as an autonomous process and subordinates interpretation to the political interests of the Russian state. The concept of the "Old Russian nationality," which is merely an ideological twin of the theory of the "one Soviet people," completely suppresses the early feudal period in Ukraine's history. . . . [For the period] before the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, the reader will find nothing Ukrainian in Soviet literature: no territory, no language, no culture, not even an ethnos. The scientifically and historically absurd idea is being asserted that, from the ninth to the thirteenth century, the Eastern Slavs constituted one people, one ethnos, which, of course, was Russian: the Ukrainians and Belorussians [allegedly] appeared only in the fourteenth-fifteenth centuries. They appeared for no other purpose than to "dream" about "reunification" with Russia. All peoples of the world aspired, and still aspire, toward national independence. Only the Ukrainians and the Belorussians are an exception: their dream was to "reunite" with Russia. We have reached the point where the Soviet press and literature write about Ukraine's wish to reunite with Russia "in a single state." This is a gross distortion of historical truth even from a formal point of view. Documents testify that the Ukrainian government headed by B. Khmelnytsky, in negotiating an agreement with the Russian state's representatives, reserved for itself substantial political autonomy. The conception of "reunification" implies the idea of one people, and in essence it denies the Ukrainian people the right to a separate, independent state. . . . The falsification of Ukrainian history by Russian great-power nationalism is a most important factor in the national oppression of the Ukrainian people.

Only the future will tell whether these insidious efforts to manipulate the historical consciousness of the Ukrainian people will succeed or fail. One prognosis can be ventured, however: the Pereiaslav agreement is a topic which, besides its scholarly historical interest, is likely to retain for a long time also a political dimension. This situation enhances the
relevance of John Basarab’s work, in which the author has candidly and competently undertaken to set straight the historiographical record of the Pereiaslav problem.

Notes


3. K. Levytsky, Istoriia politychnoi dumky hal’tskykh ukrainsiv 1848–1914 (Lviv 1926), 720.


5. V.V. Shulgin, Anshlus i my (Belgrade 1938). Summary and quotations are derived from W. Bączkowski’s review article, “Perspektywy anschlusu... rosyjsko-ukraińskiego,” Biuletyn Polsko-Ukraiński (Warsaw) 7. no. 35, 18 September 1938, 377–8.

Trends in Ukrainian Political Thought

Delineating the Subject
In discussing the development of Ukrainian political ideas, I intend to restrict myself to the modern era, corresponding to the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. This chronological limitation is suggested by the structure of the subject itself. Pre-modern social thought and political ideologies diverge substantially from those of the last and the present centuries, and their study would require a different methodological approach. A few indications must suffice. Political consciousness in medieval Ukraine (Kievan Rus’ and the Galician-Volhynian Kingdom) was expressed primarily in religious-ecclesiastical and dynastic terms. The political consciousness of the Ukrainian Cossack state in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was “estate”-bound, taking the form of a defence of the rights and liberties of the Cossack class; in addition, the ecclesiastical and dynastic elements continued to play a major role.

In contrast with previous ages, Ukrainian political ideas of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries evolved within a social setting where the old distinctions of hereditary estate were disappearing, and the traditional rural way of life was gradually being undermined and superseded by the rise of industrial mass society. The dominant themes in Ukrainian social thought of the past century and a half are nationalism, democracy, liberalism, conservatism, socialism, communism, and fascism. All are typically “modern” ideologies, common to all European peoples, although in Ukraine they assumed a specific shape. The peculiar character of modern Ukrainian political and social thought was largely determined by the condition of a people living under foreign domination and struggling to establish their own identity as a nation. This peculiarity becomes especially evident if we compare the development of Ukrainian and Russian ideologies. Ukraine was affected by Russian intellectual and political
trends such as Decembrism, Pan-Slavism, Populism, and Marxism, but in the Ukrainian environment all these assumed a distinct character. But Ukraine received its ideological inspirations not only from or through Russia. Polish and Austro-German influences, as well as channels of direct intellectual communication with the West and certain purely indigenous phenomena, were also important.

First, however, a few brief observations about the state of research on the history of modern Ukrainian political and social thought are in order. The latter is still largely an unexplored, virgin land. So far, not a single major scholarly work has been written on the subject. Concerning the former, the essay by Iuliian Okhrimovych, *Rozvytok ukrainskoї natsionalno-politychnoi dumky* (The Development of Ukrainian National Political Thought, Lviv 1922), is but a brilliant sketch; moreover, it ends in the 1870s. Other works on the history of Ukrainian literature, historiography, and philosophy, such as the excellent study by Dmytro Chyzhevsky, *Narysy z istorii filosofii na Ukraini* (Outlines of the History of Philosophy in Ukraine, Prague 1931), are general and only partly relevant to our subject. Of basic importance are original sources: the writings of Ukrainian social theorists and publicists, and the programs and policy statements of political parties and movements. However, there are no editions of the collected works of such leading Ukrainian political thinkers as Mykhailo Drahomanov and Viacheslav Lypynsky, and the student is forced to search for the original editions, which often are not easily accessible. Publications of documents pertaining to the ideologies and activities of Ukrainian parties and other political organizations are, with few exceptions, also non-existent.

This unsatisfactory state of affairs is the result of adverse circumstances. Until World War I, the nineteenth century, historically speaking, was still contemporary and hence unsuitable for detached scholarly research. Discretion was also advisable to avoid the intervention of tsarist authorities. A very hopeful start in studying the history of social movements and thought was made in Soviet Ukraine during the 1920s, but these beginnings were cut short by the advent of Stalinism. After a lapse of three decades, studies in that field have been resumed in the Ukrainian SSR in recent years, but only on a modest scale and in a most diffident manner. Among the symposia which have appeared are *Z istorii filosofskoi dumky na Ukraini* (From the History of Philosophical Thought in Ukraine) and *Z istorii ekonomichnoї dumky na Ukraini* (From the History of Economic Thought in Ukraine). But the quality of most articles is not impressive. Particularly distressing is the fact that, with rare exceptions, the Academy of Sciences and other scholarly institutions of the Ukrainian SSR do not publish the original works of pre-1917 Ukrain-
ian social thinkers, philosophers, historians and economists, even of those who are officially labelled "revolutionary democrats" and "progressives." The same applies to documents pertaining to the history of political movements. In this respect, there is a striking difference between Russia and Ukraine. For instance, the works of the pre-revolutionary, non-Marxist Russian historians Solovev and Kliuchevsky have been brought out in new mass editions; Russian scholarly institutions feel no compunction about publishing the memoirs of tsarist statesmen, such as Valuev or Witte, not to mention the very extensive documentary and research literature on the history of nineteenth-century Russian revolutionary movements. It would appear that the communist regime discourages scholarly research which might strengthen the Ukrainian community's awareness of its intellectual continuity with its own past.

There are certain indications that valuable unpublished materials on the history of pre-revolutionary Ukrainian political movements and social thought are still hidden in Soviet archives. Conditions under the tsarist regime, especially prior to 1905, were such that many tracts, pamphlets, memoranda, and satirical poems circulated only in manuscript form without reaching the press. It is to be hoped that some day such materials will become available and the history of modern Ukrainian social thought will be seen in a new light, namely as a movement of ideas more continuous, comprehensive, and cohesive than it appears at present.

The Fourfold Structure
The development of modern Ukrainian social and political thought cannot be understood properly if it is visualized as a simple lineal progression. This error has often been made by Ukrainian writers who, by strongly identifying themselves with a particular trend or school of thought, have presented it as the mainstream, while denying the validity and legitimacy of the other trends in their nation's intellectual history.

This bias is particularly evident in the way in which various authors have approached the history of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917-21. For one group of writers, the one and only true expression of the will of the Ukrainian people was the Ukrainian People's Republic, i.e., the regime represented successively by Mykhailo Hrushevsky, Volodymyr Vynnychenko, and Symon Petliura. According to another interpretation, however, a "real" Ukrainian state existed only during the Hetmanate of 1918, headed by Pavlo Skoropadsky. And there exists a third school for which the only legitimate spokesman of the Ukrainian toiling masses, the workers and peasants, was the government of the Ukrainian Soviet Republic. Each of the three schools tries to monopolize the history of the
Ukrainian Revolution (at least in its positive and constructive aspects), while vociferously disparaging the rival trends. The inadequacy of these one-sided approaches is obvious: the history of the Ukrainian Revolution is the totality of the forces which in fact were active among the Ukrainian people during those years. This observation ought to be applied also in the broader context of the history of modern Ukrainian social and political thought.

The basic heuristic assumption of this paper is the following. The development of modern Ukrainian social thought is to be understood not as a single stream, but rather as a process containing several parallel and distinct, although correlated and interdependent, trends. A conscientious researcher has the obligation, in spite of his personal preferences, not to favour exclusively one trend, but to try to comprehend them all, being aware of their positive contributions and their shortcomings and failures.

The proposed approach can be illustrated by examples drawn from the history of other countries. Since the seventeenth century, English political thought has been dominated by the polarities of Cavalier and Roundhead, Tory and Whig, Conservative and Liberal, and finally Conservative and Labour. In German history of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries we find the polarity of Catholic Austria and Protestant Prussia, each claiming to represent the "true" Germany. In nineteenth-century France the parallel trends were Legitimism, Orleanism, Bonapartism, Republicanism, and Socialism, none of which could be said to be more French than any other.

In modern Ukrainian social and political thought we can identify four basic trends: the democratic-populist, the conservative, the communist, and the integral-nationalist. The first two exclusively dominated the scene before World War I, while the last two emerged after the Revolution. These four trends can be categorized in two ways: first, populism and communism form the "left," and conservatism and integral nationalism form the "right"; and second, there is a link between populism and conservatism in that both are pluralistic, while communism and integral nationalism share a totalitarian outlook, as the diagram below shows.

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The proposed fourfold division provides an "orientation map" to aid one through the maze of Ukrainian political movements and schools of social thought. The division, however, should be used flexibly, as each
of the four major trends contained—either in chronological sequence or contemporaneously—a number of parties, factions, and groups, and a variety of shades of opinion. Ukrainian political life has often been charged with a tendency toward excessive factionalism, but this was more pronounced in east-central than in western Ukraine, because the tsarist regime, at least prior to 1905, denied the Ukrainian people the opportunities for free civic self-expression which existed under the constitutional Austrian regime. As a result, in Russian Ukraine political movements were driven underground, which reduced them to small, informal circles and splinter groups, frequently isolated from each other. This applies all the more to conditions under Soviet rule, where, even during the comparatively liberal 1920s, unorthodox political ideas could be expressed only in an allusive manner by using "Aesopian language" in poetry, fiction, literary criticism, and works of scholarship.

The very fact that the Ukrainian people had been living in different states (the Russian and Austro-Hungarian Empires before World War I, and the USSR, Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia during the interwar period) led to the formation of political organizations on a sectional basis, determined by the specific conditions of each state. Nevertheless—and this point needs to be stressed—all four major trends of political thought were all-Ukrainian in their nature, encompassing, with varying degrees of intensity, all territorial sections. For instance, outstanding representatives of populist thought, Drahomanov and Hrushevsky, who were natives of east-central Ukraine, exercised a formative impact on the development of Galicia. There exists a mistaken opinion that integral nationalism was peculiar to western Ukrainian lands only. It is obvious that this trend, which crystallized in the 1920s and 1930s, could not penetrate Soviet Ukraine overtly. However, the chief ideologist of integral nationalism, Dmytro Dontsov, was an eastern Ukrainian émigré, and among the leading personalities of the movement we find several who were of eastern Ukrainian background.

As a final methodological observation, I confess that I do not subscribe to the Marxist theory which views political ideologies as direct reflections of economic class interests. It would be easy, for example, to ascribe conservatism to the landowning gentry, or communism to the industrial working class, but such an interpretation would amount to an oversimplification. In Soviet polemical literature one often encounters the term "bourgeois nationalism," but this is a form of abuse rather than a useful category. Ukrainian integral nationalism, in whatever way one wants to judge it, is not the ideological superstructure of a (largely non-existent) national bourgeoisie. It is self-evident that social and political ideas do not develop out of thin air, but in a concrete social setting. However, the relationship between trends of thought, on the one hand, and
social classes and economic interest groups, on the other, is highly complex; ideologies, although to some extent conditioned by the social environment, possess also an autonomous dynamic of their own. A key role in the formulation and development of political ideas was played in Ukraine, as in other modern East European nations, by the intelligentsia—a peculiar social stratum which transcends economic classes. Thus we find contradictory schools of political philosophy supported by intellectuals whose personal social background and living conditions were often quite similar.

The paper will now proceed to an individual discussion of the four major trends noted above. The scope of this study allows us to characterize them only in briefest outline.

**Populism**

Modern democratic political and social ideas appeared in Ukraine in the 1820s in the wake of the Decembrist movement. A group particularly relevant from the viewpoint of the evolution of Ukrainian thought was the Society of United Slavs, whose program combined implacable hostility to serfdom with the idea of a democratic Pan-Slav federation.

The democratic-populist trend came of age with the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, a circle of young intellectuals in Kiev in 1846–7. The chief theorist of the Society was Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85), a gifted historian who later founded the populist school in Ukrainian historiography. Also associated with the Society was the poet Taras Shevchenko (1814–61), whose genius has made him the most influential figure in the intellectual life of modern Ukraine.

The new element in the ideology of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, in comparison with that of its Decembrist predecessors, was Ukrainian nationalism. This was due to the influence of the Ukrainian cultural revival of the early decades of the century, mostly connected with Kharkiv University, which, although non-political in nature, awakened both an enthusiasm for the "people" and an awareness of a Ukrainian ethnocultural identity. The program of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society was a synthesis of Romantic nationalism with the radical political and social ideas derived from the Decembrist movement, infused with the spirit of ardent Christian faith. The Cyrillo-Methodians wanted to base their country’s national rebirth on the emancipation of the peasant masses; their goal was an independent Ukrainian republic within a federation of Slavic nations and a new social order incorporating the Christian principles of freedom, justice, and equality. The world-view of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society implied also an interpretation of history in which the democratic tradition of Ukraine (as embodied in the Cossacks) was favourably contrasted with aristocratic Poland and autocratic Muscovy-Russia.

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The tenets of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society determined the ideological orientation of the Ukrainian national movement in the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. From the 1860s to 1905 the organizational basis of the movement was the network of hromady ("communities"), semi-conspirational circles of the liberal-populist intelligentsia. The leader of the hromady movement was Vолодимир Антонович (1834–1908), a distinguished historian and founder of the Kiev historical school. Beginning in the 1860s populism also affected Galicia, where its supporters were known as narodovtsi.

The outstanding Ukrainian political thinker of the second half of the century was Михайло Драхоманов (1841–95). What differentiated him from the Cyrillo-Methodians was his consistently positivist and secular philosophical outlook. Драхоманов was a non-Marxist socialist, influenced by Proudhon and close to Western evolutionary socialism. He produced elaborate proposals for a constitutional reorganization of Russia on federalist lines, with strong guarantees of individual civil rights and of self-government for regions and nationalities. Драхоманов hoped to secure Ukraine’s national interests through a federalization of the existing states, Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The first Ukrainian political parties came into existence in Galicia in the 1890s. The two main parties were the National Democrats and the Radicals. The former was a broad coalition whose platform contained the planks of democratic nationalism and social reform. The latter, founded under the direct inspiration of Драхоманов, was a party of agrarian socialists and militant anti-clericals. The outstanding exponent of democratic thought in Galicia was Иван Франко (1856–1916). An encyclopedic mind, Франко distinguished himself as a poet, novelist, historian, literary scholar, critic, and brilliant publicist. A co-founder of the Radical Party, he gradually moved away from the federalist teachings of his teacher Драхоманов and became one of the first exponents of the idea of a fully independent, democratic Ukrainian state.

In east-central Ukraine, embryonic political parties appeared only at the turn of the century and especially after the Revolution of 1905, but their existence remained precarious. The leading groupings were the Social Democrats, the Socialist Revolutionaries, and the Radical Democrats, who in 1917 changed their name to Socialist Federalists. All three were subdivisions of the broad democratic-populist trend; this applies also to the the Ukrainian Social Democrats, despite their official adoption of Marxism. The most prominent intellectual of that generation was Михайло Хрушевський (1866–1934), a disciple of Antonович, the last and greatest of Ukrainian populist historians, also eminent as an organizer of scholarly research and as political publicist. Хрушевський was originally associated with the Radical Democrats, but gradually moved to the left, and during the Revolution joined the Socialist Revolution-
aries. Another noteworthy figure was Mykola Porsh (1877–1944), the Social-Democratic theorist who ably defended the ideal of Ukrainian autonomy with economic arguments.

In the thinking of all shades of the democratic-populist movement we can notice two distinct components: a striving for civic and national liberty and for social justice. Of the two, the latter component was probably more pronounced than the former. A concern for the socio-economic interests of the downtrodden masses, combined with a strong egalitarian bias, was the ideological leitmotif of the whole trend. On the other hand, Drahomanov’s insistence on the importance of an adequate and well-planned democratic institutional framework did not leave a durable imprint. The desire for liberty was authentic in Ukrainian populism, but its content was primarily negative: an intense loathing of the oppressive features of tsarist autocracy. The sense of the ‘‘rules of the game’’ in an effective democratic system, and of the restraints which representative government necessarily implies, remained underdeveloped.

The culmination of the democratic-populist trend came in 1917. Ukraine’s revolutionary parliament, the Central Rada, was the direct outcome of a line of development which started with the Cyrillo-Methodian Society. The Central Rada proclaimed the Ukrainian People’s Republic, whose first president was Hrushevsky. After the interlude of a conservative regime in 1918, the so-called Hetmanate, the Ukrainian People’s Republic was restored by the end of that year. It was headed now by a collective Directory whose chairman was Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951), a Social Democrat, noted as a novelist and playwright. He was succeeded by Symon Petliura (1879–1926), a former Social-Democratic journalist. Petliura’s name is associated in history with the military struggle in 1919–20 for the preservation of an independent, democratic Ukrainian state.

The inter-war period was a time of decline for Ukrainian democratic forces. They were forcibly repressed in Soviet Ukraine, although during the 1920s intellectuals with a democratic-populist background continued to play an influential role in the country’s cultural life. In western Ukraine, which had been annexed by Poland, the traditional democratic parties remained the official spokesmen of the Ukrainian community until the outbreak of the Second World War. But their position was challenged and undermined by the rise first of communism and later of integral nationalism. The decline of Ukrainian democracy resulted in part from the fact that it had to bear the blame for the failure of Ukrainian independent statehood in the years 1917–21, and in part from the general crisis of European democratic systems and the ascendency of left- and right-wing totalitarian regimes.
Conservatism

The first expression of modern Ukrainian conservative thought was *Istoriiia Rusov* (the *Rusy* being the Ukrainian people, as heirs of old Kievan Rus'), an anonymous historical-political treatise written about 1800. In the form of a historical narrative, embellished with fictional features, this work formulated a concept of Ukrainian “historical legitimism”: by the Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654), the Ukrainian nation voluntarily accepted the suzerainty of the Russian tsar under a guarantee of full self-government; the agreement was violated many times by Russia, but this did not affect Ukraine’s imprescriptible claim to the restoration of its constitutional rights, which the author equates with the traditional liberties and privileges of the Cossack class. The *Istoriiia Rusov*, widely circulated in manuscript form, enjoyed great popularity and exercised a lasting influence on Ukrainian historical and political thinking. This influence can be traced in the programmatic documents of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society and in the writings of Shevchenko. The work was representative of the way of thinking of a large part of the nobility in Left-Bank Ukraine, descendants of the former Cossack officer class. Dreams about the restoration of an autonomous Cossack state lingered on in those circles until approximately the middle of the century.

During the second half of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian landowners inclined toward conservatism found an outlet in the institutions of zemstvo local self-government; they also financially supported Ukrainian cultural activities and kept in touch with the moderate elements of the *hromady* movement. However, the conservative forces were unable to oppose the dominant democratic-populist trend with any consistent political program of their own. Historical legitimism and the concept of “state rights,” based on the Treaty of Pereiaslav, had become obsolete, and no new idea was found to take their place. This failure can, perhaps, be explained by the Ukrainian nobility’s dynastic loyalty to the Russian throne; such allegiance did not preclude Ukrainian territorial patriotism, but it deprived the nobility’s political thinking of a focal point located within their own nation.

An exception to the intellectual sterility of conservatism in that era was Panteleimon Kulish (1819–97), a brilliant and versatile writer. A former Cyrillo-Methodian, Kulish gradually adopted a rightist position from which he criticized the comrades of his youth, Shevchenko and Kostomarov. Kulish was sensitive to the weak spots of populist ideology: the naive adoration of the peasant, the condoning of destructive and retrograde popular revolts, and the prejudice against the elitist elements that are necessary for the cultural and political life of a civilized community. However, he was unable to provide a constructive alternative to populism, and his idiosyncratic and bitter polemics only caused his isolation.
An interesting attempt to revive the historical-juridical program of the *Istoriiia Rusov* was advanced, at the turn of the century, by Mykola Mikhnovsky (1873–1924), a lawyer from Kharkiv. In his pamphlet, *Samostiina Ukraina* (Independent Ukraine, 1900), he called on his compatriots to resume the struggle for the restoration of the “Pereiaslav Constitution.” His appeal, however, met with only a very limited response because of the populist preference for natural rights based on ethnic nationalism over historical rights and legalistic arguments.

In Galicia, where the Greek Catholic Church was the main Ukrainian national institution, conservatism was stronger than in east-central Ukraine. The Greek Catholic clergy formed a semi-hereditary class, which in its way of life resembled a lesser gentry. The Galician Ukrainians made their political debut during the 1848–9 Revolution. Their leadership was at that time predominantly clerical, and their policy was pro-Habsburg and socially moderate. The so-called Old Ruthenians or Russophiles were an expression of the conservative trend in the second half of the century. The rise of populism and modern Ukrainian nationalism gradually reduced the Old Ruthenian faction to insignificance. But the more moderate elements among the *narodovtsi* were also tinged with conservatism. The same can be said of their successors, the National Democrats, Galicia’s leading Ukrainian party, organized in the 1890s. Galician conservatism was not so much a deliberate philosophy as a mental attitude which could go hand-in-hand with democratic principles. This attitude was revealed in a dedication to legal, parliamentary methods of political struggle, a down-to-earth sobriety, and an instinctive respect for established authority. The Galician conservative mentality manifested itself during the years of Revolution and struggle for national independence. The “Western Provinces of the Ukrainian People’s Republic” of 1918–19 officially adhered to the same democratic-populist principles as the Ukrainian People’s Republic on the Dnieper, but in practice the government of Western Ukraine pursued a moderate policy, avoided extremist social experiments, and showed a high regard for law and order.

The culmination of the conservative trend in east-central Ukraine was the regime of Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky in 1918. The Hetmanate undoubtedly owed its existence to the German occupation, but it also enjoyed the support of the conservative and moderate strata of Ukrainian society, which were dissatisfied with the radicalism of the Central Rada. One has to take into account that after the fall of the Russian monarchy conservative elements in Ukraine had become free from the bond of allegiance to the Romanov dynasty and were now able to direct their loyalty to a Ukrainian state which claimed to be a revival of the traditional Cossack body politic of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Upon
the withdrawal of the German army, the Hetmanate was easily over-
whelmed by a new surge of democratic-populist forces, but conservatism
had at least asserted its presence in the spectrum of Ukrainian political
trends.

One of the surprises of recent Ukrainian history is the sudden flow-
ering of conservative thought during the inter-war period. This movement
of ideas took place in the western Ukrainian lands outside the USSR and
in the Ukrainian diaspora of Western Europe and North America. The de-
velopment was largely due to the impact of Viacheslav Lypynsky
(1882–1931), who belonged to the Polish nobility of the Right Bank and
early in life had identified himself with the Ukrainian national cause. In
his historical writings, some of which were published before the war,
Lypynsky advanced a startlingly new interpretation of Ukrainian history.
Populist historians from Kostomarov to Hrushewsky had viewed the great
anti-Polish revolt of the mid-seventeenth century, headed by Hetman
Bohdan Khmelnytsky, as an elemental rising of the masses. Lypynsky,
on the other hand, stressed the contribution of the upper classes, the
Ruthenian gentry of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth who provided
the Cossacks with an educated and politically sophisticated leadership,
and he interpreted the Khmelnitsky revolution as a process whose goal
was the creation of a Ukrainian Cossack state. The experiences of the
1917 Revolution and the failure of Ukrainian independence turned
Lypynsky into a sociologist and political thinker. His sociological con-
cepts, although essentially original, in certain ways resemble those of
Vilfredo Pareto and Gaetano Mosca; his underlying philosophy, how-
ever, is close to that of Burke and Tocqueville. Lypynsky insisted on the
irreplaceable function of the elite in any organized community, and espe-
cially in every state. He believed that healthy social development re-
quires a balance between the forces of change and stability, liberty and
authority. His vision of the future independent Ukraine was that of a con-
stitutional monarchy with a differentiated class structure under the
hegemony of a class of prosperous farmers. While some of Lypynsky’s
ideas were obviously anachronistic (for instance, his advocacy of the
claims of the Skoropadsky family), many of his deep insights ought to be
considered a durable enrichment of Ukrainian political and social
thought. Lypynsky was the central figure of a group of distinguished in-
tellectuals among whom the following deserve to be mentioned individu-
ally: the historians Dmytro Doroshenko (1882–1951), Stepan Toma-
shivsky (1875–1930), and Vasyl Kuchabsky (1895–1945) (all of whom
were also active as publicists), and Osyp Nazaruk (1883–1940), prob-
ably the most brilliant Ukrainian political journalist of the inter-war era.

Thus we can state the paradox that of the four major trends of Ukrai-
nian political thought, conservatism, which was the weakest in physical
strength and mass support, was the one that made the greatest intellectual contribution in the course of the present century.

Communism

Soviet historiography has not succeeded, despite great efforts, in tracing the origins of Ukrainian communism to pre-revolutionary roots. To be sure, Bolshevik groups existed in Ukraine before 1917, but they drew their membership from the Russian and Russified Jewish urban ethnic minorities. The few ethnic Ukrainian Bolsheviks stood completely outside their country’s national-liberation movement. It is impossible to point to a single Bolshevik who, prior to 1917, made the slightest contribution to Ukrainian letters, scholarship, or social thought.

Ukrainian communism is an offspring—although the fact is hotly denied in Soviet historical literature—of the national revolution of 1917. It was the strength and the mass character of the Ukrainian liberation movement that induced Lenin and the Communist Party leadership to give some consideration to Ukrainian national aspirations. The first Soviet government in Ukraine, the so-called People’s Secretariat, was formed in December 1917 for the purpose of countering the Central Rada. If there had been no independent, democratic Ukrainian People’s Republic, it is very doubtful whether a Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic would ever have come into existence.

Bolsheviks of Ukrainian background, however, did not remain untouched by their country’s national rebirth. While retaining loyalty to the Party and the ideology of Marxism-Leninism, they also began to think of themselves as Ukrainian. The local Bolshevik groups in Ukraine were given a common organization in 1918, although the Communist Party (bolshevik) of Ukraine (CP[b]U) remained a regional branch of the Russian Party, completely subordinated to the central leadership in Moscow. The national element in the CP(b)U was strengthened by the influx of some former Ukrainian Social Democrats and Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries (the left fringe of the democratic-populist trend) who in the course of the Revolution had broken away from their parent parties. Thus the old Bolsheviks of Ukrainian background, whose national consciousness had been activated, as well as the ex-SDs and ex-SRs who had turned communist, gradually gave the CP(b)U a more pronounced local colour, which it had originally lacked. Nevertheless Ukrainian nationalists remained, until well into the 1920s, a numerical minority among the members of the CP(b)U.

Communism is the only one among the four major trends of Ukrainian political thought which may claim to have succeeded. After all, there exists today a Soviet Ukrainian Republic, while both the Ukrainian People’s Republic of Hrushevsky and Petliura and the Ukrainian State of
Hetman Skoropadsky collapsed in a rather short time. But this apparent communist triumph has one very questionable side: it was due primarily to Soviet Russian military intervention. There is, in this respect, a basic difference between Russian and Ukrainian communism. In Russia the Bolsheviks were the legitimate heirs of their nation's revolutionary tradition, and they had conquered and retained power by their own devices. In Ukraine, on the other hand, the communist regime was only weakly rooted in the native tradition, and it could not have been established without the "fraternal aid" of the Russian Red Army. Thus, Ukrainian communists have never been masters in their own house, and they were condemned to the thankless role of intermediaries between their own people and the overlords in Moscow.

Still, the 1920s witnessed a considerable growth of Ukrainian communism. The younger generation of the intelligentsia in the Ukrainian SSR felt that the traditional populist-democratic outlook had become outdated and provincial. Communist ideology had an appeal for them because of its dynamism, supposedly scientific foundations, and world-wide perspectives. On the Ukrainian communists devolved, by force of circumstance, the defence of their homeland's national and state interests. At that time Soviet Ukraine still possessed a measure of effective autonomy, especially in educational and cultural matters, and it was possible to believe in good faith that the process of building a Ukrainian socialist nation was under way. The cultural achievements—in letters, scholarship, and art—of the decade 1923–33 were impressive. This cultural work was largely carried out by non-party intellectuals who were still schooled in the older democratic tradition, but the movement was officially sponsored by Ukrainian communists. An achievement which must be credited to them particularly was the Ukrainization of urban life. The pre-revolutionary Ukrainian movement was ideologically and organizationally oriented toward the countryside, while the cities resembled alien enclaves. Now, for the first time in modern history, Ukrainian culture began to assume an urban character, while the cities gradually became more Ukrainian in language and general tenor.

Evidence of the vitality of Ukrainian communism in the 1920s was the fact that it was able to make recruits outside the frontiers of the USSR, where it was not backed by the might of the state. Communist and pro-Soviet sympathies were very noticeable among Ukrainians in Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, émigrés in the countries of Western Europe, and Ukrainian settlers in the United States and Canada. The appeal of communism—besides the usual economic grievances—was to some extent also patriotic: the positive national achievements in the Ukrainian SSR provided an attractive contrast to the oppression and humiliation to which Ukrainians were exposed in other countries, espe-
cially under the chauvinistic and vexatious Polish domination of Galicia and Volhynia. The spread of pro-Soviet sympathies also reflected the crisis of the traditional democratic-populist outlook. It was certainly symptomatic that some former leading personalities of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, such as Hrushevsky and Vynnychenko, proclaimed their adherence to the Soviet system; the former even returned to the Ukrainian SSR.

But the development of Soviet Ukraine was bound to clash with Moscow’s centralism. Violations of state and national-cultural rights of the Ukrainian Republic—rights nominally guaranteed by the party program and Soviet law—provoked reactions on the part of some Ukrainian communists. This was the origin of the so-called nationalist deviations within the CP(b)U, which were a frequent occurrence during the 1920s. The very fact that there were communists willing to defend the rights of their nation to the point of conflict with Moscow proved that communism had become a Ukrainian political trend, and not simply a tool of Russian imperialism, as anti-communist Ukrainians have often asserted. At the same time, these deviations illustrated the tragic dilemma of Ukrainian communists: the difficulty of reconciling two incompatible loyalties, to the party with its demands of total conformity on the one hand, and to their own nation on the other.

The basic text of Ukrainian “national” communism was the treatise by Serhii Mazlakh and Vasyl Shakhrai, *Do khvyli: Shcho diietsia na Ukraini i z Ukrainoiu* (On the Current Situation: What is Happening in Ukraine and to Ukraine, 1919). It contained a drastic critique of the ambiguities of Bolshevik policy toward Ukraine and culminated in the program of an independent Ukrainian Soviet Republic, allied with Soviet Russia and other socialist states on a footing of genuine equality, and of a separate Ukrainian Communist Party, associated with the Russian Party only through the Communist International. Of the numerous nationalist deviations in the CP(b)U perhaps the most interesting intellectually was the case of Mykola Khvylovy. Khvylovy (1893–1933), a noted communist novelist and essayist, turned from a favourite of the regime into its sharp critic. A man endowed with a charismatic personality who exercised a strong influence on the young and the intelligentsia, Khvylovy preached a reorientation of Soviet Ukrainian culture toward the West, away from Russia. Nationalist deviations in the Ukrainian SSR had repercussions among Ukrainian communists in other countries. At one point, the majority of the Central Committee of the underground Communist Party of Western Ukraine sided with the national opposition in the CP(b)U.

The catastrophe of Ukrainian communism came in the 1930s. Virtually the entire old leadership of the CP(b)U was purged by Stalin. Af-
affected were not only those who had been identified previously as deviationists, but also the former loyal upholders of the official party line. One of the early victims, driven to suicide, was Mykola Skrypnyk (1872–1933), the Leninist stalwart, who for many years had been the authoritative interpreter of party policy on nationality issues. Stalin’s reign of terror, the artificially induced famine of 1933, and the renewed Russification drive in the Ukrainian SSR delivered a heavy blow to Ukrainian communism. A reliable barometer of the crumbling of communism as an indigenous Ukrainian trend was the rapid and irreversible decline of pro-Soviet sympathies among Ukrainians outside the USSR. Prior to the outbreak of World War II, the communist movement in Galicia and Volhynia had dwindled to the point of insignificance, retaining some influence only in Transcarpathia (in Czechoslovakia), the most backward and nationally most underdeveloped of all Ukrainian lands.

**Integral Nationalism**

First it is necessary to clarify a point of semantics. In English, the term nationalism is used to designate any conscious striving toward national self-expression. In this broad sense Ukrainian patriots of all ideological hues—democrats, conservatives, and even “national” communists—may be described as nationalists. But in Ukrainian political terminology the word is usually given a specialized, partisan meaning to designate an intense, militant, and exclusive devotion to one’s own nation. To avoid a possible confusion of terms, and to differentiate clearly between the broad and the specialized meanings of the word nationalism, I shall use, in the latter case, the term integral nationalism.

The nationalist trend originated in the 1920s as a reaction to the defeat of the struggle for Ukrainian national independence. The nucleus of the movement consisted of veterans of the Ukrainian army, especially young officers, who refused to accept the fact of defeat and decided to continue the armed struggle for national liberation by revolutionary, underground means. For this purpose they created, as early as 1920, a secret Ukrainian Military Organization (Ukrainska viiskova orhanizatsiia, UVO), whose commander was Colonel Ievhen Konovalets (1891–1938). The UVO was originally intended to be non-partisan and included men of various political convictions.

The second root of integral nationalism is to be found in the circles of young intellectuals, mostly students, in Lviv, Prague and Vienna. In the two latter cities, large Ukrainian communities existed in the 1920s. The problem passionately debated in these groups was the assessment of the causes of the recent failure of Ukrainian statehood. The leaders of the Ukrainian People’s Republic were indicted for their “softness” and the humanitarian and cosmopolitan ideas by which they allegedly had
deflected popular energies from the supreme goal of national independence. To remedy the deficiencies of their populist predecessors, the nationalists proposed the fostering of a “new spirit” characterized by uncompromising militancy and resolute assertion of the primacy of national self-interest.

The publicist whose impact was decisive in the formation of the ideology of Ukrainian integral nationalism was Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973). A native of Dnieper Ukraine, educated in St. Petersburg, Dontsov settled in Lviv, where he became the editor of an influential monthly journal, Literaturno-naukovyi visnyk (Literary and Scientific Herald). A brilliant controversialist, he advocated in his treatise, Natsionalizm (Nationalism, 1926), and in numerous articles and pamphlets a philosophy of “national voluntarism” partly derived from Nietzsche. Dontsov was mainly responsible for giving the ideology of Ukrainian integral nationalism a deliberately irrationalist, anti-intellectual, and voluntarist bias. A peculiar trait of Dontsov’s thought was his implacable execration of Russia, not just of the tsarist or Soviet state but of the Russian people and culture. (It is to be noted that for western Ukrainians, among whom Dontsov worked, the primary national adversary was not Russia, with which they had had only limited experience, but Poland.) At an early date Dontsov began a determined campaign against the pro-Soviet sympathies which were widespread in Galicia and Volhynia at that time. Later tragic developments in Soviet Ukraine were to confirm Dontsov’s predictions, thus enhancing his prestige. He also devoted much of his labour to literary criticism, for which he had a real gift. He assembled around his journal a group of noted poets and writers who left a durable mark on the evolution of modern Ukrainian literature.

Nationalist ideological groups and the UVO, from which members of other political leanings gradually withdrew, moved closer together. They merged at the First Congress of Ukrainian Nationalists held in Vienna in 1929. At the Congress the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (Orhanizatsiia ukrainskykh natsionalistiv, OUN) was created and Konovalets was proclaimed its leader. The OUN was to combine the functions of an “underground army,” fighting the foreign rulers of Ukraine, and of a political movement, in fact a party (although the word was avoided) aspiring to a predominant position in Ukrainian society.

According to the program of the OUN, the supreme goal, national independence, was to be achieved by revolutionary means. The Ukrainian masses were to be kept in a state of permanent unrest, thus preventing the consolidation of the power of the “occupiers.” The chain of acts of terrorism, civil disobedience, and local riots and uprisings was to culminate in a great future conflagration, out of which an independent Ukrainian state was to be born. The nationalists scornfully rejected any
accommodation of Ukrainian policies to the existing order of things, which they condemned as shameful opportunism and a betrayal of the national ideal. They refused in principle to co-operate with other Ukrainian parties and political movements, which were all, according to them, tainted with opportunism. The OUN's vision of a future independent Ukraine was that of a dictatorial, one-party state. The nationalists were not very specific on social and economic questions, but, in general terms, they advocated "national solidarity," i.e., a social order in which competition among classes and economic interest groups would be permanently eliminated. There were several causes for the Ukrainian integral nationalists' rejection of democracy: the conviction that democracy was mainly responsible for the downfall of Ukrainian statehood in 1917–21; resentment against Western democratic powers which had denied recognition and support to the Ukrainian nation; the desire to emulate the successes of the Russian Bolsheviks and the dictatorial Piłsudski regime in Poland; and the notion that the cruelty and cynicism of these foreign oppressors could be resisted only by equally ruthless means.

While Ukrainian integral nationalism was an indigenous growth, it undoubtedly modelled itself on contemporary fascist movements and regimes in the West. This orientation was strengthened by considerations of international policy. As many Ukrainians, besides integral nationalists, felt the existing international order to be unbearable, it was natural for them to look to those powers from whom a revision and overthrow of the Versailles system could be expected. The integral nationalists, aware of their ideological kinship with Western fascism, were able to profit politically from the desire for international change which was widespread in Ukrainian society. Despite cautionary voices raised by a few far-sighted publicists, Ukrainians had in general little appreciation of the dangers which Nazi Germany presented to their people. They relied on the fact that German and Ukrainian ethnic areas were not contiguous, and they were confident that in the event of a great European showdown Germany would be obliged in its own interest, as during the Brest-Litovsk era, to back Ukrainian claims.

The decade from 1929 to 1939 was a time of rapid expansion of the integral-nationalist movement. The headquarters of the OUN were abroad, but its primary operational field was Ukrainian ethnic territory in Poland. According to nationalist doctrine, the revolutionary struggle was to be conducted against all "occupiers" simultaneously, but in practice the terrorist activities of the OUN were directed almost exclusively against Poland. The nationalists' anti-Russian stand was, at that time, expressed by occasional assassination attempts against Soviet diplomats and by a vigorous struggle against any surviving communist sympathies.
within Ukrainian society outside the USSR. The nationalists were able to capture much of the revolutionary ferment among the population of Galicia and Volhynia, which the Communist Party of Western Ukraine had previously tried to exploit. A particular success of the OUN was its solid support among the young. Integral nationalism had the character of a youth movement, and the antagonism between the OUN and the traditional democratic parties assumed the psychological dimension of a conflict of generations. While the old parties retained their role as official spokesmen of the Ukrainian minority in Poland and leadership in the "legal" community organizations (co-operatives, educational institutions) still tolerated by the Polish government, their position was increasingly undermined by the nationalist underground.

The rise of the integral-nationalist trend must be seen against the historical background of the 1930s. For the Ukrainian people this was an exceptionally tragic era: the time of the Stalinist purges and massacres in Soviet Ukraine and of the ever-increasing chauvinism and oppressiveness of Polish rule in Western Ukraine. In such circumstances, the nationalist movement appeared as the embodiment of the Ukrainian people’s defiant will to survive. The aura of heroism and self-sacrifice which surrounded the OUN attracted thousands of idealistic young men and women. Neither the half-hearted opposition of the older democratic parties nor the repressive measures of the Polish administration were able to stem the tide. The gaps created in the ranks of the organization by arrests were easily filled by new recruits. In Polish prisons and concentration camps, raw youths underwent a transformation into hardened professional revolutionaries—a human category previously unknown in western Ukraine. There was a saying during those years in Galicia and Volhynia that "prison is the Ukrainian university." But this transformation took a heavy toll in human lives and broken existences. To concerned observers, even within the movement, it was becoming increasingly evident that Ukrainian integral nationalism was contaminated by serious intrinsic ills. This led to a blunting of moral sensibility, as demonstrated by the use of physical and moral terror against Ukrainian political opponents. The voluntaristic character of nationalist ideology, and its reliance on "myth" rather than knowledge, interfered with the ability to perceive reality objectively and therefore with rational and responsible decision-making. While integral nationalism enhanced the militancy and resilience of the Ukrainian people in times of great stress, it also lowered the level of their civic maturity.

World War II
The years of the Second World War brought both the apogee and the crisis of integral nationalism. The annexation of the Galician-Volhynian
lands by the USSR in the autumn of 1939 caused the demise of the Ukrainian democratic parties in that area, while the clandestine OUN was able to preserve its underground organization. Also, among the numerous Ukrainian refugees who fled to Germany and German-occupied Poland, the nationalists obtained an almost monopolistic preponderance. But at this very time, when the OUN was facing its greatest opportunity, a split occurred within its ranks. It was caused by the struggle to succeed Konovalets, founder and leader of the OUN, who was assassinated by a Soviet agent in 1938. The two rival factions were commonly designated after their respective leaders, Andrii Melnyk (1890–1964) and Stepan Bandera (1909–59), the “Melnykites” (melnykivtsi) and the “Banderites” (banderivtsi). Originally the schism had no ideological connotations; both groups adhered to the same totalitarian ideology and claimed the name of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists. Nevertheless, the conflict also possessed a psychological dimension. The supporters of Melnyk were generally to be found among the more mature and moderate elements of the OUN, the military veterans of the 1917–21 era and the old émigrés who had spent most of their lives in foreign countries. The Banderites, on the other hand, were the “Young Turks” of the movement, and their faction attracted the professional revolutionaries from western Ukraine, many of whom had just emerged from Polish prisons. The ugly factional conflict, which soon degenerated into reciprocal vilification and terrorism, shattered the nationalists’ claim to provide unity and leadership to the Ukrainian cause in a critical time.

The German occupation of Ukraine lasted about three years (1941–4). The everyday life of the Ukrainian people was dominated by physical privations and the overriding concern for sheer survival. The vicious cruelty and naked colonialism of the German occupation regime are too well known to need elaboration. It must be stressed, however, that, in spite of the indiscriminate application of mass terror, the Nazis were not able to control Ukrainian society as throughly as the Russian Bolsheviks. While any autonomous intellectual life had come to a standstill in the Ukrainian SSR in the 1930s, a fairly lively underground exchange of ideas took place during the German occupation.

Both groups of the OUN, but especially the more enterprising Banderites, succeeded in expanding their clandestine networks from the western Ukrainian base into the former Soviet territories of east-central Ukraine, where they attracted considerable local support. The Bandera faction provided the nucleus for a guerrilla force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, whose operations, conducted simultaneously against Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, were a powerful demonstration of the Ukrainian people’s will to national independence, asserted under the most adverse circumstances.
Confrontations with Hitler’s system, on the one hand, and with the realities of east-central (former Soviet) Ukraine, on the other, spurred revisionist tendencies within the intellectually more flexible segments of the nationalist movement. The drift of the changes was toward a liberalization of the ideology of integral nationalism: putting a new stress on the rights of the individual, rejection of ethnic or racial exclusiveness, toleration of philosophical pluralism (as against the former adherence to compulsory “idealism”), and attempts to formulate an attractive social and economic program which would combine the best features of socialism and capitalism. Still, these changes, however significant, did not make the nationalist movement democratic. Fascistic authoritarianism was deeply rooted in the nationalist mind, and revisionist tendencies were checked by the orthodox adherents of both factions. Even the most advanced nationalist revisionists remained ambiguous on the crucial questions of political pluralism and representative government. One has also to take into consideration the brevity of the period during which these developments took place, not allowing them to grow to maturity. After the re-establishment of Soviet rule, the remnants of the nationalist underground continued their activities for several years until their final eradication at the beginning of the 1950s. The programmatic statements which emanated from the underground had, by that time, lost the specific traits of the old OUN ideology (save, of course, the goal of national independence), and their general tenor may be defined as reflecting an outlook of democratic socialism.

Ukrainian democratic forces were at a disadvantage during the war years, as they were not prepared to engage in underground operations, and the conditions of the time did not allow them to organize overtly. People of democratic convictions found an outlet in non-political cultural and relief activities, precariously tolerated by the German authorities. Circumstances for such work were more favourable in Galicia than in the former Soviet territories. The Ukrainian Central Committee in Cracow and Lviv was able to render substantial services to the population of Galicia in the area of education and social welfare. This body, although outwardly conforming with the requirements of Hitler’s “New Order,” was staffed predominantly with members of the old western Ukrainian democratic parties and civic organizations. A similar centre came into existence at the opposite end of Ukraine, in Kharkiv. That zone, near the front line, was under military administration, and conditions there were somewhat less oppressive than in the Reichskommissariat Ukraine, which encompassed the central portion of the country.

A remarkable fact needs to be noted. Twenty years of Soviet rule had not eradicated the memory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, and the name of Petliura still enjoyed great popularity. This applied not only to
the few surviving members of the old intelligentsia, but also to many young people who had no personal memories of pre-Soviet days. All over east-central Ukraine informal circles sprang up whose participants, without possessing any formal political program, professed allegiance to the traditions of the democratic Ukrainian state of 1917–21. In comparison with the tight network of underground cells which the integral nationalists were building up, the democratic trend remained fluid and inchoate, but it was more broadly based. It represented a potential force which, under the adverse circumstances of the time, could not find adequate expression. Only in the post-war years did the movement crystallize in the Ukrainian Revolutionary Democratic Party (URDP), created in the refugee camps of western Germany. The leader of the party was the writer and journalist Ivan Bahriany (1907–63), a former inmate of Soviet concentration camps. The URDP found its supporters mostly among émigrés from east-central Ukraine. It must be considered a reincarnation of the old democratic-populist trend which attempted to incorporate the experience of the Soviet era of the 1920s and 30s.

The years of World War II also gave a new lease on life to Ukrainian communism. The fresh horrors of the German occupation to some extent overshadowed the tragic memories of the 1930s. In a historical conjuncture which did not offer realistic prospects for the achievement of national independence, and faced with the stark Nazi-Soviet alternative, many Ukrainians felt that while there was hope for their nation as a Soviet Republic, there was none as a German colony. This conclusion was facilitated by Soviet wartime propaganda, which employed Ukrainian patriotic symbols, cleverly insinuated that the "mistakes" of the 1930s would not be repeated, and implied that the Ukrainian people could expect better treatment in the future. If one accepted the premise that the defeat and expulsion of the German invader was the primary, overriding goal, it followed logically that one had also to accept the Soviet system and the necessity of continued close Ukrainian-Russian association under the hegemony of Moscow. Thus a new generation of Ukrainian communists, almost all of whom had fought as officers in the Soviet army or partisan units, was forged by the wartime experience. Few, however, had any but nominal links with the traditions of the working-class movement and revolutionary Marxism. For the last quarter of a century, but especially since Stalin’s death and the advent of Khrushchev, men of this background have furnished the leading party and government cadres in the Ukrainian SSR.

The Contemporary Scene in Soviet Ukraine
The outstanding recent event in the intellectual life of Ukraine is the emergence of a group of vocal dissidents in the 1960s. The writings of
Ivan Dziuba, Sviatoslav Karavansky, Viacheslav Chornovil, Valentyn Moroz, Mykhailo Osadchy, Ievhen Sverstiuk, and others, circulated in Soviet Ukraine clandestinely, have been published abroad both in the original Ukrainian and in translations, and have attracted world attention.

Certain points should be noted concerning the background of the Ukrainian dissidents. Most are young, usually in their thirties, born and educated under the Soviet system. This fact makes nonsense of the label of “bourgeois nationalism,” which official propaganda tries to pin on them. Socially, all can be classified as typical intellectuals: writers, literary critics, artists, historians, educators, journalists. Geographically, they represent all sections of Ukraine, not excluding such strongly Russianified regions as the Donbas. Numerically, they are a tiny group. The total number of persons identified in one way or another as participants in the movement does not exceed 1,000 out of the republic’s population of 47,000,000 (according to the 1970 census). But there are indications that the avowed dissidents—men and women of truly exceptional civic courage—ought to be considered as the visible tip of a much larger iceberg. In “legal” literary and scholarly publications from Soviet Ukraine one often finds ideas analogous to those of the dissidents expressed in veiled, allusive form. We are even entitled to surmise that the dissidents have enjoyed the sympathy and tacit protection of some elements in the republic’s governing circles. It is, finally, to be observed that the Ukrainian dissidents have carefully eschewed any formal organization. The movement seems to have taken the shape of a ramified network of informal, personal contacts.

The ideas formulated by the spokesmen of Ukrainian dissent can be subsumed under two headings. To the first group belong issues of a general libertarian nature: protests against infringements of human and civil rights and particularly against the denial of intellectual freedom. The second group includes points of a specifically national character: protests against the curtailment of constitutional state rights of the Ukrainian SSR, the diluting and perversion of the nation’s cultural heritage, the discrimination against the Ukrainian language in education and public life, and demands for cultural rights for Ukrainian minorities residing in other parts of the USSR.

It is well known that dissent has become vocal in recent years not only in Ukraine, but also in Russia. A comparison of the ideas of Ukrainian and Russian dissidents is most instructive. In the area of general libertarian postulates the goals of the two movements largely coincide, but there is a notable divergence between them concerning the national problem. While Russian dissidents have condemned ethnic discrimination in the USSR (i.e., the regime’s anti-Semitic tendencies or the expulsion of the Crimean Tatars from their homeland), they have been wary of taking a
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stand on the issue of the non-Russians' right to national self-determination. It would seem that even those Russians who are dissatisfied with many aspects of the existing system are reluctant to oppose it to a point which might endanger the coherence of the Russian imperial state and weaken its international position. This apprehension that liberalization might be detrimental to Russia's great-power interests is also the chief cause of the impotence and isolation of the Russian dissidents within their own national community. The communist government can claim the credit for having elevated Russia to a pinnacle of unprecedented power and prestige. A dissociation of Russian patriotism from the Soviet regime is likely to occur only in the event of serious setbacks suffered by the USSR in foreign policy. This hypothesis is supported by the evidence of history. In old Russia reform and/or revolution was a regular concomitant of unsuccessful foreign wars: Crimean, Balkan, Japanese, and, finally, World War I.

One can see now that Ukrainian dissent is, in this respect, placed differently from its Russian counterpart: it is not checked, but fed, by national instincts. The national issue provides an ideological complex of great emotional appeal, to which all the other frustrations and grievances, diffused in the society, tend to gravitate and around which, circumstances permitting, they could easily coalesce. The ideas of the Ukrainian dissidents, therefore, possess a potentially high mass appeal, irrespective of the limited number of currently active participants. Within many Ukrainian families there have been members who, within the memory of the living generation, have at one time or another made sacrifices for the national cause or suffered persecution for its sake. Experiences of this kind leave indelible marks on the collective mind of a society in which family ties are still very strong. This is the deep well-spring from which the present intellectual ferment in Ukraine draws its strength. The reassertion of independent Ukrainian thought, after decades of indoctrination and repeated purges of the nation's "brain," its intellectual elite, is a portent of great historical significance.

If we try to apply to recent Soviet Ukrainian dissent the model of the four trends proposed earlier in this paper, the most plausible location for this dissent is within the tradition of national communism. Ukrainian dissidents have not, as a rule, attacked the premises of Marxist-Leninist philosophy, neither have they rejected socialist economics, nor the Soviet political system, nor even the membership of the Ukrainian republic in the USSR. They have only criticized the distortions of the system and called for bringing Soviet practice into line with true Leninist principles, especially in the field of nationality policy. Dziuba, perhaps the most articulate spokesman of Ukrainian dissent, refers constantly to the writings of Lenin, to former Communist Party resolutions, and to the texts of
the USSR and Ukrainian SSR constitutions and Soviet laws.

Students of Soviet affairs have already pointed to the continuity of thought between early Ukrainian communist national deviationists, such as Shakhrai, and contemporary dissidents, such as Dziuba. There is, however, between the generations of the “twenties” and the “sixties,” separated as they are by a quarter-century of Stalinist rule, a perceptible distinction which needs to be carefully defined. Communist ideology of the revolutionary and early post-revolutionary epoch was an ardent faith in an imminent radical transformation of man and society. This millenarian myth has been beautifully expressed by the communist writer Khvylov in his vision of the “commune beyond the hills” (zahirna komuna). In contrast to this strong ideological motivation of the early Bolsheviks, both orthodox and deviationist, the present dissidents’ approach to Marxism-Leninism seems to be mostly pragmatic. They ransack the “classics” for arguments to promote certain desired reforms. They try to prove that Lenin was more broad-minded on the nationalities problem than the present leadership of the CPSU, and that respect for Ukrainian national rights is compatible with the principles of socialist economics and the Soviet political system. This pragmatic use of Marxism-Leninism is, of course, also characteristic of the men of the Soviet establishment, only the latter apply it in a sense opposite to that of the dissidents—to provide ideological legitimacy to the status quo and to rationalize current policies of the government.

While the national-communist strand is the most pronounced in contemporary Soviet Ukrainian dissent, a study of the relevant literature also shows the presence of other strands of thought. The writings of Valentyn Moroz, for instance, display features reminiscent of integral nationalism of the inter-war era: the postulate of personal moral integrity to be maintained against all odds; a resolute rejection of Realpolitik, if the latter implies an accommodation to conditions incompatible with individual or national honour; and a definitely voluntaristic turn of mind. In contrast to Dziuba, Moroz has shown little interest in constitutional and institutional issues; he also forgoes any citations from Marxist “classics.” His primary concern is with the maintenance of an uncompromising national ethos regardless of any considerations of political expediency. The stress on the primacy of will and character was an important part of the integral-nationalist ideology. It should be made clear, however, that neither Moroz nor any other of the contemporary Ukrainian dissenters has shown any trace of the specifically fascist features of the old OUN program: glorification of the one-party state and dictatorship, fostering of ethnic exclusiveness, deliberate irrationalism, and anti-intellectualism. Carry-overs of this kind are precluded by the basically libertarian and humanist outlook of Ukrainian dissent.
Communism and integral nationalism represent the two younger, post-revolutionary trends in Ukrainian political thought. Can one also ascertain the presence of vestiges of the two older trends, democratic populism and conservatism? This can be answered in the affirmative. We have already noted the libertarian colouring of the ideas of the Ukrainian dissenters, and their defence of human rights and intellectual freedom. They have also advanced proposals for an improvement of living standards and the welfare of the people, as well as the removal of the existing discriminatory measures against the peasantry. Going beyond the literature of dissent, we find evidence in Soviet Ukrainian academic and intellectual circles of an increased interest in the legacy of prerevolutionary democratic-populist thought. For instance, the selected works of Kostomarov and Drahomanov have appeared in recent years in new (though heavily censored) editions, and the number of scholarly studies dealing with such topics is growing.

A noteworthy phenomenon in the intellectual life of contemporary Ukraine is a marked return to the national tradition. Because of official restraints and manipulations, the movement has assumed primarily non-political, cultural forms. The manifestations are manifold and include the drive for the preservation and restoration of historical monuments; a revival of folk customs and arts, and their adaptation to modern urban conditions; frequent treatment of historical subjects in fiction and poetry; the labours of scholars intent on recapturing the nation’s cultural heritage. In other countries, where the continuity of national life has never been disrupted, such activities might be considered routine. In the case of Ukraine, however, with its tragically fragmented development, such cultivation of the nation’s historically continuous cultural identity is bound to have political implications.

The preceding statement leads to a discussion of the conservative element in contemporary Ukrainian intellectual life. The term “conservatism” is in bad odour in the Soviet Union, but the absence of the label does not preclude the presence of the phenomenon. A conservative orientation is characterized by two traits: a strong sense of tradition and continuity (as opposed to an eschatological and futuristic view of society) and a high regard for legal and orderly modes of procedure (in contrast to revolutionary rejection of precedent and established form). In applying these criteria to the contemporary Ukrainian scene, we have already taken note of the heightened cultural traditionalism. As to the second point, the Soviet establishment itself has lately become more conservative, inasmuch as it is trying to divest itself of arbitrariness and to approximate the model of a Rechtsstaat. (In the course of doing so, it has become increasingly enmeshed in intrinsic contradictions, as the nature of a totalitarian dictatorship is incompatible with the requirements of the authentic rule of
law.) Concerning Ukrainian dissent, its legal and constitutional character has already been stressed. It has tried to operate in the manner of a loyal opposition within the framework of the existing system. The purpose of the Ukrainian dissidents is not to destroy existing institutions, but to adapt them in order to promote civil rights, general prosperity, and Ukrainian national interests. In this sense, Ukrainian dissidents may be called "conservative reformers." Such an interpretation also helps us to understand the attitude of Dziuba and his colleagues toward the statehood of the Ukrainian SSR. In their view, the Soviet Ukrainian body politic, despite all its obvious deficiencies, represents a valuable form which must not be destroyed, but rather strengthened and gradually filled with a new, living content. This concept strongly recalls the way of thinking of the patriotic Cossack nobles of the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (as reflected, for instance, in the Istoriiia Rusov), who based their resistance to the encroachments of St. Petersburg centralism on the Treaty of Pereiaslav as a constitutional act guaranteeing their nation's autonomous status. By the workings of historical dialectics, Soviet constitutional arrangements, resulting from a great revolutionary explosion and imposed on the Ukrainian people by superior outside force, have assumed the character of "historical" rights. The future will tell whether the attempt of contemporary Ukrainian dissidents to formulate a national policy on the platform of a Soviet version of historical legitimism will be more successful than the endeavours of their predecessors two centuries ago. Such a policy could have a chance only if the defence of Ukrainian state and national rights were to be taken up by the leading cadres of the CPU and the Republic's administrative and economic elite. This would mean a return to the policy of Skrypnyk, the loyal Bolshevik, who did not hesitate to stand up for the interests of Soviet Ukraine in the 1920s. The conditions for this are today, in a way, more favourable than in the past, inasmuch as the membership of the CPU has become predominantly Ukrainian in its ethnic composition. On the other hand, the present CPU leadership is the product of the conformist Stalinist era and wartime experience. The cardinal points in the private philosophy of these men seem to be to take full advantage of the good things life has offered them, and otherwise to exercise extreme caution. A change may take place with the rise of the next generation of leaders, who will no longer have a personal memory of Stalinism and World War II and who perhaps will be less fearful of asserting the rights of their nation.

The Ukrainian Diaspora
A problem which still remains to be considered is that of the role of the Ukrainian diaspora. The total number of people of Ukrainian descent in the countries of Western Europe, North and South America, and
Australia amounts to about two million. Ukrainian emigration has occurred in several waves, beginning in the 1890s with the economically caused movement overseas and ending with the post-World War II displaced persons, whose motivation was primarily political. Ukrainians in the diaspora are undergoing a gradual but inevitable assimilation to the host countries, and this process has advanced quite far among various generational and occupational groups. The retention of a national identity by Ukrainian emigrants and their descendants is strengthened by their conviction that conditions in Ukraine are abnormal and that their brethren there are suffering from oppression. This conviction places Ukrainians in the diaspora under a moral obligation and endows them with a feeling of historical mission: to work for the liberation of the homeland. To some extent, this commitment gives the entire Ukrainian diaspora the colouring of a political emigration, independently of the time and circumstances of each individual’s or his forefathers’ departure from Ukraine.

It is well known that exile communities tend to perpetuate in a fossilized form attitudes and modes of thought which, because of changed conditions, have lapsed in the country of origin. Thus every political current, from the monarchist to the communist, which has been active in Ukraine over the past two or three generations still has its spokesmen within the Ukrainian diaspora. The politically most articulate segment are the post-World War II émigrés. Besides maintaining their own institutions and organizations (including a “government-in-exile,” with headquarters in Munich, which claims to be the continuation of the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic of the years 1917–21), they have also largely taken over the leadership of the older community organizations in the United States and Canada. This preponderance of the “new” emigration contributes to keeping the bulk of the Ukrainian diaspora militantly anti-communist, save for small “progressive” (pro-Soviet) groups among the old-time settlers in North America.

The Ukrainian diaspora lacks the numerical and financial strength to influence the policies of Western governments as a pressure group. Moreover, its political effectiveness is handicapped by the legacy of integral nationalism. The OUN factions continue to play a leading role in the life of the Ukrainian emigration. Although they have become more moderate over the years, their ingrained totalitarian mentality alienates them from the political climate of the Western democracies, as well as from the libertarian trends in contemporary Soviet Ukraine. This has also been the cause of their repeated political blundering: misunderstanding the defensive nature of the American containment policy; investing false hopes in the so-called liberation program during the Eisenhower-Dulles era; relying on right-wing extremist groups in the United States and West Germany; collaborating with Chinese nationalists in Taiwan; and mis-
reading the character and goals of the current dissident movement in the Ukrainian SSR. The democratic groups of the diaspora have failed to establish a credible alternative policy of their own. As for the mass of ordinary Ukrainian emigrants, they are preoccupied with everyday cares, and for sentimental reasons often tend to trust those leaders who prove their ‘superpatriotism’ by energetically waving the blue-and-yellow flag.

The above critical remarks do not mean that the Ukrainian diaspora ought to be written off as a political factor. On the contrary, it exercises an important function whose center of gravity, however, lies in a different sphere from the sterile and narcissistic posturing of the émigré politicians and professional community leaders. The significance of the diaspora is attested by the extreme vigilance with which the Soviet authorities watch everything that goes on among Ukrainians abroad.

The true function of the diaspora consists in the auxiliary but essential contribution which it is making to the evolution of the Ukrainian people in Ukraine. The very fact that free Ukrainian political thought and cultural life exist on foreign soil has had an invigorating effect on the intellectual climate in the Ukrainian SSR. The contemporary diaspora has not produced great individual political thinkers of the stature of Drahomanov or Lypynsky, but Ukrainian exiles are bringing out several respectable journals of opinion and literary magazines. Ukrainian scholarly organizations, institutions, and literary groups are active in Western Europe and North America. Emigré writers, artists, and scholars, among whom are men and women of distinction, have produced works which will retain a permanent place in Ukrainian cultural history. Because they are able freely to treat subjects and use approaches prohibited in the USSR, their productions complement and stimulate Soviet Ukrainian cultural processes, which have been forced into a Procrustean bed. Access to the works of the diaspora is, of course, extremely limited in Ukraine, but through various channels relevant, even if fragmentary, information is reaching interested circles. Members of the Soviet Ukrainian creative intelligentsia have eagerly availed themselves of every opportunity to establish relations with their compatriot colleagues abroad. To anyone who has taken part in such exchanges one thing is particularly striking: their almost overflowing emotional warmth, which strangely contrasts with official Soviet deprecation of the ‘bourgeois-nationalist rabble.’ It is not rare to hear Soviet Ukrainian intellectuals express privately their respect and admiration for the very same émigré figures on whom the Soviet press heaps such scurrilous abuse. Circumstantial evidence suggests that the positive achievements of the emigration have been used by influential members of the intellectual community in the Ukrainian SSR as a lever in pressing for cultural concessions. All the points touched
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upon in this paragraph pertain to the cultural sphere, but their cumulative political effect should be regarded as self-evident. Only a slight relaxation of conditions would be needed to begin an overt political dialogue between democratic intellectual elements of the emigration and the reformist stratum of the party and non-party Soviet Ukrainian intelligentsia. Such a possibility is alarming in the highest degree not only to the Soviet establishment, but to the émigré die-hards as well.

One has, of course, to keep in mind that there are probably several million Soviet Ukrainian citizens who have relatives abroad. With the easing of correspondence and travel restrictions in the past decade, countless divided families have re-established direct contacts. Every year thousands of Ukrainians visit their relatives in the "old country." In a society which for many years has been hermetically isolated from the outside world, such contacts cannot but act as a tonic. The Ukrainian people under Soviet rule are reassured by the awareness that their kinsmen in foreign lands think of them and wish to help them.

Last but not least, the role of the diaspora is that of a spiritual link between Ukraine and the outside world. The Soviet regime's intention is to minimize individual and institutional communications between Ukrainian scientists, scholars, and other cultural workers with their counterparts in Western, democratic nations. Undoubtedly, it would prefer the world to forget the existence of Ukraine. Therefore, the responsibility for keeping the world informed about conditions in the Ukrainian SSR and the Ukrainian problem in general is incumbent on scholars of the diaspora. Theirs is an arduous task in view of the fact that, especially in English-speaking countries, knowledge of things Ukrainian has been, and largely still is, sorely inadequate. The difficulty is that the Western scholarly community's understanding of eastern Slavdom is dominated by a centralist viewpoint derived from the intellectual traditions of imperial Russia.

Conditions have, however, improved somewhat in this respect over the past twenty years. It is possible to point to a number of solid recent works in English dealing with Ukraine, and it is no longer unusual to find Ukrainian topics treated in scholarly journals and at professional meetings. This change is due to the general growth of Slavic and East European studies and to the labours of scholars of Ukrainian descent, particularly those employed in American and Canadian universities and colleges. What has been accomplished so far is only a modest beginning. Vast stretches of Ukrainian history and culture are still unrepresented by a single monograph in English or any other Western language. But the academic community in the United States and Canada has at least become aware of the existence of Ukraine as a potential field of study. The centralist conceptual framework alluded to above has by no means been
dislodged—such mental constructs are extremely ingrained and resistant to change—but it has become problematic. Information about Ukraine no longer comes exclusively from hostile sources. This may be considered an important positive step.

While these developments in the intellectual sphere have no impact on the current policies of the Western powers, their probable long-range political significance cannot be overlooked. To state the matter briefly: the scholarly and other cultural endeavours of the Ukrainian diaspora are an essential dimension of the Ukrainian people’s struggle for a better life and complete nationhood.

Conclusions and Forecasts
Historians are justifiably wary of making predictions. But inasmuch as “futurology” has lately achieved academic respectability, I will venture to advance some forecasts about the direction which Ukrainian political thought is likely to take. This obviously can be no more than an extrapolation from past experiences, and the conclusions must remain tentative.

1. As a result of the territorial consolidation of Ukrainian lands within one body politic, future currents of ideas and political movements will be less sectional than in the past. This does not preclude the possibility that certain areas with pronounced geographical and historical traits (for instance, Transcarpathia) will retain a regional identity. But regionalism will play only a subordinate role within the framework of a unified Ukrainian nation.

2. In the past the Ukrainians were overwhelmingly a peasant people, and this fact was reflected in their ideologies. Populism, the dominant trend of the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, was peasant-oriented. The conservative trend also had an agrarian coloration. The social structure of Ukraine has, however, undergone a profound transformation during the past half-century. At present, about one-half of the Ukrainian people are already urban, and the rate of urbanization is bound to increase. Despite the communist regime’s conscious policy since the 1930s of Russifying the cities, a Ukrainian industrial working class and an urban technical intelligentsia have come into existence. The latter group fulfills a function analogous to that of the middle class in Western societies. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that Ukrainian social thought and political programs of the future will be less determined by peasant concerns than in the past. Yet it is likely that a marked “village background” will remain a characteristic feature of Ukrainian life and thought for a long time to come. This diagnosis is suggested not only by the fact that the urbanization of Ukrainian society is comparatively less advanced than in Western countries, but also by the circum-
stance that Ukrainian city dwellers retain an awareness of their recent vil-
lage origins and have many family and emotional ties with the coun-
tryside.

3. The image of intellectual uniformity which Soviet Ukraine, together
with all of the USSR, offers to the world should be considered a superfi-
cial and necessarily transitory phenomenon. The varieties of thought and
opinion have not been eliminated, only forcibly silenced. They still lurk
beneath the surface, not only as survivals of the past, but as living intel-
lectual forces, generated anew by the dialectical nature of society and hu-
man thought. According to official Soviet doctrine, there is no place for
ideological diversity in a "socialist" society, where antagonistic classes
allegedly no longer exist. But this claim is belied by the tremendous ex-
trentions of indoctrination, propaganda, and outright repression which the
regime must constantly apply to maintain the appearance of ideological
uniformity. Any lifting, or even partial weakening, of restraints is bound
to lead in a short time to a resurgence of ideological and political
pluralism.

4. The four main trends of modern Ukrainian political thought are still
alive, if only in latent form. This assumption is based on the experiences
of the World War II era and on a study of contemporary intellectual fer-
ment in the Ukrainian SSR. Given the opportunity, the traditional trends
would surface again, although certainly in a new, changed form. It is im-
possible to assess their future relative strength, or to predict which of
them will become a leading force. The resolution of this question will
depend not only on internal Ukrainian factors, but also on the prevailing
political climate in Eastern Europe as a whole. The two most likely alter-
natives, however, are either an evolution on national-communist lines
(i.e., the endowing of the fictitious statehood of the Ukrainian SSR with
real substance), or, in the event of a revolutionary upheaval, a turn to-
ward democracy (i.e., a revival of the traditions of the Ukrainian
People's Republic).

5. Perhaps the most portentous issue in the future evolution of Ukrain-
ian thought will be the problem of a synthesis of antagonistic political-
ideological trends. The absence of such a synthesis was a major cause of
the failure of the independent Ukrainian state in 1917–21. In view of the
country's precarious geographical location, its political survival will
depend on Ukrainians' ability to resolve their internal differences ami-
cably and to maintain a reasonable degree of solidarity against foreign
threats and pressures. Civil wars are a luxury that Ukraine can ill afford.
But what could be the meaning of such an envisaged synthesis? It cer-
tainly does not imply the reduction of antagonistic trends to a single
unitary formula. It should rather be conceived as a process of mutual ad-
justment. The trends, which in the past were simply juxtaposed, would
have to learn the art of constructive interaction. Before this could take place in the practical political sphere, and finally be institutionalized, it would have to occur first on the intellectual plane. A step in this direction would be the cultivation of an inclusive vision of history, embracing all the facets of the nation’s past, even those which in their own time were irreconcilably opposed to each other. What is needed is a type of mentality which makes it possible to find in London monuments to both Charles I and Oliver Cromwell. Such an attitude precludes neither a critique of personalities, groups, and ideas nor the taking of a definite stand on controversial current issues. But it requires a spirit of catholicity which views all the nation’s past and present spiritual and material achievements as a common inheritance, and not the exclusive property of any faction. Obversely, it also implies the willingness to accept a share of moral responsibility for one’s nation’s mistakes and follies, even if they were perpetrated by specific groups or individuals.
The Epoch of the Nobility (to the 1840s)
The beginning of the national renaissance of Ukraine is usually dated from the publication of the travestied *Aeneid* by Kotliarevsky in 1798. Although the *Aeneid* was undoubtedly epoch-making in the history of Ukrainian literature, from the viewpoint of the development of national consciousness it is rather an echo of the previous Cossack epoch. The entire literary and cultural movement up to the appearance of Shevchenko and the Cyrillo-Methodian Society in the 1840s was a sort of prolonged epilogue to the Cossack era.

In eastern Ukraine, in the former territory of the Hetmanate (provinces of Chernihiv and Poltava) and of Slobodian Ukraine (province of Kharkiv), the nobility of Cossack origin continued to be the leading class of society through the first half of the nineteenth century. Foreign travelers (such as Kohl, a German, in 1841) noted that the Ukrainian nobles were dissatisfied with the existing order and antipathetic toward the Moscovites. However, this discontent found almost no expression in practical politics, except for such episodes as the secret diplomatic mission of Vasyl Kapnist to Prussia in 1791, certain hopes raised by Napoleon's invasion in 1812, and the participation of Ukrainians in the Decembrist uprising of 1825. A counterpart to these manifestations of active opposition were the occasional attempts (during the Napoleonic War and again during the Polish revolt of 1830–31) to win at least a partial restoration of the old Cossack autonomy through a demonstration of loyalty to the throne and the Empire.

Ukrainian consciousness was expressed much more strongly in the

*Only problems connected with the part of Ukraine formerly under Russian rule are treated in this article.*
form of an apolitical, cultural “provincialism,” i.e., an attachment to the historical and ethnic particularities of the homeland, but with a passive acceptance of the political and social status quo. This nostalgia for the glorious Cossack past, lost beyond recall, served as the basis for a vigorous movement of historical and antiquarian dilettantism. A practical aim was also present here: that of vindicating by historical documents the rights of the nobles which Russian law had long denied to the descendants of the lower ranks of the Cossack officers’ stratum, the starshyna. This last is enough to make it clear that local patriotism, so understood, was in no way contradictory to loyalty to the dynasty and the Russian Empire. It is worthy of mention that, in spite of the notorious severity of the absolutist-bureaucratic regime of Nicholas I, the Ukrainian literary movement as such was at first not persecuted, because the government regarded it as harmless, although at the same time the work of administrative levelling of characteristic Ukrainian traits was continued (abolition of Ukrainian civil law as embodied in the so-called Lithuanian Statute, suppression of the Uniate Church in Right-Bank Ukraine, etc.).

During this epoch we find the beginnings of scholarly research into the various fields of Ukrainian studies, particularly that of historiography. The central point of interest of the historiography of the Ukrainian nobles was the military and diplomatic history of the Hetmanate in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. This historiography had a much more outspoken sense of Ukrainian state loyalty than did the “populist” historiography of the next generation. But the logic of this conception, which identified the nation with the former political organization of the Cossack class, led to the conviction that the nation must have been extinguished by the demise of the state. The aristocratic authors of the first third of the nineteenth century felt themselves to be epigones who wished to preserve from oblivion the remnants of a Ukraine which no longer existed in reality. In these circles the conviction was widespread that even the Ukrainian language was dying out. In truth this feeling of decadence reflected the situation of the Ukrainian nobility, which was weakened politically by the absolutism of Nicholas, economically by the crisis of serfdom, and morally by its alienation from the people, and was ready to leave the historical stage as an independent force.

The chief importance of the aristocratic period in the formation of Ukrainian consciousness lies in the fact that it preserved the continuity of development between Cossack and modern Ukraine. There were also noteworthy original achievements during this period which were not destroyed by the decadence of the nobility and entered into the permanent Ukrainian heritage. We have just mentioned the beginnings of scholarly research into Ukrainian studies. The conception of Ukrainian history elaborated by the aristocratic authors of the first third of the nineteenth
century had a profound influence on later generations of scholars and on public opinion. The beginnings of a new Ukrainian literature proved even more fruitful. This new literature used the language of the people, unlike Ukrainian literature of previous epochs, which, up to the second half of the eighteenth century (i.e., until the abolition of the Cossack state), preserved Old Church Slavonic as its linguistic base. This new Ukrainian literature, fertilized by the general trend of European pre-Romantic and Romantic poetry toward the "popular" and local colour, at first made no claims to be a national literature or to compete with Russian literature, to the flowering of which many native Ukrainians contributed. The Ukrainian writers of that period were bilingual; they wrote in Ukrainian when addressing the narrower local circle of connoisseurs and in Russian when they wanted the wider audience of the entire educated public of the Empire. Here the linguistic line of division in no way coincided with any division in political ideas. In Ukrainian-language works we often find complete loyalty to the tsar and the Empire. On the other hand, the work which expressed most radically the anti-Russian national opposition, and which had an enormous influence on the development of national consciousness in the first half of the nineteenth century—Istorìia Rusov (History of the Rus' People)—was written in Russian around 1800. Sociologically the Ukrainian literature of the aristocratic epoch was clearly a regional Heimatkunst. Nonetheless, the generation which began with Kotliarevsky produced a number of worthwhile artistic works. Particularly important was the achievement of legitimizing the vernacular in literature, thus forming a sort of "investment capital" which later Ukrainian national literature could draw upon.

No less important for the future were the efforts to create a synthesis between Ukrainian patriotic feelings and modern Western political ideas. The great importance of Istorìia Rusov lies in the fact that here, for the first time, the traditional defence of the rights and liberties of the Cossacks was fused with European liberalism of the Age of Enlightenment. A similar phenomenon in the next generation was the birth of a program of democratic, federalistic Pan-Slavism developed by the young conspirator-officers in the Society of United Slavs—a particularly Ukrainian brand of the Decembrist movement. However, the Ukrainian Decembrists fell under the direction of Russian revolutionary "Jacobins," men such as Pestel, and perished without having brought any permanent gain to their homeland. This was a portent of the future. Throughout the nineteenth century, the bleeding of Ukraine by the Russification of its elite continued, not only on the "right" by service in the imperial bureaucracy, but also on the "left" by participation in the all-Russian revolutionary movements.

So far we have spoken chiefly of Left-Bank Ukraine. However,
analogue, if less clear-cut, processes were also visible on the Right Bank among the Polish or Polonized nobility. The so-called Ukrainian School in Polish literature corresponded to that of Gogol and other writers of Ukrainian origin in Russia, with exactly the same Romantic enthusiasm for the beauties of the Ukrainian land and the life of its people. Here also there were beginnings of literature in the popular language. The political ideology of this circle was the idealization of the old Polish Commonwealth as an alleged fraternal union of three nations: Poland, Lithuania, and Rus'-Ukraine. But the revolutions, in 1830 and 1863, of the Polish nobility, in the name of the restoration of pre-partition Poland, ran into a wall of resistance and hostility among the Ukrainian peasantry of the Right Bank. The myth of Vernyhora created by the Ukrainian School—“a fantastic, completely artificial Ukrainian peasant who aspires to serve aristocratic Poland”—was in too great contradiction to the true history of Ukrainian-Polish relations to be a social reality. Nonetheless, in a subtle way difficult to identify, the Polish heritage (or more exactly, the heritage of the nobles of Polish civilization living in the western half of the Ukrainian territory) contributed to the crystallization of modern Ukrainian national consciousness, making the movement more political and strengthening the anti-Russian position.

This can be illustrated by the following examples. Before the appearance of Shevchenko, when the new vernacular Ukrainian literature created by Left-Bank writers was politically rather harmless, it was a Polish-Ukrainian poet, Tymko Padura, who dared to glorify Hetman Mazepa as a great champion of liberty. “Mazepism” had always been, in Russian eyes, the very embodiment of Ukrainian separatism. Another Ukrainian Pole—or should we rather say a “Polish Ukrainian”?—Franciszek Duchimiński (“de Kiow,” as he signed his French pamphlets), made an important contribution to the formation of modern Ukrainian political thought. Duchimiński, an advisor to Prince Adam Czartoryski, the “uncrowned king of the Polish emigration,” formulated the theory that the Great Russians or Muscovites, their language notwithstanding, were not real Slavs, but only superficially Slavicized “Turians.” The Ukrainians, on the other hand, were genuine Slavs and hence, according to Duchimiński, closely related to the Poles. The latter thesis failed to impress Ukrainians, but the former did. Duchimiński was not a sound scholar, and his fantastic exaggerations compromised his theory, which nevertheless contained an element of objective truth. The differences in mental attitudes and in social and cultural traditions between Great Russians and Ukrainians are certainly more profound than the variation of the two East Slavic languages would indicate.

A look at a nineteenth-century political map of Europe shows that, but
for the Austrian section, all Ukrainian lands were united in the Russian Empire. But this is not the full story. On the Right Bank there was a dominant Polish class. Actually, these noble families were often of Ukrainian descent, having become Polonized through conversion to Roman Catholicism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Polish public opinion was unanimous in claiming not only ethnically Polish territories, but also all provinces of the historical Polish state in its pre-partition frontiers. Even the Russian authorities, at least before 1830, tacitly recognized Right-Bank Ukraine (and similarly, Belorussia and Lithuania) as a Polish sphere of influence. After the defeat of the 1830 insurrection, the tsarist government proceeded to remove the most glaring symbols of Polish ascendancy in the area—e.g., the Kremianets Lyceum, the chief educational center for sons of the Polish gentry in Ukraine, was closed down. But its conservative social outlook and devotion to serf-owning interests made it impossible for the regime of Nicholas I to attack the roots of Polish power on the Right Bank.

Thus, for most of the nineteenth century, Ukraine remained a battlefield where Russian and Polish forces clashed. Neither side was ready to give Ukraine a position of equality. Russians and Poles fully agreed—discounting a few exceptions—in rejecting the Ukrainian claim that Ukraine had the right to a free national development of her own. But, as a matter of fact, the Russo-Polish struggle was a retarding factor in the process of assimilating Ukrainians to either neighbour. It prevented the Ukrainian problem from becoming fully and exclusively an internal concern of Russia. For instance, during the Crimean War, the Polish-Ukrainian adventurer Michał Czajkowski (Sadyk Pasha) organized in Turkey a Cossack legion against Russia. Between the Russian hammer and the Polish anvil, Ukrainian patriots were forced to define their attitude to both their neighbours. This helped to develop an awareness of Ukrainian national identity. The Ukrainian answer to Russian and Polish pressure was formulated theoretically by Mykola Kostomarov, a noted historian and publicist of the ensuing "populist" generation: he defined the Great Russians as pre-eminently despotic, the Poles as aristocratic, and the Ukrainians as a democratic people. Here we see the birth of a Ukrainian "messianism."

The leaders of the Ukrainian movement in the nineteenth century did not separate the cause of their people from that of all of Eastern Europe. They believed that Ukraine had a mission to fulfill. By liberating herself, Ukraine would also help the Russians and Poles throw off the most objectionable traits of their inheritance, and thus secure a better common future for all three peoples. This is the kernel of the federalist idea which, up to 1917, remained the very foundation of Ukrainian political thought.
Populism (1840s to 1880s)
Beginning with the 1840s, the leadership of the Ukrainian movement passed into the hands of a new social group, that of the intelligentsia, composed in part of déclassé nobles, in part of elements risen from the lower classes. This new intelligentsia gravitated toward the universities which had recently been founded on Ukrainian territory, in Kharkiv (1805) and Kiev (1834). The first political organization of the intelligentsia, the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, was founded in 1845.

The standard-bearer of this new epoch was Shevchenko, the poet of genius who, born a serf, was an artist by profession. Shevchenko synthesized national pathos and social protest with a deeply religious (though radically undogmatic and unorthodox) yearning for the ethical regeneration of man and society. Shevchenko’s thinking was strongly influenced by the ideas of the previous epoch, such as the conception of Ukrainian history presented in Istoriia Rusov. What was new with him was his revolutionary passion, his implacable condemnation of that modern Babylon, tsarist Russia. He sharply criticized the Ukrainian nobles who, he felt, had dishonoured themselves by their submissiveness to the tsar and by their support of serfdom. Of course it would be wrong to look for a systematic political program from a poet. Nonetheless Shevchenko’s role was not simply that of an influential literary figure; as a great spiritual leader he might better be compared with the Hebrew prophets. His steadfastness under persecution gave Shevchenko the halo of a martyr. In his person the Ukrainian national movement of the nineteenth century achieved for the first time a dimension which surpassed the limits of Little Russian regionalism.

Two consecutive stages of development may be distinguished during the populist epoch, the “Romantic” (the generation of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society) and the “positivist” (the generation of the Stara Hromada [Old Community]). The first stage was characterized by the idealization of the Cossack order (not only nationally, but also socially, as a retrospective utopia of equality and brotherhood), by religious enthusiasm slightly tinged with the spirit of reform, and by a tendency toward democratic-federalist Pan-Slavism. The literary expression of this generation is depicted in the poems of the young Shevchenko and in the programmatic works of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, primarily in the Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu (Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People) by Kostomarov. The positivist generation, which emerged in the 1860s and reached maturity in the 1870s, put the strongest accent on the power of critical knowledge. The Cossack epoch was no longer idealized indiscriminately; the egoism and aristocratic prejudices of the starshyna were contrasted with the interests and aims of the common people. Moreover, Slavophilism was gradually replaced by “Europeanism,” i.e., by
an orientation toward the democratic and radical currents of the West of that time.

It must be pointed out that fundamentally the populist epoch placed its emphasis on the "people," which was equated with the peasantry. From this comes the very designation of populism (narodnytstvo), which came into current usage in the 1860s. It is no accident that the favourite field of scholarly study of the time was ethnography, which also influenced the historiography of the period. The historians of the populist school, from Kostomarov to Lazarevsky and Antonovych, interpreted the past of Ukraine as a series of elemental popular movements for social freedom and especially for the free possession of the soil. The retrospective national consciousness of the aristocratic period, facing backward to the former Cossack statehood, had been helpless against the reality created by the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian Empire. Now the center of gravity was shifted to a living object of great promise—the people. The populist intelligentsia felt the call to contribute to the emancipation of the people, who had only been freed from serfdom in 1861, and to the raising of their social and cultural status. This gave a clear direction to the constructive work of the populist intelligentsia, and at the same time provided a solid foundation for the Ukrainian national cause. "Giving precedence to peasant ethnographic interests rather than to political historical ones and placing emphasis on democratic populism rather than aristocratic state consciousness of rights and privileges was at that time the only salvation for the national idea, the only possible exit from an ideological blind alley." In close connection with the apotheosis of the people was the cult of the popular language, "the Word," which was honoured as the most important vessel of the soul of the people. The populists were the first to stress the linguistic and ethnic unity of all areas of Ukrainian settlement. This was the prerequisite for the development first of a cultural and then of a political Pan-Ukrainian consciousness. The first practical step in this direction was the union of representatives from Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine in the Kiev Hromada around 1860; those from the Left Bank had either previously been members of or were successors to the Cyrillo-Methodian Society; those from the Right Bank were the so-called khlopomany (peasant-lovers), who had split away from the Polish nobility and aristocratic intelligentsia.

The failure of the 1830–31 insurrection had spurred a great deal of soul-searching among Polish patriots. Accusing voices were raised calling attention to the aristocratic character of the revolution and the lack of popular support as the chief reasons for the catastrophe. So a new political movement was born among the Poles, one which attempted to win "the people" for the national cause by hoisting the flag of the emancipation of the peasants. The underground activities of this new Polish move-
ment spread also to Ukrainian lands. The conspirators did not let themselves be deterred by the fact that here, in Ukraine, the people whom they tried to approach had no use for Polish patriotism. Even Polish "red democrats," while employing Ukrainian in their proclamations and leaflets, remained devoted to the idea of the historical Polish state. But in time a new group emerged in which there was a shift of emphasis; for them the emancipation of the peasants was no longer merely a tactical means, subordinated to Polish political interests, but an end in itself. Their attitude can be defined as a truly populist one. These khlopomany, in embracing the people's point of view, were obliged to reject the fetish of Polish "historical patriots"—the frontier of 1772. The final break between the khlopomany and Polish society was brought on by the approach of the new Polish insurrection. Polish conspirators had but little hope of success in Ukraine; nevertheless, they decided to rise, if only to demonstrate the claim of Poland to the historical Dnieper frontier. The khlopomany, on the other hand, rejected this planned Polish nationalist action on non-Polish soil as futile and senseless. As the leader of the khlopomany, Volodymyr Antonovych, explained to a Polish friend: "Because we are with the people, and the people are against you, we cannot march with you." Cutting their ties with Polish society, the khlopomany declared that the principle of solidarity with the people entailed also the return to Ukrainian nationality, which their forefathers had betrayed for the lure of the privileges attached to Polish nobility. This was the content of Antonovych's "Confession"—a true profession of faith in Ukrainian populism.

The concentration on the "people" led to a certain weakness and one-sidedness in the populist ideology. Aspects of the Ukrainian cause which did not correspond to the "popular" were neglected. For instance, the medieval Rus' of the princes was largely effaced from the historical horizon; in studies of the Cossack epoch, the efforts of the Hetmans and the starshyna to create a state were deprecated, while even clearly destructive whims of the masses were condoned. Culturally, populism often led to narrow utilitarianism: it was considered less important that literature be of high quality than that it be easily understandable and have a social and educational function. One person who had a fine perception of the weakness of the populist ideology, and who protested against cultural vulgarism and the danger of mob rule, was a former member of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, Panteleimon Kulish, historian, publicist, poet, and translator of Shakespeare. But his criticism remained fruitless, for he was unable to offer a constructive concept to oppose the populist current.

The narrowness of the social base of Ukrainian populism was the cause of its weakness in practical politics. The Ukrainian movement, or
“Ukrainophilism,” as it was called at that time, wished to carry its message to the masses, but in fact its influence was limited to scattered groups here and there, composed almost exclusively of representatives of the intellectual professions: teachers, students, zemstvo officials, etc. The Ukrainophiles, who were a minority even among the educated classes of Ukraine, had a very limited influence on the great social changes that were taking place in the Ukrainian lands at that time. The transition to capitalism did not produce a nationalist Ukrainian bourgeoisie; on the contrary, the development of railroads, industry, and commerce linked Ukraine more closely to the Russian Empire. In this respect there was a retrogression in comparison with previous decades, when the wealthiest and socially leading class in Left-Bank Ukraine—the nobility—still had a certain traditional feeling for Ukraine. But in the second half of the nineteenth century the Russification of Ukraine reached its apogee, particularly in the cities. And yet, it was at this very time that, in the darkness, the seeds of 1917 were being sown.

The weakness of Ukrainophilism was reflected in the modesty of its practical platform:

All the dreams of the Ukrainophiles were limited to the furthering of Little Russian literature and the publication of educational materials in the Little Russian language in order to extend useful knowledge among the people.  

In an article by Kostomarov, published anonymously in Herzen’s Kolokol, and therefore free from tsarist censorship, we find a brilliant apology for the independence of the Ukrainian historical process from Russia and Poland, but the political desiderata are limited to two points: the unhindered development of Ukrainian literature and the use of the Ukrainian language in the elementary schools.

In spite of the modesty of these aims, it was precisely during the populist epoch that the tsarist government began its systematic persecution of the Ukrainian movement. Its first victim was the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, which was suppressed in 1847. The Polish uprising of 1863 was the occasion for further repression, even though all vocal Ukrainians had opposed Polish claims to Right-Bank Ukraine. However, there can be no doubt that, in trying to suppress the Ukrainian movement, the Russian bureaucrats were, in their own way, showing far-sightedness. Behind the actual weakness of the Ukrainian populist movement lay a great potential force which could have been developed almost instantaneously once the movement spread from the intelligentsia to the masses. Even during the few years between the Crimean War (1855) and the Polish uprising (1863), symptoms of the beginning of the penetration of Ukrainian ideas among the masses multiplied. For instance, educa-
tional and other literature in Ukrainian sold to the peasants many times faster than did writings in Russian. The Russian chauvinists, including some Russified Ukrainians, excited by the Polish insurrection of 1863, launched a furious campaign against the phantom of "Ukrainian separatism." These incitements led to the Valuev ukaz of 1863 (named after its author, then minister of the interior), which forbade popular educational and religious publications in Ukrainian. It aimed at creating a wall between the Ukrainophile intelligentsia and the peasants. This and similar measures, although unavailing in the long run, did delay the formation of a modern Ukrainian national consciousness for decades.

During the relatively liberal reign of Alexander II the Ukrainian movement made further progress, and during the 1870s it took on a definitely political hue. A network of conspiratorial communities (hromady) under the leadership of the Kievan (or Old) Hromada covered all the principal cities of Ukraine. The Ukrainian movement created a position for itself in scholarly associations (The South-Western Section of the Imperial Russian Geographical Society) and in the press (the daily Kievskii Telegraf, published, of course, in Russian). The literary, and especially the scholarly, production of those years was important. One might even speak of the beginnings of Ukrainian foreign policy: the regulation of relations with Galicia and the action taken in connection with the Balkan Wars. At the same time contact with the Russian opposition, both revolutionary and liberal, was intensified, and both obtained considerable support in Ukraine. Many of the members of the terrorist Narodnaia volia organization, including its leader, Andrei Zheliabov, were Ukrainians by birth. The Ukrainian zemstvos, particularly those of Chernihiv and Kharkiv, were tinder-boxes for the Russian constitutional movement. In 1879 a secret conference took place in Kiev; the leaders of the Hromada offered their mediation between zemstvo liberals and the terrorist "Executive Committee." The purpose was to create a common front of all forces of opposition to autocracy. The conference failed, but this event shows that in the 1870s there was already a tendency among all democratic groups of "South Russia" to unite on a platform provided by the Ukrainian national movement. This foreshadowed the situation of 1917.

These many-sided and successful activities gave the Ukrainian patriots a feeling of assurance and self-confidence. Leading the effort to make the Ukrainian movement political was Mykhailo Drahomanov, the author of its first systematic political program. Drahomanov envisaged the solution of the Ukrainian problem in the democratization and federalization of Russia and Austria-Hungary, and in an alliance of Ukrainians with the progressive forces of all the peoples of Eastern Europe, the Great Rus-
sians not excluded, but under a guarantee of the organizational independence of the Ukrainian movement.

Deeply disturbed by this development, the Russian government proceeded to an anti-Ukrainian counterattack in 1875–6. In a series of well-planned measures, the legal forms of social and cultural activity were destroyed, the Ukrainian language banned in publications (Ukase of Ems), and the leaders banished. The first Ukrainian reaction was resistance; the Russian opposition was approached more closely, and Drahomanov was sent abroad to create a political center for propaganda in the West. But the Hromada’s hopes that the storm would soon blow over, and that the Russian Empire would be transformed into a constitutional regime, were not fulfilled. On the contrary, Alexander III’s accession to the throne stabilized absolutism and reaction. Under the blows of repression, the morale of the Ukrainian movement collapsed. The exuberant optimism of the 1870s was replaced by depression and passivity. As the slogan of the times, the old one of the “apolitical and purely cultural” character of the Ukrainian movement was again taken up. In the 1860s this had been suited to the immaturity of the movement, but after the great upswing of the 1870s it was unquestionably a retreat. But by this withdrawal the Ukrainophiles at least managed to preserve the continuity of scholarly work in various fields, even if these studies were written in Russian and treated problems innocent of any suspicion of immediacy (cf. the review *Kievskaia starina*). But the national movement became isolated from society at large. For the loyalist and conservative elements, its reputation for political unreliability and democracy made it suspect, while its political colourlessness made it lose control of the radical youth, which fell under the influence of the Russian revolutionaries. As a publicist of the next generation expressed it, “The tactics of the Ukrainophiles were such that they alienated the entire young generation of Ukraine, while at the same time they did not know how to win the sympathies of old Ukraine [i.e., of the nobility].” In the 1880s the Ukrainian movement shrank to a narrow rivulet, but it did succeed, under the cautious leadership of Antonovych, in preserving the kernel of the Kiev Hromada and an embryonic organizational network throughout the land.

From Switzerland Drahomanov continued his brilliant journalistic and propagandistic activities. His efforts gave the Western public their first authentic information about the Ukrainian movement and its persecution in Russia. But Drahomanov’s sharp attacks against absolutism seemed inopportune to the Kiev Hromada, because they aggravated the government and contradicted the Hromada’s policy of appearing politically innocuous. This led to a break between Drahomanov and his Kiev sponsors in the mid-1880s. The little émigré group clustered around Drahomanov
was the seed of the Ukrainian socialist movement, but at that time its direct organizational influence reached only Galicia.

Modernism (from the 1890s to the First World War)
The period of the quarter-century before the First World War does not have a fixed name in Ukrainian historical literature. But there is no doubt that it marks a separate and important step in the development of Ukrainian national consciousness and political thought, clearly distinct from both the previous populist epoch and the following one of the Ukrainian Revolution. To designate this period we shall borrow from the history of literature the term "modernism."

Two factors had an exceptional influence on the Ukrainian cause at that time. The first was the progressive weakening of tsarist absolutism and of the Russian state apparatus; the second was the economic flowering of Russian Ukraine, its rapid industrialization, and the rise in the general standard of living of the population. The undoubted economic progress had a sinister side, however, in the proletarianization of the landless peasants on the one hand and in the mushrooming of speculative capitalism on the other, which sharpened the social contrasts in the country.

The intelligentsia continued to be the principal channel of the Ukrainian movement. But in the 1890s a new generation appeared, one which, in comparison with its populist fathers, was not only numerically stronger, but also, as a result of the general change in the political atmosphere, more courageous and energetic. From this generation arose a galaxy of gifted persons who were later destined to play a leading role in the Ukrainian revolution. Probably the most representative figure of that generation was Mykhailo Hrushevsky, the great scholar and organizer of scientific studies, the outstanding politician and journalist.

In that epoch Dnieper Ukraine saw the beginnings of Ukrainian party differentiations and organizations. The first attempts to organize politically in the new way were made by the Brotherhood of the Disciples of Taras (Shevchenko) (Braterstvo Tarasivtsiv) in 1892. In 1899 the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party (RUP) was founded in Kharkiv; it later adopted a Marxist program and the name Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (USDLP). After 1905 the beginnings of several other parties were visible: liberal (the Radical Democrats), agrarian-socialist (the Socialist Revolutionaries), and nationalist (the Ukrainian People’s Party). These were still in an embryonic state, however, and after the victory of reaction in 1907 they became disorganized and were driven underground. Nevertheless a virtual party differentiation had become a fact. No less remarkable was the debut of the Ukrainian movement in the parliamentary field. In the first and second imperial Dumas there were strong Ukrainian representations which were, however, unable to develop any program of
activity, since both times the Dumas were dissolved soon after election. After the government’s arbitrary alteration of the electoral laws there was no organized Ukrainian group in the third and fourth Dumas, although there were still Ukrainian sympathizers. In any case proof had been given that, with a chance for free expression, the Ukrainian people were ready to give preference to Ukrainian parties and Ukrainian electoral platforms.

The most important achievement of the period was the breaking down of the artificial walls which tsarism had sought to impose between the Ukrainian intelligentsia and the masses. Even after the abolition of serfdom in 1861, Russian law continued to treat the peasants as a separate class without full rights. But with the spread of elementary education, with the increase in trade between the cities and the villages, and with the growth of a class of well-to-do and “capitalistically” minded peasants, the legal sequestration of the peasants became an anachronism. The Revolution of 1905 led to the repeal of at least the crudest forms of discrimination against the peasants. The villages began to awaken to modern political consciousness, and began to support the Ukrainian national idea. Now, the fact that since the days of Shevchenko and the Cyrillic-Methodian Society the Ukrainian movement had had a strong social orientation, one that was in conformity with the gropings of the peasantry, was to bear fruit. Under the new, if very limited, measure of Russian constitutionalism after 1905, the villages and towns of Ukraine were dotted with Prosvita (Enlightenment) reading halls, co-operatives, and various other organizations, all of which served as points of support for the Ukrainian movement. The chief propagators of national awareness among the masses were the members of the special social group of “village intelligentsia,” elementary school teachers, leaders of co-operatives, etc. Most of these people were the offspring of peasants; they remained close to the village communities and, enjoying their confidence, were able to influence popular opinion in a way with which not only the tsarist administration, but also the alien Russian parties were unable to compete. The members of the village intelligentsia themselves owed their national enlightenment to the secret patriotic student groups of the universities, normal schools, and even gymnasiuums. In this way Ukrainian national consciousness spread out from its tiny centres of origin, the hromadas of the second half of the nineteenth century, through the intelligentsia, and out to ever widening circles of the people. A Russian historian has described this process pertinently:

Though everything Ukrainian was forbidden, the social development was creating an increasingly favourable soil for the national movement by the growth of a rural intelligentsia and a “semi-intelligentsia.” These groups were almost entirely Ukrainian in
their consciousness, and when the revolution of 1905 came the
movement was in their hands... After 1907, and especially dur-
ing the war, the national movement again became the object of per-
secution and suppression. But by that time it was irrepressible.
When the pressure of tsarism was lifted it became apparent that
practically all the democratic intelligentsia and "semi-
intelligentsia" of south-western Russia was conscious of itself as
Ukrainian, that the peasants were on the verge of becoming con-
scious of the same, and that the Ukraine was going to be an inde-
pendent nation.7

The national idea also reached, though more slowly, the other classes of
society. Before 1914 there were already small bridgeheads of "conscious
Ukrainians," i.e., of active Ukrainian patriots, among the workers,
bourgeoisie, and the landowners. Even where the feeling of Ukrainian
national individuality had not yet clearly evolved, there was a strengthen-
ing of "regional consciousness." For instance, the bourgeoisie of
Ukraine, though Russified in language and culture, was profoundly dis-
satisfied with the economic centralism of the tsarist government, which
favoured the Great Russian provinces. An awareness spread of the con-
lict between the economic interests of the Ukrainian south and the Great
Russian north. Similarly, among the workers a tendency to form regional
"South Russian" unions became apparent. There is no doubt that in the
course of natural development these tendencies would have turned,
sooner or later, into a consciously Ukrainian ideology. But the Revolu-
tion precipitated the outcome of this drift, preventing the normal gradual
growth to maturity.

In the course of the quarter-century before the First World War the
character of Ukrainian literature changed. With the appearance of such
writers as Kotsiubynsky, Lesia Ukrainka, Vynnychenko, and others,
Ukrainian literature could no longer be regarded as purely "popular"; it
had begun to fulfill the sociological requirements of a national literature,
i.e., one able to satisfy the many-sided spiritual interests of a diverse
modern society.

In that same period, the foundations were laid for scholarly and techni-
cal terminologies in Ukrainian. Up to the end of the nineteenth century,
Ukrainian literature had been limited, with few exceptions, to poetry and
fiction, with subjects taken from country life. Even conscious patriots
wrote most of their scholarly and political works in Russian. It was only
now that the Ukrainian language became an instrument of scholarship,
journalism, and politics.

It is no wonder that about 1905 the idea of the complete class structure
of Ukrainian society was formulated. Viacheslav Lypynsky appealed to
the Polonized nobility of the Right Bank to return to the Ukrainian nation. At first glance this seems like a simple continuation of the *khlopomany* movement of the 1860s, which had desired the return of the nobility to the people as a radical break from the interests and traditions of the class to which they belonged. But Lypynsky’s position was different. Although he certainly did not dream of preserving the anachronistic class privileges of the aristocracy, he did believe that if the nobles were to place their experience and their cultural and political potentialities at the service of the Ukrainian cause, they would thereby obtain the moral right to be reintegrated into the new national elite of renascent Ukraine. The essential value of this concept transcends its immediate occasion. In seeking the national reorientation of the Polonized or Russified Ukrainian nobility, Lypynsky basically asserted that Ukraine should be composed of all the classes and social groups which every modern nation possesses. This was a true revolution against the political philosophy of the populists, who saw the essence of Ukraine in its plebs.

The progress of national consciousness was reflected in the development of Ukrainian historiography and historical evaluation. With Hrushesvsky and his school, a true turning point was reached in this field.

The aspect of Hrushesvsky’s writings which had the greatest ideological significance was his vindication of the continuity of Ukrainian national development from Kievan Rus’ through the Galician-Volhynian Kingdom, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the Cossack state to modern Ukraine. The medieval Kievan state, which had been neglected by Ukrainian historians of the populist school and annexed by Russian historiography, was once again integrated into Ukrainian tradition. Since the period of old Rus’ had been the epoch of Kiev’s imperial glory and the climax of its importance in Eastern Europe, this enhanced the Ukrainian feeling of national self-esteem.

The second historian to introduce a new viewpoint was Lypynsky, whom we have already mentioned. His studies of the Khmelnytsky period completely revolutionized the habitual conceptions of the Cossack age. Lypynsky demonstrated that the Khmelnytsky Revolution was not only a peasant and Cossack uprising, but also a political movement of the upper strata of Ukrainian society. It was precisely the aristocratic elements, the nobles and *starshyna* who had been treated with suspicion by the populist historians, who had, according to Lypynsky, provided the leadership in the revolution and in the creation of the Cossack state, and who were responsible for the bold and constructive plans and acts of the Khmelnytsky era. Lypynsky introduced into Ukrainian historiography the problems of power, leadership, and the elite.

The growth of national consciousness found its natural culmination in the formulation of the idea of an independent Ukrainian state. By the
turn of the century, in 1900, a pamphlet by Mykola Mikhnovsky appeared under the self-descriptive title, *Samostiina Ukraina*. The pamphlet ended with the slogan, "A single, united, free and independent Ukraine from the Carpathians to the Caucasus." But until 1917 the idea of separatism did not find general acceptance. For one thing, the arguments adduced by Mikhnovsky in support of Ukrainian statehood were not ones to impress his contemporaries very deeply. Mikhnovsky, a lawyer by profession, utilized as his chief premise the legal argument of the inalienable political rights of Ukraine in relation to Russia, as fixed in the Treaty of Pereiaslav (1654); as a practical program Mikhnovsky proposed a struggle for the revalidation of the "Constitution of Pereiaslav." But too long a time had elapsed since the downfall of the Hetmanate for such a policy of legitimism to be practicable. Moreover, Mikhnovsky, unlike Dražomanov and Lypynsky, neither formulated his ideas in ponderous tomes nor gathered a group of disciples about himself. Thus his raising of the separatist banner remained, at least in Russian Ukraine (in Galicia the situation was somewhat different), an isolated act. The general drift of the Ukrainian national movement indicated that the issue of statehood was bound to be raised sooner or later, but no one could foresee that this was to be the case in the comparatively near future. For the time being tsarist Russia, decadent though it was, appeared unchallengeably powerful in comparison with the young Ukrainian forces. For this reason the spokesmen of the Ukrainian cause contented themselves with the traditional call for an autonomous Ukraine in a decentralized and federative Russia. The paramount immediate aim, the struggle against tsarism, necessitated an alliance with the Russian democratic groups. Finally, the highly inflamed class conflicts, very perceptible in that period, delayed the crystallization of the feeling of national solidarity and of a basic community of interests of all Ukrainians, which were necessary prerequisites for the creation of a Ukrainian state.

From the days of Shevchenko and the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, the social element had played a tremendous role in the ideology of the Ukrainian movement, in which protest against social injustice was at least as strong a battle cry as that against national enslavement. In the era of modernism this old social tendency definitely took the shape of a socialist idea. The overwhelming majority of the younger generation was socialist. It is even possible to speak of this as an ideological fashion, which in many cases was never more than a rather superficial and passing youthful enthusiasm. But behind this fashion there were also quite serious, objective factors: the proletarianization of the landless peasants, the development of industry, and the general sharpening of social contrasts. Thus the ground was prepared for the growth of the socialist movement. But the budding Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (USDLP)
did not create an original program corresponding to Ukrainian conditions and clearly differentiating Ukrainian socialism from Russian. There had been very promising beginnings of a specifically Ukrainian school of socialism in the 1870s and 1880s in the pioneer work done by Drahomanov and his friends, Serhii Podolynsky and Mykola Ziber. But the émigré character of this group and the breach between Drahomanov and the Kiev Hromada had the result that this experiment was practically lost. When, in the 1890s, the Ukrainian movement again raised its head in Russia, its socialist wing did not continue Drahomanov’s line but adopted, from Russian sources, the ready-made formulas of international socialism. One of the results of this Russian influence was an insufficient appreciation of the value of political constitutional freedom. Another negative effect was the fact that the Ukrainian socialists did not know how to integrate the socio-economic and national sides of the program. Marxism in general, and the Russian brand in particular, paid very little attention in its doctrine to problems which were of burning importance to Ukrainians as members of a subjugated nation. Of course this does not mean that Ukrainians who were converted to Marxism lost their patriotism. But in their thinking they developed an undigested amalgam of the formulas of a simplified Marxism and a naive, romantic patriotism. On the political scene there appeared the type of revolutionary youth with Marx’s Communist Manifesto in one pocket and Shevchenko’s collected poems, Kobzar, in the other. To be sure, the talented Mykola Porsh, the spiritual leader of the USDLP, tried to adapt Marxism to local conditions, and defended the demand for autonomy from a socialist position. But in general the young generation of socialists, the most dynamic force in the Ukrainian movement, demonstrated a high degree of confusion in their thinking, combined with great emotional excitability. These traits, explicable by the immaturity of the group and their lack of a balanced education and of practical experience, were harmless enough as long as their political task was mainly negative, that of undermining the foundations of tsarism. It was to be hoped that in due course most of these childhood diseases would be outgrown. Nobody could have predicted the tremendous scope of the problems the Ukrainians were to be faced with as a result of the sudden collapse of the Empire in 1917.

The period preceding the First World War was probably the happiest one in all of modern Ukrainian history. This was the time of the rapid and well-rounded growth of the Ukrainian national cause. The obstacles in its path were high enough to serve as a stimulus, but not sufficient to stop progress. Though the destruction of the Cossack state and the Russification of the Cossack aristocracy had reduced Ukraine to the level of a politically amorphous ethnic mass, now, from this mass, the Ukrainian nation was beginning to re-emerge. But the huge dimensions of Ukrainian
In the competition from ceased the decisive factor. Rather of Ukrainian "Russian" the territory, the great size of its population, the complexity of the internal and international questions involved, the stern repressive policy of the Russian government and the despotic character of the Empire, which handicapped any free civic activity—all this made the process of rebirth longer and more difficult than for other peoples of Central and Eastern Europe. When the First World War started, the Ukrainian movement in Russia already presented a factor of real power, but it was still only a "movement." It was not as yet a crystallized nation, as were the Poles, Czechs, or Finns. It was during the Revolution that the modern Ukrainian nation was created.

In Retrospect
The political, and then cultural, Russification of the former class of Cossack starshyna toward the end of the eighteenth century formed a turning point in the development of Ukrainian national consciousness. In an epoch where the people were still represented by their aristocracy, it meant an interruption in the national existence of Ukraine. With it came an alienation between the popular masses and the ruling class, which had ceased to serve the interest of its native land. This alienation of the elite from the masses condemned the former to civic impotence, while depriving the latter of much needed cultural services. Up to 1917 the greatest problem in the realm of Ukrainian consciousness remained that of the competition of two currents within Ukrainian society: one, "Little Russianism," which saw no other path than that of the deepening and securing of the union with Russia, and the other, "conscious Ukrainianism," which clamoured for the maintenance and reactivation of Ukrainian identity. Of course, this was not a free competition on both sides, reflecting the internal reactions of the Ukrainian community alone. The "Little Russian" current was supported by the power of the Empire, while the Ukrainian national current was discouraged and persecuted. In the course of the nineteenth century, between these two extreme positions there was a whole scale of nuances. Even the "Little Russians" preserved a sense of their ethnic difference from the "Muscovites" and a certain attachment to local characteristics and customs; and, on the other hand, the "conscious Ukrainians" did not postulate a radical break with Russia—which in any case seemed beyond the bounds of possibility—and sought rather a compromise between Ukrainian and Pan-Russian interests. The decisive factor was to be the attitude of the new social groups that made their appearance in the nineteenth century (intelligentsia and bourgeoisie) and that of the popular masses, who could not be kept in a state of civic tutelage forever. These new social forces were to decide whether they would confirm or reject the national capitulation of the former Cossack aristocracy.
Notes

2. B. Olkhivsky, Vilnyi narid (Warsaw 1937), 72.
5. K. Mykhalchuk and P. Chubynsky in Trudy etnograficheskoi-statisticheskoi expeditsii v Zapadno-Russkii krai, as quoted by M. Drahomanov in Avstro-ruski spomyny (Lviv 1892), 322.
Hipolit Vladimir Terlecki

Hipolit (religious name, Vladimir) Terlecki¹ (1808–88) merits the historian’s attention because of his contribution to the development of nineteenth-century Ukrainian political thought, and because of the biographical interest of his long and extraordinary life. Nevertheless, he is virtually a forgotten figure, and no monographic study has ever been written about him.

This neglect is to be explained by the fact that Terlecki falls into a marginal area between Polish, Ukrainian, and Russian national histories. By birth he belonged to the Polish nobility of Right-Bank Ukraine; in his mature years he identified himself with the Ukrainian nationality; in his old age, finally, he went over to the Russian side. These changes in national-political orientation were paralleled by religious changes. Terlecki was in turn a Roman Catholic of the Latin rite, an Eastern-rite Catholic (Uniate), and an Orthodox. It is not surprising that scholars of all three Slavic nationalities have been reluctant to claim as their own a figure who did not seem to fit well into any of their respective national histories.

An evaluation of Terlecki’s personality, and of his disturbing spiritual odyssey, will be offered in the concluding part of this paper. It will be based on the preceding discussion of his life, writings, and ideas. At this point, I wish only to propose that Terlecki, in spite of his metamorphoses, ought to be considered as belonging essentially to Ukrainian history, not only because during the prime of his life he professed to be Ukrainian,² but also because his very vacillations are characteristic of the difficulties and pitfalls to be found on the road which nineteenth-century Ukrainian intellectuals had to travel.
Life
Within the scope of this paper it is possible to present no more than an outline of Terlecki’s life. But even this will suffice to show the strange turns of fate and the wealth of experiences which were this man’s lot.

Hipolit Terlecki was born in 1808 in the Starokostiantyniv district of Volhynia province. He belonged to an old Ukrainian noble family which in the sixteenth century had produced Kyrylo Terletsky, the Orthodox bishop of Lutsk, one of the architects of the Union of Brest (1596). The Terleckis, however, like the rest of the Right-Bank nobility, had become Polonized, and Hipolit was baptized a Roman Catholic. Hipolit Terlecki’s parents must have been comparatively poor, because he chose a professional career which would have been considered unsuitable for a rich landowner’s son. He attended the Lycée of Kremianets (Krzemieniec), the celebrated Polish educational institution in Volhynia, and afterwards, from 1825 to 1830, the Faculty of Medicine at the University of Vilnius. The granting of a medical doctorate was prevented by the outbreak of the Polish revolt in November 1830, which spilled over from the Congress Kingdom into Right-Bank Ukraine. Terlecki hastened to join the Volhynian Cavalry Regiment, formed by volunteers from the local nobility. He took part in the campaign in the capacity of a military surgeon, experienced battle, and was at one time captured by the Russians, but succeeded in rejoining his unit. He shared the fate of his regiment: first the retreat to Congress Poland, and afterwards the final defeat and the flight to Galicia, where the insurgents laid down their arms before the Austrians.

He found a new home in Cracow, then a free city under the joint protectorate of the three partitioning powers. Terlecki resumed medical studies at the Jagellonian University, and in 1834 obtained the doctorate. Next year he married the daughter of a professor of classics, Anna Schugt, who enjoyed renown as a poetess. But Hipolit’s dream of family happiness and normal professional life was soon to be shattered. In 1836 his young wife died in childbirth. The same year the Austrian government expelled Polish émigrés from Galicia and Cracow. Leaving his infant son in the care of grandparents, he embarked in Trieste for Marseilles. His destination was France, the haven of Polish exiles.

Terlecki settled in Montpellier. The loss of everything which was dear to him and the sudden transplantation to a foreign country caused him to fall into a deep depression. Until that time he had been religiously indifferent, but now he experienced a conversion, became an ardent Catholic, and began to think of the priesthood. As he wrote in his memoirs, “even then an ineffable feeling attracted me to the Eastern rite.” Terlecki decided to dedicate his life to the idea of the union of the Eastern Christians, especially of the Orthodox Ukrainians, with the Catholic Church.
Before embarking on this great design, however, he wished to validate his medical degree. He enrolled in the Faculty of Medicine at Montpellier, and in 1838 obtained a second, French doctorate. Terlecki also visited Paris, where he was introduced to Prince Adam Czartoryski, the "uncrowned king of the Polish emigration." He made the acquaintance of the French liberal Catholic politician, Count Montalembert, and befriended the poets Adam Mickiewicz and Bohdan Zaleski. Terlecki felt particularly attracted to the latter, because Zaleski was a native of Ukraine and an exponent of the "Ukrainian School" in Polish literature. But these mundane connections did not deter Terlecki from his spiritual vocation. After briefly practicing medicine in France, he left for Rome in 1839. He had just recently turned thirty.

In Rome Hipolit Terlecki joined the Resurrectionists, a recently founded Polish religious order. He embarked on the study of theology, was ordained a priest in 1842, and the next year received the Doctorate of Divinity. The election in 1846 of Pius IX, reputed a liberal, seemed to indicate the beginning of a new era in the Vatican's policy, and Terlecki felt that his hour had come. In 1846 he submitted a memorandum to the Pope on the subject of the union of churches. The paper was read by Pius IX and evoked his interest. Terlecki was granted several private audiences by the Pope. One can only marvel at Terlecki's luck, and also his unusual persuasiveness, which allowed a simple young cleric, without any hierarchical standing, to establish direct communications with the pontiff.

The main points of Terlecki's memorandum were the following: Eastern churches united with Rome should enjoy privileges and honour equal to those of the Latin-rite Catholic Church, and their customs and liturgies should be preserved integrally; Eastern Catholic churches should be permanently represented in the College of Cardinals; all Latin missions among the Orthodox should be discontinued, and missionary work entrusted exclusively to Uniates, members of the same nationalities and the same rites as the respective Orthodox communities. Point four of the memorandum stated that "there should be created a Ruthenian Slavonic [i.e., Ukrainian Catholic] patriarchate, with rights equal to those of the other [Uniate] patriarchal sees"; the Ruthenian patriarch should also be made cardinal. In conclusion, Terlecki asked a personal favour: permission to rejoin his ancestral Slavonic rite, so as to be able better to devote himself to his unionist task. The Pope's reaction to Terlecki's proposals was most encouraging, and he immediately granted his personal request. One result of Terlecki's turning from a Latin into a Uniate priest was the end of his association with the Resurrectionist Order.

On Terlecki's initiative, an Oriental Society for the Union of Churches was founded in Rome. It was to include ecclesiastics and influential lay-
men, and was to serve as a platform for the proposed unionist action. The preparatory meetings took place at the residence of Princess Zinaide Volkonsky, a Russian expatriate and Catholic convert. Princess Volkonsky took a lively interest in Terlecki’s plans and aided him financially in difficult moments. A promoter of the Society was the French missionary Bishop Lucquet, recently returned from India. The Oriental Society was formally constituted on 1 July 1847. Cardinal Fransoni, the prefect of the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith, was elected president, and Terlecki became secretary. An endorsement of the Society, and thus, indirectly, of Terlecki’s work, was to be found in Pius IX’s encyclical, *In supremi Petri apostoli sede*, dated 6 January 1848. This was an appeal to the Orthodox churches to unite with Rome under the authority of the Pope. The encyclical contained a specific reference to the Oriental Society. As could have been expected, the encyclical met with no favourable response among the Orthodox.

Immediately after the founding of the Oriental Society, Terlecki went on a pilgrimage to the Holy Land. The purpose of the journey was to acquaint himself with the condition of the Christian communities in the Near East. It seems that this was the occasion on which he was given the title “apostolic missionary.” After a brief visit to Jerusalem, Terlecki stopped for two months in Istanbul. His guide there was his old comrade-in-arms from the Volhynian Cavalry Regiment, Michał Czajkowski, a prolific author of historical romances on the Ukrainian Cossacks and by that time Prince Czartoryski’s chief political agent in the Ottoman Empire. On his return trip Terlecki took the overland route. In Belgrade he had an interview with Prince Alexander Karadjordjević, the ruler of Serbia.

After his return to Rome, in March 1848, Terlecki found the Oriental Society dormant because of his own absence and the departure of Bishop Lucquet, appointed nuncio to Switzerland. This was the “mad year” when almost the entire continent was swept by revolutionary upheavals. Despite his many grave preoccupations, Pius IX again granted Terlecki several gracious audiences. In the course of one of them Pius IX told Terlecki: “I will appoint for you [Catholics of the Ruthenian Slavonic rite] a cardinal; I will appoint [for you] a separate patriarch.” The Pope enjoined Terlecki to submit a new version of his memorandum. It was printed in a limited number of copies, together with the opinions of four ecclesiastical dignitaries. The whole matter was treated on a strictly confidential basis, and Terlecki himself was able to see only briefly the printed text of his memorandum. A committee of seven cardinals was to review Terlecki’s proposals, and to formulate specific recommendations, by 17 November. But the work of the commission was interrupted by the outbreak of revolutionary disturbances in Rome in November 1848 and
the flight of Pius IX and the Curia from the Eternal City.

Terlecki was instructed by the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith to use this enforced interval for a visit to the Greek Catholic dioceses of the Habsburg Empire, in Galicia and northeastern Hungary, and to report on conditions there. Personally, he wished to see his son in Cracow. But Terlecki was able to reach only Dresden in Saxony; the Austrian frontiers were closed because of revolution and civil war in the country. During his stay in Saxony Terlecki established contacts with some Lusatian Sorb leaders. This acquaintance with the representatives of the smallest Slavic nationality strengthened his Pan-Slavic proclivities. On the outbreak of an overt revolution in Saxony in May 1849, Terlecki was arrested on suspicion of being a foreign revolutionary agent. He spent one month in prison together with Mikhail Bakunin, who had played an active part in the Saxon upheaval. Upon his release, Terlecki was ordered to leave Saxony in twenty-four hours. His mission unfulfilled, he returned to Paris.\textsuperscript{12}

For the next six years, from 1849 to 1855, Terlecki lived in Paris. There he published, in 1849, his programmatic pamphlet, \textit{Słowo Rusinka ku wszej braci szczepu słowiańskiego o rzeczach słowiańskich} (Address of a Ruthenian to All Brethren of the Slavic Race on Things Slavic).\textsuperscript{13} The pamphlet, which appeared anonymously, contains the fullest exposition of Terlecki’s religious and political ideas. With his wonted energy, Abbé Terlecki (to give him his French appellation) soon established relations with many leading ecclesiastical and lay personalities. In 1852, on Mickiewicz’s recommendation, he was granted an audience by Prince Louis Napoleon, the president of the republic. Terlecki’s main efforts during his Paris years were centred on the Oriental Society for the Union of All the Christians of the East, founded on his initiative. Although based on the precedent of the earlier Oriental Society in Rome, it was technically a new organization, constituted on 29 April 1850. The Archbishop of Paris, Sibour, accepted the position of honorary president; the Duke Louis Cadore de Champagny (the son of a foreign minister of Napoleon I, a member of the Chamber of Peers during the July Monarchy, and former treasurer of the Oriental Society in Rome) became president, and Terlecki vice-president. The celebrated Dominican preacher, Lacordaire, in a sermon delivered in Notre Dame cathedral (14 April 1850), called on French Catholics to support the work of the Society with their donations. Also in 1850 the first Eastern Catholic church was inaugurated in Paris, with Terlecki as its rector. The church, named after Sts. Cyril and Methodius, was located at rue Babylone 69. According to a report in the Lusatian Sorb organ, \textit{Jahrbücher für slavische Literatur und Wissenschaft} (Bautzen 1852), “on the iconostasis of the new church one finds the icons of the sainted Slavic apostles, Cyril and Methodius, of St.
Olha and of St. Volodymyr, the prince of Kiev who evangelized Rus'. Every Sunday a liturgy is celebrated in this church in the Slavonic rite, and a sermon is preached in Ruthenian." The Oriental Society attempted to publish a periodical, but only one issue of the Annales de la Société Orientale pour l'Union de tous les chrétiens d'Orient (July 1853) appeared. Under the auspices of the Society, and under Terlecki's direction, an institute was founded in Paris for the education of future missionary priests who would eventually work among Eastern Christians. The pupils lived at the institute while attending classes at the Saint Sulpice seminary as externs; from Terlecki they received instruction in the Church Slavonic language and in the usages of the Eastern church. But the number of pupils never exceeded ten, and only two were finally ordained. Both were young Galician Ukrainians who in 1849 had joined the Polish volunteers fighting against Austria in Hungary, and had gone to France after the defeat of the Hungarian revolution. One of Terlecki's protégés, Iuliiian Kuilovsky, was later to make a distinguished ecclesiastical career: he became Bishop of Stanyslaviv (today Ivano-Frankivsk; 1891–8), and toward the end of his life briefly occupied the see of the Metropolitan of Halych (1899–1900).

Despite his multifarious and apparently successful activities, Terlecki's position in Paris was anything but easy. He met with suspicion and hostility from many quarters. He was charged simultaneously with such contrary things as being a red revolutionary inciting European powers against Russia and a crypto-Orthodox and Russian agent trying to subvert the Catholic church and the Polish nationality. Terlecki's support among the Polish emigration came from the so-called Hôtel Lambert, i.e., the circle of Prince Adam Czartoryski. In 1850 Terlecki was considered for the position of co-editor of a propaganda paper in Ukrainian which two of Czartoryski's collaborators, Michał Czajkowski and Franciszek Duchiński (both natives of Ukraine and strong Ukrainophiles), were planning to start either in Istanbul or on Corfu. But Terlecki felt increasingly disinclined to subordinate his action to Polish political goals. Attacks on Terlecki in the Polish press, published abroad and in Poznania, multiplied, and he had to engage in rebuttals and distasteful polemics. To make his situation even more difficult, he no longer had the full trust and support of Rome. His old protector, Pius IX, chastened by the experiences of 1848–9, lost interest in innovative projects. During Terlecki's repeated visits to Rome, the Pope showed him personal kindness, but there was no more talk of the 1846 and 1848 memoranda. Terlecki's former favour with the Pope must have evoked many jealousies, and his current behaviour created new resentments. A circular letter of the Oriental Society sent under Terlecki's signature to Eastern Catholic bishops contained criticism of the work of Latin missionaries in
the lands of Eastern Christendom. This was an old idea of Terlecki’s, to be found already in his 1846 memorandum. But now the powerful Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith took offence at Terlecki’s undiplomatic frankness. He was reprimanded, and the papal nuncio in Paris was advised by the Congregation to keep a watchful eye on Terlecki and his Oriental Society.\(^{20}\) It appears that by the early 1850s he was looked upon by his superiors as a difficult man and a potential troublemaker. The second Oriental Society, in contrast to the first, was only tolerated by Rome, and never formally approved or granted official status. Thus Terlecki felt that his efforts were obstructed by the Vatican bureaucracy.

In addition to all these worries Terlecki experienced personal grief: the death of his son at the age of eighteen.\(^{21}\) Weary in his soul and disgusted by the futility of an émigré’s existence, he had no wish to remain permanently in Paris. He applied for permission to go to Bulgaria as a missionary, but in view of the unstable political situation in the Balkans caused by the Crimean War, the request was refused by the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith.\(^{22}\) But Terlecki had already conceived an alternative plan: to settle among the Galician Ukrainians, a people of the same nationality and religion as his own. From Paris he had established contacts with some Galician leaders, such as Hryhorii Iakhymovych, the Bishop of Przemyśl (Peremyshl), and had contributed dispatches to the Lviv newspaper Zoria Halytska.\(^{23}\) In 1855 he dissolved his Paris Institute and donated its library, archives, and other moveable possessions to the Narodnyi Dim (Ruthenian National Home) in Lviv.

Terlecki left Western Europe, never to return, in September 1855. His decision was to go to the Ukrainian areas of the Austrian Empire and to enter a monastery there. Before renouncing the world, however, he wished to revisit the Holy Land and neighbouring countries. Terlecki’s second Near Eastern journey lasted about a year and a half, and its itinerary included the following major stations: Malta, Alexandria, Cairo, Jerusalem, Beirut, Damascus, Smyrna, and Istanbul. In Jerusalem Terlecki was called to render medical services to the Turkish pasha, the governor of the city. After three months in Jerusalem, he went to Beirut, where he again remained several months. There he made friends among the Maronites, Syrian Christians whose church was united with Rome, and had an opportunity to assist at the election of the Maronite patriarch. From Beirut Terlecki mailed a long letter (19 May 1856) to the Galician scholar and civic leader, Rev. Iakiv Holovatsky, in which he described some of his travel experiences and expressed his hopes of finding a permanent refuge among Ruthenian compatriots.\(^{24}\) After having reached Istanbul, Terlecki took a boat across the Black Sea and up the Danube to Belgrade. From there he crossed into Austria in the spring of 1857. He is mentioned in a letter from Vienna (26 April 1857) by Ivan Holovatsky to
his brother Iakiv in Lviv: "Father Hipolit Terlecki, a mixture of a Pole and a Ukrainian, arrived here recently in an Orthodox, or rather Greek, garb." 25

Terlecki’s desire to settle in Galicia was frustrated by the veto of the provincial governor, Count Agenor Gołuchowski, an exponent of the interests of the Polish aristocracy and a determined opponent of the Ukrainian national revival. Instead of Galicia, Terlecki went to the Ukrainian area of north-eastern Hungary, the so-called Hungarian Rus’, known today as Carpatho-Ukraine or Transcarpathia. There, in 1857, he entered the Basilian Order, adopting a new religious name, Vladimir. Thus the former Abbé Hipolit Terlecki was transformed into Father Vladimir Terlecki, OSBM (Ordo Sancti Basilii Magni).

We are only imperfectly informed about the circumstances of Terlecki’s life in Austria. He had turned fifty in 1858, but was still physically vigorous and mentally alert as ever. In time he was entrusted with the position of hegumen of the Basilian monastery in Mala Bereznytsia, and later in Krasnyi Brid. But the widely travelled man, who was used to the great capitals of Paris and Rome, must have found the cloistered existence in the Carpathian wilderness confining. In a letter to Iakiv Holovatsky he complained about the lack of news and of an intellectually stimulating environment. 26 Occasionally he contributed to the Lviv newspaper Slovo. Trips to Galicia provided diversions, and became more frequent after 1859, when Gołuchowski was summoned to become a cabinet minister in Vienna.

Vladimir Terlecki’s situation remained precarious. Gołuchowski’s attitude toward him was a token of the hostility of the Polish ruling class in Galicia, in whose eyes Terlecki was a renegade. But he was also mistrusted in the circles of the Greek Catholic clergy, for whom a man of his background and experience remained something of a riddle. There is evidence in contemporary memoirs of a lingering suspicion that Terlecki was in reality a “Conrad Wallenrod,” i.e., a Pole in disguise working covertly to the detriment of the good Ruthenian people. 27 His long hair, flowing beard, and Orthodox-style cassock contrasted with the shaven faces and Latinized clothing of the local Greek Catholic clergy. For Terlecki this was an expression of his adherence to the traditions of Eastern Christianity, but his exotic appearance made him conspicuous and scandalized many. 28 Still, owing to his warm, affectionate personality, he was, as always, able to attract people and form new friendships. He found a devoted friend in Rev. Oleksander Dukhnovych, the Transcarpathian poet, educator, and national “awakener.” Dukhnovych wrote a poem in honour of Terlecki in which he expressed the wish that the old “Ruthenian champion” (ruskyi bohatyr) might find “friendship and peace” in his Carpathian mountain retreat. 29
But peace was not to be Terlecki’s lot. Soon he again found himself in the midst of public controversy in connection with the purist, or ritualist, movement. This was a drive by a group of Greek Catholic clergymen to purify the liturgy and rituals of their Church of all Latin accretions which had gradually crept in since the Union of Brest (1596), and especially since the Synod of Zamość (Zamostia) (1720). For Terlecki this was an old pet idea. Already in his Address of a Ruthenian he had protested against the contamination of the rituals of the Eastern-rite Catholic churches by the usages of the Latin church. Now he raised the issue again. The Ukrainian church historian, Bishop Iuliian Pelesh, a contemporary of the events, names Terlecki as the chief instigator of the ritualist movement of the 1860s. His involvement in this controversy earned Terlecki a new reprimand from the Congregation for the Propagation of the Faith and a warning not to stir up discord between Catholics of the two rites in Galicia. He was advised by his superiors to return to the monastery in Transcarpathia.

There is no reason to doubt that Terlecki sincerely wished to spend the remainder of his days among his compatriots in Austria. But a train of events beyond his control was to give a completely new direction to his life. In 1867 the Austro-Hungarian Compromise transformed Hungary into a self-governing state. The Budapest government and the chauvinistic Magyar ruling class immediately embarked on a policy of repression and Magyarization of the national minorities, and on a hunt after real or imaginary Pan-Slavists. The Transcarpathian Ukrainians were the weakest among the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary and, consequently, were exposed to the greatest pressure. Terlecki was too conspicuous a figure not to attract the attention of the Hungarian administration. In 1871 the Ministry of the Interior in Budapest requested his transfer from the Basilian monastery in Krasnyi Brid to that in Mukachevo, a larger town, where he could be watched more closely. Six months later a denunciation was lodged against Terlecki (we do not know its author) in which he was charged with being a secret agent of Russia. The only basis for the accusation was the fact that he received books from Russia. On the strength of this, Terlecki was arrested. He was kept in prison only briefly, as there was insufficient evidence for a formal indictment, but upon his release he was ordered to leave Hungary immediately. This outrage must have shocked Terlecki profoundly, and it induced him to take a radical step. He sent a letter of protest to the Hungarian interior minister in which he declared his innocence. But as he was being unjustly persecuted, Terlecki stated, he preferred to surrender himself to the justice of his native country, against which he had indeed offended in his youth. Simultaneously he addressed a petition to Emperor Alexander II, put himself at the tsar’s mercy, and asked permission to re-
turn to Russia. The request was granted, and in September 1872 he went to Russia. Upon his arrival in Kiev, still during the same month, he was admitted to the fold of the Russian Orthodox Church.

At that time Terlecki was sixty-four years old. He still had sixteen years to live. The story of the rest of his life can be told briefly. At first he resided in the Mykhailivsky monastery in Kiev and worked as the secretary of the Slavic Benevolent Committee in that city. In 1874 Terlecki went to Italy with a Russian aristocrat, Prince Demidov, and spent five years as a private chaplain at Demidov’s estate near Florence. This must have been a pleasant sinecure for the old man, and we can only wonder with what feelings Terlecki revisited Italy, the scene of his early activities. In 1879 he returned to Kiev. After Prince Demidov’s death, his widow granted Terlecki a pension which secured him financially for the rest of his days. Next Terlecki moved to Zhytomyr, in his native province of Volhynia, where he had a friend and protector in the person of Archbishop Dimitrii. When the latter was transferred to Odessa, Terlecki followed him in 1881. The Russian Orthodox Church had granted Terlecki the rank of archimandrite. He was associated, probably in an honorary capacity, with the Odessa theological seminary, and then lived in that city in retirement. During those last years he wrote his “Zapiski arkhimandrita...” (Reminiscences).34

Father Vladimir Terlecki died in Odessa on 17 January 1888, at the age of eighty.

Works
Terlecki was not a professional writer. Still, his literary and journalistic productions are far from negligible. In presenting a catalogue of Terlecki’s writings, my purpose is to give some indication of the scope of his intellectual interests, and also to provide guidelines for future research.

Only two of Terlecki’s works were accessible to me. These are the programmatic political pamphlet in Polish, The Address of a Ruthenian (1849),35 which will be examined in detail in the next section, and his Russian-language “Reminiscences.”36 They possess considerable value from the historical and literary points of view. The Polish historian Marceli Handelsman stresses their reliability.37 They are written in a simple, straightforward, and yet vigorous manner, without any trace of self-advertisement or special pleading. Their outstanding feature is, perhaps, a tone of emotional detachment. They give the impression of being the work of an old man who has retained a fresh mind and a vivid memory of past events, but who reports the story of his stormy youth and mature manhood from a great distance, as if from another shore.

During his years in Austria Terlecki published several books in Ukrainian: a translation of Thomas à Kempis’s Imitation of Christ;38 a
volume of translations of the poems of Bohdan Zaleski;\textsuperscript{39} a collection of sermons;\textsuperscript{40} and a description of his second journey to Palestine and the Near East.\textsuperscript{41} The last work was planned in three volumes, but only two fascicles of the first volume appeared in print. According to a cryptic note of the bibliographer, Ivan Levytsky, the publication was discontinued because ‘‘the sequel did not suit the taste of the Galician-Ruthenian public.’’\textsuperscript{42} Also the apparently non-controversial translations of the poems of Zaleski were to cause Terlecki unexpected worry. Bohdan Józef Zaleski, a Romantic poet and leading exponent of the ‘‘Ukrainian School’’ in Polish literature, was a friend of Terlecki’s from his Paris days. Terlecki dedicated the volume to the author ‘‘in remembrance of an unshakeable friendship.’’ But Zaleski disowned the translation.\textsuperscript{43} The reason for this rebuff, which must have been painful to Terlecki, was rather peculiar. Zaleski was angered that the book was printed in the Cyrillic script. This was a time when many Polish patriots were convinced that Ukrainian was a peasant dialect of the Polish language. Consequently, they demanded that the Latin-Polish alphabet be used in Ukrainian publications and denounced the Cyrillic alphabet as a device of tsarist Russia.

During the decade from 1861 to 1872 Terlecki published about a dozen articles in the Lviv newspaper \textit{Slovo}.\textsuperscript{44} Some of them were fairly long, as they ran over several issues. Judging by their titles, they dealt with religious and political topics or contained descriptions of Terlecki’s former travels.

After his move to Russia, Terlecki brought out a little book based on his observations in Transcarpathia, entitled \textit{Ugorskaia Rus’ i vozrozhdenie soznania narodnosti mezhdu russkimi v Vengrii} (Hungarian Rus’ and the Rebirth of National Consciousness among the Ruthenians in Hungary, 1874).\textsuperscript{45} To my knowledge, this was the last of Terlecki’s works to appear during his lifetime. The ‘‘Reminiscences’’ were published posthumously. None of Terlecki’s writings has ever been reprinted.

\textbf{Political Thought}

The fullest exposition of Terlecki’s political ideas is to be found in his book-length tract, \textit{The Address of a Ruthenian}. Its ornate style, which smacks of pulpit oratory, contrasts perceptibly with the matter-of-fact, simple narrative of the later ‘‘Reminiscences.’’

Terlecki treated political issues as a churchman. In discussing the history of various Slavic nations, he approached it mainly from the viewpoint of their religious development. Religion was for him the foundation of civil society. According to Terlecki, a sound civic life was possible only if based on the one true religion, Catholicism. His philosophy of
history was providential. God has appointed a specific mission for every nation, and His hand directs all nations toward the fulfillment of their predetermined destinies. When encountering historical occurrences and trends which seemed to diverge from the providential plan, Terlecki consoled himself with the assurance that God’s will is inscrutable.

Terlecki’s basic religious-ecclesiastical orientation, however, did not make him reactionary. “We declare that we are sincere and hearty supporters of every kind of decent civic liberty and equality. We respect the will of the people and we bow before it, because we frequently perceive in it a divine inspiration... but we have never been and are not its idolators; we do not recognize it as infallible, which pertains to God alone’’ (5). Thus the political creed of Terlecki may be fairly defined as Christian-democratic. He paid tribute to Pius IX, who, “inspired by Heaven and understanding the needs of the time, introduces salutary improvements,” and who, “by uniting freedom with faith, lays the cornerstone of a future ordering of society” (3).

The beginning of the Address strangely resembles that of the Communist Manifesto. “A specter is haunting Europe—the specter of Communism,” Marx and Engels proclaimed in 1848. Writing a year later, Terlecki stated that out of the conflagration of the 1848 Revolution has risen “a new element, dormant for many centuries and completely unknown to Western peoples... This is the all-Slavic element, called in Europe Pan-Slavism” (1–2). This phenomenon, Terlecki added, has evoked great apprehension, and is being given diverse and contradictory interpretations. He proposed to expound his own insights and convictions concerning the meaning of the Slavic renascence. He intended to do it in his capacity as a “son of Rus’, not the least among the branches of the Slavic family’’ (2).

Terlecki proceeded by drawing a sketch of the history of the Slavic peoples. This résumé, which forms the largest part of the book, shows that he was well-read and knowledgeable. Usually he did not cite his authorities, but he referred occasionally to Nestor’s chronicle and Karamzin, and also mentioned such leading Slavic scholars as Dobrovský, Šafařík, and Kopitar. Terlecki had both erudition and a comprehensive vision, yet his approach to history was essentially uncritical. He had the capacity to believe what he wanted to believe. Thus, for instance, he assumed that the Illyrians and other ancient peoples of the Balkan peninsula were Slavs. By upholding this theory, long discredited among serious scholars, Terlecki was able to assert that the Gospel had been first preached to the Slavs by St. Paul (because he had stayed in Thessalonica), and that St. Jerome and the Emperor Justinian were Slavs (because of their Illyrian origin). He also accepted as historically true the legend about the visit of the apostle St. Andrew to the future site of Kiev, and
believed that Sts. Cyril and Methodius, the originators of the Slavonic liturgy, were themselves Slavs. Terlecki’s account becomes more accurate and reliable when dealing with more recent history, but the selection and interpretation of facts is always dominated by a strong religious bias.

According to Terlecki, all Slavs had been converted to Christianity in the Catholic faith, although under two rites, the Latin and the Greek Slavonic; Cyril and Methodius were Catholics, and their work was endorsed by the pope. In addition, Rus’ had been Catholic from the beginning, because its conversion occurred before the split between the Latin and Greek churches. But “soon the Greek schism blew its murderous breath on Slavic lands and infected sincere Slavic souls with the poison of hatred against the true church of Christ” (15). It never crossed Terlecki’s mind that the separation of churches might have been caused by deep cultural and social factors, and that responsibility for it might have been divided. For him, the schism was due exclusively to the ambition and pride of the Greek patriarchs. The fall of the Byzantine Empire and the humiliation of the Greek Church by the Turkish infidels was a just retribution of heaven on the perpetrators of the schism. As far as the Russian Orthodox Church was concerned, it had been chastised for breaking away from Catholic unity by enslavement to the state. “The [Russian] church crawls supinely before secular power; it is dominated by the whim of the ruler, or even by the will of his deputy, some general or colonel, who fills the tsar’s place in the Holy Synod” (10). Terlecki addressed the following rhetorical questions to the “separated brethren”:

Look for yourself, dearest brethren, is it not true that Orthodoxy has everywhere fallen into a heavy bondage to secular power, and is not this bondage heaviest in those countries where the government claims to be Orthodox? Because there it has despoiled Mother Church of all possessions, it has sacrilegiously erected itself as head of the church, rules her contemptuously through a colonel of dragoons or hussars, and holds the entire clergy in humiliation and ignorance. Is it not true that Orthodoxy is everywhere an instrument of obscurantism and of material and spiritual despotism? (83)

To put it briefly, Orthodoxy was nothing but “a petrified, corpse-like church, which gives no sign of life save hatred of Catholicism” (18).

So far, Terlecki’s ideas are rather commonplace and do not transcend the limits of typical nineteenth-century Catholic apologetics. He displayed more originality in dealing with the question of the status of Eastern Catholic churches, which was for him a matter of special concern. The Catholic church is one, Terlecki declares, but it consists of several rites, none of which is superior to any other. “We consider that the pope, as pope, belongs no more to the Latin than to any other rite. As the suc-
cessor of St. Peter, he is the universal bishop, and, therefore, the high priest of every rite” (21). The Eastern churches are fully Catholic, but at the same time in full possession of their distinct traditions, which differentiate them from the Latin rite. He appeals to Orthodox Ukrainians with these sincerely felt words:

You adhere with your souls to your rite, which you celebrate in the ancestral language. We, however, who are writing this Address, are of the same rite, and we also celebrate all rituals in the same language and according to the same tradition. We are proud to be attached with our heart to all the customs of our forefathers, beginning with Sts. Cyril, Methodius, Olha, Volodymyr, Antonii Pechersky, and others, who, like ourselves, were Catholics and of the Greek Slavonic Rite. (84–5)

But Terlecki was painfully aware that reality often diverged from this ideal model, and he stated boldly: “We Slavs of the Greek Slavonic rite have many grievances against Rome” (21). He exonerated the papacy from any direct blame: the popes have many times expressed respect for Eastern traditions, and have defended the rights of the Oriental Catholic churches. But the good intentions of the popes have been frustrated by

the tendencies and efforts of a part of the Latin clergy, and sometimes even of the high dignitaries of the Roman church. Having a one-sided view of the church, derived from the perspective of their own rite, and guided by an intemperate and unwise zeal, they have wished and tried to reduce the whole church to the one Latin form, and they have thereby caused her incalculable harm. . . . Thus the Eastern-rite churches have not so far found in Rome sufficient protection and cover against the pressure of the Latin rite. (21–2)

But Terlecki was confident that these errors could be rectified, and he did not hesitate to propose definite measures to that effect. The proposals formulated in the Address are identical to those already to be found in the memoranda to Pius IX of 1846 and 1848: the appointment of cardinals representing all Eastern rites, and the formation within the Roman Curia of a special congregation for the affairs of the Oriental churches. Moreover, the term “Uniates” should no longer be applied to Eastern Catholics. This term was inappropriate, and even offensive, because it implied incomplete catholicity, as if these rites were only externally tacked onto the Catholic church, instead of being her organic parts. “What would people say if England and Germany, after a return from Protestantism to the bosom of the Western church, were to be labelled Uniate? Surely the whole world would consider this nonsense. And yet this very nonsense
has been perpetuated, and is still being perpetuated to this day, against us” (46).

Terlecki discussed in some detail the history of three Slavic nations, Poland, Russia, and Rus’ (Ukraine). He traced the rise of Poland from her medieval beginnings to her position as the leading power of Eastern Europe, attained through the union with Lithuania and Rus’. But the powerful and brilliant Polish Commonwealth of the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries already contained the seeds of its future downfall. The primary cause of decline was Poland’s betrayal of her Slavic vocation. “Constantly drawing close to Western countries, she began to detach herself from the Slavic family” (37). Poland abandoned western Slavic tribes, including her own Silesia, to Germanization, and failed to provide leadership to eastern and southern Slavs in the struggle against the Tatars and Turks.47 Poland’s second failure was the restriction of liberty to the noble class only, while the masses were kept in degrading bondage. In consequence, the freedom of the nobility degenerated into aristocratic license, while the peasants did not even consider themselves Polish nationals. Thirdly, Poland had mishandled the Union of Brest. Ruthenian bishops were not admitted to the Senate, and parish priests were treated with contempt by the landowners. The Jesuits, characterized by an intolerant exclusiveness, had used their influence to seduce the Ruthenian nobility to the Latin rite, in contravention of papal injunctions. “Our rite was condemned to become that of the peasantry, while the Latin one was to be for the gentry” (48). The circumstance that the Ruthenian Catholic Church was deprived in the Polish Commonwealth of an educated, representative social stratum facilitated its later destruction by the Russian schism.

The partitions of Poland were, therefore, a just punishment for her sins. Subsequent insurrections and the factious, convulsive efforts of the Polish exiles only plunged the nation into greater misery. “It must, however, be acknowledged that by her sufferings and groans Poland has awakened national consciousness among the other peoples of the Slavic race, which have been slumbering in a long sleep of indifference. She is the only one among the whole Slavic race to have raised the banner of social progress, under the watchwords of liberty, equality, and fraternity” (41).

Turning to the second great Slavic nation, Terlecki asserted that the Russian state had been formed under the impact of the Tatar overlords in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. “This was the school in which the grand dukes of Moscow learned the arts of autocratic despotism” (61). The history of Russia is that of the rulers rather than of the people. “The entire state is like a dead machine, moved by the tsar’s hand, en-
livened only by his will’” (67). The Russian government, “the most cunning and the most treacherous, flexible yet pitiless, ready to use the most immoral means, stubborn in the pursuit of its goals, has been set by destiny on the course of conquest” (61). Muscovite autocracy has subjugated the Orthodox church and transformed the aristocracy of the boiars into a bureaucracy of chinovniki. Peter, “called the Great,” borrowed from Europe only that which served the consolidation of autocracy and the increase of the power of the state; he gave Russia a deceptive European appearance. “The [Russian] system of administration is thoroughly immoral, it is based on exploitation and theft, and it has fostered spying and bribery on an unheard-of scale” (67). A total suppression of freedom of expression and “a public education capable of training slaves only” (68) are the tsarist government’s favourite devices. Moreover, tsarism “strives to impose on all distinct nationalities the Russian language and nationality. Therefore, the Ruthenians and Poles suffer also in this respect a great oppression” (72). Everything which pertains to the official sphere—in the army, the civil service, and the schools—must be transacted in Russian, and serves the policy of Russification. The languages and customs of the non-Russian nationalities find refuge only in peasant huts and the privacy of family life.48

It is to be noted that Terlecki’s anti-Russian diatribe was directed only against the Russian state and the tsarist regime, not against the Russian people. The latter “possess all the fine traits of the Slavic character” (72). On this important point Terlecki’s interpretation differed radically from the theories of his colleague from the Hôtel Lambert circle, Franciszek Duchiński. According to Duchiński, the Russians, in contradistinction to both Ukrainians and Poles, did not belong at all to the Slavic “race”; in reality, they were linguistically Slavicized “Turaniens” and displayed an altogether non-Slavic national character.49

Terlecki’s low opinion of the Russian Orthodox Church has already been observed. On the other hand, he spoke with noticeable sympathy of the Old Believers, whom he valued as a movement of popular resistance against the corrupt official church, and he hinted that the Old Believers might be susceptible to the attraction of Catholicism.50 The tsarist state, strongly identified with Orthodoxy, was, according to Terlecki, implacably hostile to the Catholic church, but especially to its Eastern rite.

The Russian government has furiously attacked, in the first place, the Greek Slavonic Catholic Church, whose very existence was like a reproach of conscience to the Russian church. The world knows the treacherous and cruel persecutions under which the major part of that church has succumbed... The two persecutions under
Catherine [II] and Nicholas [I] have deprived the Catholic church of some five million faithful. (71)

Therefore, "one can feel only pity for the delusion of many Catholics who hope for a conversion of the emperor and the people of Russia." (72). Short of a miracle, this cannot occur as long as the present political system in Russia persists. It is true that the tsarist government entertains diplomatic relations with Rome, but its purpose is to elicit the Holy See's acquiescence in the facts accomplished perpetrated against the Eastern Catholics. "And we must confess with pain that in all the dealings between the Russian government and Rome, including the latest transaction (if it may be so called) signed by Cardinal Lambruschini and Bliudov, Rome has always been the deceived and duped party, with great harm to the Faith" (71).

The history of the third great Slavic nation, Rus' (Ukraine), was, according to Terlecki, closely interwoven with that of her neighbours, Poland and Russia. But he insisted on the existence of a separate Ruthenian (Ukrainian) national identity. "Rus' was absorbed [in the fourteenth century] into Lithuania, and later into Poland, but she always retained her distinct national characteristics" (55). Terlecki asserted even more emphatically the Ruthenians' distinctiveness from the Russians.

In the first place, we consider it a duty of our conscience to protest against the fraudulent incorporation of Ruthenian nationality, history, and literature into Russian nationality, history, and literature. The Russian government would like to convince everybody, including the Ruthenians themselves, that the latter were always the same as the Russians. Russian writers, prompted by their government or terrorized by censorship and the fear of punishment, try to outdo one another in spreading this opinion. This act of robbery, which the Russian government perpetrates in the field of history and letters, equals those which it commits in stealing territories. We, however, in the name of all of Rus', most solemnly protest against this robbery. Our common people, too, oppose it by the term moskal (Muscovite), which they use to differentiate the Great Russians from themselves. (51–2)

Terlecki considered the medieval Kievan State as appertaining to Ruthenian (Ukrainian) and not to Russian national history. In point of fact, "the land and the population which served as the nucleus of present-day Russia used to belong to the old Ruthenian state. . . . But the spirit and the direction of development [of the two nations] were altogether different" (52). After the Mongol invasions, Rus' merged
with Lithuania and Poland, and the Ruthenian nobility gradually became Polonized.

But the people retained their native traits, and they possessed in Zaporozhian Cossackdom the basis of a social development which conformed with their hearts' aspirations. The Zaporozhian Cossacks were like a military order of Rus’, and they formed a truly Christian and Slavic community. Free and equal, they appointed leaders through elections by all. Toward elected leaders, they were admirably obedient. (56)

Terlecki spoke with enthusiasm of the Cossack struggles with the Crimean Tatars and of their daring naval expeditions against the Ottoman Empire. According to Terlecki, Cossackdom, which “during that era had concentrated in itself the Ruthenian nationality,” was “a seed rich in promise for all Slavs”; it was predestined “to occupy a high position in Europe, because it had already begun to implement Christian principles [of freedom and equality] in life and social relations. It might have attained permanence, and thus it would also have saved Poland” (56). The reasons why these potentialities did not materialize were religious schism and the failure to establish a Ruthenian Catholic patriarchate in Kiev. The imposition of the Latin rite by the Polish Jesuits and the oppression of Ruthenian Cossacks and peasants by the Polish nobility caused a reaction in favour of Orthodoxy. Protracted Cossack-Polish wars ensued, which were the cause of the downfall of both adversaries, from which Russia cleverly drew profit.

A large part of the Cossacks, however, felt such a strong revulsion against the servile Russian element that after the annexation of Ukraine they emigrated to Turkey, and preferred to preserve old liberties under the protection of their [former] greatest enemies than to submit to the yoke prepared for them by the Russian government. Turkey granted them all their ancient liberties, and until 1828 a free Cossackdom continued to exist on the Danube. (57)

A basic tenet of Terlecki’s interpretation of Ukrainian history was his conviction that Eastern Catholicism—combining loyalty to the Church Universal with adherence to the Greek Slavonic rite—had been chosen by Providence as the national religion of the Ruthenian (Ukrainian) people. He believed that “even after the breaking of unity with Rome by Cerularius, Rus’ remained Catholic and for a long time hesitated between Rome and Constantinople” (54). He listed lovingly (not without exaggeration and stretching of historical evidence) all the instances of rapprochement between Rus’ and the Roman Catholic church. In connection
with the Council of Florence (1439) and the Union adopted by it, Terlecki exclaimed rapturously: "Let us rejoice in the sight of the righteousness of our Rus', which at this council, in the person of her worthy representative, [Metropolitan] Isidore, as well as in later times, has always demonstrated her willingness to recognize and to accept [Catholic] truth. God willing, Rus' will become the great intermediary between the Roman church and our separated Slavic brethren. Glory be to thee, eternal glory, oh our Country, we may indeed be proud in calling ourselves thy sons!" (19).

Having completed the survey of Slavic history, Terlecki proceeded to sketch the present condition of the Slavic peoples and to formulate proposals for their future organization. Because there are more than 80 million Slavs, "Nobody can any more deny today the existence of a Slavic movement" (73). Three factors have chiefly contributed to the Slavic revival in recent decades: first, Poland's sufferings and struggle for independence, which have had strong repercussions among other Slavic peoples; second, the labours of Czech scholars, which have awakened interest in Slavic historical and literary studies; and third, the wars of Russia with Turkey and the campaigns of Russian armies south of the Danube, which have kindled the hopes of the Balkan Slavs. So far, however, the Slavic movement has "lacked a focus, a distinct flag under which it could unite" (76). The Slavs are, regrettably, divided by denominational and national differences. "Thus the Slavic movement, although encompassing a vast territory and a huge population, remains disorganized and unco-ordinated" (78). The Russian government has in the past, for its own selfish purposes, encouraged the stirrings among the foreign Slavs. But "Russian Pan-Slavism is in reality tsar-Slavism" (73). The libertarian character of the Slavic movement inevitably alienates it from official Russia. The tsarist government apprehends the danger of a national rebirth of the Slavic peoples under its rule. "This explains why in recent years the Russian government has become indifferent toward Pan-Slavism, why it has prohibited school teachers from spreading this idea, and why it has severely punished its most zealous partisans, the Ruthenians Shevchenko, Kulesha (sic), and others, by condemning them to perpetual hard labour in the mines and to lifelong military service" (77).54

The Slavic peoples possess the feeling of racial kinship, but simultaneously they are aware of their individual national identities. The merger of all Slavs into a single nationality is undesirable, as it could make them a danger to mankind. "In our opinion, the organization of Slavdom could be very much advanced... by its differentiation into six major nationalities, viz., the Polish, the Czecho-Moravian, the Illyrian-Croatian-
Serbian, the Ruthenian, the Bulgarian, and the Russian. Into them should be incorporated all the minor subdivisions” (80). These six leading Slavic nations should unite in a broader federation.

We postulate, therefore, a federal union of the entire Slavic race. The striving toward such a union is in evidence even now. This will be a great Slavic union, in the spirit of God, and with free development of the particular nationalities. . . . Every Slavic nation will organize according to its own needs and will possess a separate government. These will be fused in a central government which will provide unity and direction to the whole. (93)

The institutions of the future Slavic federation would be democratic. Terlecki believed that the Slavs’ innate “inclination toward democracy became manifest whenever they succeeded in throwing off the [foreign] yoke” (74). “The Slavic spirit calls for an elective authority” (93). Terlecki did not advance any specific recommendations for the ordering of the future Slavic commonwealth. He stressed, however, that Slavic democracy would differ from that of the Western countries by the absence of materialistic greed, selfish interests, and political factionalism. Elections will be prepared for not by partisan agitation but by fasting, penitence, and public prayers. The voters and the elected, the people, the council (legislature), and the government will be organically united by one pervasive religious spirit.

Terlecki assigned to individual Slavic peoples specific tasks within the framework of the great common enterprise. “To Poland belongs the leadership. Among the Slavic family, she has acquired the greatest merits in the sight of God and mankind. She has many times protected the Church of God and Europe against grave dangers. Of all the Slavic peoples she possesses the greatest spiritual resources in her bards, her literature, and her legislature” (89). Poland, it is true, has deviated from her vocation by her subservience to Western influences and her indifference to the Slavic cause. But if she repents, she will at once resume her place at the head of the Slavic peoples, especially those of the Latin persuasion. The peculiar vocation of the Czechs is to provide an example to all Slavs in the field of intellectual endeavour and scholarship. Moreover, they must bear the brunt of the defence of the Slavic world against the pressure of the Germans. The “Illyrians” (i.e., the Yugoslav peoples) and the Bulgarians are predestined to bring to an end Turkish rule in Europe and “to plant the cross, the symbol of salvation, liberty, and social progress . . . on the tops of the minarets” (92). The Illyrians will create a Slavic fleet on the Adriatic, as the Bulgarians and the Ruthenians will do on the Black Sea, the Poles on the Baltic, and the Russians on the Arctic Sea. This will make possible “the establishment
of a Slavic naval power, relations with other nations overseas, and the supplying of the Slavs with Asian and African products and the rich foods of Western Europe’’ (91).57 Finally, the ‘‘Catholic-national-Slavic spirit’’ will also penetrate Russia, consume the Mongol element in her government, transform her present anti-Christian social structure, ‘‘and the Russian nation will then enter the ranks of the united, fraternal Slavic peoples’’ (92). A regenerated Russia will become the apostle of Christianity and civilization to Asia.

Terlecki advocated close Polish-Ukrainian co-operation. He considered Poland the natural leader of the ‘‘Latin’’ Slavic peoples, and Rus’-Ukraine of those of the Greek Slavonic tradition. ‘‘The alliance of Rus’ and Poland, based on mutual freedom, is necessary for the future of Slavdom.... It would help the Poles’ reintegration into the Slavic movement, and it would allow the Ruthenians to raise the Greek Catholic Church, and to develop their nationality and language’’ (81–2). The alliance between Rus’ and Poland was to become the cornerstone of the projected Pan-Slavic federation. ‘‘On their linking depends the harmonization of the whole [Slavic] race’’ (90).

In regard to his own nation, Terlecki believed that it was endowed with a great and glorious mission. Speaking of Ukrainian history, he stated:

The location of Rus’ near the centre of the Slavic world, a dialect most closely approximating the maternal language and, therefore, to this day the most comprehensible to all other Slavs,58 the elevation of Kiev to a supreme spiritual position which made of it among the Slavs of the Eastern rite almost the equivalent of Rome in the entire Church of God,59 continuous neighbouring relations with Poland and Hungary (two Catholic countries of the Latin Rite)—all this seemed marvelously to favour the development of Rus’ in the direction of this idea: ... to keep all Slavic tribes in Catholic unity. (53)

Rus’ has been unable to accomplish this task in the past, but she will do it in the future. ‘‘Rus’, which is already Catholic in part, is predestined to bring back to Catholic unity all the Slavs of the Slavonic rite and to preside over their spiritual development’’ (91).

**Terlecki’s Place in the Evolution of Ukrainian Political Thought**

The only Ukrainian scholar to have discussed Terlecki’s ideas was Ivan Franko, as long ago as 1906. (Neither Ivan Krevetsky nor Elie Borschak, who have written on Terlecki’s life, has paid attention to his political program.) Franko’s opinion of the *Address of a Ruthenian* is worth quoting: ‘‘This was the most brilliant and—in spite of many factual mistakes
and an erroneous a priori tendency—the most broadly conceived publicistic production of the Ukrainian mind during the entire 1850s, a work informed by a great talent and inspired by an ardent and, if we may say so, unfeigned enthusiasm for and love of Ukraine.” Franko goes on to say that Terlecki’s essay contains ideas which “we rediscover thirty years later, in a different stylization and bolstered by other arguments, in the best writings of Drahomanov, such as Po voprosu o malorusskoi literature (Concerning the Question of Little Russian Literature, 1876) and Istoricheskaia Polsha i velikorusskaia demokratiiia (Historical Poland and Great Russian Democracy, 1882).”

This praise is the more noteworthy as Franko, the sober and critical scholar, felt no sympathy for Terlecki’s visionary flights. Franko’s article contains a number of ironical comments on Terlecki’s wishful thinking and deviations from strict historical truth. The parallel which Franko draws between Terlecki and Drahomanov may at first appear surprising. Although only one generation apart chronologically, the two men belonged intellectually to different worlds. Terlecki was a son of the Romantic age, Drahomanov of Positivism. Franko was certainly not unaware of the gulf which separated the priest from the freethinker and advocate of radical secularism. Still, he was not mistaken in stressing the link between them. The common element consisted in democratic federalism. Democratic-populist and federalist notions were a recurrent theme in Ukrainian ideologies, from the Society of United Slavs in the 1820s to Drahomanov and later to Mykhailo Hrushevsky and the 1917 Revolution. Thus Ivan Franko testifies to the fact that Terlecki’s program must be considered as belonging to the mainstream of nineteenth-century Ukrainian political thought.

There is another parallel, much closer both in time and in substance, which Franko failed to draw. I am referring to the obvious similarity of Terlecki’s ideas to those of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society. This omission is probably to be explained by the circumstance that in Franko’s day the papers of the Society were still hidden in tsarist police archives and, therefore, its program was not completely available to scholars. The main document that expresses the ideology of the Society, Kostomarov’s Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu (The Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People), was published only in 1918. The Polish historian Marceli Handelsman, writing in the 1930s, was the first to assert that the ideas of Terlecki were “strangely similar, almost identical” with the statutes of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society.

A student of the history of Ukrainian political thought has identified the four main planks of the Cyrillo-Methodians’ program as social Christianity, egalitarian democracy, Ukrainian messianism, and Slavic federalism. All these components are also to be found, with some modifica-
tions in emphasis, in Terlecki. Despite his sincere concern for the welfare of the common man and his execration of serfdom, Terlecki’s preoccupation with the peasant problem was not as central as in the case of the Cyrillo-Methodians; he was less of a narodnik (populist). In addition, as Handelsman has rightly seen, there are two points in which the ideas of the Address markedly diverge from those contained in the Knyhy bytiia. Both programs had a strong religious colouring, but of dissimilar hues. While Terlecki in 1849 was a militant Catholic and believed in the historical mission of the Uniate church, the ardent Christian faith of the Cyrillo-Methodians was non-ecclesiastical and of a distinctly non-conformist character, near to the spirit of radical Protestantism.

Secondly, Terlecki’s concept of a Ukrainian-Polish alliance as an axis of the future Slavic federation was alien to the Cyrillo-Methodians and would hardly have met with their approval. As most members of the Society were natives of Left-Bank Ukraine, their political thinking took place in a Russo-Ukrainian rather than in a Polish-Ukrainian context.

Still, the extraordinary similarity of the two programs has to be accounted for. Are we to assume an impact of the Cyrillo-Methodians’ ideas on Terlecki? As we have seen, Terlecki knew in 1849, although inaccurately, about the arrest and trial of Shevchenko, Kulish, and their associates, which had occurred two years earlier. (It should be noted that he speaks of them as a group of individuals rather than as members of an organization.) But what did he know about the ideology of the “Ruthenian” intellectuals in Kiev? He referred to them briefly in connection with his discussion of the Pan-Slavist trend in Russia. In this respect, his information was correct. But the Society’s thought contained elements other than Pan-Slavism, such as Ukrainian nationalism, which would have been of interest to Terlecki, and which he failed to mention. Neither did he mention the names of Sts. Cyril and Methodius, used by the Kiev circle. As Terlecki was himself devoted to the cult of the Apostles of the Slavs, to whom he later dedicated his church in Paris, his silence might be considered a sign of ignorance. He certainly had no access to the Society’s programmatic papers, which were only circulated in a few handwritten copies among members, and were later impounded by the authorities. Terlecki’s source, Duchński, reported contemporary Kievian rumors, but he was unable to provide detailed and reliable information. Thus we reach the conclusion that Terlecki could not have been influenced by the ideas of the Cyrillo-Methodians to any significant degree. At most, information about the Ukrainian group in Kiev could have confirmed him in his own convictions, arrived at independently.

The parallels between the Address of a Ruthenian and the program of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society must therefore be explained by their being rooted in the common spirit of the age. Ideas of an eschatological, reli-
gious, democratic-populist, nationalist, and Pan-Slavic federalist character were "in the air" of all East European countries around the middle of the nineteenth century. When the first modern Ukrainian political programs were formulated about that time, they were bound to incorporate these intellectual elements and to synthesize them in accordance with the requirements of the specific Ukrainian situation. The broad correspondence between the Cyrillo-Methodians' and Terlecki's formulations ought to be taken as an indication that some such program indeed represented an adequate response to the challenge of the age. In addition, both Terlecki and the Society were influenced by the writings of the Polish Romanticists, which served them as a model. As a biographer of Kostomarov stated, "There can be no doubt that Kostomarov, Hulak, Shevchenko, Bilozersky, Savych, and other members of the [Cyrillo-Methodian] group experienced the strong impact of Polish political thought, Polish underground organizations, and the writings of Polish poets and publicists." Terlecki drew his inspiration from the same source, and this fact may account for the correspondence between his ideas and those of the Cyrillo-Methodians. It was no mean accomplishment of Terlecki to effect single-handedly and unaided an ideological synthesis which bears comparison with the one which emerged from the collective discussions of the brilliant group of Ukrainian intellectuals in Kiev.

The historical fortunes of the two programs, however, were altogether dissimilar. The Cyrillo-Methodian Society existed only for a short time before its suppression by the Russian government, and its original papers disappeared from sight until the downfall of the tsarist regime. Nevertheless, "the ideas of the Society became the watchword of all Ukrainian 'awakeners.'" It can be stated without exaggeration that the Cyrillo-Methodian program, with successive revisions and amendments, served as the ideological cornerstone of the Ukrainian national movement in Russia during the entire second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, down to the 1917 Revolution. This happened primarily through the powerful impact of Shevchenko's poetry, and also by the personal influence of several former members of the Society, such as Mykola Kostomarov, Panteleimon Kulish, and Vasyl Bilozersky, who, after their return from exile, became the protagonists of the Ukrainian movement in the 1860s and were able to transmit their leading ideas to the next generation.

Such a constructive historical role was denied Terlecki. It might have been expected that his 1849 program, owing to its strong Uniate bias, would have had a particular appeal to Greek Catholic Ukrainians in Galicia. Franko attests that the Address of a Ruthenian was "widely circulated in Galicia and diligently read by the older generations of our in-
But he adds that in his own time Terlecki’s study and his very person have been virtually forgotten. These words still apply today. As a matter of fact, some of the ideas formulated forcefully and eloquently in the *Address of a Ruthenian* were to re-emerge at a later date, proving the vitality of Terlecki’s thinking. For instance, the notion that Ukraine was a Slavic nation completely distinct from Poland and Russia, and the claim that Ukraine, not Russia, was the legitimate heir of medieval Kievan Rus’, are basic to the ideology of modern Ukrainian nationalism. The conviction of the historical mission of the Uniate Church has taken a strong hold among Ukrainian Catholics of the Eastern rite, although this belief is, of course, rejected by Ukrainians of other denominations. In recent years the Ukrainian diaspora in Western countries has been agitated by the call for a Ukrainian Catholic patriarchate. But all these revivals of ideas originally advanced by Terlecki occurred without any knowledge of his person and work. Hipolit Vladimir Terlecki remains the forgotten man of modern Ukrainian intellectual history.

How can this peculiar state of affairs be explained? In contrast to the Cyrillo-Methodians’ program, which was backed by a group, the program of the *Address of a Ruthenian* was the work of a maverick individual. Terlecki never lacked personal friends, but he had no disciples. By his changes of religious and political colours and his return to Russia in 1872, he, in Franko’s words, “gave the lie to his former ideas, expressed in the 1849 brochure.” The Ukrainian community retaliated against this apparent act of treachery by expunging Terlecki from its collective memory and casting him into oblivion.

Notes

1. “Hipolit Terlecki” is Polish, and “Vladimir” Russian. I use these forms, which are to be found in contemporary documents. The Ukrainian form of the name is Ippolit Volodymyr Terletsky.

2. Terlecki consistently adhered to the traditional national nomenclature, *Rus’*, *rusyn* (Ruthenia, Ruthenian), which he strictly differentiated from Russia, Russian.

mostly to Terlecki’s second Paris period, in the early 1850s. (3) An article of I. Krevetsky, “Vid apostolstva do znaje,” Nova Zoria 4 (1929), no. 45, 3–6. (4 and 5) Two articles of I. Borschak (E. Borschak): “Ukrainska katolytska treskva v Paryzhi sto rokov tomu,” Viznyk Ukraїnskoi Hreko-Katolytskoi Tserkvy u Frantsii (1945), nos. 1 and 3–4 (this article was available to me in a typewritten copy); “Une Eglise Catholique Ukrainienne à Paris il y a un siècle,” Analecta Ordinis S. Basili Magni 1 (8), Series 2, Section 2 (Rome 1950), fasc. 2–3:360–63. The two articles of Borschak, which have the same title, do not coincide fully as to their contents, and each contains some bits of information not duplicated in the other.

4. Borschak erroneously states that Terlecki was a Uniate by birth. This is contradicted by Terlecki’s own “Reminiscences.”


6. Ibid., 565.

7. Ibid.

8. Princess Volkskony was a hostess to Nikolai Gogol during his stay in Rome. I was not able to find evidence of any direct contact between Terlecki and Gogol, although it does not seem impossible chronologically.


10. “Zapiski arkhimandrita Vladimira Terletskogo,” Russkaia Starina 70 (1891):589. It is to be noted that a few years later, in 1856, the Metropolitan of Halych, Mykhailo Levytsky, was appointed cardinal. This was the first instance of the elevation of a Ukrainian bishop to the College of Cardinals. This action of Pius IX may be viewed as a partial fulfillment of his promise to Terlecki. As to the second, more important measure, the creation of a Ukrainian Catholic patriarchate, it remains unfulfilled to this day.

11. “Greek Catholics” was the term used for Eastern-rite Catholics, or Uniates, of the Habsburg Empire.

12. Here ends the part of Terlecki’s “Reminiscences” which was accessible to me. I was unable to consult the concluding section, Russkaia Starina 71 (1891):351–91.


14. Quoted in Borschak, “Une Eglise Ukrainienne,” 362. One wonders about the composition of the congregation to which Terlecki preached his Ukrainian sermons in Paris. The services at the Church of Sts. Cyril and Methodius might have been attended by some Polish émigrés, natives of Ukraine. They were, however, Roman Catholics of the Latin rite, not Uniates.

15. Several of the documents in Welykyi, Litterae S.C. de Propaganda Fide, v. 7, nos. 3356, 3360, 3368, 3375, 3376, 3377, deal with questions pertaining to the ordination of Terlecki’s pupils, Iulian Kuilovsky and Teofil Korostensky.


18. According to Terlecki’s memoirs, during his stay in Constantinople in 1847 he received a letter from Prince Czartoryski in which, in guarded terms, a deal was proposed: the Prince promised to support Terlecki’s unionist action on condition that the latter accept Czartoryski’s political leadership. “This condition was, of course, unacceptable to me.” Russkaia Starina 63 (1889):576.

19. Handelsman mentions the “malicious remarks” published about Terlecki c. 1850 by
the prominent Polish journalist Julian Klaczko. *Ukrainańska polityka*, 120, n. 3.


21. The sources available to me do not tell whether Hipolit Terlecki and his son were ever reunited after 1836, and where the son’s death occurred.


25. Ibid., 351.


27. K.N. Ustianovych, *M.F. Raiievskii i rossiiskii panslavizm: Spomyny z perezhyytoho i peredumanoho* (Lviv 1884), 78.

28. The appearance of Terlecki is described in the unpublished memoirs of Platon Kostetsky, quoted in Franko, “‘Stará Rus’,” 374.


32. The account of the last period of Terlecki’s life is based exclusively on Krevet’sky’s article (see note 3), as other available biographical sources provide no information.

33. It seems quite possible that the denunciation against Terlecki and his arrest were a frame-up arranged to supply the authorities with a pretext for the expulsion of an inconvenient man. We do not know Terlecki’s legal status during his stay in Transcarpathia and Galicia, but he had probably never acquired Austro-Hungarian citizenship, for otherwise he could not have ordered out of the country.

34. See note 3.

35. See note 13.

36. See above, note 3. The “‘Reminiscences’” were prepared for publication by Terlecki’s friend Lev Lopatynsky. Under the pseudonym “L.I. Halychanyn,” Lopatynsky wrote an article after Terlecki’s death dedicated to his memory, “‘Starómu druhu,’” *Slovo*, 1889, no. 5. This article, inaccessible to me, could be valuable from the biographical viewpoint.

37. Handelsman, *Ukrainańska polityka*, 120, n. 3.


39. Dumy ta dumky Iosypa Bohdana Zaleskoho, perevedeni z polskoho na rodimyi rus’kyi iazyk (Przemyśl 1861).

40. Otcherk prazdnychyk propovidei (Przemyśl 1862).

41. Zapysky vtoroho poklonycheskoho puteshestviia z Ryma v Ierusalym i inshykh mis’tsiakh Vostoka sovershennoho (Lviv 1861), 2 fasc.

42. I.E. Levitsky, *Halytsko-ruskaia bybliihrafia XIX stolitiia*, 2 vols. (Lviv 1888—95), 2:12. This work is also the source of information on the items listed in notes 38—41.

44. They are listed in Levtsky, Halysko-ruskaia byblohrafisla, v. 2.
45. Ugoskaia Rus’ i vozrozhdenie soznania narodnosti mezhdu russkimi v Vengrii (Kiev 1874).
46. Such a Congregatio pro ecclesia orientali was actually created in 1917, under the pontificate of Benedict XV.
47. Terlecki shared this opinion with his old comrade-in-arms, Michał Czajkowski. The latter’s biographer states: “According to Czajkowski’s historical theories, the cause of Poland’s fall was separation from the common Slavic interest and Slavdom in general. Because of this, she was dragged along, if I may say so, tied to the tail of West European politics, and became a plaything in the hands of the Germans and other European powers. To correct this age-old error, it was necessary to draw close to the Slavs.” Fr. Rawita-Gawroński, Michał Czajkowski (Sadyk-Pasza). Jego życie, działalność wojskowa i literacka, 2d ed. (St. Petersburg 1901), 36.
48. Terlecki’s concept of Russian history resembles strikingly the argument of Astolph de Custine’s La Russie en 1839 (1843). Terlecki does not cite de Custine, but I am convinced that he drew on his famous and much-discussed work.
50. It is noteworthy that when in 1907 the Metropolitan of Halych, Andrei Sheptytsky, embarked on his bold unionist action in Russia, he also intended to base it partly on the Old Believers. Cf. C. Korolevskij, Métropolite André Szeptyckyj, 1865–1944, Opera Theologicae Societatis Scientificae Ucrainorum (Rome 1964), 16–17:192 ff.
51. The context suggests that the reference to “many Catholics” who, according to Terlecki, harboured wishful thoughts about the prospects of a conversion of Russia was a covert polemic against the views which he encountered in certain circles of the Roman Curia.
52. The “transaction” alluded to by Terlecki was the concordat between the Holy See and Russia of 3 August 1847 signed by the Cardinal Secretary of State, Luigi Lambruschini, and Count Dmitrii Bludov. The concordat was an attempt to regularize the position of the Latin-rite Catholic church in the Russian Empire, but it bypassed the problem of the Uniates. The Union had been officially suppressed by Nicholas I in 1839, except for the Chelm (Kholm) diocese in Congress Poland. In Terlecki’s interpretation, the concordat of 1847 implied Rome’s tacit acceptance of this act.
53. This is the only instance in the Address of the use of the term Ukraine. The context shows that Terlecki understood it in the traditional sense, as the name of the Cossack territory on the Dnieper.
54. It can safely be assumed that Terlecki’s knowledge of the fate of Shevchenko and the other members of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society was derived from Duchihski. The latter, prior to his escape to the West in 1846, resided in Kiev, where he obtained some second-hand information about the existence of a clandestine Ukrainian group. Between January and March 1848 Duchihski published in Prince Czartoryski’s Paris organ, Trzeci Maj, a series of articles on the Ukrainian problem, entitled “The Pereiaslav Agreement.” He advocated Polish-Ukrainian co-operation, discussed the oppression of Ukraine by the tsarist government, and mentioned the trial of Shevchenko, Kulish (whose name he misspelled “Kulesza”), and of several of their associates (whose names he badly confused). (Excerpts of the Trzeci Maj articles are reprinted in Pisma Franciszka Duchinckiego, 3 vols. [Rapperswil 1901–4] 2:313–25. See also Handelsman, Ukraińska polityka, 2:110–15.) Contrary to Duchincki’s erroneous statement, repeated by Terlecki, none of the Cyrillo-Methodians had been condemned to forced labour in the mines.
55. The notion that Slavic peoples are particularly prone to democracy was widespread during the Romantic age. Terlecki most likely obtained it from the writings of the influential Polish émigré historian and publicist, Joachim Lelewel (1786–1861), who postulated gminowładztwo (people’s rule) as the socio-political system of the primeval Slavs.

56. “Bards” (wieszczę) was an honorific name given to Poland’s Romantic poets, primarily Mickiewicz, with whom Terlecki was personally acquainted.

57. This point of Terlecki’s program is strangely reminiscent of a passage in the “Rules,” or “Catechism,” of the Society of United Slavs (1823–5): “... (15) You are a Slav, and in your country, on the shores of the four seas which surround it, you shall construct four fleets: Black, White, Dalmatian, and Arctic. ... (16) In your ports, o Slav, commerce and naval power will flourish, and justice will reside in the city at the centre of your country.” (Izbrannye sotsialno-politicheskie i filosofskie proizvedenia dekabristov, 3 vols. [Moscow 1951], 3:71–2.) Is this puzzling parallelism a mere coincidence? Or do we have the right to speculate that some information about the United Slavs slipped through to Terlecki? He was a native of Volhynia, where the Society had originated; some of its members belonged to the local Polish-Ukrainian gentry. The United Slavs were the branch of the Decembrist movement which, despite its lack of a developed Ukrainian national consciousness, must be considered as belonging to the tradition of Ukrainian political thought. The United Slavs’ democratic and federalistic Pan-Slavism found a continuation in the program of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, on the one hand, and in that of Terlecki on the other.

58. In calling individual Slavic languages “dialects” (narzecz), Terlecki followed a usage common to many nineteenth-century Pan-Slavists. By the “maternal language” he meant Church Slavonic. The erroneous notion that among the Slavic languages Ukrainian is particularly close to Church Slavonic might have been suggested to Terlecki by the circumstance that a Ukrainized version of Church Slavonic, the so-called Slavonic Ruthenian (slaveno-ruskyi iazyk), served as the literary language of Ukraine until the eighteenth century.

59. Terlecki’s idea of the exalted position and spiritual primacy of Kiev derives from the tradition of Ukrainian seventeenth-century thought. The myth of “Kiev, the second Jerusalem” was widespread in Ukraine during the Cossack era. (Cf. Oleksander Ohloblyn, Hetman Mazepa ta ioho doba [New York, Paris, Toronto 1960], 145–7.) This idea is also to be found among some of Terlecki’s contemporaries. Mykola Kostomarov, the leader and ideologist of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, in an unfinished novel, Panych Natalych, puts in the mouth of one of the protagonists the prophecy that “the reconciled Slavs will some day unite in Kiev, ‘the capital of the Slavic race,’ and the bell of St. Sophia [cathedral in Kiev] will announce the deliverance of the Slavic peoples.” (G. Luciani, Le Livre de la Genèse du peuple ukrainien [Paris 1950], 46.) And Terlecki’s acquaintance and comrade-in-arms during the 1831 insurrection, the Ukrainophile Pole Michał Czajkowski, said in his Powieści kozackie (1837): “Kiev is the true cradle of the Slavic race. ...I have often talked with Slavs of different countries and all agreed that Kiev is an arch-Slavic city.” (Luciani, Le Livre de la Genèse, 47.)


61. Recent works on the Cyrillo-Methodian Society are: B. Yanivsky, ed., Kostomar’v’s “Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People” (New York 1954); P.A. Zaionchkovskii, Kirillo-Mefodievs’ko obschhestvo (Moscow 1959); Luciani,


64. Handelsman, *Ukrainaśka polityka*, 121.

65. The religious philosophy of the Cyrillo-Methodians has been discussed by M. Hrushevsky, *Z istorii religioîi dumky na Ukrainî* (Lviv 1925), 111–24; D. Chyzhevsky, *Narysy z istorii filosofii na Ukrainî* (Prague 1931), 107–34.


68. Franko, "'Stara Rus’"," 359–60.

69. Ibid., 374.
Michał Czajkowski’s Cossack Project During the Crimean War: An Analysis of Ideas

The Polish minority in Right-Bank Ukraine is a social stratum which has been insufficiently studied, because from the point of view of both Polish and Ukrainian national histories, as they are normally conceived, it is a marginal group that falls outside the perspective of the two national histories. However, this group did have a considerable impact on the development of modern Ukraine, and as we now move increasingly toward a territorial concept of Ukrainian history—in which Ukrainian history is defined as everything connected with Ukrainian territory as opposed to a narrowly ethnocentric approach—it merits our renewed attention.

According to Viacheslav Lypynsky, who himself originated from that stratum, one could distinguish among the Right-Bank Poles in the nineteenth century three, not formal parties, but trends or currents of thought. The first comprised the loyalists or compromisers (ugodowcy) who adjusted to the Russian imperial regime. Throughout most of the nineteenth century, imperial Russia did not follow a policy of ethnic nationalism; it was an imperial state, and we find among the imperial elite people of diverse origins, not only of the Orthodox religion but also a large contingent, for instance, of Lutheran Germans and Catholic Polish aristocrats. As long as they were loyal to the Romanov dynasty, they were accepted as part of the establishment. The second trend was that of Polish nationalism: those groups aiming at the restoration of the Polish Commonwealth in its pre-partition frontiers. Finally, Lypynsky’s third category, and the most interesting for our present purposes, was the Ukrainophile trend.

These currents, however, cannot always be clearly separated. For example, the writer Henryk Rzewuski, brother of Balzac’s wife, who was by religion and nationality a Roman Catholic and a Pole, was both politically loyal to the Russian monarchy and a local Ukrainophile patriot. In
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more recent times, the Polish journal _Kultura_ in Paris published in its supplementary _Zeszyty Historyczne_ the memoirs of Henryk Józefewski, who for more than ten years during the inter-war era was the _wojewoda_, or regional governor, of the province of Volhynia. He was a Piłsudskiite, and thus certainly a strong Polish nationalist, but at the same time he was a native of Kiev from about the 1890s and briefly served in 1920 as Vice-Minister of Internal Affairs of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. In his memoirs, which were written late in his life—he survived World War II, was imprisoned by the Polish communist regime and then released—he reveals in addition to his strong Polish nationalism pronounced Ukrainophile tendencies.

The background of these Ukrainophile sympathies was what we might call _Landespatriotismus_ (territorial patriotism). There were many expressions of this attitude, beginning in the 1820s and 30s, including the so-called Ukrainian school in Polish literature, which has a place in the history of Polish Romanticism. Some members of that school attempted to write in the Ukrainian vernacular, although normally they wrote in Polish. In 1971, an anthology of this Ukrainian-language poetry written by men of Polish background was published in Soviet Ukraine—Roman Kyrchiv’s collection, _Ukrainskoiu muzoiu natkhenni_ (Inspired by the Ukrainian Muse). The landed nobles who belonged to that circle knew the Ukrainian language very well. (In Galicia the situation was different, for there the Polish minority was between 20 and 25 per cent of the population, and urban Poles could live without knowing Ukrainian.) But in Right-Bank Ukraine, members of the Polish minority were bilingual in Polish and Ukrainian, besides knowing Russian and Western languages. They spoke Ukrainian from childhood, for this was the language of their wet-nurses and servants, whereas in the drawing room they would use Polish. The Ukrainian they knew was not the standard literary language, which was not yet developed, but the current local vernacular.

The political ideology of the Ukrainophile Poles envisioned the restoration of the historical Polish Commonwealth, but within the structure of that future Commonwealth, Ruthenia (Ukraine) was to be an autonomous entity. Such an arrangement had been envisioned in the Union of Hadiach, the unrealized mid-seventeenth-century concept of the transformation of the Commonwealth from a dualistic into a triadic structure. References to this idea are to be found frequently. As is well known, some of the Ukrainophile Poles went so far as to identify themselves with the Ukrainian nationality. The first significant group were the so-called _khlopomany_ (peasant-lovers) of the early 1860s. Until the revolution, both individuals and small groups continued to do this, and some of the outstanding personalities of modern Ukraine came from that background. However, these were exceptional cases. Most of the Ukrainophile Poles
continued to consider themselves Poles, but at the same time had Ukrainian sympathies and tried to balance their Polish loyalties with Ukrainian territorial patriotism. Within this group of Poles who came close to the nationality borderline without actually crossing it, I have singled out for study three personalities: Franciszek Duchiński (1816–93); Hipolit (religious name Vladimir) Terlecki (Terletsky) (1808–88); and Michał Czajkowski (1804–86). They were all men of the same generation, and not only are there parallels in their lives, but they were actually acquainted, so that one can speak of them as belonging to a certain circle.

Unlike both Duchiński and Terlecki, who until recently were virtually forgotten, Czajkowski has never languished in oblivion. Previous researchers have approached Czajkowski principally from two angles. The first is the biographical. Czajkowski had a long and very adventurous life, and there are several biographical works that recount it as a romance. A few years ago quite a lengthy biography of Czajkowski, entitled Dziwne życie Sadyka Pasy (The Strange Life of Sadyk Pasha), was published in Poland by Jadwiga Chudzikowska. There are older biographical studies; one was written around the turn of the century by Franciszek Rawita-Gawroński. The other approach is that of literary history. Because Czajkowski was a prolific writer and in his day a well-known Polish novelist, historians of Polish literature have dealt with him, both in general surveys and in several monographic studies. I do not intend to compete with these two approaches, because I cannot add anything new as far as Czajkowski’s biography is concerned and my interest is not that of a student of literature or literary history. I propose to study Czajkowski from the point of view of his political ideas. This is an aspect which has been neglected by Polish students of Czajkowski, who have not taken his ideas seriously. They have considered him simply a fantastic man of excessive imagination, a colourful figure certainly, but at the same time one whose concepts need not be treated with respect. I believe, however, that his ideas are worth consideration and actually become much more understandable when they are placed in a Ukrainian context.

There is one difficulty in studying Czajkowski’s ideas. He was a voluminous writer; his collected fiction is contained in twelve volumes of novels and short stories, and this does not include his assorted memoirs. But he was no theorist, and did not produce a single systematic treatise expounding his political thought. Czajkowski’s ideas must therefore be deduced from their reflections in his literary works and from his memoirs and correspondence, as well as from reports by contemporaries. In addition, of course, his ideas can be inferred from his actions. The one period in Czajkowski’s long life in which he seemed to have had a chance to implement these ideas was the Crimean War (1853–6), and I will concen-
trate on this crucial period, not from the point of view of military history, but from that of political thought. Before proceeding I will have to sketch Czajkowski’s life and intellectual development prior to 1854 in order to provide the necessary background.

Czajkowski was born in 1804 in the village of Halchyn (now in Zhytomyr oblast). His youth was that of a wealthy country squire; he had little formal education and led a life devoted to hunting, riding, and boisterous social parties. However, in Czajkowski’s family, as he repeatedly mentions in his memoirs, there was a tradition that on his maternal side he was descended from the seventeenth-century Cossack Hetman Ivan Briukhovetsky. He was proud of this, without apparently being aware that Ivan Briukhovetsky has a very bad reputation in Ukrainian history. November 1830 saw the outbreak of the Polish uprising, which spilled over from Poland proper, or the Congress Kingdom, to the Lithuanian and Ukrainian borderlands. In the spring of 1831 military detachments of the insurgents entered Right-Bank Ukraine from Congress Poland, and there was also an insurrectionary movement among the local Polish nobility which Czajkowski joined. He spent the campaign in the Volhynian cavalry regiment, which was formed from the Polish gentry of the province, obtained the rank of lieutenant, and received the Golden Cross for valour. After the defeat of the uprising and the retreat of the insurgents to the West, Czajkowski settled in Paris and after some years turned to literature.

At first he worked on French newspapers, then in 1837 published his first work of fiction in Polish, Powieści Kozackie (Cossack Tales). During the next seven years, there appeared several volumes of his novels and collected tales or short stories. Evidently, Czajkowski had a ready pen—he could write quickly, probably without reading a second time what he had written once. Today Czajkowski’s fiction is not read widely except by professional students of Polish literature. His works have been superseded among the Polish public by the historical romances of Sienkiewicz, who to this day remains the popular Polish historical novelist. Technically, Czajkowski’s fiction was modelled, I believe, on Sir Walter Scott. His stories of adventure, with some romantic or love intrigue, are not psychologically interesting, and he must be considered a second-rate writer. The important thing from our point of view is that Czajkowski’s fiction deals in large measure with topics taken from Ukrainian history. For instance, there is a novel, Hetman Ukrainy (The Hetman of Ukraine), which is a fictional account of the life of Hetman Ivan Vyhovsky, successor to Khmelnytsky and one of the architects of the Union of Hadiach. Perhaps Czajkowski’s best work of fiction is the novel Wernyhora, which is set against the background of the haidamak revolt of 1768. Interestingly, what from Czajkowski’s point of view was
a tragic event—namely, the rising of the Ukrainian peasants who massacred the Polish gentry of Kiev province—is used to preach the idea of the unity of Ukrainians and Poles; the Ukrainians are seen as an organic part of a broader Polish Commonwealth opposed to a foreign enemy, the Muscovite.

Czajkowski’s political ideology is directly expressed in his lecture presented at the European Historical Congress in Paris in 1835; the text of his lecture was published in the proceedings of the conference. The title of his paper is characteristic: “Quelle a été l’influence des Cossaque sur la littérature dans le Nord et dans l’Orient?” The main point of his presentation is that Cossack Ukraine is the perfect embodiment of the true Slavic spirit, and that the Cossack element brought about the rebirth of modern Polish and Russian literature. He refers to the Ukrainian school in Polish Romantic poetry, as well as to Bohdan Zaleski and Kondratii Ryleev, the Decembrist poet and martyr. There are positive references to Cossack hetmans—not only to Mazepa, which is perhaps not surprising, but even to Khmelnytsky, which would not be normal in a man who considered himself a Pole. He says the following about Khmelnytsky: “This man by his genius merits the name of hero of Cossackdom. But a great blot soils his memory: he delivered his homeland to the tsar of Muscovy by separating the Cossacks from the Poles, their brothers and natural allies.” I believe that the Polish literary historian, Zymunt Szweykowski, has correctly characterized Czajkowski’s political world-view:

Czajkowski always considered himself a Pole, but the idea of an independent Poland was undoubtedly a secondary matter for him. It appeared in his mind inseparable from the idea of a free Ukraine and, without the latter, lost all charm and significance for him. Thinking of Rus’, Czajkowski visualized it as standing under the authority of an idealized Poland. The authority, however, was limited to the Polish king, who was the distant overlord of Ukraine. Czajkowski’s leading idea was the resurrection of the Zaporozhian Sich, of old Cossack Ukraine, in such form and character as it had existed in the era of Polish independence [i.e., under the old Commonwealth]. He believed that old Ukraine was the embodiment of the highest ideas of life, and therefore its resurrection was an issue not of local, but rather of all-European and even world-wide significance. Czajkowski yearned after this holy, this divine Ukraine all his life.

In reference to Czajkowski’s belief in the universal significance of Cossackdom, one of his favourite sayings was Napoleon’s *bon mot* that in one hundred years all of Europe would be either republican or Cos-
sack. But apparently Czajkowski reversed Napoleon’s priorities, because he meant that in one hundred years either all of Europe would be regenerated by Cossackdom or it would fall into the mire of materialistic republicanism.

There are certain perennial features in Czajkowski’s thinking. First, uncommonly for a Pole, he was a strong monarchist. The Polish gentry had essentially a republican tradition; the old Commonwealth was an elective kingdom, but in effect a crowned republic, and the concept of hereditary monarchy was not strong in the evolution of Polish political thought. Czajkowski’s exceptional monarchism is tied to his Cossack idea, because he envisioned an autonomous Cossack Ukraine under the authority of a distant hereditary Jagellonian king who would be recognized and revered as father of all, but would not interfere with the autonomous Cossack host. Another foundation of his outlook was Pan-Slavism. Throughout the various changes in his thinking, he always tried to stress the idea of the solidarity of all Slavs, not excluding the Russians. This recognition of the Russians as Slavs distinguishes him from his contemporary and one-time friend, Duchiński, who defended the notion that the Russians were not Slavs but linguistically Slavicized Turanians. The third interesting feature is Czajkowski’s anti-clericalism, which was directed against the Jesuits. He believed that Catholicism had alienated Poland from the Slavic world, and above all that the evil Jesuits were the root cause of the conflict between Mother Poland and the Cossacks, who otherwise would have remained loyal to her. Interestingly, however, his anti-Catholicism did not extend to the Uniate denomination. He argued, so to say, in favour of Catholicism, but a Catholicism of the Basilian Fathers with their “Hospody pomyłui,” not the Catholicism of the Jesuits with their “Dominus vobiscum.” He also expressed the notion that, at some future time, the capital of Poland and of the Slavic world should be Kiev.

In Paris Czajkowski became politically associated with Prince Adam Czartoryski (1770–1861), a long-lived man who had a very strange career and, after 1831, became the leader of the conservative wing of the Polish exile community. Czajkowski grew profoundly attached to Prince Czartoryski, in whom he saw a Ruthenian and a descendant of the old Lithuanian-Ruthenian dynasty, the Jagellonian counts. In 1841, on Czartoryski’s behalf, Czajkowski went to Istanbul as a political agent, and for the next thirty years or so his life was centred on Istanbul and the Turkish Empire. It seems that the atmosphere of the Ottoman capital suited Czajkowski very well. He established close links with important Ottoman dignitaries and became a confidant of the Grand Vizir, Reshid Mustapha Pasha. Among his many activities—which were, incidentally, typical of émigré political life, but quite successful in this case—were the
establishment of contacts with the Caucasian mountaineers under Shamîl, who were fighting the Russians; receiving authorization from the Ottoman government to establish a colony for Polish veterans, named Adampol, in honour of Prince Czartoryski, on the Sea of Marmara; and seeking to bridge the conflict between the Balkan Slavs and the Ottoman government. This last was perhaps an impossible task, but Czajkowski undertook, on the one hand, to encourage various cultural strivings of the Balkan Slavs, especially supporting the struggle of the Bulgarians to free themselves from the ecclesiastical domination of the Greek patriarchate, while, on the other hand, trying to convince the Balkan Slavs that they should acquiesce in the imperial Ottoman system. In this effort he used a rather specious argument, writing time and again that the sultan was the legitimate heir of medieval Serbian kings, for Serbian princesses had become spouses of Ottoman emperors, hence the legitimate line was carried on by the Osmanli dynasty. But he supported Bulgarian educational efforts, and there are in fact monographs dealing with the impact of Czajkowski on the national revivals of Bulgaria and Romania.

Czajkowski’s principal objective was to work for an uprising in Ukraine against Russia using the Don and Kuban Cossacks, with whom he tried to establish links. The base of this future uprising was to be the Cossack community at the lower Danube, in the Dobrudja. Those who lived there were descendants of the Zaporozhian Cossacks, the so-called Trans-Danubian Cossacks, who are well known from the operetta Zaporozhets za Dunaiem (Zaporozhian Cossack Beyond the Danube), as well as descendants of the Don Cossacks, the followers of Igoshka Nekrasov, who had revolted against Tsar Peter. There were certain difficulties with this concept—for instance, the organized Sîch which actually existed on the Danube delta under Turkish overlordship had disappeared in 1828, for during one of the Russo-Turkish wars the majority of Trans-Danubian Cossacks went over to the Russian side, after which only dispersed settlements remained. At that time relations between the local Ukrainian Cossacks and the descendants of the Don Cossacks were not good, and local wars were fought between them. Nevertheless, Czajkowski’s activities were considered a serious nuisance by the Russian government, and its ambassador in Istanbul, Vladimir Titov, put considerable pressure on the Turkish government to demand the expulsion of Czajkowski as one who was harming Turkish-Russian relations. By 1849–50 the Ottoman government was on the verge of complying.

To prevent this, Czajkowski did something very unexpected—he converted to Islam and became a Turkish subject in 1850. He continued to act according to the same ideology, no longer technically in the capacity of a Polish émigré and representative of Czartoryski, but in that of a Turkish official. He assumed a new name, Mehemmed Sadyk, which means
Mehmed the Loyal, and entered Ottoman service with the rank of general or pasha. There was, however, an additional motive for Czajkowski’s change of religion and citizenship, not of a political but of a personal and romantic nature. During his years in France, Czajkowski married a Frenchwoman, Léonide Gabaret, with whom he had four children. His French wife stayed in Paris when he went to Istanbul, where he became involved with a Polish lady named Ludwika Śniadecka. As divorce was impossible in France under existing Catholic law, it was the conversion to Islam which enabled Czajkowski to regularize his relationship with Śniadecka.

Born in 1802, Ludwika Śniadecka was two years older than Czajkowski. Both were in their forties at that time, so this was a romance not of youngsters but of mature people. She was an outstanding personality in her own right, and there exists a very interesting biography of Śniadecka by Maria Czapska. Śniadecka was the daughter of a celebrated Polish scientist, a medical doctor and professor of chemistry at Vilnius University, Jędrzej Śniadecki. His brother, Ludwika’s uncle, was for many years the rector of Vilnius University. How Śniadecka found herself in Istanbul is a separate romantic story. All sources attest to her exceptional intelligence and strength of character, and in many respects she was a better politician than her husband. Czajkowski was a man of vision, courage, and great energy, but it seems he was also impulsive and touchy, that he lost control over his nerves, became angry, quarrelled with people, and was given to moodiness. Śniadecka, on the other hand, was a woman of great tact and self-control, an excellent judge of character, and — most important in politics — possessed of a steady, unidirectional will and indomitable determination. Ludwika became her husband’s principal political advisor and aide; she ran his secretariat, and his political correspondence went through her hands. She wrote in a letter to a friend in 1856, “Now I am everything to him. Wife, mistress, friend, confidante, and nurse.”

Czajkowski’s conversion to Islam shocked Polish society. If one thinks how profoundly Polish patriotism is linked with Catholicism, it is understandable that his becoming a religious renegade was something which Polish society could not easily digest. Prince Czartoryski himself deplored this step, but he was still an eighteenth-century aristocrat in his outlook, urbane and tolerant, able if need be to look the other way. But for most Polish patriots, including many former friends and collaborators of Czajkowski, this was an unforgivable act and marked the beginning of his estrangement from Polish society, which proceeded apace later on.

The Crimean War offered Czajkowski what he believed to be the opportunity to realize his life’s dream. Even prior to the outbreak of hostilities in 1853, he submitted to the court a proposal to create a Cos-
sack military force under Ottoman auspices to fight Russia. This was authorized, and Czajkowski was given the title of Mirmiran-Pasha, the traditional designation of Cossack otamans in the service of the court. A regiment was formed, consisting of six companies or about 1,400 soldiers, and it is noteworthy that the language of service was Ukrainian. There was some difficulty owing to a shortage of Ukrainians, but the Cossack regiment was brought up to strength with soldiers drawn from the Dobrudja Cossacks of both Ukrainian and Russian ethnic origin, deserters from the Russian army from Russia and Ukraine, Bulgarians, and assorted freed prisoners. The officers were Polish veterans of 1831, many of them natives of Ukraine and close compatriots of Czajkowski. Czajkowski’s regiment played a fairly important role in the 1854 campaign. It helped relieve the fortress of Silistra on the Danube, besieged by the Russians, and was also the first to enter Bucharest after its evacuation by the Russians. Indeed, Czajkowski acted for some time as military governor of Bucharest, the capital not of Romania, which did not yet exist, but of the Principality of Wallachia. By the end of 1854, Czajkowski’s Cossacks had reached the river Prut, which marked the frontier of Russia.

Czajkowski’s plan was to enter Ukraine at the head of his force, and he expected that this would provoke an anti-Russian revolt. But this did not happen, and we must ask why. One major factor was the strategy of the great powers: Britain and France decided to make the Crimea the main theatre of war, so that the Danubian front was neglected. The allied landing occurred in the Crimea, leading to the well-known siege of Sevastopol. Austria’s role throughout the Crimean War was extremely ambiguous, as attested by Schwarzenberg’s famous saying that Austria would surprise the world by her ingratitude. This ingratitude consisted in the fact that, in 1849, Russian intervention had helped suppress the Hungarian Revolution, so that the court of Vienna was ostensibly indebted to that of St. Petersburg. But raison d’état prevailed when Austria opposed Russian expansion into the Balkans and threatened to join the anti-Russian coalition if Russia did not withdraw from the Danubian principalities. In August 1854 Russia capitulated to the Austrian demand. For the remainder of the war Austria occupied the principalities, at first jointly with the Turks, but as of January 1855 alone. When the Turkish forces withdrew, Czajkowski’s legion was moved back from the frontier, from the Dniester down to Bulgaria, where it was stationed for the remainder of the war, no longer participating in military action.

Shortly after these events, there appeared in Paris in 1857 a miscellany with the title Kozaczyna w Turcji (Cossackdom in Turkey), edited by Czajkowski’s collaborator and friend Ludwik Zwierchowski. The author, however, was almost certainly Czajkowski using a cryptonym. The
collection attempts to provide an apologia for his strategy during the Crimean War. Like most of Czajkowski’s writings, it was thrown together in a slapdash manner, and there are an enormous number of misprints. It includes short stories, lists of the officers of the Cossack regiment, bits of poetry (some in Ukrainian, though printed in the Latin alphabet), and so on. Above all, there are some interesting articles which explain Czajkowski’s political policy. His underlying idea was the restoration of the Hetmanate under a Turkish protectorate, following in the tradition of those Cossack leaders who had been, as it were, vassals of the Ottoman Empire—Petro Doroshenko (1666–76) and Pylyp Orlyk (1710–42), the exile, successor to Mazepa—and of those Zaporozhians who settled in the Dobrudja after 1775, following the destruction of the Zaporozhian Sich: “This armed and chivalrous exile community has existed already for one and one-half centuries. In 1854 Cossackdom revived again under Michał Czajka-Czajkowski.” Czajkowski pretends that there was a continuous Cossack community in Turkey for 150 years. This is, of course, untrue; although there were separate episodes of Cossack-Turkish collaboration, such as with Pylyp Orlyk and in the case of the settlement of the Zaporozhians after 1775, there was no direct connection with Doroshenko’s policy of the late seventeenth century. Czajkowski writes with pride that the Cossack regiment’s flag was the old flag of Hetman Doroshenko, which used to be preserved in the treasury of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. Whether this is true or not is difficult to determine. At the same time, somewhat illogically, this same Cossack force is seen as an organic part of Poland: “We are bone of the bone of those Cossacks of old, raised in the stirrups for the service of king and Commonwealth (Rzeczpospolita).” However, Czajkowski’s Poland was not ethnic Poland but rather the multinational Confederation: “Polish statesmen tend to forget a little question of ethnography—the existence of the Ruthenian people of 14 million; in crossing the Prut River, the war is bound to encounter the Ruthenians, and it can advance toward Kiev and Vilnius only, not toward Warsaw and Cracow.” There are a good many indications that Czajkowski envisioned his own future role as that of a Cossack hetman in a restored Hetmanate under the suzerainty either of the Sultan or of the Polish King.

Polish historians have generally assessed Czajkowski’s plans as chimeric, a sort of strange personal fancy. I would by no means consider him a paragon of Realpolitik, but there is perhaps more substance to his designs than previous students have been willing to admit. Let us not forget, first of all, that the Crimean War was the only occasion between the Napoleonic era and World War I when Russia faced a military challenge in Europe from major European powers—Great Britain and France—who fought in support of Turkey, and that it ended in Russia’s defeat.
The Crimean War also revealed the internal weakness and corruption of the system of Nicholas I and triggered a profound internal crisis in Russia; Soviet Marxist historians even speak, with some exaggeration, of the first revolutionary situation in the post-Crimean War era. Was there any basis in Ukrainian society for a movement of the type conceived by Czajkowski? Evidence that there was some potential for such a movement is provided by the episode known in history under the name of Kyivska kozachchyna (Kievan Cossackdom). In 1855, toward the end of the Crimean War, there arose a spontaneous mass movement in the province of Kiev and neighbouring regions of Right-Bank Ukraine, where approximately 500 villages refused to do labour for the gentry and organized in traditional Cossack fashion. This was due to a sort of inadvertence. The peasants misunderstood the tsarist manifesto which called for the formation of a militia (opolchenie) in the struggle against the foreign enemy as a call for restoration of Cossack liberty. The movement was later suppressed by the use of armed force. However, the episode shows that there were elements in Ukrainian society of the period, quite apart from Czajkowski, among whom such an idea might have found favour.

But there were two inherent weaknesses in Czajkowski’s concept. First of all, his whole outlook has a definitely archaic quality. Czajkowski lived through most of the nineteenth century, but his mind really belongs to the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. From his writings, it would be difficult to guess that he was a contemporary of the mid-Victorian age and the industrial revolution, of thinkers such as Darwin, John Stuart Mill, and Marx or, among politicians, Palmerston, Bismarck, and Cavour. This, by the way, is the reason why he felt at home in Turkey, for Turkish society was archaic and still based on relations of personal loyalty, not on modern institutional arrangements. The notion of tying a modern political movement to an earlier tradition is not without merit, and the Cossack tradition remained a force in Ukrainian society as late as 1917. However, this traditional idea had to be translated into the terms of a new age, and this Czajkowski was unable to do. In the second place, and no less importantly, it was inherently impossible to reconcile the Ukrainian and Polish sides of his allegiance. If a popular revolt had by some chance materialized in Ukraine, in all likelihood it would have been directed against the local Polish gentry. This was in the nature of things, and the notion that a Ukrainian popular movement could be mobilized for the restoration of Poland, even with the promise that this Poland would be federated, was out of the question. Thus, Czajkowski’s tragedy was that he tried to fuse two loyalties in his own soul which in reality could not be combined.

Czajkowski wrote two memoirs: those of his own life, written after his return to Russia, of which the Polish original has perished (there remains
only the Russian translation, published between 1895 and 1904 in *Russkaia Starina*), and his memoirs of the Crimean War, published in Poland in 1962 under the title *Moje wspomnienia o wojnie 1854 roku* (My Memoirs of the War of 1854). In reading the latter, I was greatly struck by a passage in which Czajkowski claims to have received secret messages from Ukraine on behalf of an underground organization called the “Committee of Ukraine and Bessarabia.” These messages requested the Ottoman Porte to take Ukraine and Bessarabia under its protection and to restore an autonomous Cossack entity along the lines initiated by Petro Doroshenko, with a status comparable to that of Wallachia and Moldavia, which at that time were still autonomous principalities under the suzerainty of the Porte. Czajkowski states that these memoranda were written in Russian, and adds that he made a great error in sending copies, which had been translated by his wife into French, to Prince Czartoryski in Paris. Here they fell into the hands of Polish leaders and alarmed them, for they provided conclusive proof that Czajkowski was a dangerous man aspiring to the role of a new Bohdan Khmelnytsky.

The most outstanding exception to the general resistance encountered by Czajkowski in Polish society was Adam Mickiewicz, the great poet, who had become Czajkowski’s friend in Paris. Mickiewicz actually came to Turkey to lend support to Czajkowski’s actions, but fell victim to an epidemic of cholera and died in Czajkowski’s camp. In addition to being a great loss to Polish literature, Mickiewicz’s death was a personal blow to Czajkowski, for his prestige and authority would have lent Czajkowski powerful support.

What particularly fascinated me was Czajkowski’s assertion that in the mid-nineteenth century there was allegedly a secret organization in Ukraine with a separatist political program. This is very unusual, as by and large the Ukrainian movement in the nineteenth century was not separatist but autonomist, that is, working for cultural self-expression or the federalization of the Russian Empire. It is quite possible that the memorandum was Czajkowski’s own fabrication, because the ideas expressed in it look suspiciously close to his own. I was unable to examine the memorandum in the Polish library in Paris where part of Czajkowski’s papers are held or in the Czartoryski Library in Cracow. However, I did find another piece of relevant evidence which was published a long time ago but has not attracted sufficient attention. In 1918, during the German occupation of the Crimea, a philologist named Ievhen Rudnytsky—no relation to the present writer—was in personal contact with Czajkowski’s son Adam, a child of his French wife, who went to Turkey, served with Czajkowski, and then returned to Russia with his father and became a general in the Russian service. Late in life, during the Civil War and Revolution, Adam Czajkowski met Ievhen Rudnytsky in
the Crimea and handed him some papers obtained from his father, which were published in the well-known series *Zas sto lit*, in 1924. In addition, a Galician Ukrainian historian and Uniate priest, Father Iosyp Zastyrets, wrote several articles before World War I dealing with Czajkowski, and apparently also had been in touch with the Czajkowski family, as he referred to these very same documents, but without a text. Although these articles are so confused as not to be very helpful, they do draw upon the same sources.

The papers in question are the following: a short biography of Michał Czajkowski written by his son; a list of the estates of the Czajkowski family in Volhynia which were confiscated after 1831; the manifesto or appeal of the secret patriotic Committee of Ukraine and Bessarabia (16 September 1853), which is apparently the same as the memorandum to which Czajkowski refers in his memoirs; and the Address of the Committee of Ukraine and Bessarabia to the Sublime Porte, also dated 16 September 1853. The content indeed reflects the summary given by Czajkowski in his memoirs. The documents exist, then, but since they came from Czajkowski’s son, it cannot be ruled out that they were forged by Czajkowski himself. There is one additional interesting feature—the documents are signed, but I confess that the names are unknown to me. For instance, the Address to the Sublime Porte contains the signatures of the chairman of the Committee of Ukraine and Bessarabia, General Major Prince Dabizha; Major-General Kraichenko; Major-General Haparii; State Councillor Obraza; grazhdanin, or merchant, Gramba; and the delegate of Bessarabia, P. S. Bashata. The names on the second document coincide, except in a few instances. With some further effort, it could be determined whether these men really existed, but in any case, this overlooked episode is an interesting and important one, with more substance to it than has been generally recognized.

In conclusion, nothing materialized of Czajkowski’s Crimean project of 1854. The Cossack unit was maintained for some years, but transferred to the regular Turkish army and eventually stationed on the frontier of the kingdom of Greece in Thessaly, which still belonged to the Ottoman Empire. In 1866 Ludwika died, a great loss to Czajkowski, because she was a steadying factor in his life. After some time, Czajkowski entered upon a third marriage with a Greek girl, Irene Theoskolo, who was considerably younger than he. Partly under the influence of his third wife, and partly because of his awareness of the futility of his life in exile and the failure of his plans, all Czajkowski’s later writings are suffused with a sense of profound nostalgia for his Ukrainian homeland. Furthermore, the change of political scene with the fall of the Second Empire and Napoleon III eliminated any possibility of an anti-Russian coalition in Europe. Now the dominant power was Germany, which was closely
allied with Russia. Czajkowski was always anti-German, and now he conceived the notion that Russia was the last hope of the Slavs in face of the Teutonic danger. In 1873, he appealed for a pardon to Alexander II, whom he hailed as leader of all the Slavs. This pardon was granted, and he returned to Russia, which for him meant Ukraine. Once again he changed his religion and converted to Orthodoxy. He was given a small landed estate in Left-Bank Ukraine, but was boycotted by the entire Polish society and had no contact with the new Ukrainian national movement, which was populist in orientation and had no use for such an archaic figure as Czajkowski. His wife left him, and Czajkowski lived together with an old aide-de-camp and companion, Morozowicz. After the death of his friend, Czajkowski took his own life in 1886.

Note

1. Professor Omeljan Pritsak points out that General Dabizha is known to have existed; he had a Mazepist orientation and published some articles in Kievskaiarstarina.

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Franciszek Duchiński and His Impact on Ukrainian Political Thought

Franciszek Duchinski is a nearly unknown historical figure. Even the few scholars who have taken an interest in him in recent decades have failed to recognize his role in Ukrainian intellectual history. Yet in fact, as this study contends, Duchinski had a major influence on the shaping of modern Ukrainian political thought.

Franciszek Henryk Duchinski was born in 1816 to an impoverished Polish szlachta family of Right-Bank Ukraine. He attended secondary schools in Berdychiv and Uman, run by the Carmelite and Basilian orders, respectively. In 1834 he settled in Kiev, where for the next twelve years he made a living as a tutor in the homes of Polish aristocrats. Duchinski developed a strong attachment to the ancient Ukrainian capital; in later years, he regularly signed his Polish works “Franciszek Duchinski Kijowianin,” or, in French, “Duchinski de Kiew.” In 1846 he left the Russian Empire surreptitiously on a Greek ship sailing from Odessa. Having arrived in Paris, Duchinski attached himself to the “uncrowned king of the Polish emigration,” Prince Adam Czartoryski. In Czartoryski’s paper, Trzeci Maj (1847–8), Duchinski published, besides several programmatic articles, news about the arrest and trial by tsarist authorities of the members of the Cyriollo-Methodian Society in Kiev. Duchinski belonged to the circle of Prince Czartoryski’s “Ukrainian” collaborators; the two other members were Michał Czajkowski (1804–86) and Reverend Hipolit Terlecki (1808–88), both remarkable personalities in their own right. Like Duchinski, they were descended from the Right-Bank Polish-Ukrainian gentry and shared with him a pronounced Ukrainophile orientation. During the 1848 revolution Duchinski acted as Czartoryski’s agent in Italy and also visited Serbia. He moved to Istanbul in 1849, where he was to remain through 1855. In 1849 Duchinski conceived the idea of founding a Ukrainian journal dedi-
cated to fostering Ukrainian-Polish co-operation against Russia. The journal was to be published on the island of Corfu (then a British possession) and smuggled to Galicia via Hungary, and to Russian Ukraine via Odessa. However, Prince Czartoryski refused to endorse the plan. During the Crimean War, Duchiński worked in a civilian capacity for the British forces in Turkey. He returned to Paris in 1856. The next decade and a half comprised the most productive years of his life. He published profusely in Polish and French, gave a series of public lectures (at the Cercle des Sociétés Savantes and the Polish Higher School in Paris), and established contacts with French scholars and men of letters. These activities were cut short by the demise of the Second Empire. Duchiński then moved to Switzerland, where he became director of the Polish National Museum in Rapperswil near Zurich in 1872. From Switzerland, he visited Galicia a few times. Contemporaries described him as honourable, gentle, and considerate in his personal dealings, but dogmatic and rigid in his theoretical conceptions. His works testify to industry and considerable erudition. However, as a self-taught man with a one-track mind, he was by no means a sound scholar. Duchiński did not hesitate to bend facts to make them conform with his preconceptions.

Franciszek Duchiński died on 13 July 1893, at the age of seventy-seven. He is buried at the Polish cemetery in Montmorency, France. His tombstone bears an epitaph in Ukrainian written in the Latin script—a fitting symbol of the man’s dual Polish-Ukrainian allegiance.

A posthumous edition of Duchiński’s Polish works was planned in five volumes, of which only three appeared. The loss is perhaps not to be regretted, because he was an extremely repetitious writer who had the habit of inserting summaries of and excerpts from his earlier writings in subsequent ones. Duchiński’s output also included several books and numerous articles in French, as well as a few pieces in German and in Ukrainian.

These writings were based on a racial philosophy of history. Duchiński divided mankind into two great branches—the “Aryans,” or Indo-Europeans, and the “Turanians.” To the latter group he assigned the Finno-Ugrians, Turks, Mongols, and Chinese, and even the Semites, African Negroes, American Indians, and Australian Aborigines. The main difference between the two racial families consists, according the Duchiński, in the Aryans being sedentary agriculturalists, whereas the Turanians are more or less nomadic. This racial contrast extends to all aspects of social and cultural life and is ineradicable. Unsurprisingly, Duchiński attributed all attractive features—e.g., love of freedom and capacity for intellectual creativity—to the Aryans, and the opposite features to the Turanians.

These universal-historical concepts became Duchiński’s intellectual
frame of reference for treating the issues that were his real concerns. He was obsessed with the problem of Polish-Russian relations, in which he assigned Ukraine a crucial role. In an autobiographical passage, Duchński states that the formative experience of his youth had been the Polish insurrection of 1830–31, which happened when he was only thirteen. But, he wrote, “since that time, war [against Russia] and [the problem of] Rus’ [i.e., Ukraine] have been the content of our life.” He became strongly convinced that “Rus’ means a stronger and more valorous Poland, and that Poland’s [future] rising will not succeed unless it starts in Rus’.\textsuperscript{11}

Duchński interpreted the Polish–Russian conflict in racial terms. For him, Poland represented the Aryan, and Muscovy-Russia the Turanian race. A corollary of this was the thesis of the racial (and hence cultural and political) unity of Poland and Rus’-Ukraine. According to Duchński, Aryan Europe extends as far as the Dnieper valley. This European sphere includes Ukraine (to which he consistently applied the historical name of Rus’), Belorussia, Lithuania, the Baltic provinces, the region of Smolensk, and the territory of the former republic of Great Novgorod. Farther east lies the alien Turanian world, which corresponds geographically with the Volga River valley. Duchński strenuously denied the Slavic character of the Russian people: “The Muscovites are neither Slavs nor Christians in the spirit of the [true] Slavs and other Indo-European Christians. They are nomads until this day, and will remain nomads forever.”\textsuperscript{12} He maintained that the Muscovites are in essence more related to the Chinese than to their Ukrainian and Belorussian neighbours. Inversely, the latter are closer to the Irish and Portuguese, or to the European settlers in the Americas, than to the Muscovites.

It is a great error, Duchński asserted, to begin the history of Muscovy with the Slavs of Kiev and Novgorod instead of with the Finnic tribes of the Volga valley. Contrary to what Russian historians say, there has never been a mass migration of Slavs from the Dnieper to the Volga, and the Tsardom of Muscovy cannot be considered a continuation or a legitimate heir of the Kievian Rus’ state. The adoption of the name “Russia” by the rulers of Muscovy is a historical usurpation. The Finnic and Tatar inhabitants of Muscovy, it is true, have gradually taken on the Slavic language under the impact of the Riurikid dynasty and the church, but they have retained their original racial character, as evidenced by their migratory habits, communism (a reference to the Russian repartitional village commune), autocratic form of government, and religious sects. The Russian Empire will never become federative, because the Turanians lack the rooting in the soil and the sense of local and regional patriotism that are the preconditions for federal arrangements.

Duchński represented the history of Ukrainian-Russian (in his termi-
nology, Ruthenian-Muscovite) relations as a continuous confrontation, beginning with Volodymyr the Great (who subjugated the Volga tribes), through the sack of Kiev by the Suzdalian in the twelfth century, and down to Mazepa’s times and his own. The wars of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth against Muscovy were a direct continuation of the preceding conflicts of the Ruthenians of Kiev and Novgorod with Suzdal and Moscow. It is untrue that the Muscovites rule over Little Russia (i.e., Left-Bank Ukraine) with the free consent of that country. Actually, the Treaty of Pereiaslav, concluded between Hetman Bohdan Khmelnytsky and tsarist envoys in 1654, established only a loose link between Little Russia and Muscovy, analogous to the relationship between the principalities of Wallachia and Moldavia and the Ottoman Porte. “The Muscovites rule over the Little Russians as a result of their victory over the latter at the Battle of Poltava, in 1708 [sic].”

As a reverse side of this alleged perennial Ukrainian-Russian conflict, Duchinński postulated an organic unity of Ukrainians and Poles. A proof of this, he said, was in the very name of the Poliany, the Slavic tribe of the Kiev region, which he considered identical with the name of the Poles. The original unity of the Slavs of the Vistula and the Dnieper had been temporarily disrupted by the Varangian Riurik dynasty and Tatar invasions, but it was fortunately restored in the fourteenth century under the auspices of the Jagiellonian dynasty. Contrary to appearances, the Poles and Ukrainians are not separated either by language or religion. The Polish and Ukrainian languages are closer to each other in spirit than is Polish to Czech or Ukrainian to Russian. The Holy See recognized the Catholicity of Old Rus’ Christianity by accepting the canonization of the Kievan saints—Olha, Volodymyr, Antonii, and Teodosii. The Ruthenians have always inclined toward union with the Roman church, but this natural trend has been interfered with by Moscow. Duchinński pushed the concept of Polish-Ukrainian unity to its logical conclusion:

It is necessary to incorporate into Polish history the entire historical past of Lithuania and Rus’. . . . The medieval history of Poland, prior to the unification of her people in the fourteenth century, belongs today to all inhabitants of Poland in the same manner as the provincial histories of the dukies and kingdoms which existed in France until the fifteenth century belong today to all Frenchmen.

Duchinński dealt ingeniously with historical facts not easily reconcilable with his vision of a providential Polish-Ukrainian harmony. This was especially true of his explanation of the great Cossack uprisings against Poland in the seventeenth century: the Cossacks were not genuine Slavs but Slavicized Tatars, and the Cossack brigands actually oppressed
the Ukrainian peasantry. However, Duchiński immediately forgets the "Turanianism" of the Cossacks whenever instances of their resistance to Moscow occur, and he mentions favourably Mazepa's revolt against Peter I. Thus for Duchiński the Cossacks were evil Turanians when they fought Poland, but good Aryans when they opposed Muscovy.

One could be tempted to label Duchiński a nationalist Pole who wished to restore Polish dominion over Ukraine and to entice Ukrainians into Poland's struggle against Russia. However, this interpretation would not do justice to his position. There can be no doubt that he sincerely loved his Ukrainian homeland, and that he believed in an equal partnership and fraternal union of the Slavs of the Vistula with those of the Dnieper. Duchiński deprecated Polish ethnic nationalism as "Mazovian provincialism." He envisioned future Polish-Ukrainian relations on the model of the Union of Hadiach (1658), which was an attempt to transform the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth into a tripartite federation by the addition of a Ruthenian Grand Duchy. However, in contrast to the seventeenth-century arrangement, the future autonomous Rus'-Ukraine would also include Galicia. "The rise of the Ruthenian nationality in Galicia is a natural phenomenon, and it cannot be stopped by any force." Duchiński tried to dispel Polish apprehensions that the Ukrainian national movement was a threat to historical Poland. He trusted that a free Ukraine would be drawn irresistibly toward union with Poland, and argued that "the easiest means to disarm the Ruthenians in their struggle against Poland and to bring them closer to Poland is to recognize their independence."

Duchiński was a sympathetic, even enthusiastic, observer of the contemporary Ukrainian national revival. One finds in his writings frequent references to the historical and political treatise Istoriia Rusov (written c. 1820 and published in 1846), "in which Little Russia's hatred of Moscow is depicted in strong colours"; to the activities of Ukrainian writers and scholars, e.g., the publication of Cossack chronicles; and to the efforts of the nobility in the Chernihiv and Poltava provinces to preserve the traditional code of civil law, the so-called Lithuanian Statute, in opposition to the centralizing policies of Nicholas I. Duchiński was the first to advertise in the Polish émigré press the suppression of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society. At times, it is true, Duchiński's statements about the Ukrainian movement were exaggerated, but this was the result of his wishful thinking. Thus he assured his French readers: "Gogol and Shevchenko are not Muscovites at all. They are Little Russians, and they were the first and among the most ardent in protesting against Muscovite domination of Little Russia. They dreamed of the complete independence of that country." This is a fairly correct definition of Shevchenko's national-political position, but hardly of Gogol's!
In his historical-political theory Duchinski advocated the idea of an all-European federation led by France and directed against Russia. To facilitate the formation of such a European community, he wished to defuse the smouldering German-Polish hostility. According to Duchinski, there exists no basic racial incompatibility between the Germans and the Poles. For centuries the two peoples lived peacefully side by side, and past conflicts involved only individual German states (such as the Teutonic Knights and the Prussia of Frederick the Great), not the German nation as such. Unfortunately, German-Polish relations became exacerbated after 1848, but this tension will cease "once the Poles and the Germans comprehend the dangers which threaten them from the East."  

In Duchinski’s own words, his entire life’s work was inspired by one guiding idea, which he formulated in an appeal addressed to the peoples of Europe: "On to the Dnieper! on to the Dnieper! forward to Kiev, ye peoples of Europe! There is the point of your solidarity, because there the Little Russians are resuming their struggle against Moscow in defence of their European civilization...."  

Duchinski’s views make up a curious tissue in which obvious fallacies and doctrinaire distortions are interspersed with genuine insight. To sort out these various strands would transcend the scope of the present paper. Instead, I shall consider Duchinski’s theory as an ideology whose historical impact can be assessed irrespectively of how it stands up to a scientific critique.

In the late 1850s and 60s Duchinski acquired a following among a group of French intellectuals, including Elias Regnault, Charlier de Steinbach, M. Brullé (dean of the Faculty of Sciences at the University of Dijon), the historian Henri Martin (author of a popular textbook of French history), and the traveller, geographer, and ethnographer Auguste Viquesnel. To their number must be added the politician and economist Casimir Delamarre (1796–1870), a regent of the Bank of France and publisher of the newspaper La Patrie, who "became a zealous apostle of Duchinski’s ideas." In 1868 Delamarre published a pamphlet addressed to the Legislative Body (Corps législatif) of the French Empire in which he proposed that the Chair of Slavic Language and Literature at the Collège de France be renamed the Chair of "Slavic Languages and Literatures"; the plural was "to destroy [Russian] Pan-Slavism in its principle." Delamarre’s initiative was crowned with success. The Legislative Body discussed his proposal and adopted a favourable resolution. On 20 November 1868, Napoleon III signed a decree changing the name of the Slavic chair. The next year, Delamarre published a second pamphlet, this time devoted specifically to the Ukrainian question, entitled Un peuple européen de quinze millions oublé devant
l'histoire.\textsuperscript{26} This was a petition to the French Senate calling for a reform in the teaching of history in secondary schools. A new syllabus was to be adopted which would stress the difference between the Ruthenians and the Russians, and the non-Slavic nature of the latter. In the introduction to the German translation of the pamphlet, C. de Steinbach paid Duchinski the following tribute: "If we in France have for the past twelve or fifteen years known more than people elsewhere about this subject ['the truth about the eastern parts of Europe'], we owe this exclusively to the researches of Mr. Duchinski.\ldots"\textsuperscript{27}

Duchinski's successes in France were short-lived. The effects of his propaganda were wiped out by the debacle of the Second Empire in 1870. Defeated and humiliated by Bismarck's Prussia-Germany, the French could no longer indulge in dreams of hegemony on the continent, or of intervention in the affairs of Eastern Europe. Pro-Polish sympathies, traditional in France, evaporated. French public opinion began rather to look toward Russia as a potential ally against Germany. Also, the rise of scholarly Slavic studies in the last quarter of the century discredited Duchinski's ideas. The noted French Slavic scholar, Louis Leger (1843–1923), who for many years occupied the Slavic chair at the Collège de France, dismisses Duchinski with a few contemptuous phrases, without mentioning him by name.\textsuperscript{28}

Duchinski's theory enjoyed a certain popularity in Poland in the late nineteenth century, but there, too, its impact was only transitory. Intellectually Duchinski belonged to the age of Polish Romanticism. He was out of tune with the new positivist mood which swept Polish society after the failure of the 1863 uprising. His dilettantism and lack of academic respectability became a source of embarrassment to Polish intellectuals, among whom the term Duchińskićzyzna (Duchinskianism) acquired ironic overtones. Even the editors of the posthumous publication of his works felt compelled to insert a disclaimer in the preface: "Duchinski is no scholar in the precise meaning of the word."\textsuperscript{29} As to his political program, it must be kept in mind that Duchinski was an heir to the tradition of the historical Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth; Ukraine was his homeland, and he could not envisage a Poland without Ukraine. The growth of Polish ethnic nationalism (which Duchinski deplored) and the gradual withdrawal of interest from the former eastern borderlands made his theory irrelevant for Polish society.

The one national community on whose intellectual development Duchinski exercised a profound, long-range impact was that of Ukraine. Certain concepts widespread in modern Ukrainian society can be traced back to him, although their original authorship is not remembered.

Let us identify the points of contact between Duchinski and the Ukrainian national movement of his time. In 1870–72 he contributed
several serialized articles and shorter pieces to the Ukrainian newspaper *Osnova*, published in Lviv. The articles, which he signed *Kyianyn* (A Kievan), rehashed Duchinski’s perennial ideas. At the same time, in the early 1870s, Duchinski maintained contacts with a group of Galician Ukrainian students at the Zurich Polytechnical Institute. Educated Ukrainians also read Duchinski’s Polish writings and knew about the repercussions and polemics they evoked in the Polish and Russian press.

It ought to be made clear that Ukrainian receptivity to Duchinski’s message was selective. That part of it which pertained to Ukrainian-Polish relations did not strike a responsive chord in Ukrainian minds. The entire course of the Ukrainian national revival in Galicia, from 1848 until World War I and beyond, was determined by the struggle, of ever increasing intensity, against Polish dominance in the province. Rare attempts at compromise, such as the one initiated in 1869 by Iulian Lavrivsky, the publisher of *Osnova*, invariably miscarried. Relations between Poles and Ukrainians in the Russian Empire were less acrimonious than in Galicia. But the Polish minority in Right-Bank Ukraine was represented by the region’s landed nobility, while the Ukrainian movement, which had a populist colouring, identified itself with the interests of the peasantry. No responsible Ukrainian spokesman, either in Russian Ukraine or Galicia, ever endorsed the platform of a restored Polish Commonwealth with an autonomous Ukraine as a component. Duchinski’s favourite idea of a Polish-Ukrainian federation could not, therefore, withstand the test of reality.

In turning our attention to the other side of Duchinski’s theory, that dealing with Ukrainian-Russian relations, we encounter an altogether different situation. His thoughts on that subject found a receptive audience among certain segments of Ukrainian society.

Among the ideological issues which the Ukrainian national movement had to face in the nineteenth century, perhaps none was more important than defining the Ukrainians’ attitude toward Russia. The problem had an obvious practical urgency: a policy had to be evolved toward the Russian imperial state, whose presence weighed so heavily on all aspects of Ukrainian life. On a theoretical level, an answer had to be found to the question in what relation Ukrainians and Russians stood toward each other as peoples—whether they formed an essential national unity with only minor tribal and dialectal differences, or were two totally distinct national organisms, or whether some intermediate view should be taken. Virtually all Ukrainian social thinkers of the age wrestled with this problem, and their search for national identity was gradually moving toward an ever more radical assertion of Ukraine’s distinctiveness as an ethnic and historic entity.

During the early stages of the Ukrainian national revival, from the be-
beginning through the middle of the nineteenth century, Ukrainian intellectuals did not, as a rule, perceive the Ukrainian-Russian relationship as an irreconcilable ethnic antagonism. Ukrainian patriotism often co-existed in their minds with the notion of a broader all-Rus’ identity which encompassed both Ukrainians (South or Little Russians) and Muscovites (North or Great Russians). This concept, which tried to strike a balance between loyalties to Ukraine and to Russia as a whole, found its clearest formulation in the programmatic essay by Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85), *Dve russkiia narodnosti* (The Two Rus’ Nationalities), published in 1861. Kostomarov contrasted the Ukrainian tradition of individualism and libertarianism with the Great Russian tradition of collectivism and authoritarianism, and he concluded that the relationship between the two branches of the Rus’ people was essentially complementary. Kostomarov later recapitulated his convictions in the following statement: ‘‘... the Little and the Great Russians complement each other by their specific traits, evolved under the influence of history and geography, and they ought to seek their true common good in a close union and interaction of the two principal nationalities [of Rus’].’’ A twentieth-century historian has said of Kostomarov’s ‘‘The Two Rus’ Nationalities’’ that the article ‘‘was very popular and was for a long time regarded as ‘the gospel of Ukrainian nationalism.’’”

But there also existed in Ukrainian society another, alternative trend—at first, only an emotional undercurrent—which can be described as separatist. It was given stirring expression by the bard of the Ukrainian renascence, Taras Shevchenko. The separatist trend was beset by serious intellectual difficulties, however: it ran against the established opinion of a close ethnic kinship between the Ukrainians and the Russians, rooted in the shared legacy of Old Rus’ and bolstered by their common Orthodox religion. It is significant that even the *Istoriiia Rusov*, which so eloquently voiced protest against the subversion of Cossack Ukraine’s autonomy by Muscovite autocracy, frequently referred to the Russians as ‘‘people of the same origin and the same faith.’’ Duchinński’s theory offered a means of overcoming this intellectual difficulty. This explains its appeal to those Ukrainians who were groping for arguments supporting their distinct national identity.

Anti-Russian ideas derived from Duchinński could not be aired openly in publications which appeared under tsarist censorship. We know, however, that they had some followers in Dnieper Ukraine, for instance, the writer and civic activist Oleksander Konisky (1836–1900). Concepts of this type could surface only in Austrian Galicia. They frequently appeared in the press of the populist-nationalist (*narodovtsi*) movement, especially in polemics against the local Russophiles (*moskovфи*) ; the latter advocated the notion of ‘‘one Russian nation from the Carpathians to the
Pacific.'" Writing in 1889, Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95) noted regretfully that "Galician official Ukrainophiles have for some time begun to broadcast Duchiński’s refurbished theory in their popular literature, thinking that by this means they serve the interests of Ukrainian nationality." 40 A good specimen of such propagandistic literature was the pamphlet by Lonhyn Tsehelsky (1875–1950), Rus’-Ukraine a Moskovshchyna-Rossiiia (Rus’-Ukraine and Muscovy-Russia), published in 1900 by the Prosvita society and circulated in tens of thousands of copies throughout the Galician countryside. 41 According to a memoirist, the purpose of the brochure was "to popularize among our people the name ‘Ukrainian’ and ‘Ukraine,’ and to overcome moskovfil’stvo by a demonstration of the historic, ethnic, ideological, and cultural differences between the two peoples." 42

Mykola Kostomarov and Mykhailo Drahomanov, the two outstanding political thinkers of nineteenth-century Ukraine, opposed the spread of Duchiński’s theory on intellectual as well as political grounds. As conscientious scholars, they could not agree with Duchiński’s distortions of historical truth. Thus Kostomarov argued:

The Great Russians are no Finns, but Slavs, because they do not know any Finnic dialect, but speak a Slavic language. Finnic blood, it is true, has entered Great Russians, but it has been assimilated by Slavic blood. The admixture of the Finnic race has not been without some influence on the material and intellectual make-up of the Great Russian people, but the Slavic element remains dominant. We cannot call the [German] inhabitants of Mecklenburg Slavs only because their ancestors were once Slavs. . . . 43

Drahomanov insistently objected to clichés about national character and to ascribing to race certain features of Russian life which, in fact, were conditioned by historic and social factors and hence were not innate, but amenable to change. 44 About the issue of the degree of kinship between the Ukrainians and the Russians, Drahomanov demanded that it be approached with an open mind. He thought that, at the current level of knowledge, the problem was not yet ready for an unequivocal answer: ‘there is room either for a theory of a total distinctiveness of the Ukrainians from the Great Russians or for a pan-Russian theory.’ 45

Kostomarov and Drahomanov also opposed Duchiński’s teachings for political reasons. As convinced federalists, they believed that the cause of the Ukrainian people’s national and social liberation was tied to the evolution of Russia as a whole, that is, to the transformation of the imperial state on democratic-federalist lines. (The differences between Kostomarov’s and Drahomanov’s versions of federalism cannot be considered here.) This imposed the need for cooperation with the liberal and
democratic elements of Russian society, and precluded ethnic hatred of the Russian people. But the prospects of the federalist program depended on the response of the Russian side, and this response could not have been more discouraging. Not only did the tsarist regime remain obdurately centralist and repressive, but also the Russian leftist intelligentsia, including its revolutionary segments, displayed a constant disregard of and hostility toward the claims of the non-Russian nationalities. Ironically, the very champions of Ukrainian federalist thought, Kostomarov and Drahomanov, were frequently attacked by Russian spokesmen for their alleged “separatism.” This state of affairs was bound to favour the spread of Duchinski-type ideas among Ukrainians. Drahomanov once wrote in exasperation to a Galician confidant: “This idiot Katkov has indeed succeeded in inoculating the Ukrainian national movement (ukrainofilstvo) with Duchinskianism.”

Drahomanov made this diagnosis in 1889. Future developments fully confirmed its accuracy. The decisive shift in Ukrainian political thinking from federalism to the idea of independent statehood occurred in Galicia around the turn of the century, and in east-central Ukraine in 1917—20, as a result of painful experiences with the Russias of Kerensky, Lenin, and Denikin. What Ukrainian patriots had previously perceived as a confrontation primarily with the tsarist regime they now began to see as a confrontation with the Russian state as such, irrespective of its form of government, or even as an ethnic confrontation with the Russian people. During the inter-war era, Ukrainian society outside the USSR (which comprised the Ukrainian populations in Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia, as well as the Ukrainian diaspora) became permeated by an ideology of militant anti-Russian nationalism. The most influential publicist of the interwar era, Dmytro Dontsov (1883—1973), in his tract Piłstavy nashoi polityky (The Foundations of Our Policy, 1921) formulated the theory of an eternal struggle between Russia and Europe, and assigned to Ukraine the historical mission of being the outpost of Europe against Russia. There is a striking coincidence between Dontsov’s and Duchinski’s views on this issue, although we do not know whether the former drew directly on the latter’s writings. Some other concepts of Duchinskian provenance, which were now elevated to the rank of patriotic dogma among non-Soviet Ukrainians, were the following: the thesis that the medieval Kievan Rus’ state was the creation of the Ukrainian people alone and that the Russians have no legitimate claims to this legacy; and the stress on the presence of a non-Slavic, Finno-Ugric substratum in the ethnic make-up of the Russian people. Even after World War II the linguist and literary critic George Shevelov (Iurii Sherekh) felt motivated to rebuke the racist prejudices of his fellow Ukrainian émigrés:

Why should blood links with the Finns be considered comprom-
ing for the Russians?... Has any other nation behaved more heroically than the Finns in recent times?... There is truly much that we could learn from the Finns. Our contempt for the Mongols, the Semites, and the Finns is something that we have borrowed from Moscow. And the naive theory of our historical role as a bulwark of Europe against the East we have borrowed from Warsaw. Parochial national presumption is always ridiculous, and its consequences can only be catastrophic.50

In spite of personal idiosyncrasies, Franciszek Duchiński was representative of a peculiar social type, the Ukrainophile Pole. The Polish minority in Right-Bank Ukraine produced a series of personalities in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries who stood on the border between the Polish and the Ukrainian nationalities. Some of the Ukrainophile Poles were actually to cross over to the Ukrainian side. Duchiński did not take this step. He always continued to consider himself a Pole, but also maintained his Ukrainian loyalties. In his old age, he stated proudly: "... I have not betrayed my Kievan flag, that is, the flag of an independent Little Russia. . . ."51 Ukrainophile Poles and Ukrainians with a Polish background (the dividing line between these two categories was tenuous) made a definite contribution to the making of modern Ukraine which historians have been slow to recognize. Coming from a national society which possessed strong traditions of statehood and active resistance to foreign oppression, they were able to impart something of these qualities to the Ukrainian movement. Their influence helped to lift the Ukrainian revival above the level of a non-political, cultural regionalism, and stimulated its anti-Russian militancy. The reason they have not received due attention in scholarly literature is not difficult to discern. Ukrainophile Poles had the misfortune to fall into a "blind spot." From the perspective of Polish national history they appeared marginal and irrelevant, while, at the same time, they did not seem to belong fully to the Ukrainian historical process, at least not as it was understood by historians of the populist school.
Notes

1. This biographical account is based primarily on S. Grabski, “Życie i działalność lite-
racka Franciszka Duchińskiego Kijowanina,” published as an introductory essay in Pisma Franciszka Duchińskiego (Rapperswil 1901), 1:viii–xxxiv. Reminiscences of
Duchiński’s youth are to be found in his Drógi [sic] mój XXVº letni jubileusz (Paris
1885). Additional information derives from M. Handelsman, Ukraińska polityka ks.
Adama Czartoryskiego przed wojną krymską (Warsaw 1937), and I. Borshchak,

2. There is some uncertainty about Duchiński’s year of birth, which in some sources is
given as 1817. I accept the year given by Duchiński himself in Drógi mój XXVº letni
jubileusz, v; information about the month and day of his birth was unavailable to me.

3. Trzeci Maj, no. 7, 24 January 1848, in Handelsman, Ukraińska polityka, 114. Al-
though Duchiński lived in Kiev at the time when the Society was active, he was not
personally acquainted with any of its members. Duchiński, Drógi mój XXVº letni ju-
bileusz, xxii.

4. During the Crimean War, Czajkowski organized a Cossack legion in Turkey with the
aim of creating an autonomous Ukrainian Cossack state under Ottoman protection: see M. Czajkowski (Mehmed Sadyk Pasza), Moje wspomnienia o wojnie 1854 roku
(Warsaw 1962). Cf. the recent biographical study by J. Chudzikowska, Dzienne życie Sadyka Paszy: O Michale Czajkowski (Warsaw 1971). In 1847–8 Terlecki sub-
mitted several memoranda to Pope Pius IX proposing the establishment of a
Ruthenian Uniate (Eastern-rite Catholic) patriarchate, with the intention of turning
the Ukrainian and Belorussian peoples away from the spiritual authority of the Rus-
sian Orthodox church. See I. L. Rudnytsky, “Ipolit Volodymyr Terletskyi—
 zabutyi tservkovo-hromadskyi diiach i politychnyi myslytel XIX stolittia,” Ukra"
143–72.

5. Based on the vivid pen portrait in Handelsman, Ukraińska polityka, 110.

is 13 June 1893.

Borshchak also reproduces the text of the epitaph:

    DUCHINSKÓMU
    ZEMLAKI
    NASHI LUDE NE ZABUDUT’
    DOKI ŽTY PY BUDUT’
    DUSZI TWEI, SŁOWA TWOHO
    BILSZ NE TRA NICZHO.
    /To Duchiński
    his fellow countrymen:
    our people shall not forget
    as long as they live
    your soul. your word.
    Nothing more is needed./

8. Pisma Franciszka Duchińskiego (hereafter Pisma), 1 (1901), 2 (1902), 3 (1904), all
published in Rapperswil.


10. The following account is based primarily on F.-H. Duchiński (de Kiew), Peuples
Aryâs et Tourans, Agriculteurs et Nomades: Nécessité des réformes dans
l’exposition de l’histoire des peuples Aryâs-Européens et Tourans, particulièrem

des Slaves et des Moscovites (Paris 1864). The three volumes of Duchinisky’s Pisma have also been consulted.

12. Peuples Aryâs et Tourans, 22.
13. Peuples Aryâs et Tourans, 48. The incorrect date is not a typographical error, because it was repeated by Duchinisky in the title of his German pamphlet: Ursachen die seit der Katastrophe von Pultava 1708 zur Entwicklung der ruthenischen Nationalität das Meiste beigetragen haben… (Rapperswil 1872), cited in Borshchak, “Ukraina v Paryzhi,” 707.
17. Duchinisky’s letter of 15 March 1852 to Count Władysław Zamoyski, nephew and closest collaborator of Prince Adam Czartoryski. The full text of this important letter is reprinted in Handelsman, Ukrainska polityka, 148–50. The quoted passage appears on p. 150.
18. Handelsman, Ukrainska polityka, 149.
19. Ibid., 148.
20. Peuples Aryâs et Tourans, 74, n. 27.
21. Ibid., 64, n. 12.
22. Drógi mój XXV-leci jubileusz, x.
23. The publications of Duchinisky’s French followers are listed and briefly discussed in E. Borschak (I. Borshchak), L’Ukraine dans la littérature de l’Europe occidentale (Paris 1935), Offprint from Le Moude Slave, nos. 3, 4 (1933); nos. 1, 2, 4 (1934); no. 1 (1935):89–91.
27. Delamarre, Ein Volk, 8.
30. The newspaper Osnova, which appeared in Lviv twice weekly (1870–72), must not be confused with the better-known St. Petersburg monthly of the same title (1861–2).
31. For a detailed discussion of Duchinisky’s articles in Osnova, see M. Vozniak, “Pid haslom ‘Na Dnipro! Na Dnipro! Do Kyieva!’ Frantsišek Dukhinskij i ukrainska sprava,” Dilo, 12, 13, 14, 17 April 1935, nos. 96, 97, 98 and 101.
32. References in M. P. Drahomanov, Literatururno-publitsystychni prasti (Kiev 1970), 2:11, 183–5, 461. The one Galician known to have been acquainted with Duchinisky in Zurich was Vasyl Nahirny (1847–1921), who later had a distinguished career as architect and pioneer of the Ukrainian co-operative movement.
33. On Iliian Lavrivsky’s policy, see K. Levytsky, Istoriiia politychnoi dumky halutskykh ukrainsiv 1848–1914 (Lviv 1926), 118–23.
34. Cf. Lu. Venelin’s penetrating contemporary analysis, “O spore mezhdush iuzhanami i secvrianami na schet ikh rossizma,” written c. 1832 and published posthumously in Chtenia Moskovskogo obschestva istorii i drevnostei, no. 4 (1847). I used the résumé, with extensive quotations from the original, which appears in A. N. Pypin,
Istoriia russkoi etnografii, v. 3: Etnografiiia malorusskaia (St. Petersburg 1891), 301–7.


36. “Moe ukrainofilstvo v Kudeiare” (1875), in Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia Kostomarova, ed. M. Hrushevsky (Kiev 1928), 251.

37. Doroshenko, Survey, 139.


41. I was able to consult the second enlarged edition, Rus’-Ukraina a Moskovshchyna-Rossiia (Istanbul [actually Vienna] 1916).

42. A. Tsurkovsky in Almanakh ‘‘Molodoi Ukrainy’’: Spohady pro himnaziini hurky v Berezhanakh (Munich and New York 1954), 30.

43. “Otvet na vykhodki gazety (krakovskoi) Czas i zhurnala Revue contemporaine” (1861), in Naukovo-publitsystychni i polemichni pysannia Kostomarova, 98.


45. “Chudatski dumky pro ukrainsku natsionalnu spravu” (1891), in Drahomanov, Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi, 2:364.

46. Letter of Drahomanov to M. Pavlyk dated 31 October 1889, in Perepyska Mykhaila Drahomanova z Mykhalom Pavlykom, ed. M. Pavlyk (Chernivtsi 1912), 5:396. The reference in the letter is to the Russian publicist Mikhail Katkov (1818–87), who was regarded as the ideologue of the reactionary and chauvinistic regime of Alexander III.

47. I discuss this transition in Ukrainian political thought from federalism to separatism in “The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents” (see this volume, 389–416).

48. D. Dontsov, Pidstavy nashoi politky (Vienna 1921).

49. For a recent attempt to justify this thesis in scholarly terms, see Mykola Chubaty, Kniazha Rus’-Ukraina ta vynyknennia trokh skhidnoslovianskykh natsii (New York and Paris 1964).


51. Duchinski, Drógi mój XXVeletni jubileusz, xi.
Drahomanov as a Political Theorist

The Scholar, the Journalist, and the Political Thinker

Drahomanov's literary work is composed of two clearly distinct groups—his scholarly writings, chiefly on ethnography and folklore, and his political writings, which are exclusively journalistic in form. There is never a question as to the group in which a certain work belongs. It is remarkable that Drahomanov, who was a scholar by training and profession, never gave his political works the form of learned treatises.

Of course, this does not mean that there is no connection between the two sides of Drahomanov's creative activity. He states clearly that his study of Ukrainian folk literature had a deep influence on the development of his political ideas. On the other hand, it is clear that the direction taken by his scholarly researches was often motivated by his political interests, as in the case of the analysis of the social and political content of folk poetry. In spite of these connections, there is a clear division between Drahomanov's scholarly and political writings. This is characteristic of his personality and methods. He was too conscientious to claim scholarly authority outside the field of his special competence. Drahomanov does not teach about political questions ex cathedra; he writes about them as a citizen and fighter who seeks to reach certain practical goals and is clearly aware of his special standpoint.

Therefore outwardly Drahomanov's political writings should be classified as journalism. But this is journalism on an exceptionally high level. Drahomanov brought his great erudition and conscientious scholarship to bear on each particular article. Even more important was his incorruptible intellectual integrity. Although the immediate occasion for many of his political writings was polemical, his attitude was never sophistical—to win the debate at any price—but philosophical in the best Socratic sense—to recognize the objective truth. Drahomanov did not
say what was tactically opportune, but what his research and reflection led him to believe to be true. His whole life was lived in accordance with his basic principle:

The least or bitterest truth is more valuable than the sweetest or most imposing false appearance.¹

Behind his journalistic exterior Drahomanov was a vigorous and original political thinker. As is always the case with original thinkers, to succeeding generations his ideas are not only of historical interest; they are also still vital enough to enrich and influence contemporary thought.

The fact that Drahomanov’s political writings usually had a polemical purpose has hindered the understanding of his ideas. Apart from the external difficulty that in order to read Drahomanov easily it is necessary to have some acquaintance with the quarrels of various Russian and Ukrainian factions of the 1870s to 1890s, there is a greater difficulty. In each of his political writings he is not only defending, but also opposing, a specific point of view. Therefore each given work is rather one-sided. None of them, with the possible exception of Istoricueskaia Polsha i velikorusskaia demokratia (Historical Poland and Great Russian Democracy), represents the whole Drahomanov, the whole range of his ideas, but only a certain section, determined by the position of his opponent. Thus there is a noticeable discrepancy between his Ukrainian and his Russian writings. In the former he appears as a ruthless critic of the weaknesses of the Ukrainian movement. In order to know Drahomanov, the courageous apologist for the rights of the Ukrainian people against Russian centralism and chauvinism, one must read his writings in Russian. It is only by taking both together that one obtains a well-rounded picture of Drahomanov’s position on the question of Russian-Ukrainian relations. It is the same with other topics. The contradictory interpretations of Drahomanov made by various critics—at various times he was attacked as a socialist and as a bourgeois constitutionalist, as a nationalist and as a cosmopolitan—are caused by the fact that his critics were content with considering one aspect of Drahomanov’s political philosophy. Drahomanov was aware of this, and once wrote, half jestingly:

During my whole life I have always been attacked from at least two opposite sides at once, and I have even set up for myself the criterion of regarding something as a failure if, on its account, I am only attacked from one side.²

We must, however, emphasize that although most of Drahomanov’s political writings are polemical, and all of them are in journalistic form, he should not be regarded as an essayist following the inspiration of the moment, but rather as a systematic thinker.
For me, each of my ideas, which is attacked from various sides, is a part of a whole system of ideas about Ukraine, Russia, Poland, the Slavic world, the Germans. . . . I have often stated that it is only to another system, even though it be diametrically opposed to my own, that I should surrender. So far no one has been able to show me such a system.  

Of course the "system" spoken of here is not a dogmatic, closed one. Drahomanov always rejected theories which claimed to have answers to all questions and patent remedies for all the difficulties of social life. This anti-dogmatism was certainly one of the bases for his repudiation of Marxism. The systematic character of Drahomanov's thought lies in the organic unity of his ideas, each of which is connected to and completes the others, and can only be understood within the whole.

The Liberal Kernel
Drahomanov's thought is syncretic. It combines democratic and socialist, patriotic and cosmopolitan, Slavophile and occidentalist elements. In order to view Drahomanov's system as an organic unity it is necessary to find the centre of gravity of the whole. In his political thinking this central point and determining factor is undoubtedly the liberal idea.

I define Drahomanov's liberalism as the doctrine that the freedom and worth of the human being are the highest values. Politically it is primarily concerned with the extension and strengthening of the rights of individuals. Like President Wilson after him, Drahomanov believed that the history of liberty was the history of the limitation of governmental power, not the increase of it. The security of the personal sphere is more important than participation in the creation of a collective political will.

It is self-evident that for each person the inviolability of his individual rights is much more essential than the right to direct, and particularly to indirect, influence on the course of affairs of state.  

In political revolutions he [the liberal] will be relatively indifferent to the form taken by the state at the top governmental level. However, he will always intervene to enlarge the freedom of every person, in word and deed—equally so for the freedom of races, associations, communities, and regions—this through the limitation, wherever possible, of the power and the authority of the state.

For Drahomanov the logical consequence of this thought was the ideal of anarchy—not of course in the popular sense of the word as disorder and the war of each against each, but as a vision of a condition where external authority and pressure would no longer be necessary, since men
would have learned to govern themselves and live in peace with their fellow men.

Mankind’s aim, which is completely unlike present-day states, is a condition where both larger and smaller social bodies will be composed of free men, united voluntarily for common work and mutual help. This goal is called anarchy, i.e., the autonomy of each individual and the free co-operation of men and groups. Proudhon’s influence on Drahomanov is visible here, and Drahomanov acknowledges it himself.

The doctrine of anarchy was formulated by Proudhon as an antithesis to French theories of the forties and fifties, which all, whether monarchic, constitutional, or republican, were more or less centralistic. Proudhon’s anarchism is the doctrine of the complete independence of the individual and the inviolability of his rights by all governmental powers, even elected and representative ones.

It is improbable that Drahomanov believed that anarchist ideals could be realized in the foreseeable, or even in the remote, future. He saw them rather as an indicator of the direction in which progress should be made, whether or not the goal could ever be reached. At one point Drahomanov compared the ideal of anarchy with the efforts of an engineer to reduce the friction in machines to nothing, although this naturally is impossible. Here a critic is inclined to remark that without friction no machine would function at all. The analogy is not completely favourable to Drahomanov’s thesis!

Drahomanov’s anarchic ideals led him to federalism. This is the part of his political philosophy which is best known. Anyone who has heard of Drahomanov at all knows that he was a federalist. People think that the federalization of Russia was his aim, but in reality this federalism was a universal principle. For a political thinker who takes the autonomy of the individual as his starting point, and who rejects every form of authoritarianism, federation—the adherence of persons with equal rights to groups and communities, and the co-operation of these in greater unions—is the only way to overcome the atomization of society.

In practice Proudhon’s anarchistic doctrines come down to federalism. Not only does federation not exclude discipline, but rather it is the best form of organization and discipline for humanity.

Proudhon says that the synonym for anarchy is the English word self-government. In its practical application the theory of anarchy leads to federalism.
Only small states, or rather communities, can be truly free societies. Only a federation of communities can be truly free.\textsuperscript{12}

The next quotation is especially important. It comes from a letter written in answer to a friend’s request for information about federalism. The letter shows Drahomanov’s wide erudition in this field and the sources he used, as well as certain practical implications of his federalist philosophy.

Among continental authors who have been concerned with the problem of federalism, the first place belongs to Proudhon and his \textit{Du Principe Fédératif}. I must pass over the English [he probably means Italian] and Spanish works except for the mention of Pi-y-Margal, \textit{Les Nationalités}; there is also a German translation. Constantin Frantz, \textit{Der Föderalismus}, is unreliable. It is hard to obtain Eőtvös [a Hungarian author]. Much of value is to be found in Mill, \textit{On Liberty}; Laboulaye, \textit{L’Etat et ses limites}; Odilon Barrot, \textit{De la centralisation et ses effets}; Dupont-White, \textit{L’Individu et l'état}; \textit{and in old Benjamin Constant, Principes de politique}… The theoretical pros and cons of federalism can be discussed endlessly. In some things centralization is necessary, in others, decentralization. Federalism has two main practical advantages: a) By the use of the national languages federation aids education and brings the courts and the administration closer to the people. There is a good book on this problem in modern Europe by Fischhof, \textit{Die Sprachenrechte in den Staaten gemischter Nationalität}. \textit{b) Administrative affairs are conducted by those whose interests are most directly affected. This latter point can best be understood by a comparison of social and political life in centralized and federative states. Our people must be shown how the peoples of Switzerland, England, and the United States of America live; the details of the national, provincial, and local constitutions must be explained. (cf. Decombynes, \textit{Les constitutions européennes}; Dareste, \textit{Les constitutions modernes}.)}\textsuperscript{13} There is an interesting book on the parallel development of the idea of democracy and the idea of freedom in Switzerland by Theodor Curti, \textit{Geschichte der schweizerischen Volksgesetzgebung}. \textit{Particular attention must be given to how, in our time, even centralized parliamen-}

tarism is being undermined from all sides.

Perhaps we can best see the natural tendency of Drahomanov’s thoughts in his sympathies and antipathies toward various lands and their governments. From the abstract discussion of the ideas of liberalism, anarchy, and federalism we here return to the world of concrete political reality.
Up to today the only states in Western Europe which have enjoyed solid political freedom are federative Switzerland, England—with its system of the guaranteed rights of classes, corporations, counties, and cities—municipal Belgium, the formerly federal republic of Holland, and the Scandinavian states, where centralism was never strong.\textsuperscript{14}

I put no faith in any state, with the exception of Switzerland and England.\textsuperscript{15}

It will immediately be noted that among the states which Drahomanov considers nearest to being the incarnation of his ideal there are a number of monarchies. Drahomanov did not share the automatic republicanism of most East European progressives, not because he had any particular fondness for monarchies, but because for him the form of the central government was of secondary importance.

Certain modern monarchies, such as the English and the Belgian, better guarantee a larger degree [of self-government and personal rights] than does the French Republic, for instance.\textsuperscript{16}

Finally let us remark that Drahomanov had a rather low opinion of the French Republic and its system of parliamentary centralism. Of all West European cultures, the French was the one that Drahomanov knew best, but his political thought was always opposed to the specifically French type of democracy, which looked back toward the Great Revolution. During the whole nineteenth century the French Revolution enjoyed tremendous prestige among Central and East European democrats. We need only mention that for decades the French \textit{Marseillaise} served as the hymn of progressives in Russia. The fact that Russian revolutionary factions tended to take the Jacobins as their prototype was probably the reason that Drahomanov formulated his negative judgment of Jacobinism so sharply. His opinion of the French Revolution is not in line with that of Burke, whose traditionalism was foreign to him; it is rather similar to that of the French liberal historian and sociologist Tocqueville, whose works he knew well. Like Tocqueville, Drahomanov distinguishes two currents in the Revolution, a constitutional, liberal and decentralizing one, and a centralizing, levelling, terrorist one. The victory of the latter through the dictatorship of the Jacobins was in fact the beginning of the counter-revolution, a reactivation of the worst aspects of the \textit{ancien régime}.\textsuperscript{17} Drahomanov gives special weight to the attitude of the revolutionaries toward provincial ethnic groups. In the forcible repression by the National Convention of the linguistic and cultural individuality of the Provençals, Bretons, Basques, Corsicans, and Alsatians, Drahomanov saw the first modern example of the policy of denationalization by the systematic
pressure of state machinery, a policy which was later to be copied by Prussia and Russia in their treatment of ethnic minorities.\textsuperscript{18}

Drahomanov believed that ever since the Great Revolution France had been on the wrong track.

Since 1789 France has experimented with seventeen constitutions [this was written in 1881] and has gone through four revolutions. In spite of this it has had to suffer three military coups d’état. It is only very recently that it has had the beginnings of even a very weak and insecure municipal self-government. Freedom of the press and of assembly are still very incomplete. There is no freedom of association. In France labour unions are not recognized by law, and in fact, very characteristically, the workers’ freedom of association, like many other freedoms, is forbidden on the basis of laws that were passed during the Great Revolution (1791–1796) with the intention of preventing the rebirth of the old corporations and the foundation of counterrevolutionary associations! Here we can see what it means to strive for the replacement of the autocracy of the monarchy by the autocracy of the people without first making clear the true nature of political freedom.\textsuperscript{19}

The expression ‘autocracy of the people’ in the last sentence is an allusion to the famous theory of popular sovereignty, according to which the source of all power and authority is to be sought in the will of the people. The classic form of this theory is the doctrine of the social contract, i.e., the conferring of rights upon the government by the citizens. Rousseau gave this doctrine of social contract a revolutionary twist, which then served the French Revolution as the ideological justification of the Jacobin dictatorship. In the nineteenth century the historically unfounded doctrine of the social contract fell into disrepute, but the theory of popular sovereignty, of the unlimited authority of the popular will, remained untarnished in democratic circles. Drahomanov was very sceptical of this theory, to say the least. He believed in the inviolable rights of individuals and natural groups (communities, economic groups, nationalities, etc.). For him freedom consisted in political and social pluralism, while the doctrine of the popular will obviously led to a process of levelling and to the creation of large, centralized, collective bodies.

The concept of “the popular will” is almost the exact opposite of the concept of “political freedom.”... It [the popular will] can mean nothing other than the will of the majority, and in modern states, so different from the ancient communal and cantonal states, this means the will of the majority of the representatives of the majority. It is obvious that the absolutism of such a will may be
in opposition to the interests of a great part of the population and to the essential rights of persons, groups, areas, and entire nationalities.\textsuperscript{20}

In developing this thought Drahomanov adds that the doctrine of the absolutism of the popular will may contribute to the creation of dictatorial regimes. This is demonstrated by the examples of the tyrants in the Greek city-states, of Roman Caesarism, of the Jacobin dictatorship of the Committee of Public Safety, and of the Bonapartism of the First and Second Empires. In all of these regimes the absolute power of the government was supposedly derived from and legitimated by the will of the people. Napoleon I and Napoleon III even used plebiscites, and every time the ‘popular will’ endorsed the constitutional amendments and the extensions of powers desired by the government. Drahomanov remarks that Muscovite Slavophiles are also fond of using the argument of the will of the people; for them the tsar is the incarnation of the will of the Russian people. Drahomanov was disturbed to hear the Russian revolutionaries also speak of the omnipotence of the popular will.

So far we have shown what Drahomanov understood by political freedom. It is interesting to see where he felt the historical roots of liberalism were. In his early work on Tacitus he opposed the thesis introduced by Montesquieu that freedom originated in the Germanic forests. He pointed to the Roman Empire with its ruling humanitarian and cosmopolitan stoic philosophy, enlightened lawmaking, improvement of the lot of women and slaves, gradual extension of the rights of provincials, and self-government of communities and provinces.\textsuperscript{21} Here we cannot evaluate these views. It is enough to say that later Drahomanov himself expressed a very different opinion, tracing liberalism to the institutions of territorial and class self-government and the feudal parliamentarianism of the late Middle Ages.

\textbf{In part liberalism is the heir of feudalism, a medieval thing. England, the Netherlands, and Switzerland preserved their medieval freedom, and did not fall victim to later absolutism. Therefore they gave the impetus for the development of modern liberalism.}\textsuperscript{22}

The question of the rise of political freedom leads to the problem of progress in general. The idea of progress was a basic component of nineteenth-century liberalism. What distinguishes Drahomanov’s idea of progress is his precise, cautious, and relatively critical formulation. Drahomanov never regards progress as a sort of automatic process of nature, or identifies it with technological achievements and the accumulation of material goods, as did so many representatives of the vulgar liberalism of the nineteenth century. To anyone as ethically oriented as
Drahomanov, progress is essentially a question of a higher degree of spiritual culture and of social justice. Drahomanov provides a remarkable pragmatic justification for the idea of progress. Belief in progress allows men to strive for the perfection of conditions as a realizable aim, and does not permit fatalistic resignation to the existing state of affairs. Since men fight for improvement, true progress will then be achieved.

Only the belief in the stern ideal of progress saves man from pessimism, doubt, and misanthropy and teaches him to judge epochs of history and historical personalities according to the idea of relative perfection. . . . It is only with the acceptance of the idea of progress that a solid basis is found for the idea that historical phenomena follow certain laws and rules.\textsuperscript{23}

One of Drahomanov’s last works, published a year before his death, was the pamphlet \textit{Rai i postup} (Paradise and Progress). It is written so as to be intelligible to peasant readers, the members of the Galician Radical Party. But its simplicity should not deceive us; here Drahomanov develops a truly original philosophy of history. In contrast to most of the apologists for the belief in progress, he does not construct his argument from a demonstration of the outward achievements of civilization, but on the development of the idea of progress itself. The biblical myth of Paradise, like similar myths among other peoples, shows how men, dissatisfied with reality, began to imagine a better life, even if in the remote past. The next step was Persian dualism, with its belief in the final victory of good. Then came Christian chiliasm, the hope of Christ’s coming to reign during the millennium. From the sixteenth century men began to turn their eyes from heaven toward the earth, no longer hoping for the victory of good as a supernatural event at the end of time, but as the result of their own conscious efforts.

The truth of the idea of progress is shown through the development of this idea itself. In its development we see a clear advance with the passage of time.\textsuperscript{24}

In this connection Drahomanov demonstrates briefly how each advance in the concept of progress has corresponded to an advance in civilization. This idealistic philosophy of history can be expressed in the following way: the moving force behind positive development is the progress of ideas.

To complete the picture, we must also speak of Drahomanov’s attitude toward religion.\textsuperscript{25} This is not out of place in an examination of Drahomanov as a political thinker. He himself had the following conviction:
It is well known that there is a close connection between men's conceptions of political and social matters and their religious ideas.\textsuperscript{26} Drahomanov had a clear practical program in regard to religious questions. He always desired the separation of church and state and the turning of the churches into private, financially independent organizations. He referred specifically to the American example, and expressed the hope that it would be followed by the European states as soon as possible.\textsuperscript{27}

He believed that in politics free-thinkers and liberal Christians should work together, but he feared that the Catholic and Orthodox faithful were unlikely to be useful in the struggle for civic progress. Later he modified this opinion. He realized that in lands such as Ireland and Belgium the Catholic church worked for the interests of the people. In the work of such men as Cardinal Manning he saw the beginnings of social Catholicism. He also saw that there was a difference between lands such as the United States and Switzerland and other lands, such as Austria. In the former Catholics and Protestants lived together in a mixed population, and the Catholic hierarchy had adapted itself to democratic institutions; in the latter the Catholic church was still linked to feudal interests. In a letter to a Galician leader Drahomanov expressed the opinion that the Radicals in Galicia could find a modus vivendi with the clergy of the Uniate church (an Eastern-rite branch of Roman Catholicism), provided that freedom for scientific research was undisturbed and that the social interests of the working classes were supported.\textsuperscript{28} In the heat of his struggle against clericalism, Drahomanov was unable to appraise correctly the historical services which the Uniate church had rendered to the Ukrainian people in Galicia. However, it is difficult to deny that his appeal for the secularization of Ukrainian culture and politics corresponded to an urgent need of his time.

Both during his lifetime and after his death Drahomanov was often considered an atheist. This was one of the principal reasons for much of the hostility against him, as well as the cause of his popularity in other quarters. Such an interpretation is possible on the basis of certain of his writings, where he attacks the churches as the cause of many bloody wars and unnecessary battles, and calls for rationalism in religious affairs. However, Drahomanov does not offer a rationalist ersatz religion in the style of Auguste Comte's positivism or the all-embracing ideology of Marxism. On closer inspection it is seen that Drahomanov's positivism may be reduced to the demand for the freedom of scientific investigation, unhindered by traditionalist taboos of a religious, or any other, nature. In one of his popular pamphlets he gives a beautiful interpretation of the
Prometheus myth as the ancient but eternally new symbol of the human spirit storming heaven unafraid. In connection with his studies of folklore and ethnography Drahomanov took a scholarly interest in the problems of the history of religions. He tried to spread among Ukrainians the study of the history of religions and of biblical criticism. In a society where religion was almost universally identified with the traditional faith and the established churches, Orthodox and Uniate, this was quite enough to give Drahomanov the reputation of being an atheist. He did regard the religious situation in the Russian Empire as pathological. There, thanks to the censorship and to tsarist policy in general, even most educated people saw no other alternatives than the Orthodox state church (which was backward even in comparison with Byzantium of the fourth to eighth centuries) or the crude materialism of the Nihilists. There is no doubt that Drahomanov tried with all his strength to indicate to the Ukrainian people a third way out of this religious dilemma.

No reader of Drahomanov's writings can fail to notice the attention he gives to Protestantism, so disproportionately large in relation to its actual role in the life of the Ukrainian people. He sought all the heterodox influences in Ukrainian religious history, from Manichaeism through Huguenot, Calvinism, and Socinianism. He was also extremely interested in the lay brotherhoods of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. These represented the democratic element in the government of the Orthodox church in Ukraine; they controlled the hierarchy, fostered the development of schools and presses, and led the resistance against the militant Catholicism of the Polish Counter-Reformation. In the second half of the nineteenth century peasants of Russian Ukraine who were dissatisfied with the official Orthodox faith founded an evangelical movement called Stundism. In spite of the harsh persecutions of the tsarist government, Stundism became increasingly important, and in the course of time it took on the character of a Protestant sect related to Western Baptism. Drahomanov followed the progress of the Stundists with unwavering interest. As early as 1875 he endeavoured to provide Ukrainian translations of the Bible for them. In the early 1890s he wrote a number of pamphlets, among them one in 1893 on John Wycliffe, which were aimed at acquainting the Ukrainian peasant reformers with the traditions of Western Protestantism. At the same time he spurred on his Galician friends to try to propagate in Austrian Ukraine a movement similar to the Stundism of Russian Ukraine. Drahomanov even made a proposal of basic principles for a "Ruthenian Brotherhood." Drahomanov's death prevented him from writing two pamphlets he had planned, one on Roger Williams and the other on John of Leyden. The first was to illustrate the relationship between enlightened Christianity and social and political progress; the second, the dangers of fanatical sectarianism.
It has been claimed that Drahomanov’s interest in Protestantism was of a tactical nature, an attempt to weaken the traditional faith and prepare the way for the penetration of radical ideas. This explanation does not fit a man of Drahomanov’s intellectual honesty. Drahomanov had many of the characteristics of a puritan reformer: severe self-discipline, high demands on both himself and others, tireless work, a moralistic attitude toward life, stiff-necked fidelity to his principles, and the courage to go his own way. It must be acknowledged that there was a genuine inner relationship between Drahomanov’s spirit and that of Protestantism.

It is well known that the emergence of liberalism in the West was closely connected with the Protestant spirit. Nothing shows better the depth of Drahomanov’s liberal position than does the attraction which Protestantism had for him.

The Liberal in the Face of the Social and National Awakening of the Masses

Even if Drahomanov had been nothing but a sort of East European incarnation of the spirit of John Stuart Mill, he would still have been an interesting and unusual historical phenomenon (for genuine liberalism was a rare thing in the Russian Empire), but he would not be as worthy of honour as he is. Drahomanov’s starting point was always liberal, but his originality as a political thinker is shown when he steps outside the framework of classical liberalism and treats problems that were beyond the vision of the typical nineteenth-century liberal philosophy.

Although the liberal gospel, as formulated in the first half of the nineteenth century, claimed universal applicability, in practice the blessings of liberalism reached very few. Liberalism defended the interests of the middle class. In the nationality question the liberals had only the peoples of Western and Central Europe at heart; farther to the east they were only interested in a few historical nationalities, such as the Greeks, the Poles, and the Hungarians. Liberalism had nothing to offer either to the fourth estate in Western Europe or to the peoples of most of Eastern Europe, not to mention Asia and Africa.

After 1848, and particularly after 1870, the tide of the liberal movement began to ebb. The economic postulates of the middle classes had been fulfilled. In all European states, with the exceptions of Russia and Turkey, constitutional governments had been introduced. Italy and Germany had been unified and reconstructed as national states. All the more important goals of liberalism seemed to have been reached, and nothing was left for it but to rest on its laurels; liberalism became conservative in the worst sense of the word—lazy and self-satisfied. Thereby it lost the chance to bring the awakening social and political forces into its camp.
Drahomanov was painfully aware of this decline of Western liberalism. He once said to a Polish democrat:

Everywhere the epoch of the purely political democracies is at an end. Even in its classic lands, France and Italy, you can scarcely find two or three uncompromised names. . . . All of that democracy is dried up, rotten, incapable of bearing fruit. Only look at Gam-betta’s republic. For these “democrats,” the Russian tsar and his oppressive bureaucracy, with the money they have squeezed out of the Polish people, are more interesting as business partners than is a Polish revolutionary. 34

It is noticeable that in his writings Drahomanov more often calls himself a “radical” than a “liberal.” Naturally it is not a question here of words, and on the basis of an analysis of his political philosophy, Drahomanov must be counted a member of the liberal school, whatever label he may have given to his position. But in the reticence which Drahomanov shows toward the use of the word “liberal,” we see a symptom of his disinclination, conscious or unconscious, to use a name which he felt to be compromised by the decadence of Western liberalism.

Two great new political forces were appearing on the stage of history: the social awakening of the fourth estate and the national awakening of the oppressed peoples. Drahomanov’s attitude toward these two forces was emphatically positive, for in them he saw an enormous stride forward on the road of the emancipation of humanity. But even for their sake he was not willing to deviate a hair’s breadth from his liberal principles of individual freedom, the decentralization of power, and the rule of law.

Drahomanov believed that the logical consequence of democratic principles was socialism. 35 For the moment we can leave aside the question of the exact content of Drahomanov’s socialist program. The basic tendencies must be made clear, however. True civic freedom requires not only that men have legal rights, but also that their social and economic conditions permit them to use these rights. The essence of the concept of democracy includes the idea of social change and social progress; otherwise it is no living democracy.

Drahomanov’s ideas on the nationality question parallel these.

Peoples do not exist for states, but states for peoples. The peoples of multi-national states do not exist for the interests of one or two [ruling] peoples, but for themselves. A state has the duty to satisfy the requirements of all its peoples, not only those of the privileged ones. 36
Drahomanov’s pedagogic experiences convinced him that the work of popular education would make progress only if it were conducted in the language of the people, and in accordance with national traditions. Conversely, the policies of Russification and Polonization were the chief causes of the cultural doldrums in Ukraine. From this it was only a step to a much broader conception: that the centralism and chauvinism of the ruling nations were condemning the millions of the other nationalities to cultural stagnation. The masses can only participate in a universal culture through the medium of their own national cultural traditions. Drahomanov was a thorough believer in the blessings of national-cultural pluralism and in the historic mission of the less numerous peoples. Naturally it was Drahomanov’s opinion that the development of national cultures could only be assured through a corresponding change in political institutions.

The range of Drahomanov’s vision can be seen in his glad welcome to the beginnings of constitutional government in Japan and the movement for self-government in British India. He expressed the hope that this example would soon have an effect on the other Asiatic lands.37

Drahomanov felt that the social and national movements were closely related. He introduced the sociological term “plebeian nation,” that is, a nation that has been reduced to a peasant mass and has no aristocracy or bourgeoisie of its own. With a few exceptions, such as the Poles and the Magyars, almost all the peoples of Eastern Europe were, in Drahomanov’s lifetime, such plebeian nations. In lands where the lines of class division were at the same time lines of national division, where the dominant class was sharply divided from the simple people by the deep chasm of a different language, culture, and ideology, the movements for social and national emancipation became one and the same.38

Drahomanov believed that it was a weakness of the socialist parties in Western Europe that, since they were not immediately confronted by the problem of national oppression, they did not understand the inter-relationship of the social and national questions.

The Hungarian state can be a useful object lesson for a socialist, for there he can observe how social relations are complicated by national ones. In all the states of present-day Europe the laws of social development have led to the subjugation of the working classes by a capitalist oligarchy. The working classes are even more oppressed in those lands where a conquering nationality has enslaved other nationalities. Then the conquering nationality forms a sort of aristocracy... An observer accustomed to the socialist movement in the great industrial centres, with its enlistment of important masses of workers, and to the national homogeneity of France, En-
gland, and Germany, would not understand what he saw if he were transported from the sphere of metropolitan socialism to Eastern Europe.\textsuperscript{39}

But Drahomanov's instinctive sympathy for the masses struggling for their social and national emancipation never brought him even to a partial abdication of his liberal principles. A number of his writings were aimed at convincing the Russian revolutionary factions that the struggle for political freedom in the Russian Empire must have priority over specifically socialist aims. In his arguments Drahomanov usually stressed tactical points: only the introduction of liberal political institutions would create the necessary conditions for a labour movement. But we can scarcely doubt that for Drahomanov himself civic freedoms had a logical priority over specifically socialist postulates.

Although the bourgeoisie is a heavy burden on the working masses, it is not the unrestricted ruler of the masses, and it does not even have absolute control of capital. Rather it plays the role of trustee in the present economic system. With the progressive development and organization of the workers, this trusteeship will be replaced by economic self-government. On the other hand the political autocrats are the shepherds and masters of the people. The autocrats regard the people as a herd, or at best as eternal children. The first step toward the self-government of the people must be the breaking of the power of these shepherds, masters, fathers, or whatever they may choose to call themselves.\textsuperscript{40}

Drahomanov formulates his views on nationalism in an analogous manner:

All civic work in Ukraine must wear a Ukrainian dress, must be Ukrainian. But of course Ukraine alone cannot be the aim of this activity. The aims of human activity are the same all over the world, just as theoretical knowledge is the same everywhere.\textsuperscript{41}

I acknowledge the right of all groups of men, including nationalities, to self-government. I believe that such self-government brings inestimable advantages to men. But we may not seek the guiding idea for our cultural and political activity in national feelings and interests. To do this would lose us in the jungle of subjective viewpoints and historical traditions. Governing and controlling ideas are to be found in scientific thoughts and in international, universal human interests. In brief, I do not reject nationalities, but nationalism, particularly nationalism which opposes cosmopolitan-
ism. . . . I have always repeated: cosmopolitanism in the ideas and aims, nationality in the foundation and form. . . . For thirty years I have raised my voice against both Russian pseudo-cosmopolitanism, which neglects the Ukrainian nationality, and against the Ukrainian nationalists who, by their rejection of cosmopolitanism, bury the only sure indicator of progress and national rebirth and open the door to chauvinism, exclusivism, and reaction.  

The example of Germany shows that national homogeneity in a state does not guarantee greater freedom, and that the national idea can lead to the violation of men and to great injustice. . . . By itself the national idea cannot bring men to greater general freedom and truth; it is not even enough for the settlement of political matters. We must seek something else, above all nations, that can reconcile the nations when they fight among themselves. We must seek a universal truth common to all nations.

Drahomanov defended the cosmopolitanism of cultural values against all national egocentricity. In this he drew on the example of the great religions, Buddhism, Christianity, and Islam, and on that of modern scientific progress, which is only made possible by international cooperation. At the same time Drahomanov spoke up against the "false cosmopolitanism" of the ruling nations, which used the idea of "progress" to excuse their forcible levelling and discrimination against the weaker nations. However, legitimate resentment against foreign domination and cultural discrimination can have dangerous consequences if directed by blind hatred. For this the classic example is the German reaction to Napoleon’s occupation.

In its struggle to throw off French occupation and to re-establish the honour of its own language, the German national movement was justified. Not only was it not opposed to the cosmopolitan idea of the brotherhood of all men, it even drew directly from this idea. . . . But, in time, educated Germans developed the notion that the most important thing for men is their nationality, and that universal humanism is something abominable. They decided that in every respect Germans might think of nothing but being German, that in all relations with foreigners they must think of nothing but Germany’s advantage, that they might live only in the German spirit, always have a German understanding, and possess purely German customs, etc. Thus they would cultivate that peculiar national character or spirit which God or Nature had especially destined for the Germans for all eternity.
Drahomanov opposed the myth of innate and unalterable national character. Of course he recognized that empirically there are various differences between one folk and another, but he felt that these were the result of historical development, and therefore subject to further alteration. Moreover, for Drahomanov the cultural individuality of a nation did not lie in unique and independent originality, but in its particular manner of combining elements, each of them common to a number of peoples. Here Drahomanov used the evidence of his special field of study: the number of "wandering motifs" in folklore and folk poetry, i.e., in those very fields which the Romantics claimed as the purest expression of the national soul.  

Drahomanov’s general attitude toward the problems created by the emancipation of previously oppressed groups can be illustrated by his ideas on sexual morality and on the role of women in society. The questions were debated very heatedly in Russian revolutionary circles. Under the influence of Chernyshevsky’s programmatic novel, Chto delat? (What Is to be Done?), the slogan of free love, unfettered by any conventions, found considerable response. To a friend Drahomanov confided:

Free love is just as difficult as monogamy. One should approach this problem cautiously. Defend women’s rights to education, work, and participation in public life. Struggle to make divorce less difficult. But keep from preaching free love in the fashion of the birds. Even among birds there is usually monogamy until the little ones are grown, and the human child takes twenty years to grow up. . . . A constitution is as necessary for the maintenance of freedom in love as for the maintenance of freedom in society. Liberum veto is not suited to either one or the other. 

Drahomanov desired the emancipation of all oppressed groups, but sought an orderly freedom, not individual or collective arbitrariness.

Ethical Socialism
Drahomanov often speaks of himself as a socialist, but without giving allegiance to any of the schools or sects of socialism. There are few concepts which have so many varied and contradictory meanings as does "socialism." Therefore it is necessary for us to investigate more exactly Drahomanov’s definition of socialism.

I have always been a socialist, ever since I was given Robert Owen and Saint-Simon to read in the gymnasium. But I have never thought of trying to put into practice in our country any stereotyped foreign socialist program.

We shall probably not be mistaken in the thesis that socialists who do
not themselves spring from the working classes are usually socialists for reasons of ethics. However, only a few admit this. Usually the intellectual socialist has the tendency to cloak his resentments and hopes with scientific reasons. The commonest rationalization is the idea of a historical determinism which, inevitably, is leading mankind from a capitalist to a socialist epoch.

It is not the fact that Drahomanov became a socialist because of ethical motives which distinguishes him, but the fact that he himself realized it.

In Russia, up to the present, the socialist movement has depended chiefly on men who do not personally belong to the working classes and who become involved because of moral motives, because of the need to strive for the realization of social justice, and not because of economic needs or class ambitions.\textsuperscript{48}

But what is "social justice"? Many socialists live in the conviction that as long as capitalism exists, there can be no social justice, but that when a socialist order is victorious in the future, all imaginable social justice will automatically be assured. Drahomanov could not accept any such fatalism, just as he was not convinced by the bourgeois liberals who whitewashed the evils of the present system as the regrettable but unfortunately inevitable by-products of the great economic and technical progress of the nineteenth century. His alert social conscience demanded concrete measures whereby the existing abuses could be remedied as rapidly as possible. This is the point of departure for his socialism.

I have expressed an idea that has always seemed heretical to many of my socialist friends, i.e., that in the social movement of our time, and even in the labour movement in the narrower sense, the question of communism [i.e., the future collective economic order] does not have a large place. For this movement the primary questions are ones such as the length of working hours, the standardization of wages, social insurance for the workers, etc. The importance of these is quite independent of the question of communism. Moreover, there are radical, and even revolutionary, agrarian movements (e.g., in Ireland) which have no communist elements at all.\textsuperscript{49}

Drahomanov gave a Galician friend the following advice:

You [the Galician Radicals] need European socialist ideas, and perhaps also something of the Russian sympathy for the peasants. But all this must be adapted to Austrian and specifically Galician conditions. I would advise you to pay special attention to Ireland and Belgium. The former is interesting to us because of its agrarian
problems and the skillful organization of the peasantry; the latter because of the linking of social agitation with political demands, because of the co-operation of the Walloons and the Flemings in the labour movement, and also because of the parallel between the development of social agitation and that of the co-operative movement. . . . I would advise you to pay attention to all of the movements of workers and peasants, and not only to those which label themselves socialist and collectivist. In practice socialism has taken on the nature of social politics. Such things as the eight-hour working day are of more importance than any quarrels over the form of collectivization (state or communal), or even over collectivism itself. Moreover, the political and cultural conditions necessary for socialist policy, such as the general franchise, technical education, etc., are very important. We must come to regard the socialist movement not from a sectarian perspective (either revolutionary or conservative), but from a civic and evolutionary one. 50

Naturally, a far-reaching and systematic policy of social reform cannot be based on the forces of organized labour alone. Drahomanov names three elements which contribute to social progress. The intellectual socialists are the theoreticians, critics, and propagandists. Then there are the mass movements of workers (unions, co-operative societies, etc.), similar peasant movements, and the political campaigns of the socialist and populist parties, such as the struggle for universal suffrage. Finally, we must include the measures of the ruling classes and the existing governments, even conservative ones, for the abolition or alleviation of social injustice (e.g., the English factory laws). 51 All three factors contribute toward social progress, and a common denominator must be found. An interesting attempt to find one for Russia is represented by Drahomanov’s social and political program in “Free Union.” 52 As the author explains in his commentary, this program is the result of a comparison and synthesis of the maximum reform program of the zemstvo constitutionalists and the Russian liberal bourgeois press on the one hand, and the minimum demands of the European socialist and labour movements on the other. The soundness of Drahomanov’s judgment is indicated by the fact that, since these ideas were enunciated, almost all the more important points of his social and economic programme (legal limitation of the working day, public arbitration between employers and employees, progressive income taxes, etc.) have been adopted by most civilized states.

That Drahomanov was free from the prejudices common to most of the socialists of his time is demonstrated by his realization that everywhere in Europe it is not the poorest, but the culturally and economically
strongest, workers who lead in the labour movements.\textsuperscript{53} At the same time he warned the socialists against lumping the stable and productive businessmen together with speculators and adventurers on the stock exchange, even though in practice it may sometimes be difficult to distinguish the various groups in the bourgeoisie.\textsuperscript{54} Drahomanov was convinced that in principle a socialist collectivism was preferable to private enterprise. At the same time it was clear to him that many honourable democrats and progressives did not agree, and he tried to persuade the hot-headed socialists among his younger friends not to spurn collaboration with the non-socialist democrats.

\textbf{In our time it would be enough if each progressive party would really strive to do for the cause of progress what it promises in its program. With this the time of socialism would also come much more quickly.}\textsuperscript{55}

Drahomanov was not a specialist in national economy. Compared to constitutional questions and problems of nationalities and foreign policy, economic questions take a relatively subordinate place in his writings. Various passages in his articles, particularly his strongly expressed interest in co-operatives, give grounds for the assumption that Drahomanov desired guild socialism (to use a later term) rather than centralized state socialism. It is doubtful whether he was fully aware of the problems created by the complexity of modern economic life. But all his works are impregnated with a strong social ethic, which is the more commendable as Drahomanov’s longing for social justice never caused him to forget—as did so many socialists—the value of political freedom and personal independence. The following definition is noteworthy.

\textbf{The socialist ideal is not Arakcheev’s military settlements but, on the contrary, a brotherhood of well-rounded (integral, as the West European socialists say), developed individuals.}\textsuperscript{56}

This comes from one of Drahomanov’s polemics against a group of Russian socialists. Arakcheev was Minister of War under Alexander I (tsar from 1801 to 1825). While in office he established military settlements where soldiers performed agricultural labour combined with military exercises and military discipline. In the Russian and Ukrainian languages these colonies have become synonymous with insane despotism and gruesome regimentation. It is noteworthy that, as early as the last quarter of the nineteenth century, Drahomanov was keenly aware of an Arakcheevian spirit among Russian socialists. This leads us to a particularly interesting theme, that of Drahomanov as a critic of the Russian socialist and revolutionary movements.

We cannot summarize Drahomanov’s opinion of individual leaders
and theoreticians of the Russian revolutionary and socialist movements, such as Bakunin, Chernyshevsky, Lavrov, Plekhanov, and others. Let us only remark that Drahomanov always testified to his respect and admiration for Herzen, although he criticized a number of his views. Herzen was perhaps the only leading man in the Russian revolutionary movement in whose humanism and liberalism Drahomanov had implicit trust.

The Russian socialist movement of the second half of the nineteenth century, of which Drahomanov was the contemporary, critic, and in part participant, had two stages of development, populist and Marxist. The term populist covers various leading individuals and groups from Herzen and Bakunin to the Narodnaia volia (People’s Will) Party—roughly from the middle of the century to the 1880s. In spite of divergences on various points, all had certain basic convictions in common, one of which was the belief that, thanks to the institution of the mir (a form of agrarian community), Russia would be able to bypass the purgatory of Western capitalism and proceed straight into the socialist paradise. Hand in hand with this went a general idealization of the Russian peasant as the supposed vessel of the highest social and moral values.

This romantic idealization of the muzhik (peasant) was completely foreign to Drahomanov’s nature.

At the present level of education of the masses, many valuable interests of civilization, which someday may be useful to the demos, are simply unavailable to the demos of today. The people may betray them or, even worse, simply trample on them. . . . In a word, thou shalt not set up for thyself any graven image, either in heaven, or on earth, or in the “people.”

The traditions on which the socialists of the populist persuasion drew were those of the great Cossack and peasant rebellions of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, led by Stenka Razin and Pugachev. These were supposed to show that the Russian peasant is a natural revolutionary, ready to rise against his oppressor at any time. Drahomanov supported the contrary thesis that these revolutions were even more reactionary than the uprising of the German peasants and mystics in the sixteenth century, and therefore completely unfit to serve as an example for a modern, progressive movement. In particular he pointed out that the leading element in these revolts had been neither urban, nor even agrarian, but half-nomadic, which fact made success impossible from the beginning. Drahomanov was equally dubious about the doctrine according to which the mir could serve as leaven for a socialist order. It is true that he believed that wherever there were remnants of this primitive collectivism, they should not be destroyed, but transformed into modern co-operatives if possible. But the mir system had serious defects. Although these Great
Russian agrarian communities were self-governing bodies, the rights of the individuals within them were not guaranteed. Moreover, in its way the mir was an authoritarian and irresponsible ruling body. And within the individual families of which the mir was composed, the patriarch was a despot. The Russian peasant imagined the tsar as such a despotic pater familias.\textsuperscript{59}

Russian society lacks the conditions necessary for socialism, which are to be found in urban, industrialized, educated, liberal Europe, where one can see unbroken progress since the tenth–eleventh centuries.\textsuperscript{60}

Drahomanov hoped, however, that with the development of the economy, city life, and education, the socialist movement in the Russian Empire would finally also enter the "natural" (general European) path.

One sees that in our lands too we already have an embryo of a better society. We dare to say that the beginnings of an urban educated working class, which combines manual labour and reading, are the foundation of all foundations.\textsuperscript{61}

Since the expected general peasant revolt did not materialize, the Russian populists, or rather the most active and courageous of them, turned in the 1870s to individual terror in order to force concessions from the tsarist regime. This terror reached its peak with the assassination of Alexander II on 1 March 1881. Drahomanov never rejected revolutionary methods as such, but felt that they should be only one part of the many-sided political battle against the existing regime. However, he considered that individual terror was a decidedly pathological phenomenon.

[In the given circumstances of lawlessness, for which tsarism is responsible], one can excuse political terrorism and seek to understand its causes. As historians we must recognize the good it has brought: it has forced all of [Russian] society to reflect on the reason for these assassinations. But it is inadmissible to glorify assassination, to present it as a pattern to be imitated, or to elevate it to the rank of a system. . . .

Even if we leave aside the moral aspect of the matter, these killings have a negative political effect. They strike the government, but do not overthrow it, and offer nothing new in its place.\textsuperscript{62}

The death of Alexander II was followed by the rapid disintegration of the populist movement. The most courageous participants were dead, the organization was smashed, and its members were scattered, their faith shaken. In the 1880s a new form of the Russian revolutionary and socialist movement, Marxism, began to rise on its ruins. Drahomanov
lived through the rise and fall of populism, but he saw only the beginning stages, the incubation period, of Russian Marxism. Drahomanov died before the (Marxist) Social-Democratic Party had crystallized organizationally in Russia. Nonetheless, he was able to define clearly his position in regard to this movement.

We must remember that the point of departure for Russian Marxism was criticism of the preceding stage, populism. The attacks of Plekhanov, the father of the Russian Social-Democratic Labour Party, were directed against the same populist illusions—belief in the mir, in peasant revolts, and in individual terror—that Drahomanov had already criticized. Thus there is a certain parallel between Drahomanov’s position and that of the early Russian Marxists. This gives some verisimilitude to the claims of those later authors who tried to present Drahomanov as a forerunner of Russian Marxism.63

Certain Ukrainian authors, particularly some Ukrainian communists of the 1920s, were eager to construct a national, non-Great Russian genealogy for Ukrainian Marxism; Drahomanov had a place of honour in this family tree.64 This thesis could be buttressed by Drahomanov’s personal associations with certain Marxists or semi-Marxists, such as his friend Mykola Ziber (1844–88), professor of national economy at the University of Kiev, who resigned and went into exile as a protest against Drahomanov’s dismissal from the University. Ziber, who was prominent in Ukrainian circles in Kiev, was one of the first men in the Russian Empire to take an active interest in Marxism, and there is no doubt that through Ziber Drahomanov early became acquainted with the basic ideas of Marxism.

In spite of these points of contact, Drahomanov must not be counted as a predecessor, but rather as a decided opponent, of Marxism. Indeed, he took a premeditated and conscious stand; within the limits of his influence he made every attempt to combat Marxist influences among the Ukrainian and Russian socialists. In this he had some success in Galicia.

Drahomanov had serious reservations about Marxist theories. He was ready to accept historical materialism only as an heuristic hypothesis, not as a dogma.

You know that I cannot agree to an exclusively economic philosophy of history and politics; this I regard as a sort of metaphysics. Human life is too complex to be explained by only one element. I have nothing against a one-sided theory if it makes easier the discovery of new facts. Unfortunately the followers of Marx, or rather those of Engels, seldom investigate anything; they rather draw a priori and often completely arbitrary historical and political figures.65
Drahomanov endeavoured to show that the political revolutions of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries in Holland, England, America, and France were by no means the work of only one class, the bourgeoisie, and to point out that they could not be reduced to purely economic terms.  

Drahomanov also had serious practical grounds for his opposition to Marxism, and these were perhaps decisive. He did not believe that sectarian methods, which he imputed to the Marxist German Social Democrats, were suited to Eastern Europe.

The conditions necessary in order that German-style sectarianism may progress are not only the existence of a homogeneous and compact mass—the factory workers—but also the spirit of military discipline, to which the Germans are accustomed even before they become socialists. Such sectarianism is ineffective even among the French workers; for us, a scattered peasant people, it would be even more so. Thus the English system of organizing on the basis of a practical task, and not of a catechism, suits us better.

The spread of Marxism was undoubtedly a form of German cultural penetration into Russia. Drahomanov feared that this influence would strengthen the Russian socialists’ inclination toward sterile dogmatism in theory and toward centralism in practical politics.

Of all the West European socialist parties, the German has had the greatest impact on Russia. This is to be explained by the strong personalities who have belonged to it recently, such as Marx, Engels, Lassalle. Their writings have become the substratum of the ideas of the Russian socialists. Moreover, their geographical nearness to St. Petersburg plays a role, as does the fact that the Jews have an important place in the socialist movements of Germany and Russia and, particularly in the north-western provinces, present the natural link between the two socialist movements.

So far we have considered separately Drahomanov’s stands on the two phases of Russian socialism, populism and Marxism. He also criticized certain features which, to a greater or lesser degree, were common to almost all the leaders and groups of Russian socialists. The chief of these was the lack of a sense of political freedom in the Western meaning of the term.

The social and revolutionary theories [of the populists] are in essence much closer to absolutism or to any other dictatorship than to liberalism.
In this respect Marxism was no better than populism. Drahomanov said that the doctrine (developed by its publicists, Plekhanov and Vera Zasulich) of the dictatorship of the proletariat was a farce in a land in which, at that time (1884), factory workers made up only about one per cent of the population.  

An example of the dictatorial tendencies of the Russian socialists was to be found in the fact that each individual group, instead of speaking only in its own name, considered itself the sole representative of the whole revolutionary movement. Where in reality there were merely little circles of conspirators, parties and committees were spoken of. Revolutionary hierarchies, which behaved as if they were already the potential government of the Russian state, were set up.

The Executive Committee [of Narodnaia volia] is far from being a government. Nonetheless, in certain circles one can observe symptoms not dissimilar to those of courtiers: the fear of contradicting the Executive Committee in anything... the effort to draw profit from its fame, etc. Such customs... make the Russian revolutionary and the Russian governmental milieux similar.

Drahomanov was particularly indignant over the cynicism of the Russian socialists in tactical methods. He felt that the Jesuitical theory that the ends justify the means would lead ultimately to the complete despotism of one person.

One indication of the amorality of the Russian socialists was the fact that they called their acts of individual terror executions of the judgments of underground tribunals. Drahomanov considered such an attitude a perversion of justice and legality. He considered equally improper the use of "pious frauds," such as falsified tsarist manifestoes, to incite the peasants to rebellion. Drahomanov, who believed that "to an honest man, speaking the truth is as natural a necessity as is breathing fresh air," was revolted by such intentional lies and by the whole unscrupulous Machiavellianism of the Russian revolutionaries.

Russian socialists of all stripes had an extremely intolerant and chauvinistic attitude toward the oppressed nationalities of the Russian Empire. At times an exception was made for the Poles, who were counted as a power factor and wooed with concessions, often at the expense of the Ukrainians, Belorussians, and Lithuanians. The Russian socialists and revolutionaries systematically ignored the existence of the plebeian peoples, who, unlike the Poles, had no aristocracy of their own. In their proclamations the Russian revolutionary parties always spoke of a "Russian people" as if the population of the Empire were homogeneous and the Russians (Great Russians or Muscovites) not one nationality among others. At a public meeting of Russian political
emigrants, and in a pamphlet, Drahomanov proposed that a publishing house be created to edit socialist publications in the languages of all the peoples of the Russian Empire, from the Estonians to the Armenians and from the Romanian Bessarabians to the Tatars. Like other similar proposals, this was rejected with scorn; anything which deviated from the centralist line was rejected by the Russian revolutionaries as "narrow nationalism," or at best as "an unnecessary splintering of forces which should be united against the common enemy, tsarism." No Russian socialist took the trouble to study Drahomanov's arguments that, without the participation of all the peoples of the Empire, the struggle against tsarism could not be successful, and that if such collaboration was to be achieved, the legitimate cultural and political interests of the non-Russian peoples had to be considered. These Russian socialists, who perpetuated tsarist bigotry against the subjugated nationalities, nevertheless considered themselves the most perfect internationalists.

These peculiar internationalists refuse to see that instead of a socialist pan-humanity, they propose to us an aristocratic, bourgeois, bureaucratic, and necessarily one-sided, nationally dyed state. Their pseudo-cosmopolitan sermons against nationalism are not directed against those who oppress other nationalities, but rather against those who seek to defend themselves against this pressure. They seek to substitute denationalization for internationalism.

Drahomanov thought that the cause of this pathological state of affairs was easy to explain. The anti-tsarist opposition was burdened with the tradition of the Russian state. This might serve as an example of the well-known sociological rule that the opposition often forms itself according to the pattern of the regime it opposes.

Just look more closely at the genealogy of these claims that in Great Russia we find the best conditions for the victory of democracy, anti-capitalism, socialism, the search for truth, etc. At the root of the genealogical tree you will find old Muscovite reactionary chauvinism and the doctrine that "Moscow is the third Rome and there will never be a fourth."

[The Russian revolutionaries] do not desire to shake the idea of an absolute and centralized state, but only to transfer the power to other hands.

Drahomanov's struggle against the Russian socialist factions of his time was a foreshadowing of the split, a generation later, of the world socialist movement into a democratic and a totalitarian wing.
The Rebirth of Ukraine as a Nation
A short résumé of Drahomanov’s views on the history of Ukraine is the best introduction to his Ukrainian political program.

As for the period antecedent to the thirteenth century, it [the history of Ukraine] reveals the federation of free cities, particularly of the cities of southern Rus’, which were grouped around Kiev. Historians usually confiscate this period of Ukrainian history to credit it to the account of the tsarist empire, whereas in reality this latter is much more directly descended from the more recent principality of Moscow, which dates from 1328. Moreover, the despotic and aristocratic Muscovite institutions developed under the influence of the Tatars have very little in common with those of the free principalities of southern and even northern Rus’ in the eleventh to thirteenth centuries. In addition we must remark that the history of the old state of Kiev is attached directly to Cossack Ukraine as much by the scene of action and by the race of the actors as by the republican institutions.\[82\]

Drahomanov believed that up to the time of the downfall of the Cossack state Ukraine, although perhaps retarded in its development, was still an organic part of the European world.

Most of the national differences between Ukraine and Muscovy can be explained by the fact that until the eighteenth century Ukraine was linked to Western Europe. In spite of the handicaps caused by the Tatar invasions, Ukraine participated in Western Europe’s social and cultural progress.\[83\]

This can be demonstrated by many details. For instance, in its own way Ukraine experienced the Renaissance and the Reformation. The great Cossack rebellion against Poland in the middle of the seventeenth century came close to giving Ukraine not only national independence, but also political and social institutions which could stand comparison with those of the most civilized European states.

[The frustration of these potentialities] was chiefly due to the devastation of Ukraine at the end of the seventeenth century, when it was divided among Muscovy, Poland, and Turkey. Left-Bank Ukraine (the Hetmanate) then fell victim to the centralism of Muscovite tsardom and the Petersburg Empire. . . . In the nineteenth century our Ukraine became a “province.” It was farther behind progressive Europe than it would have been if it had gone its own way from the seventeenth century on. In fact it was even more backward than Muscovy, which, in the seventeenth century, had been more retarded than Ukraine or Belorussia.\[84\]
ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY

The retrogression of the Ukrainian people becomes evident when one compares the Cossack revolution of Bohdan Khmelnytsky with the peasant revolts (haidamak movement) of the latter half of the eighteenth century. Both were mass movements of elemental force, but the leaders of the former were men with a European outlook and far-reaching plans. The uprising of the haidamaks was only a jacquerie.

[In the time of Khmelnytsky] the close relationships among all the classes of Ukrainian society—the nobles, Cossacks, burghers, priests, and peasants—made possible the emergence of men who could formulate their freedom-loving, democratic, and almost purely republican ideas in writing, and support them with arguments drawn from the history of their own and other lands.... The basic ideas of the last great Ukrainian mass movement, the haidamak revolt of 1768, under the leadership of Zalizniak and Honta, were scarcely more clearly expressed than those of the Stenka Razin and Pugachev rebellions [in Muscovy].

Drahomanov was firmly convinced that Muscovite Russia's protectorate had had an unfavourable effect on the political, social, and cultural development of the Ukrainian people. Socially, Russian domination led to the re-establishment of serfdom, which had previously been abolished in Dnieper Ukraine by the Cossack revolution. It is true that the Cossack state had been moving toward social stratification, the elders becoming a sort of new nobility. But it was only the help that Moscow gave the local reactionaries that made possible the sharp legal division of classes and the Russian-style enslavement of the peasants in the last quarter of the eighteenth century, i.e., after the final abolition of Ukrainian autonomy. Politically the story is similar. The Cossack state had had a flourishing system of local self-government and the beginnings of a representative national government. As Drahomanov shows, the liberal constitutional regimes of progressive European lands had developed from analogous roots. However, in Ukraine, these were smothered by Russian centralism. Culturally, the boundaries of the Russian Empire imposed an almost impenetrable wall between Ukraine and Western Europe. In the first half of the eighteenth century Ukraine still had many more men with a European education than had Russia. In the nineteenth century, however, almost the only route Russian Ukraine had to the West was the long and difficult detour via the Petersburg "window on Europe." The following facts speak for themselves. In 1748 there were 143 schools in the Chernihiv regiment (regiments were the Cossack territorial units); in 1875, even after the introduction of the zemstvos, there were only fifty-two in the same area.

Drahomanov's acute historical perception did, however, lead him to
see the obverse side of the problem. The union of Ukraine with Muscovy was no accident. Cossack Ukraine had been faced with two major problems of foreign policy, the conquest and colonization of the Black Sea coast and the expulsion of the parasitic Polish oligarchy. The continual raids of the Turks and Tatars, for whom Ukraine was a sort of "White Africa" and a favourite ground for slave-hunting, made an orderly, settled life almost impossible there. The eyes of the Ukrainian peasants and Cossacks turned longingly toward the fertile southern steppes, made uninhabitable by the Tatar menace. The harbours of the Black Sea were also necessary for commerce and contact with the outside world. Ukraine had had a toehold on the coast of the Black Sea in the early period of the Princes, and then again at the beginning of the fifteenth century, but had lost it after Turkey became a great power in the Balkans and spread its protectorate over Moldavia and over the Crimean Tatars.

After the Union of Lublin (1569), the question of Polish-Ukrainian relations became equally pressing. This union separated Ukraine from the so-called Lithuanian state, which in reality had been a federation of the Lithuanians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, and made Ukraine subject to Poland. The boundless greed of the Polish magnates, the fiercely resented Polish social system, and the militant Catholicism of the Polish Counter-Reformation all led to an elemental reaction on the part of the Ukrainian people; this came to a head in the revolution of 1648.

Countless folk songs show how deeply the Ukrainians were aware of their two national tasks: the battle against the Turko-Tatars and the struggle against the Polish nobility. By taking the initiative in this dual struggle, the Cossack military organization, which after 1648 developed into the Cossack state, became tremendously popular among the Ukrainian people. But the young Cossack state was unable to withstand the pressure of its three neighbours—Poland, Turkey, and Muscovy. Polish pressure drove Ukraine into the arms of Moscow, and by the Articles of Pereiaslav (1654), Ukraine accepted the protectorate of the tsar of Muscovy. Of course the Cossack leaders very soon realized the extent to which Muscovite centralism menaced them. Khmelnytsky's immediate successor, Vyhovsky, tried to free Ukraine from Moscow's suzerainty. Several of the more important later Hetmans, among them Doroshenko, Mazepa, and Orlyk, followed the same policy. However, a Ukrainian orientation toward either Poland or Turkey would have been necessary for a break with Moscow, and the people were not ready for either of these unnatural combinations. The anti-Russian policies of Vyhovsky, Doroshenko, and Mazepa remained "affairs of state," without the support of the masses. Hostility toward the Turks and Tatars and toward Poland continued to be primary in the popular mind. This attitude explains the comparative feebleness of the protest against Catherine II's
abolition of the remnants of Cossack autonomy; this loss coincided with the conquest of the Black Sea coast, a vast new field for Ukrainian colonization, and with the end of Polish domination in Right-Bank Ukraine. After the incorporation of Ukraine into the Russian Empire, Russia did take over, in a certain sense, the prime obligations of Ukrainian foreign policy. By fulfilling them it obtained Ukrainian popular support.

Russian tsardom has done us much harm. . . . But it has also fulfilled our national tasks from the time when history took such a turn that we were unable to do so ourselves. 89

Drahomanov believed that in his generation, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, Russian-Ukrainian relations were beginning to take a decisive turn, though as yet this might scarcely be noticeable. The Polish uprising of 1863 was the last attempt to re-establish Polish domination in Right-Bank Ukraine. The failure of this uprising, which the Ukrainian peasants and the young Ukrainian intelligentsia had united in opposing, and the succeeding agrarian reforms destroyed the last prospect for the success of the “historical” claims of the Polish nobility. From then on the acute form of the Polish-Ukrainian problem was to be limited to Austrian Galicia. A few years later the Balkan War of 1877–8 sealed the fate of Turkey as a European great power. With these two events the traditional grounds for the dependence of Ukraine on Russia were shaken. Drahomanov foresaw that the time was approaching when the Ukrainian people would redefine its relation to the centralized Russian state.

It is only now that the problem can be posed: how is Ukraine to be freed from Muscovite bureaucracy, how can the Ukrainian intelligentsia unite its forces with those of the people, how can Ukrainian national culture be regenerated, etc.? 90

During the seventeenth century and even the first half of the eighteenth century, Ukraine possessed autonomous statehood. Drahomanov’s call to the Ukrainians to “pick up the threads of our history that were broken off in the eighteenth century” 91 might be understood as a plea for the re-establishment of Ukrainian statehood. Here we come to Drahomanov’s views on Ukrainian political independence.

He made a sharp distinction between the right to separation and its practicality.

Of course we would not think of denying the right of all the nationalities to complete separation from the Russian state. But it is advisable to reflect that states are particularly sensitive on the question of separation. States offer a much more vigorous resis-
tance to the separation of a province than to the granting of personal rights to the inhabitants, or even to the granting of a certain degree of autonomy. Very great power is needed to put through the right of separation of a part of a state from the whole. The real question is not that of the legality, but that of the feasibility, of separatism.\textsuperscript{92}

Drahomanov believed that very sound arguments of foreign and internal politics militated against the possibility of Ukrainian statehood.

The Ukrainians have undoubtedly lost a great deal owing to the fact that, at the time when most of the other European peoples founded national states, they were not in a position to do so. A state of one's own . . . is, after all, a form of social organization suited to defence against foreign attacks and to the regulation of affairs in one's own land . . . [But] a rising against Austria and Russia similar to that staged by the Italians, with the aid of France, for the unity of their state is impossible for us . . . The Ukrainians will have better prospects if they strive for their political and social freedom within the states in which they live, with the help of the other peoples also subjugated by these states.\textsuperscript{93}

Drahomanov pointed to the fact that all the new states which came into being in nineteenth-century Europe needed foreign military and diplomatic aid. Italy received help from France, and the various Balkan states were aided by either Russia or England. Even the great uprisings, such as those of the Poles in 1830 and 1863 and of the Hungarians in 1848, failed without outside support. The Ukrainians had no protectors among the great powers, and Drahomanov felt that they should not hope for any. In his mind an even more conclusive argument against separatism was the immaturity of the Ukrainian national movement, shown in the denationalization of the upper classes and in the inadequate national consciousness of the masses.\textsuperscript{94}

Drahomanov believed that only the transformation of the Russian regime into a constitutional one with the greatest possible degree of regional and communal self-government would create the conditions necessary for the advancement of the Ukrainian movement. For example, the abolition of preventative censorship would automatically remove limitations on Ukrainian literature. Then, with free competition between Ukrainian and Russian publications, the former would soon replace the latter in the Ukrainian villages. If private schools were permitted, Ukrainian would be used in these schools at least, even if at first Russian remained the language of the state schools. Making the local institutions of self-government responsible for school administration would soon
bring about the "Ukrainization" of at least the folk schools, and within a few years the question of Ukrainian secondary schools and of courses in Ukrainian in the universities would arise. Such a program of constitutionalism and decentralization required the co-operation of the Russian opposition, and would have much better chances of success under the banner of autonomy and federalism than under that of separatism.  

It seems certain that Drahomanov analyzed correctly the practical possibilities open to the Ukrainian movement of his time. His analysis was vindicated by the fact that it was only after 1905—after the introduction of a certain, though very limited, degree of constitutionalism—that the momentum of the Ukrainian national movement increased. Drahomanov's attitude toward the question of independent statehood for Ukraine was thoroughly compatible with his attitude toward the socialist maximal programme. In both cases he was sceptical of utopias; he preferred to seek a strategic plan which would point the way forward from the status quo. But there was another element, besides this pragmatic one, which figured in his rejection of separatism. As we have seen, Drahomanov had a very individualistic conception of freedom. His ideal was freedom from the state rather than freedom through the state. He considered concentration of power and power politics bad in themselves. But the foundation of a new state, even of a thoroughly democratic one, is impossible without power and power politics, without the creation of authority and of a hierarchy. It is easy to understand that Drahomanov instinctively shrank from seeing the Ukrainian movement go in this direction. He hoped that the political freedom of the Ukrainian people could come from a gradual decentralist and federalist transformation of the existing powers, Russia and Austria-Hungary. Thus, at a time when there was neither a Ukrainian state nor even a modest practical basis for a Ukrainian separatist policy, a man such as Drahomanov, whose nature it was to think in terms other than those of states, was particularly fitted to render service to the Ukrainian cause.

How can we make Drahomanov's bitter criticism of Russian socialists and revolutionaries jibe with his plea that the Ukrainian movement co-operate with them? Drahomanov believed that the struggle against tsarist absolutism was the primary practical task; everything else depended on the weakening of this absolutism. At the same time he was well aware that the Russian revolutionaries made very questionable bedfellows. He was certainly not naive enough to be willing to have the Ukrainian cause depend on the good will of the Russian democrats. To secure the Ukrainians from surprise attacks from this quarter, he demanded the complete organizational independence of Ukrainian political parties and groups. It must be remembered that until 1917 Ukrainians usually participated in
Russian political organizations, so that in this respect Drahomanov was far in advance of his time.

No Ukrainian group can unite with any Russian group or party—not until the Russian groups are ready to renounce the theory of “Russian unity,” to acknowledge the Ukrainians as a nation on precisely the same footing as the Great Russians, Poles, etc., and to accept the practical consequences of this recognition.  

When a St. Petersburg newspaper spoke of Drahomanov as an alleged leader of the “Russian Social Revolutionary Party” (as a matter of fact there was no such party at that time), Drahomanov replied in a pamphlet published in Geneva:

I request you not to consider me a member of the “Russian Social Revolutionary Party” or of any other Russian party. It is true that I was born a subject of the Russian tsar, but I am not a Russian. . . . As a Ukrainian I belong to a nation which in Russia is oppressed not only by the government, but also by the dominant Great Russian people. The Ukrainian nation extends beyond the boundaries of the Russian state into Austria-Hungary. My chief aim is to strive for the well-being of our people to the best of my ability. I can take a stand on “Russian” affairs, both (Great) Russian in the ethnic sense and Russian in the political sense, only in so far as they affect our people. By the same principle I can of course have dealings with the Russian parties, but I cannot join any of them.  

The independence of Ukrainian organizations which Drahomanov urged was undoubtedly a good way of resisting the menace of the centralist and levelling tendencies of the Russian revolutionaries.

Drahomanov was not an advocate of independent Ukrainian statehood. Nonetheless, at a time when most members of the upper classes in Ukraine felt that they belonged to the Russian nation, and when the mass of peasants were without a crystallized modern political consciousness, Drahomanov did regard Ukraine as a nation. This led to two important political postulates. He felt that the estranged upper classes should become nationally integrated with the Ukrainian people, and that a unified national consciousness and co-ordinated political will, cutting across political frontiers, should be created on all ethnically Ukrainian territory.

Our people suffer injustice not only socially and politically, but also nationally. This injustice arises in part from the fact that our nationality and our language do not enjoy the same rights as do the Russian, Polish, Hungarian, and Romanian. However, a far
greater injustice arises from the fact that on all the territory where our people live, at most five per cent of the intelligentsia acknowledge their national solidarity with the people. Therefore the people do not receive the cultural services they need from the intelligentsia, which lives directly or indirectly from the people’s labor. This disgrace reaches so far that even men of democratic convictions living among the Ukrainians turn from them and dedicate their work, their gifts, and their money to the service of other peoples. . . . Arrange things so that a part of the French elite consider themselves English, a second part German, a third Italian, and a fourth Spanish, and you will soon see what will happen to French literature and politics and even to the French socialist movement.98

Drahomanov’s belief that a Ukrainian’s loyalty belonged to the Ukrainian cause was dramatically expressed to Zheliabov, leader of Narodnaia volia. Zheliabov, who was of Ukrainian origin, moved in Ukrainian circles as a young man. At that time he met Drahomanov, and apparently personal trust and friendship developed between them. Some years later, when Drahomanov had gone abroad as representative of the Kiev Hromada, Zheliabov became the leader of that revolutionary organization, whose foolhardy terrorist struggle against tsarism made Russia and the whole world hold its breath. In 1880 Zheliabov sent a confidential representative to Geneva to ask Drahomanov to be the political representative of Narodnaia Volia in Western Europe and the guardian of the party’s archives. In the same message Zheliabov used the weakness of the Ukrainian movement to excuse his going over to the all-Russian revolutionary movement:

Where are our Fenians, where is our Parnell? The truth of the matter is . . . that while one sees salvation in the break-up of the Empire into autonomous parts, one must work for a [pan-Russian] constituent assembly.99

Drahomanov’s answer did not reach Zheliabov, but after Zheliabov’s death Drahomanov published an account of the episode and his reasons for turning down this offer.

This sceptical expectation of the time when Ukraine might produce its Fenians and its Parnell comes from the pen of a man who was born in one of our Ukrainian provinces. Nothing prevented him from becoming, in his own way, a Fenian. Imagine that the Irish leaders were to wait passively until the advocates of home rule appeared in their land, until that moment conducting themselves as Englishmen and as followers of British centralism. In that

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case Ireland would also have to wait a long time for its Parnell!  

Drahomanov believed that in Ukraine it was impossible to be an honest democrat without being a Ukrainian patriot, for the people were Ukrainian, not Russian or Polish. However, many members of the upper classes in Ukraine did not recognize this duty, and joined the ranks of the Russian intelligentsia. This desertion estranged them from the people and nullified their abstract democratic ideals; this was one of the chief causes of their political weakness. Drahomanov himself had evolved from an all-Russian radical position to a Ukrainian national consciousness, and hoped that sooner or later the intelligentsia living in Ukraine would adhere to the cause of the national and social emancipation of the people.

It is time to put an end to this nomadism of educated people from “the cold Finnish crags to burning Colchis” [a quotation from Pushkin] or from “sea to sea” [from the Baltic to the Black Sea, the battle cry of Polish “historical” patriots]. As a nomad, one can serve every cause imaginable except that of the people, of the peasants. For peasants are a settled and deeply rooted people, and therefore different in every land.  

Drahomanov declared that each Ukrainian intellectual must settle himself in a specific community and grow into a definite social milieu.

[The intellectuals] must settle down in communities of our people and use their forces to fulfill the needs of the social organism. This will enable them to spread sound ideas by word and deed. . . . All of Ukraine must be covered by a network of individuals and groups linked with one another.

Drahomanov’s call to the denationalized intelligentsia to join the Ukrainian national cause was most movingly stated in these pathetic words:

Educated Ukrainians usually work for anything in the world except Ukraine and its people. . . . They must take an oath to themselves not to desert the Ukrainian cause. They must realize that every educated man who leaves Ukraine, every cent which is not spent for Ukrainian purposes, every word that is not spoken in Ukrainian, is a waste of the capital of the Ukrainian people, and that with things as they are, anything lost is irreplaceable.

No less serious than the problem of the denationalization of the elite was that of the isolation of the Ukrainian regions from each other. Drahomanov pointed to the abnormal condition that Left-Bank and Right-Bank Ukraine, Galicia and Subcarpathia—all of Russian and all of Austro-Hungarian Ukraine—had very little contact, and were even very incompletely informed about each other. In his scholarly works
Drahomanov had shown the ethnic and linguistic homogeneity of the Ukrainian people from the Kuban region at the foot of the Caucasus to the Subcarpathian region in the Hungarian state. He felt that this ethnic unity should have political consequences. Although he did not propose as a practical goal the unification of the whole Ukrainian area into one state, he aimed at close political and cultural collaboration and mutual aid among the various parts of the Ukrainian territory. For instance, he advised that all democratic propaganda destined for the population of the Kuban should begin by reminding the Kuban Cossacks that they were the descendants of the glorious Zaporozhian Host.

Drahomanov did the work of a true pioneer in Subcarpathia, the most backward and remote of the Ukrainian regions. This was the land which, before the First World War, was known as Hungarian Rus'. In the interwar period it was called Subcarpathian Ruthenia and belonged to Czechoslovakia. Since 1938 it has been called Carpatho-Ukraine. Drahomanov probably became the first leader of the Ukrainian national movement to penetrate into this land when he made two visits there in 1875 and 1876. He was deeply shocked by the misery of its oppressed and exploited people. In later years he never lost sight of the plight of this land and tried to turn the attention of other Ukrainians toward it. Shortly before his death he once again reminded the Ukrainians of their duty toward Subcarpathia.

I was the first Ukrainian to visit Hungarian Rus'. I saw that spiritually it is farther separated even from Galicia than Australia is from Europe. I swore to myself an "oath of Hannibal" to work for the integration of Hungarian Rus' into our national democratic and progressive movement, in which lies its only salvation. . . . I have not been able to fulfill my oath, but now . . . I dare to lay down this oath upon their [the Ukrainians'] heads.

Drahomanov was able to make use even of the division of Ukraine into Russian and Austro-Hungarian parts in his Ukrainian strategy. The systematic persecution of the Ukrainian movement by the tsarist government, particularly the scandalous prohibition of printing in Ukrainian, limited the possibilities of work in Russia. In this difficult situation some Ukrainian patriots felt that the only solution was to convince the Russian government of the harmlessness of the Ukrainian movement by renouncing all political aims and limiting themselves to cultural regionalism, in the fashion of the Plattdeutsch (Low German) literary movement. Drahomanov did not agree with this idea of separating politics from culture; he also doubted that such concessions would lead to the alleviation of tsarist pressure. He feared that such a cowardly attitude would repel young people—and all courageous and freedom-loving
men—and that thus their energy would be lost. He advised that the national movement give up its attempts to come to an understanding with the government. Within the Russian Empire its members should concentrate on strictly academic work (of necessity publishing in Russian) in Ukrainian history, ethnography, economic problems, etc. This research might later serve as the basis for political activity. At the same time, while of course preserving its organizational independence, the Ukrainian movement should seek to collaborate with the various Russian movements of opposition, from the zemstvo constitutionalists to the revolutionary underground. However, the centre of gravity of the Ukrainian movement should be shifted to Galicia, where, in spite of Polish hegemony, Austrian laws did provide a modicum of freedom. Drahomanov hoped that there Galician and Russian Ukrainians together could create a focal point for Ukrainian activity. Then, until the weakening of tsarist absolutism untied the hands of the Ukrainians in Russia, vitality from this centre could radiate back into Russian Ukraine.¹⁰⁸

Drahomanov doubted that the elder generation of the Galician intelligentsia could be converted to his program of joint action. Therefore he went over their heads, appealing directly to the young people. Of course this was a long-range project, but Drahomanov did not let himself be discouraged.

*Gutta cavat lapidem non vi, sed semper cadendo. [It is not by force that the drops of water wear away the stone, but by always falling.] This has always been my motto; it the best political motto.*¹⁰⁹

Some years after Drahomanov's death one of his disciples, the eminent Galician writer and scholar Ivan Franko, evaluated his influence in the following way:

**Truly our teacher, he was completely selfless. He did not spare either himself or us in his efforts to turn us—his lazy and uneducated followers, who had grown up in the slavish tradition of our narrow [Galician] provincialism—onto the better, more enlightened path of European civilization. One might say that he dragged us by the ears along this way. If any contribution to the world or to our national cause comes from the generation which was influenced by him, it will have been the work of Drahomanov.**¹¹⁰

The continuing results of Drahomanov's far-reaching vision helped Galicia become the Piedmont of the Ukrainian national cause before and during the First World War.

How could Drahomanov reconcile his ardent patriotism with his cosmopolitan convictions? He believed that the universal ideal of mankind was a synthesis of the best characteristics of each people. His realization
of the relationship between the general and the particular also made him see that a humanist who wanted to work for the well-being of mankind had to have a specific point of application. The Ukrainian people could be one such point. Humanity could but gain if, among the peoples of the earth, there were "one soulless corpse less, one living nation more." A humanistic and cosmopolitan foundation for the national idea involves the duty to combat all forms of narrow, exclusive, backward nationalism among one's own people. Drahomanov did this conscientiously. Here, to complete the picture of his Ukrainian political program, we must glance at his fight against the excesses of Ukrainian nationalism.

During Drahomanov's lifetime the Ukrainian movement was too weak to be able to harm any other people. Nonetheless, Drahomanov was very sensitive to all the symptoms of national hatred and resentment among the Ukrainians, which, in different circumstances, could turn into a destructive force.

Our nationalism is not nearly so pacific [as its apologists say]. Only listen to the hate with which our people sometimes speak of the Russians, Poles, and Jews. Reflect on what might happen to men of these races living on Ukrainian soil if our nationalists should come to power. What sort of forcible Ukrainization would be prescribed for them! This misanthropic nationalism is also harmful to us, for it aggravates the hostile feelings of our neighbours. Nowadays one must try to lessen hatred among nations even during wartime, as the Red Cross organization does within its sphere.

Drahomanov's intellectual conscientiousness made him an uncompromising opponent of all national illusions and patriotic superstitions.

I am disgusted with myself because my patriotism induces me to write on all possible subjects, from archaeology to painting, only in order to be able to proclaim the existence of a Ukraine in the tenth and fifteenth centuries as well as in the nineteenth century, in prehistoric excavations as well as in modern opera. But my love for my own people does not give me the right to attack Russians, Poles, or Jews.

Two examples of Drahomanov's struggle against the prejudices of his compatriots are his attitude toward the Shevchenko cult and his stand on the usefulness of Russian literature to Ukrainians.

The untutored genius and revolutionary poet, Taras Shevchenko (1814–61), had a tremendous influence on the development of Ukrainian national consciousness. The Ukrainians honoured him as a prophet,
and soon a cult grew up around his name and memory. Each Ukrainian faction, from the clericalists to the socialists, projected its own ideas into its picture of Shevchenko, and disregarded those aspects of his life and work which did not fit. Drahomanov was certainly not opposed to honouring the memory of Shevchenko. In later life he tried, in vain, to have published in Geneva a complete and unexpurgated edition of Shevchenko's poems. However, he did protest against the canonization of Shevchenko, which hid the true man and poet behind a halo. Drahomanov felt that a historical and critical attitude, which would also take cognizance of Shevchenko's limitations, was needed. In particular he warned against regarding his poetry as a consistent political programme.  

It may seem strange that both during his lifetime and after his death Drahomanov was often accused of being a Russophile. The reason for this was his frequently expressed conviction that Ukrainians should not shy away from Russian literature. His arguments were simple: first, Russian literature undoubtedly included the greatest artistic achievements of all the Slavic literatures; second, by turning their backs on Russian literature, Ukrainians would increase their provincialism rather than their cultural independence. Drahomanov answered the reproach that he was a slavish devotee of Russian literature and culture in the following manner:

Personally, since my early twenties I have been able to read five European languages, not including antique and Slavic ones. Of these I most love English literature, as I do the cultural and political life of England. With the exception of technical books in my field, I should be ready to live the rest of my life without books in Russian. But in Ukraine I see the following state of affairs: only two or three intellectuals out of a hundred use European books, and most of these are technical. Even most writers do not know a single European language. Under these conditions what would be the level of Ukrainian men of letters if they should also give up Russian literature? I should not waste another word on the cultural value of Russian literature if in Ukraine I saw energetic efforts to obtain spiritual nourishment directly from Western Europe, and if I did not see that our modern Ukrainian authors lack a basic European education.

Thus Russian literature was indispensable in Dnieper Ukraine because the numerous Russian translations of Western European writings were necessary. The situation was somewhat different in Galicia, where a knowledge of German was widespread. But Drahomanov was afraid that the German cultural influence tended to produce bureaucrats, and believed that Russian literature could play a positive role in Galicia too. He
thought that the spirit of social criticism prevalent in the best Russian literature was a means of drawing the attention of the backward Galician intelligentsia to the needs of its own people. According to Drahomanov, such a feeling for the people was the best stimulus for the Ukrainian national movement. Moreover, acquaintance with reality in Russia was a sure means of destroying the illusions which the conservative "Old Ruthenians" had about the tsarist empire. Drahomanov maintained that he had distributed more Russian books in Galicia than all the Muscovite Pan-Slavists together, and that as a result of this very fact the younger generation had gone over to the camp of the Ukrainian national movement. 117

Drahomanov could permit himself such a dispassionate, utilitarian attitude because he was convinced of the vitality of Ukrainian culture, and because he was free from a feeling of national inferiority. Many of his compatriots, who compensated for their dependence on Russian culture by bleating abuse against Russia, could not forgive this attitude. Drahomanov remarked that those who criticized him as a "Russophile" were the very ones who in practice were ready to make much greater concessions in the use of Russian in publications and even in private correspondence. The difference was that Drahomanov believed that the only honourable thing to do was to "admit in theory a part of the concessions which the others make in practice." 118

In the history of Ukrainian political thought Drahomanov stands halfway between the generation of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society of the 1840s—the first expression of a modern Ukrainian national consciousness—and the generation which was called upon to construct an independent Ukrainian democratic republic in 1917. Of course Drahomanov was not the first participant in the Ukrainian national movement to reflect on political problems and to work out programs. But in volume of writing and diversity of questions handled, and in profundity of thought, none of his predecessors or contemporaries can be compared with him. To the present day, in the field of political theory, Ukraine has produced but few men of the same stature. Drahomanov's reputation has suffered from the fact that he was a pioneer in so many respects. For the next generation many of his hard-won achievements were already self-evident, while the points in which his views had been surpassed by historical developments (e.g., Ukrainian statehood) were immediately obvious. This is one of the reasons for the lessening of Drahomanov's influence on Ukrainian political thought in the inter-war period. But an examination of Drahomanov's heritage which endeavours to distinguish the living ideas from the dead ones must acknowledge the richness and fertility of his contribution.
Ivan Franko said:

Clear, incorruptible, and uncompromising, he will continue to be the conscience of our nation for a long time—a true compass for the coming generations, showing them how they should live and work.\textsuperscript{119}

**Drahomanov’s Program for Russia and Eastern Europe**

Drahomanov believed that the federalization of the Russian Empire would bring freedom to the Ukrainian people.

The independence of a land and people can be achieved either by secession and the creation of an independent state (separatism) or by winning self-government without separation (federalism).\textsuperscript{120}

It should be noted that here federalism is contrasted with separatism, but not with independence. Drahomanov was probably thinking of Switzerland, where the French- and Italian-speaking cantons, though in the minority, are no less “independent” than are the German-speaking ones.

For details of Drahomanov’s constitutional program readers may refer to “Free Union,” his draft constitution for a reconstructed Russian Empire.\textsuperscript{121} Here we will only direct attention to a few especially interesting points.

A federalist structure presupposes the existence of the constituent units which compose the whole state. Drahomanov felt that the administrative divisions of tsarist Russia (provinces or gubernii), with their arbitrarily drawn boundaries, were not suitable as units for a system of vigorous self-government. On the other hand, he did not insist that the Russian Empire be divided strictly according to the ethnic principle, as the size of the single “cantons” would be too disparate. Drahomanov proposed that a new territorial unit, the oblast (region),\textsuperscript{122} be created. In fixing the boundaries of these regions, ethnic, economic, and geographic factors should all be considered. Some composite regions would have to be formed; the Latvians and the Estonians might form a single region, as might the various national groups in the Caucasus. The territories of the more numerous peoples, such as the Russians and the Ukrainians, should be divided into several regions. In the case of the Ukrainians Drahomanov proposed three regions: Kiev, or Right-Bank Ukraine; Kharkiv, or Left-Bank Ukraine; and Odessa, or southern Ukraine, including Bessarabia and the Crimea. In mixed regions national equality would be ensured by the self-government of communities and districts, and by the inviolability of personal rights (including free use of the mother tongue) of all citizens. Drahomanov cited Switzerland, where there are several bilingual cantons.\textsuperscript{123}
The most distinctive feature of Drahomanov’s draft constitution was that (as in the constitutions of the United States and of Switzerland) the member states (regions) were to have a sphere of competence inviolable by the federal government. Jurisdictional disputes were to be decided by the supreme court (Senate). What Drahomanov proposed here was not simple administrative decentralization, but rather—though he did not use these words—the division of sovereignty between the federal union and the regions. This conception was further implemented by two other provisions. First, the regions were to have the right to conclude agreements with one another for special purposes. Second, in the case of a usurpation of power on the federal level, full authority, including the command of the armed forces, was to pass automatically into the hands of the regional governments. What actually happened on the territory of the former Russian Empire in 1918 approximated the sequence of events which Drahomanov had imagined. After the Bolshevik coup d’état various regional governments, which at first regarded themselves as autonomous, but still as parts of a democratic Russia, took full authority into their own hands.

The eminent German sociologist Max Weber considered Drahomanov’s constitutional project brilliant. Weber wrote:

Drahomanov’s great strength lies in his synthesis of economic with national ideals and in his strong sense of what is possible, given the ethnographic conditions of Russia and the economic circumstances of the present.\(^{124}\)

Weber agreed completely with Drahomanov’s thesis that the unitary structure of the Russian Empire was the chief obstacle to a liberal transformation and organic “Europeanization” of that country.

What were the forces on which Drahomanov counted in the struggle for the realization of a federalist program? He thought that the natural allies of the Ukrainians were all the other non-Russian nationalities in the Empire, from the Finns in the north to the peoples of the Caucasus in the south. Among the Great Russians there were also some groups with a vigorous feeling of local patriotism and a tradition of opposition to the centralism of Moscow and St. Petersburg: the Don Cossacks, the Siberians, the inhabitants of the Volga and Ural regions, and the inhabitants of the far north.\(^{125}\) Drahomanov’s ideas were proven correct during the revolution of 1917–20, when these were the only ethnically Russian areas to resist the communist wave coming from Central Russia.

It is a well-known sociological rule that a revolutionary movement is apt to imprint its organizational pattern on any regime it creates. Not only Drahomanov’s aims, but also the means he proposed, were decentralized and federalist. He hoped for the creation of a series of regional revolu-
tionary organizations which would co-ordinate their activities voluntarily, not just follow the dictates of a central authority. This conception contrasted sharply with the idea, widespread in Russian revolutionary circles, that a strongly centralized revolutionary organization was necessary. When victory had been achieved, its central committee would be the basis for a provisional government with unlimited powers. Completing the centralist chain, this provisional government would then preside over the elections to an all-Russian national assembly.

Drahomanov warned that in reality this program could only mean the conveyance of centralized power into other hands, and would bring with it an acute danger of a dictatorial coup d'état from either the right or the left. He contrasted this idea of an all-Russian national assembly with that of regional constituent assemblies. An all-Russian assembly "would, I am almost sure, preserve the hegemony of the Great Russian people and the central Great Russian regions over all others, particularly in questions of education and economics."

This brings us to the question of methods in the political struggle.

Basically the theory of liberalism goes hand-in-hand with the idea of gradual reforms in political, social, and cultural matters, and not with the idea of revolution, understood as a forceful overthrow of the existing order. Liberal theories only approve political revolutions when they are the only means to remove oppressive regimes that block reforms which a self-governing people would introduce.

Depending on the general political situation, Drahomanov several times altered his opinion as to what were the most advisable tactical methods. In his youth he hoped that peaceful progress would be possible on the basis of Alexander II's reforms—the emancipation of the serfs, the new judiciary system, and the zemstvos. The reactionary turn taken by the Russian government, particularly the repression of the Ukrainian movement, made his attitude more warlike. During the Balkan War of 1877–8 he edited pamphlets to be distributed among the soldiers and officers of the Russian army, summoning them to armed rebellion. He hoped that once again the army would rebel, as had the Decembrists after the Napoleonic wars, but that this time the military action would be supported by public opinion focused in the zemstvos. Later, in the 1880s, having lost his illusions about the possibility of rapid improvement of the Russian regime, he again regarded the matter more coolly. He then directed his eyes toward the zemstvo, an island of local self-government in the midst of the absolute and bureaucratic regime. He drew hope from the examples of France and Prussia: in France the initiative of the provincial assemblies led to the convocation of the Estates-General in 1789; in
Prussia the action of the provincial diets caused the convocation of parliament in 1847–8.131

Drahomanov reproached the Russian opposition with the narrowness of its views: as a consequence of centuries of absolutism and centralism, it could imagine political change only as the result of violence—

of imperial decree, à la Peter I, or of a massacre, à la Pugachev. Either is a thunderbolt striking society, not a voluntary, cooperative action undertaken by the best elements of society—either in a peaceful or a revolutionary way.132

Drahomanov did not make maximal demands. He believed that it was less important for reforms to be introduced rapidly than for them to take deep root once introduced (as they had in England).133 This gradualism paralleled his doctrine on compromise in politics. He felt that compromises were necessary, but that only “quantitative,” not “qualitative,” ones were admissible.

If the body cannot digest a whole quart of milk, then give it half a pint, but give it milk, not ink, or a mixture of milk and ink.134

Drahomanov’s biographer Zaslavsky asserts that Drahomanov was the only revolutionary author in Russia to treat problems of foreign policy fully and intelligently.135

It was Drahomanov’s Ukrainian perspective that led his eyes beyond the boundaries of the Russian Empire. His concern for Galicia brought him to a general interest in the affairs of the Austro-Hungarian Empire. Looking at the Polish question, the Jewish question, and the questions arising from the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire from the standpoint of Kiev instead of St. Petersburg brought these problems nearer and made them more concrete. Drahomanov’s ideas on the relations of the Ukrainians to their western and southern neighbours, and to the national minorities living on Ukrainian soil, were a counterpart and complement to his Russian program. Here internal and foreign policy met.

For Drahomanov the kernel of the Jewish question in Ukraine was the fact that the Jews were at the same time a nationality, an economic class, and a religion. As a nationality they were isolated from the rest of the population by their language and customs. In the economic sphere, the vast majority of the Jews were employed in certain occupations of a middle-class nature. Ritualistic observances carried over into daily life intensified the isolation of the Jews from the Christian population.136 Drahomanov feared that the resentment which the Ukrainian peasants felt against the Jewish innkeepers, usurers, and aren datory (tax-gatherers for the State and the nobility) might easily turn from social protest into anti-Semitism. He felt sure that the Jewish question would not be solved by
the laudable liberal formula: abolition of the legal limitations imposed on the Jews in Russia, e.g., their artificial concentration within the “pale of settlement” (in Ukraine and Belorussia). Drahomanov saw the solution in a schism between the Jewish workers and the exploitative elements in the Jewish community, and in the development of a feeling of solidarity between the Jewish and non-Jewish workers. This would require the founding of a Jewish socialist organization and a Yiddish socialist press. In this program Drahomanov anticipated the later Bund. The first appeals for the founding of a Jewish socialist organization came from the press of Drahomanov’s Hromada in Geneva. This initiative encountered the open hostility of the Russian socialists, including the Russified Jews.137

Drahomanov saw the “egg of Columbus” solution of the Polish question in the making of a sharp distinction between the territory that was ethnically Polish and that which, though ethnically Lithuanian, Belorussian or Ukrainian, was claimed by the Poles. In these non-Polish lands, which had once belonged to the Polish Commonwealth, the Poles composed a minority of the total population, but the majority of the landlord class. “Nowadays, for people of sound mind there can be a question of the independence only of ethnic Poland.”138 Of course Drahomanov believed that ethnic Poland had an unquestionable right to independent statehood, but he felt that a federalist policy of co-operation with the other peoples of Eastern Europe would be in the Poles’ own interest. As for the Poles living outside ethnic Polish territory, they should have cultural autonomy and of course equality as citizens, but not a dominant position. The Polish minority in Right-Bank Ukraine, a relatively high percentage of which was educated, would have been able to render a great service to the cause of freedom if it had been willing to unite with the Ukrainians in the fight for the self-government of the land, rather as the Swedes in Finland had co-operated with the Finns. During the nineteenth century a few Poles in Right-Bank Ukraine were ready to take this road because of their democratic convictions or local patriotism. But the mass of the Poles, including those of democratic and even socialist opinions, were not able to free themselves from their hypnotic belief in Poland’s “historical frontiers.” Drahomanov was convinced that these Polish imperialist dreams were a source of disaster for the Polish people, who let themselves be seduced into policies of adventure, and a source of disturbance for all of Eastern Europe.139

Unlike the Russian Slavophiles, Drahomanov desired not the demolition, but the federalization, of Austria-Hungary. The organization of the Empire into historic crownlands, in which an aristocratic nationality usually oppressed the plebeian peoples, should be replaced by a system guaranteeing genuine equality, on the basis of universal suffrage, to all the peoples. Drahomanov advised his Galician friends that the struggle
for universal suffrage was their most immediate political task.\textsuperscript{140}

He took a lively interest in the fate of the Balkan Slavs, whom he believed to be the natural allies of the Ukrainians. He felt it was through the union with Ukraine that Russia had become interested in the Balkan and Black Sea regions and that the Russian Empire’s conflict with Turkey had been inherited from Cossack Ukraine. However, Russia’s imperialist tendencies made it incapable of being an honourable ally in the struggle of these regions for their independence. “A despotic state cannot be a liberator.”\textsuperscript{141} Drahomanov warned his Bulgarian and Serbian friends against expecting true help from Russia.

Drahomanov’s East European program was completed by his ideas on German-Russian relations.\textsuperscript{142} He felt that these two aggressive great powers formed a pincers enclosing Eastern Europe. Of the lands caught between them, those which were more immediately menaced by Germany placed their hopes in Russian strength, and those menaced by Russia relied on Germany. Opposing both opinions, Drahomanov maintained that Russian and German imperialisms supported each other, and that it was a fundamental error to believe that Germany and Russia would stalemate each other. He believed that an enduring peaceful order could be created in Eastern Europe only by the emancipation and federal union of the peoples living between the Russian and German ethnic blocks. This would check both the Russian and the German imperialists. The thwarting of these imperialists would then strengthen the hands of the liberals within these two nations, in which the authoritarian form of government was a function of expansionist foreign policy. In the long run, the federation of the peoples between the two blocs would benefit the Germans and Russians as well as all the smaller peoples in between.

As we know, Eastern Europe took a course directly opposite to that which Drahomanov had mapped out. Nonetheless, there can scarcely be any doubt that he saw clearly the great issues in this part of the world. And the sad course of events since 1914 justifies the conviction that Drahomanov’s ideas may still have some normative value in the future.

Notes

3. Ibid., 245–6.
DRAHOMANOV AS POLITICAL THEORIST

6. Ibid., 115.
18. M. P. Drahomanov, Chudatski dumky pro ukrainsku natsionalnu spravu (Vienna 1915), 76–81.
20. Ibid., 318–19.
22. M. P. Drahomanov, Perepyska, ed. M. Pavlyk (Lviv 1901), 123.
24. M. P. Drahomanov, Rai i postup (Vienna 1915), 64.
25. Cf. V. Doroshenko, “M. Drahomanov i ioho dumky pro relihiini i tserkovni spravy,” Vira i nauka, no. 6 (Kolomyia 1926).
32. See Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Pavlykom, 6:184. These principles recognize the fatherhood of God, the brotherhood of all men, and the self-government of all communities of three or more members of the Brotherhood.
33. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Okunevskym, 209.

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37. Drahomanov, Rai i postup, 61.
42. M. P. Drahomanov, Lysty na Naddnipriansku Ukrainu (Vienna 1915), 38.
43. Drahomanov, Chudatski dumky, 13.
44. Ibid., 16.
46. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Pavlykom, 6:151–2.
47. Arkhiv M. Drahomanova, 308.
52. Drahomanov, “Free Union: Draft of a Ukrainian Political and Social Program (Part 2, Section 5),” in Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, 204.
55. Drahomanov, Avstro-ruski spomyny, 356.
57. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Pavlykom, 6:29.
60. Ibid., 212.
64. This is the basic idea of M. Hrushevsky’s study, Z pochniv ukrainskoho sos- 

tialistychnoho rukhu: Mykh. Drahomanov i zhenevskyi sotsialistychnyi hurtok (Vienna 1922). From the official Soviet Russian standpoint the theory of the independent origin of Ukrainian Marxism is of course a capital heresy. Charges of this nationalist deviation played a role in the liquidation of the native Ukrainian communist leaders in the 1930s.
65. Drahomanov, Perepyska, 122.
70. Ibid., 342–3.
72. Ibid., 384.
75. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in *Vybrani tvory*, 130, n.
76. This is the general thesis of Drahomanov’s *Istoricheskaia Polsha*.
80. Ibid., 49.
81. Ibid., 220.
85. Ibid., 215–16.
89. Ibid., 18.
90. Ibid., 22.
93. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in *Vybrani tvory*, 112.
94. Drahomanov, *Chudatski dumky*, 94.
95. Ibid., 102.
100. Ibid., 215.
102. Ibid., 138.
103. Ibid., 125.
104. Drahomanov, Lsty na Naddnipriiansku Ukrainu, 16.
108. Ibid., 89–90; Arkhiv M. Drahomanova, 240, 331.
113. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 139.
114. Drahomanov, Chudatski dumky, 20.
117. Arkhiv M. Drahomanova, 315.
118. Ibid., 32.
122. Not to be confused with the present Soviet administrative unit of the same name.
125. Drahomanov, “Perednie slovo,” in Vybrani tvory, 142.
129. Perepyska Drahomanova z Buchynskym, 14.
140. Pavlyk, Perepyska Drahomanova z Okunevskym, 217.
142. Cf. Drahomanov, “Germany’s Drive to the East and Moscow’s Drive to the West,” in Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings, 161–74.
The First Ukrainian Political Program: Mykhailo Drahomanov's "Introduction" to *Hromada*

Mykhailo Drahomanov and His Mission

"Perednie slovo" (Introduction) appeared in Geneva in 1878 as the first issue of the non-periodical journal *Hromada* (Community). The editor of *Hromada* and the author of its programmatic "Introduction" was Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95). This publication constitutes a turning point in the development of modern Ukrainian political thought. In a certain sense, which I shall attempt to define more precisely below, it may be regarded as the first Ukrainian political program. Drahomanov's "Introduction" therefore merits consideration from the perspective of our time.

A brief account of *Hromada*’s prehistory is in order here. In 1864 Drahomanov joined the staff of the St. Vladimir University in Kiev, initially holding the rank of privatdocent and later advancing to docent on permanent appointment. He taught courses primarily in ancient history. He also published a number of important studies in Ukrainian folklore and oral literature. Aside from his scholarly endeavours, Drahomanov was active in an underground Ukrainian organization, the so-called Stara Hromada (Old Community) of Kiev, and gained a wide reputation for his outspoken articles in the Russian and Galician-Ukrainian press. Drahomanov was described as a Ukrainian "separatist" and a dangerous radical in a flurry of denunciations to the university authorities and was attacked in reactionary Russian newspapers. Ultimately the matter came to the attention of the tsar himself. During his stay in Kiev in September 1875, Alexander II ordered that Drahomanov be forbidden to lecture at the University of Kiev and at the other southern universities (in Kharkiv and Odessa), but that he be allowed to transfer to one of the northern universities. Drahomanov refused to ask for a "voluntary" transfer from the University of Kiev. Accordingly, he was dismissed on the strength of
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“point three” (i.e., by administrative decision), which closed the door to a further academic career in Russia.

Drahomanov’s banishment from the University of Kiev was the signal, as it were, for a whole series of anti-Ukrainian measures on the part of the tsarist government. The 1870s were a period of revival for the Ukrainian national movement in Dnieper Ukraine. In the eyes of the regime, this posed a threat that required energetic countermeasures. One such action was the implementation of the notorious Ems Ukase of 18 May 1876, whose goal was the eradication of all manifestations of Ukrainian national-cultural identity.

In these circumstances the Stara Hromada, of which Drahomanov was a leading member, proposed that he become an “ambassador-at-large” of the Ukrainian national cause, establishing an organ of free Ukrainian political thought in Western Europe. Plans for future activity abroad were elaborated by a “Committee of Twelve” which met in Podil (a district of Kiev) at the residence of Kost Mykhalchuk. It was agreed that Drahomanov would publish, preferably in Vienna, periodical symposia of the “thick journal” type under the title Hromada, which were to contain fundamental articles of a theoretical and programmatic character, literary works, and an extensive chronicle of current Ukrainian affairs. Brochures on subjects of topical interest were to be published in Russian and in West European languages. Financing for the project was assured thanks to a generous contribution from Iakiv Shulhyn. Having inherited a substantial estate, he donated the larger part of it, in the amount of 12,000 rubles, to the Stara Hromada, which in turn undertook to pay Drahomanov annual stipends of 1,500 rubles for publications and 1,200 rubles for personal expenses.

Having obtained a passport with no great difficulty, Drahomanov went abroad in mid-February 1876. He made a stop in Lviv, where he first met Ivan Franko. By early March he had arrived in Vienna. His wife and ten-year-old daughter remained in Kiev until June, when they were brought to Vienna by Viliam Berenshtam, a friend of the Drahomanov family and a member of the Hromada.

In the Austrian capital Drahomanov encountered unforeseen circumstances that obliged him to alter his original plans. The previous year, 1875, had seen the publication in Vienna of an anonymous pamphlet, Parova mashyna (The Steam Engine). Its author was a young revolutionary and socialist from Left-Bank Ukraine, Serhii Podolynsky. His assistant in Vienna was his Galician follower Ostap Terletsky. Parova mashyna was the first socialist publication in the Ukrainian language. Thanks to the efforts of Podolynsky and Terletsky, it was followed by three booklets of similar character. Drahomanov had nothing to do with any of this activity. He was personally acquainted with Podolynsky and
Terletsky and esteemed them both, but had strong reservations about the socialist brochures published in Vienna. He did not approve of their seditious character or of their fictionalized-utopian form. Drahomanov feared that, in spite of his non-involvement, he would be implicated as having abetted their publication. That is what actually happened.

In April 1876 the Vienna procuracy confiscated the last brochure in the series of four published by Podolynsky and Terletsky, entitled Pravdyve slovo khliboroba do svoikh zemliakov (The True Word of a Farmer to His Countrymen). Its unsigned author was a revolutionary populist from Odessa, Feliks Volkovssky. As the publisher and owner of the print shop, Terletsky was charged with responsibility for the subversive publication. This was the first anti-socialist trial in Austrian history. The jury exonerated Terletsky, but the confiscation of Pravdyve slovo was not rescinded. Taking this precedent into account, Drahomanov concluded that the Austrian authorities would not give him an opportunity to make Vienna the base of his activity. Another location had to be found. Drahomanov wavered between London and Geneva, finally choosing the latter. In the fall of 1876 Drahomanov took his family to Switzerland, where he spent the next thirteen years of his life.

Drahomanov’s move was timely, for in 1877 the Austrian province of Galicia was swept by a wave of searches and arrests that culminated in two trials in which Mykhailo Pavlyk, Ostap Terletsky, Ivan Franko, and others were defendants. The indictment charged the defendants with membership in an international underground revolutionary organization allegedly headed by Drahomanov. Thus, the transfer of Drahomanov’s base to Geneva was a necessity, but it had somewhat negative consequences for his activity. The move isolated Drahomanov from Ukrainian life, limited and impeded his contacts with like-minded Ukrainian circles in Russia and Austria-Hungary, and drew him into the revolutionary Russian émigré milieu in Geneva, with its unhealthy atmosphere of incessant bickering and intrigue among individuals and groups.

Drahomanov left Ukraine in the spring of 1876, but the first issue of Hromada did not appear until two years later. This delay was due to a variety of reasons. To begin with, there were great practical difficulties associated with the two moves and with the establishment of a print shop in Geneva. Drahomanov was assisted in this enterprise by Antin Lia-khotosky, known in the emigration by the pseudonym “Kuzma,” who became the typesetter of all Drahomanov’s publications. But there were other reasons as well. This was the critical period of the Russo-Turkish War of 1877. Drahomanov warmly sympathized with the cause of liberating the Balkan Slavs from Turkish oppression. At the same time, the Russian revolutionary movement was gaining strength. Drahomanov believed in the possibility of overthrowing the regime in Russia and pub-
lished several Russian-language brochures calling for the transformation of the war against the "external Turks" into an attack on the "internal Turks," i.e., on tsarist autocracy. Finally, there were difficulties in obtaining contributions for the journal that delayed the preparatory work. The members of the Kiev Hromada had promised to provide articles and information on current events, but failed to honour this commitment. Drahomanov therefore had to write the programmatic "Introduction" himself. It grew into a lengthy essay that he completed on 30 April 1878; this date was inscribed at the end of the text. Somewhat later in the year the "Introduction" was published as the first issue of the Ukrainska zbirka "Hromada."

Drahomanov managed to publish five issues of Hromada, which appeared very irregularly: three issues were published in 1877, one in 1879, and a final one in 1882. An attempt was also made to turn Hromada into a regular bi-monthly journal under the joint editorship of Drahomanov, Pavlyk, and Podolynsky. But this "periodical Hromada" lasted for only two issues in 1881.

The symposia were originally conceived as the external organ of the Kiev Hromada. Owing to poor contact between Geneva and Ukraine, however, they actually became Drahomanov's personal organ. The entire burden of filling Hromada's pages devolved upon Drahomanov himself. He was assisted to some extent by a small group of émigrés and a few contributors from Galicia: Podolynsky, Pavlyk, Fedir Vovk, and Volodymyr Navrotsky. Thus Hromada reflected the strong personality of its editor, as well as his philosophy, but the latter was by no means consonant with the views of most members of the Stara Hromada, in which Drahomanov had been a left-winger even before his emigration. In the course of time, the intellectual distance between the Geneva émigré and his former associates in Ukraine grew wider, leading eventually to a complete estrangement between them.

It is not the task of this paper to analyze in detail Drahomanov's life and work during his residence in Geneva, but the subject merits a few general observations. Drahomanov's situation was complex because he was both a Ukrainian and an all-Russian political activist. At first he occupied a prominent place in the Russian émigré colony. His Russian activity attained its peak in the years 1881-3, when he was a major contributor to, and later editor of, the newspaper Volnoe slovo (The Free Word), which purported to be the organ of the so-called Zemskii Soiu z (Zemstvo Union). It was on the pages of Volnoe slovo that Drahomanov first printed his major political treatise Istoricheskaia Polska i velikorusskaia demokratiiia (Historical Poland and Great Russian Democracy), which also appeared in book form in 1882. But relations between Drahomanov and most of the Russian émigrés soon deteriorated.
Drahomanov sharply condemned the terroristic and amoral methods of political struggle favoured by the Russian revolutionaries; he criticized their great-power chauvinism and their centralist, dictatorial leanings. The Russian revolutionaries, for their part, could not forgive Drahomanov his “liberalism and constitutionalism” and his “Ukrainian nationalism.” Drahomanov became a detested figure in the Russian émigré milieu, and it was only a few individuals, such as Sergei Stepiak-Kravchinsky and Vladimir Debgorii-Mokrievich—both of Ukrainian descent, it should be noted—who did not break ties with him. At the same time, as has already been mentioned, the estrangement between Drahomanov and the Stara Hromada was growing deeper. Under the pressure of harsh reaction, the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire narrowed its scope in the 1880s, almost ceasing to manifest itself externally. The members of the Stara Hromada thought it best to wait out the dark hour, limiting themselves to inconspicuous scholarly endeavours. From their point of view, Drahomanov’s political activity abroad, of which only faint echoes reached Ukraine, seemed at best a needless luxury, and at worst playing with fire, as it was liable to provoke the tsarist government into new anti-Ukrainian repressive measures. Drahomanov could not acquiesce in such an attitude, which he interpreted—with less than perfect justice—as one of surrender and cowardice. Finally, in 1886, the Stara Hromada refused Drahomanov any further financial assistance, and relations between them were severed completely.4

Drahomanov’s moral and material situation in Switzerland was always very difficult, but in the latter half of the 1880s, when he found himself almost completely isolated, it became tragic indeed. There can be no doubt that the continual worries, tensions, disappointments, setbacks, uncertainty about the future, lack of security for his family (a wife and three children), and bitter poverty all undermined Drahomanov’s health and brought about the heart disease that drove him to an early grave. Yet it should be mentioned that Drahomanov’s final years were happier. In 1889 he moved to Sofia, Bulgaria, where he was offered a professorship in history at the Higher School (incipient university). The successes of the Radical movement in Galicia, which was beginning to make rapid headway, were also a great source of satisfaction to him. Drahomanov was the spiritual father of the Galician Radical Party and a most active contributor to its press until the end of his days. Mykhailo Drahomanov died in Sofia on 20 July 1895.

If Drahomanov’s activity during his Geneva period is to be evaluated from a moral point of view, it cannot be regarded as anything other than a feat of heroism. It cannot fail to impress one by its very scope. We are unable to pause here to consider Drahomanov’s scholarly work during
these years (despite unfavourable circumstances, he did not interrupt this work) or his "ambassadorial" role as informant of Western European public opinion on the Ukrainian question. What concerns us here is Drahomanov's publicistic work, in which he made a lasting contribution to Ukrainian political thought. We shall examine one of his works, the programmatic "Introduction" to Hromada, in greater detail. In concluding this section, it is appropriate to cite a passage from the writings of Mykhailo Hrushevsky that characterizes "Drahomanov's mission" as that of the first Ukrainian political émigré of the nineteenth century.

What Drahomanov became in the history of the Ukrainian renaissance, he became thanks to this civic mission abroad, which condemned him to the bitter life of an exile but also placed him in political and social circumstances that were especially advantageous in some respects and that involved extraordinary responsibility. It freed him from the oppression of the tsarist regime, from local routines and cliques, and from the necessity of writing in Aesopian language in order to escape censorship, appointing him to the position of representative spokesman for all progressive Ukrainian life before the civilized world. It elevated him to a post that required him to exert all his energy and all the resources of his intellect over a period of years in order to remind the broad civilized world that, in the darkest era of Ukrainian life, Ukraine continued to live, that it had not died and would not die in spite of all the tsarist repres- sions and proscriptions. It condemned him to suffer the blows, insinuations, and abuses directed against this "proscribed Ukraine," to fend them off and reply with proofs and manifestations of positive, progressive, universally valid characteristics of the Ukrainian movement. Over Ukrainian life, in this difficult, oppressive, demoralizing period, it placed the civic control of this all-Ukrainian foreign representation—Drahomanov and his circle—which led the Ukrainian movement out of the byways of provincialism and opportunism onto the broad pathways of world cultural development and forced it to orient itself toward the prospects of universal political and social liberation. For a long time, the direction of the Ukrainian movement was determined by these three centers, all equal in importance: Kiev, Lviv, and Geneva. From this point of view, Drahomanov's mission constituted an epoch in Ukrainian life.\(^5\)

An Examination of the "Introduction" to Hromada
In the title of this paper, Drahomanov's "Introduction" of 1878 was termed "the first Ukrainian political program." This primacy must be
considered relative. After the dawn of the Ukrainian national renascence in the nineteenth century, modern Ukrainian political thought also began to make its appearance. Its early offshoots may be seen in the Istoryia Rusov (History of the Rus’ People), written at the turn of the nineteenth century, in the program of the Cyrllo-Methodian Society (1846–7), in the poetry of Shevchenko, in the scholarly and publicistic writings of Mykola Kostomarov and Panteleimon Kulish, in the statements of the khlopomany (peasant-lovers) circle of the 1860s, and in other documents. This was the intellectual tradition that nurtured Drahomanov, a fact of which he was well aware. Not long before his death he stated that in his own work he had only attempted, as it were, to apply “the leading ideas arrived at in the forties by the celebrated Cyrllo-Methodian Brethren . . . to be sure, with the modifications wrought by universal science and politics in recent times.”

Yet it must be said that until Drahomanov’s time Ukrainian political thought remained, so to speak, in the embryonic stage of its development. It still had a fragmentary character: the writings of the early publicists dealt with particular aspects of the Ukrainian problem, such as the question of the paths of development of Ukrainian literature, the peasant question, questions of Ukrainian-Russian and Ukrainian-Polish relations, etc., but did not attempt a synthesis. Secondly, Ukrainian political thought of the time often made its appearance not directly but in a veiled form. Its elements must be sought in belles-lettres, in works of literary criticism, historiography, and studies in ethnography and linguistics. This cannot be explained only by the restrictions of censorship, which made it necessary to employ “Aesopian language.” There was an added factor: given the state of Ukrainian society, the various branches of its spiritual life—literature, scholarship, and political thought—were as yet insufficiently differentiated. Hence political thought often manifested itself not in its appropriate form of rational discourse but coloured by the foreign element of poetic diction. An example of this is the quasi-biblical style of Kostomarov’s Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu (The Books of Genesis of the Ukrainian People). Thirdly, the works of the early Ukrainian political thinkers and publicists did not see print with any regularity; more often they circulated in manuscript, which limited their influence. For example, the hand-written programmatic documents of the Cyrllo-Methodian Society—the highest achievement of Ukrainian political thought before Drahomanov—were seized by the tsarist police during the suppression of the Society in 1847, and did not come to light until after the Revolution. Succeeding generations of nineteenth-century Ukrainians had only a general notion of the Society’s ideas. These ideas were seminal to the “Hromady” movement of the latter half of the century, but the original works were not known at that time. Moreover, there is
reason to believe that important unpublished material on the history of nineteenth-century Ukrainian political thought is still hidden away in Soviet archives.

In comparison with the works that had preceded it, Drahomanov's "Introduction" represented a new and higher stage of Ukrainian political thought. As regards its content, the "Introduction" deliberately sought to encompass the Ukrainian problem as a whole in all its salient aspects: political, social, and cultural. As regards its form, it was that of systematic and rational exposition, free of literary accretions. Since it appeared in print, it immediately gained intellectual currency. Given these elements, the "Introduction" may be considered the first modern Ukrainian political program in the full sense of the word.

In our time, however, there are probably few who have had an opportunity to read the "Introduction" of 1878. A brief résumé of this major work will therefore not be amiss.

At the beginning of this tract, Drahomanov outlines the boundaries of Ukrainian ethnic territory—from Podlachia (Pidliashshia) to the Kuban region and from the Danube estuary to Slobodian Ukraine. More than seventeen million of "our people" reside on this territory." There follows a synthetic survey of Ukrainian history which is meant to provide a basis for a contemporary political program. In connection with the Cossack era, Drahomanov states: "The periods of the most powerful uprisings of our peasantry against the nobility also saw the greatest efforts of communities across the whole of our Ukraine to create a union among themselves" (98). In other words, the experience of history confirms the thesis of the unity of social and national strivings in the Ukrainian people's struggle for freedom. But "when the power of the Polish and Muscovite states, with the assistance of the Cossack lords, abolished Cossackdom... our peasantry was everywhere subjected to heavy bondage, and our land was torn apart by neighbouring monarchies and governments" (98). The conclusion is that Ukrainians must now "take up the thread of our history that was broken in the eighteenth century" (108).

Considering Ukraine's situation in the nineteenth century, Drahomanov focuses both on manifestations of spontaneous protest of the peasant masses against social oppression (the exploits of "Robin Hoods" such as Harkusha and Karmeliuk, and the so-called Kievan Cossackdom of 1855) and on progressive initiatives emanating from the higher, educated strata: the Ukrainian cultural renascence of the first half of the century, the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, the khlopomany of the late 1850s and early 1860s. Nor does he neglect to mention the Polish insurrection of 1863 in Right-Bank Ukraine and the year 1848 in Galicia. Nothing is said of the recent Hromady movement of the 1870s, but this
omission is obviously due to the wish not to give away his friends in the homeland.

The review of Ukraine’s earlier and contemporary history leads Drahomanov to a conclusion that carries ideological weight and is of fundamental significance for the whole system of his thought. Drahomanov is profoundly convinced that the tendency of the Ukrainian people’s historical development and of its struggle for liberation is basically congruent with the tendency of universal progress. And he conceives modern socialism to be the prime manifestation of progressive strivings in the contemporary world. “In Western Europe and America there are already hundreds of thousands of people who are striving directly toward such [a just] order. That is the social, civic party, the party of socialists or communalists” (116). Drahomanov urges the Ukrainian intelligentsia (“literate people”) and the popular masses (muzhiks) “simply to adopt the ideas of the European and American communalists and apply them to our own land in our own manner” (118).

At this point there naturally arises the question of Drahomanov’s understanding of socialism. He does not directly identify his “communalism” (hromadivstvo—he used this term as a synonym for socialism) with any of the contemporary socialist currents. He mentions Louis Blanc, Proudhon, Lassalle, Marx, Dühring, Bakunin, Chernyshevsky, and other exponents of socialism in passing, but considers them all on the same plane and does not discuss ideological divergences among them. Yet it is clear that Drahomanov’s conception of socialism is fundamentally anarchistic. Drahomanov believes that, in spite of disagreements in detail, all socialist factions are striving toward a common goal. “This goal is known as non-authoritarianism [beznachalstvo, Drahomanov’s literal translation of anarchy]: to each his own will and free association and fellowship of people and communities” (115). Elsewhere Drahomanov asserts: “In this fellowship—in equality and joint management of everything that people need for their livelihood—is the root of liberty...” (114). And elsewhere: “Complete non-authoritarianism, complete freedom for every individual, will always remain the goal of every social order, in associations both large and small, just like the idea of reducing to zero the hindrance of friction in machines” (118). Thus, in Drahomanov’s world-view, the highest social ideal and the ultimate goal of human evolution is the complete elimination or at least the greatest possible reduction of authoritarian, hierarchical, and coercive elements in society, which are embodied in the organization of the state; accordingly, the state must ultimately be replaced by the voluntary association of free and equal individuals.

As applied to Ukrainian conditions, this means: “To live according to
our own wishes in our own land.’’ Here Drahomanov immediately adds: ‘‘But what does this mean: to live according to our own wishes in our own land? Does it mean simply to establish a separate state, as, for example, the Italians have done before our very eyes?’’ (111). To this question of his own formulation, Drahomanov supplies an answer that is at once especially characteristic and highly important for the understanding of his conception:

The Ukrainians have undoubtedly lost a great deal owing to the fact that, at the time when most of the other European peoples founded national states, they were not in a position to do so. A state of one's own, whether established by free choice or by coercion, is, after all, a form of social organization suited to defence against foreign attacks and to the regulation of affairs in one's own land according to one's own wishes.... Without question, if the Ukrainians had first managed to shake off the dominance of foreign states and establish one of their own, they would have begun, like other nationalities, to think for themselves in order to ease the misery from which people suffer everywhere. But what has been lost can never be recovered, and a rising against Austria and Russia similar to that staged by the Italians, with the aid of France, for the unity of their state is impossible for us.... The Ukrainians will have better prospects if they strive for their political and social freedom within the states in which they live, with the help of the other peoples also subjugated by these states. (111 – 12)

Drahomanov also believes that Ukrainians should forgo the struggle for a state of their own, as the existence of a national state does not of itself guarantee either civic freedom or social justice. After all, in such rich and powerful countries as France, England, and the United States, ‘‘most people are scarcely less badly off than the Ukrainian peasants’’ (112). This is also supposedly borne out by the Ukrainian historical experience. Ukraine was closest to attaining political independence in the time of Bohdan Khmelnytsky. Within the Cossack state, however, there soon arose estates with conflicting interests: the rich and powerful, or the Cossack officer class, began to oppress the poor and weak, or the rank-and-file Cossacks and the peasants. Drahomanov elaborates his conception in detail as follows:

We think that, instead of striving to establish their own state or some sort of dualism like that of the Hungarians in the [Habsburg] Empire, the Ukrainians would do better to attempt to dilute all state power and to strive for regional and local freedom together with all other lands and communities. This is why it would be best
for Ukrainians not to advance national ideas, but rather autonomist and federalist ones, which will always attract many people of other lands and nationalities. . . . For the Ukrainian communities it would be far better to begin immediately to strive for the greatest possible freedom for themselves than to attempt to establish a separate, more or less centralized state order for Ukraine. We think it would be wise and useful to strive for such local and regional freedom (e.g., even at the district and provincial levels) for Ukraine—in Russia, for example—because Ukrainians will not take this road alone, but in company with federalists of other nationalities, and they will be joined by many people of the Muscovite state nationality itself. (141)

Drahomanov is convinced that decentralization of power is a precondition of liberty and that liberty is possible only in a federative political order: "... it is only small states, or, better, communities and associations that can be truly free. Only a union of associations can truly be a free union ..." (115). Ukrainians ought, therefore, to strive for the federalization of existing states—Russia and Austria-Hungary. This would be the first step on the path leading to the disappearance of states as such, to "a non-authoritarian order: one without lords and without states" (120).

As regards political strategy, Drahomanov declares himself in favour of evolutionary and gradual methods. He polemicizes against extremists who hold the view "the worse, the better" and "all or nothing," clearly alluding to the Russian revolutionaries. He does not reject revolution or coup d'etat in principle, but accords them only limited significance. "Revolts may begin to awaken the public mind; they may do away with an old order which has already been undermined from all sides by other means... but a revolt cannot of itself create a new order, especially a civic or economic one" (132). All that is new makes its appearance gradually, not in ready-made form. In a state as backward as Russia, where the populace is deprived of elementary civic freedoms, it is first necessary to "ensure the abolition of arbitrary tsarist and bureaucratic rule"; in Russian conditions even "an elected council of lords," that is, a parliament elected by limited franchise, would be a step forward and would open the way to desperately needed social reforms, particularly in the agricultural sector. In Galicia, on the other hand, Ukrainians should make use of the opportunities for legal cultural and socio-political work and autonomous organization afforded by the Austrian constitutional system, whatever its faults. Drahomanov expresses his skepticism about the utility and prospects of success of the elemental popular revolts dreamt of by the Russian revolutionaries.

In Drahomanov's view, the great evil and anomaly of the contempo-
The primary situation in Ukraine is the alienation of the educated social strata from the common people. This is due to the fact that the upper classes in Ukraine are composed of foreigners—Russians, Poles, Germans, Jews, Hungarians, and Romanians—and of more or less denationalized Ukrainians. The Ukrainian masses are therefore deprived of the essential cultural services available to other peoples. In Ukraine even the socialists shun the language and disregard the national characteristics of the people among whom they live and off whom they feed. "A literate Ukrainian most often works for anyone at all except his own Ukraine and its peasantry" (125).

To this cheerless reality Drahomanov counterposes the following moral and political imperative:

We think that all civic work in Ukraine must wear Ukrainian clothing—Ukrainian identity. Of course, this Ukrainian identity cannot consist in the goals of the work. The goals of human work are the same throughout the world, as theoretical science is everywhere the same. But applied science is not everywhere the same. So it is with civic work... (122)

And so those of the literate Ukrainians who do not want Ukraine and its peasantry continually to lose strength must swear not to go outside Ukraine; they must insist that every individual who leaves Ukraine, every kopeck not spent on a Ukrainian cause, every word not spoken in Ukrainian is an expenditure from the Ukrainian peasants’ treasury, an expenditure which in current conditions will never be returned to it. (125)

The idea of service to one's own people entails a demand to become rooted in one place: "... it is high time for the literate man to end the nomadic wandering of his thought and labour 'from the cold Finnish crags to burning Colchis' and 'from sea to sea'!" (147). Socialists belonging to the intelligentsia should associate themselves with communities of the Ukrainian common people in order to be of service to them. What is required here is not the mere propagation of socialist ideas but all manner of cultural, educational, social, and economic activity. This in turn requires individuals possessing solid academic knowledge and skilled in practical professions. As religion is the force that legitimizes the unjust contemporary social order and keeps the people in ignorance, Ukrainian socialists should "begin to preach widely against the roots of belief and priestcraft with the assistance of natural and social science" (136).

Drahomanov is impatient "for Ukraine to be covered as soon as possible with a network of comrades and associations, Ukrainian civic workers, all of them linked one to another, with as many comrades as possible

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in peasant communities” (138). In this context he coins the aphorism: “Ukrainian socialism is not a party but a community” (138). There is no need to fear allegations that work for the good of one’s own people contradicts the universal interests that socialists are supposed to serve. These interests will only gain when “the world contains one soulless corpse less, one living nation more” (139).

The last question considered by Drahomanov pertains to potential allies of the Ukrainian liberation movement. Centralist habits are so deeply ingrained in Russian and Polish society that, unfortunately, even their socialist circles are infected with them. Nor do the socialists of the great Western European nations comprehend the vital needs of the smaller stateless peoples; the German Social Democrats have at times expressed clearly chauvinist opinions about the Slavs. The Ukrainians should therefore seek allies first and foremost among the stateless peoples of Russia: the Finns, Estonians, Latvians, Moldavians, Caucasians, etc. As for the Russians, those whose sympathies may most readily be enlisted are representatives of the border groups who possess regionalist traditions, such as the inhabitants of the Don and Ural territories and of Siberia. There are good prospects of co-operation with the Western and Southern Slavs. In time, friendly relations will also be established with those peoples of Western Europe whose position resembles Ukraine’s, such as the Irish, Catalonians, Flemings, Provençals, and Bretons. “We think that if Ukrainian communalism takes root in its own land and develops links with neighbouring democratic and federalist groups, then in time it will be drawn into the broad association of all-European democratic groups...” (142).

This, in outline, is the political program that Mykhailo Drahomanov proposed for Ukrainian society a century ago in his “Introduction” to Hromada.

Toward a Critique of Drahomanov’s Program
In his “Avtobiograficheskaia zametka” (Autobiographical Note) written in 1883, Drahomanov complains that “in my polemics with various camps carried on over many years, I have never encountered a truly conscientious opponent, that is, one who would present my views correctly and then refute them with his own arguments, especially factual ones.”

This rebuke was addressed to contemporaries, but it may also be applied to many of Drahomanov’s posthumous critics. Coming forward today with an analysis of Drahomanov’s program, I would not wish to be accused of unscrupulousness. I have objectively presented the basic ideas of the “Introduction” and I shall attempt to maintain objectivity, insofar as possible, in my further critical remarks. Needless to say, I do not consider myself “wiser” than Drahomanov. But the distance of a century al-
allows us to see, more clearly than was possible for contemporaries, both the strong and the weak aspects of Drahomanov's program and to distinguish those of its elements that have stood the test of time from those that have not. The great respect that we feel for Drahomanov as man and thinker does not relieve us of the responsibility to assess his ideas critically. Moreover, Drahomanov himself exhorted and accustomed Ukrainian society to critical thought. This gives us the right to adopt a critical stance toward Drahomanov himself. The fact that many points of Drahomanov's program have become generally accepted and virtually self-evident is something of an obstacle to the appropriate recognition of his merits as a pioneer and innovator.

The all-Ukrainian character of Drahomanov's program should be stressed at the outset. Drahomanov was the first political publicist and ideologue whose view included the whole of Ukrainian territory from the Kuban region to Transcarpathia. The fate of the "wounded brother" of Transcarpathia was particularly close to his heart, and he devoted a separate paragraph to it in the "Introduction" to Hromada. The painful question of Transcarpathia (Hungarian Rus', in the terminology of the day) was one to which Drahomanov returned a number of times in his later work.

This leads us to a related matter. Drahomanov was a consistent supporter of the ethnic (or, as it used to be called, "ethnographic") principle. For him, Ukraine meant the territory on which Ukrainians constituted the majority of the population. Proceeding from this principle, Drahomanov refuted the pretensions of Ukraine's neighbours to rule the territory and people of Ukraine. He was particularly severe in his criticism of Polish historical legitimism, in whose name Polish patriots aspired to restore the old Commonwealth in its pre-1772 borders, including Right-Bank Ukraine and eastern Galicia. Drahomanov argued that Poland had a right to exist only on the territory inhabited by the Polish people and that claims to ethnically non-Polish territory were extremely harmful not only to Ukrainian interests but also to the long-range national interests of Poland itself. The experience of succeeding generations has resoundingly vindicated the accuracy of this diagnosis.9

Drahomanov correctly foresaw that Ukrainian identity would become strong only when all of Ukraine was covered "with a network of comrades and associations, all of them linked one to another." In other words, he advocated the creation of a Ukrainian social "infrastructure." The absence of this infrastructure—that is, the amorphousness and lack of organization of the popular masses and the alienation of the educated strata of society from the common people—was the fundamental reason for the weakness of Ukrainian identity in the nineteenth century. The Ukrainian national movement did indeed follow the path toward which
Drahomanov directed it. In this respect, great successes were achieved, primarily in Galicia. Because of unfavourable political circumstances, the Ukrainians of Dnieper Ukraine did not manage to build their infrastructure until the Revolution itself, and this fact weighed decisively on the outcome of the liberation struggle of 1917–21.

Drahomanov called for the politicization of the Ukrainian movement and fought against the conception of so-called apolitical Ukrainianism adhered to by most members of the Stara Hromada, whether out of sincere conviction or a desire for protective colouring. This did not mean, of course, that Drahomanov, himself an eminent scholar, lacked an appreciation of cultural values. But he quite rightly believed that cultural life cannot develop normally when a nation is deprived of political freedom. Nonetheless—and this is a most important point—he organically linked national liberation with the struggle for human rights, a democratic political order, and social justice. Drahomanov was an ardent Ukrainian patriot, but he did not make an earthly god of the nation. His patriotism was anchored in universal values, and in it there was not a trace of chauvinism.

Probably the most attractive aspect of Drahomanov’s program is the breadth of its intellectual horizons. Drahomanov did not take a parochial view of the Ukrainian question, nor did he regard it as a matter of merely current interest; rather, he considered it in historical perspective and in a universal context. It is another question whether Drahomanov’s philosophy of history is wholly acceptable to Ukrainians today. But it is certain that in the person of Drahomanov Ukrainians have a political thinker of great intellectual stature from whom there is much to be learned even when one disagrees with him.

Finally, Drahomanov’s accomplishment as a creator of Ukrainian publicistic prose should not be neglected. In the seventies and eighties of the last century, when Drahomanov was active, there was as yet no fully developed Ukrainian political terminology or publicistic style. For Drahomanov, as for other “conscious” Ukrainians of the time, it was easier to write of higher matters in Russian than in Ukrainian. Reading the “Introduction” and other works of Drahomanov written in Ukrainian, we sense that he was contending with linguistic difficulties. But it was, of course, a matter of principle for him that Hromada, as the representative organ of free Ukrainian thought, appear in the native language. Drahomanov was himself obliged to coin terms, many of which failed to find acceptance; the same fate met the orthography based on the radical phonetic principle, the so-called drahomanivka, that he introduced in Hromada. Drahomanov’s Ukrainian-language publicistic style creates the impression of a certain awkwardness, but this is a natural consequence of the fact that he was a pioneer in this area as well.
One point of Drahomanov's program that cannot fail to offend the contemporary Ukrainian reader and arouse his spontaneous protest is the rejection of the idea of Ukrainian state independence. This exceedingly important problem requires more detailed consideration; we should try to comprehend Drahomanov's motives and arguments.

In analyzing Drahomanov's stand against independence it is necessary to distinguish clearly between two aspects, which we shall term pragmatic and ideological. There is no internal relationship whatever between these two aspects, and we must consider each of them separately.

On the pragmatic side, Drahomanov saw no realistic preconditions for a separatist Ukrainian policy at that time. It was rendered impossible not only by the Ukrainian people's lack of organization and the relative weakness of the Ukrainian national movement, but also by the contemporary international situation. Drahomanov considered that the cause of Ukrainian independence could be actualized only in the event of a great European war and would require the support of one of the great powers. As he stated in the "Introduction," without the active assistance of France under Napoleon III, there would have been no independent, united Italian state. But there was no prospect of Ukraine's obtaining such outside assistance.

We must admit that Drahomanov's negative conclusions about the prospects for Ukrainian independence objectively reflected contemporary political conditions. The last quarter of the nineteenth century was a period of stable international relations in Europe. Here we may refer to the example of Poland. During the nineteenth century, the Poles staged several armed insurrections in an attempt to regain the independence of their nation, but they all ended in failure. After the defeat of the insurrection of 1863, the Poles abandoned such hopeless strivings, which exacted gigantic sacrifices and only worsened the people's political situation. In the following decades Polish society went over completely to a platform of so-called "organic work," that is, the development of all aspects of its national life within the borders of three empires, Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany. If a separatist policy was as yet beyond the capacity of the Poles, who were certainly at a higher stage of national development than the Ukrainians, and who possessed relatively recent and strong state traditions, then such a policy was all the less realistic for the Ukrainians.

Drahomanov was also correct in associating the prospects for the Ukrainian cause with the political evolution of Russia and Austria-Hungary, i.e., the process of the democratization of these states. Later developments confirmed the accuracy of his prognosis. In Dnieper Ukraine, the Ukrainian movement emerged from clandestinity and began to gain strength only after the Revolution of 1905, which abolished the
Ems Ukase and partially limited the tsarist autocracy. The crucial turning point in Galicia was the reform of the law on elections in 1907, which introduced universal direct suffrage for males to the Vienna parliament. Only at this point did the Austrian government begin to take the Ukrainians into account as a genuine force.

But in addition to the pragmatic side of Drahomanov’s rejection of independence, there was also a second, ideologically motivated, aspect. As a supporter of the doctrine of anarchism (“non-authoritarianism”), Drahomanov regarded statehood—all statehood—with principled distrust. According to his convictions, state and liberty were mutually contradictory concepts. A thinker who considered the state evil in itself could not advocate state sovereignty for his own people, either as a goal of practical political activity at a given stage of historical development or as an ideal for the future.

In order to explain this position of Drahomanov’s, it should be recalled that anarchist and semi-anarchist ideas were widespread in European political thought during the nineteenth century. “The period with which we are now concerned (the era of the seventies and at least up to the mid-eighties) is characterized by the dominance within revolutionary circles throughout the continent, except in Germany, of greater or lesser tendencies toward anarchism.” Indeed, even the theoreticians of German social democracy, Marx and Engels, did not in principle constitute an exception to this rule. According to their teachings, the final stage of human development is supposed to bring with it the “withering away of the state,” although this will occur only after the triumph of a socialist revolution and a transitional “dictatorship of the proletariat.” Views approximating those of the anarchists were also held by many exponents of classical liberalism. They often favoured the conception of the “minimal state” or the “night-watchman state,” meaning a state whose responsibilities would be restricted to the defence of public order and tranquility; all else was left to individual initiative and voluntary association. Some liberal thinkers expressed serious doubts whether the state should intervene in such matters as public education and health care, or whether, for instance, compulsory education and obligatory vaccination against smallpox did not constitute, as it were, an inadmissible limitation of individual freedom. It should be added that a leaning toward anarchism is especially understandable in the mind of someone born in the Russian Empire, for whom the idea of statehood was inevitably associated with oppression and arbitrary rule.

Accordingly, Drahomanov believed that it would be possible for the Ukrainian people to bypass the problem of independent statehood in their historical development and to work toward an ideal “non-authoritarian and stateless order.” There is no question that he was deeply mistaken in
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this belief. It may be agreed that the establishment of a Ukrainian state is an exceedingly difficult undertaking, and that it was so not only in Drahomanov’s time but remains so today, a century later. But there are hundreds of states in the world, and new ones keep making their appearance. By the same token, there is nothing impossible in principle about the establishment of a Ukrainian state. On the other hand, Drahomanov’s utopian “non-authoritarianism” is something that no one has ever seen and that one can scarcely expect to see.

This cardinal error of Drahomanov’s was rooted in a mistaken understanding of the idea of freedom. It is untrue that statehood and freedom are by nature incompatible concepts. On the contrary, Hegel was right when he asserted that freedom is possible only within the framework of the rule of state law. Nor is there any basis for the belief that “the voluntary association of free and equal individuals”—Drahomanov’s socio-political ideal—will ever replace the state, even in the most distant foreseeable future. Voluntary association has an important function in the life of society, but it is not a panacea. For the coexistence of people in society continually produces new individual and group conflicts, whose resolution necessitates a government endowed with appropriate authority and armed with the “sword of justice.” It is desirable that people obey the law voluntarily. But people are not angels, and a law differs from an ethical norm in that it is backed, in case of need, by the sanction of force. This applies in equal measure to a democratic state. State power in a democracy is differently constructed and functions differently from that in an absolute monarchy or a totalitarian dictatorship. But democracy is by no means to be identified with the absence of state power or anarchy.

Drahomanov’s theoretical principle—his dislike of statehood as such and his mistaken concept of freedom—was the reason for his underestimation of the importance of the national state as an irreplaceable safeguard of national freedom. On this question, contemporary Ukrainian political thought occupies different positions from those defended by Drahomanov. Nevertheless, if we wish to be fair, we must remember certain “mitigating circumstances” that lessen the weight of Drahomanov’s “offence.”

In the first place, Drahomanov’s stand against independence was not a consequence of Russophilism, of which he was groundlessly accused by integral-nationalist critics of the inter-war era. In his “Introduction,” Drahomanov characterized Russia as “the foreign Muscovite tsardom with boundless bureaucratic centralization” (139). Similar expressions are frequently to be found in his works.

Secondly, Drahomanov consistently advocated the organizational independence of the Ukrainian movement, declaring himself opposed to centralized, “all-Russian” revolutionary organizations and Ukrainian
participation in them. Drahomanov believed that the struggle against autocracy required a common front of all progressive forces of all the peoples of the Russian Empire. But he conceived of such a common front in the form of co-operation among equal and autonomous organizations constructed on national or regional bases. In a whole series of brilliant polemical works Drahomanov unmasked the centralist and, in essence, great-power inclinations of the Russian revolutionaries, thereby making enemies for himself in this milieu. The matter was one of outstanding, absolutely critical significance. It was not for nothing that Lenin, recognizing the right of the peoples of Russia to self-determination in theory, simultaneously fought with all his might to preserve the organizational unity of Social Democracy as an all-Russian party. Drahomanov and Lenin, who took opposing stands on the question of centralization and decentralization, agreed on one point: the organizational structure of a revolutionary movement predetermines the character of the political order brought about by a victorious revolution.

Thirdly, while rejecting the ideal of an independent state as a goal of Ukrainian politics, Drahomanov considered Ukraine a separate Slavic nation and did not deny the Ukrainian people a natural aptitude for independent political life. But it is precisely such pessimistic thoughts that we often encounter among the leading Ukrainian publicists and political thinkers of the nineteenth century. For example, Panteleimon Kulish argued in his programmatic “Epilog k Chernoi rade” (Epilogue to The Black Council, 1857) that the existence of a separate Ukrainian literature was entirely legitimate, but simultaneously asserted the “political insignificance (nichtozhestvo) of Little Russia” and the “moral necessity of the merger into one state of the Southern Rus’ tribe with the Northern.”

Forty years later, similar thoughts on the inherent political inferiority of the Ukrainian people were voiced by Volodymyr Antonovych, a former colleague of Drahomanov’s and later his antagonist, the leader of the moderate, non-socialist majority in the Stara Hromada. Antonovych maintained that “as a consequence of the ethnographic particularities of its nature, the Ukrainian people did not possess the aptitude to form an independent state.” Although Drahomanov was no partisan of independence, he never went to such extremes.

I should like to supplement my critique of Drahomanov’s anarchism and anti-independentism with some observations about his socialism (“communalism”). It should be noted first of all that neither by his scholarly training nor by his interests was Drahomanov an economist. He touched on economic questions only occasionally and in passing. Drahomanov believed that the human race was progressing from capitalism to socialism, but offered no arguments to support this a priori conviction. Drahomanov’s socialism had an ethical basis—protest against so-
cial injustice. Moreover, his socialistic outlook was strongly coloured by egalitarianism. Drahomanov not only rejected the system of estates which was still legally dominant in Russia at the time, but believed all social inequality and class differentiation to be evil. Drahomanov saw his ideal in a “classless society,” although he did not employ this term. Egalitarianism was linked in Drahomanov’s thought with populism. He often criticized the Russian populists for their idealization of the village commune (obshchina) and elemental peasant revolts, but populist motifs clearly resound in his writings. In the “Introduction” to Hromada, Drahomanov identified Ukrainian nationality with its peasantry and condemned the upper classes (“nobles, priests, and merchants”) as exploiters who profited from the people’s misery. Drahomanov believed that Ukraine was receptive ground for the spread of socialist ideas: “We think that our Ukraine, which has neither a clergy, nor a nobility, nor a merchant class, nor a state of its own, but has a peasantry quite intelligent by nature, will readily adopt the doctrine of a non-authoritarian and fraternal order...”(121).

In my critique of Drahomanov’s “communalism” I do not wish to enter into the problem of the relative advantages of capitalism and socialism as economic systems; Drahomanov’s works offer no material for such a discussion. But I should like to consider some national-political and sociological implications of his “communalism.”

Between Drahomanov’s anarchism and socialism there existed an internal contradiction, although he was unconscious of it. Anarchism strives for the liquidation of the state; socialism does not. Drahomanov, naturally, conceived the future socialist order as one of voluntary association among groups of worker-producers. This conception is actually close to that of the later anarcho-syndicalism. The experience of the past century has clearly demonstrated its impracticality. In historical practice, socialism has always and everywhere gone hand in hand with the strengthening of state control over society. This applies not only to totalitarian socialist regimes, but also—in lesser measure—to democratic Western socialism.

Returning to Drahomanov’s time, we cannot help noticing that socialism in all its varieties was then spreading throughout the whole of Europe; it began to penetrate Ukraine in the 1870s. Regarding the existence of a Ukrainian socialist trend as natural, I consider the activity of its founders, Drahomanov and his associates, to have been positive. It was Drahomanov’s great historical service that he consciously adapted the universal ideas of socialism to Ukrainian conditions and attempted to draw Ukrainians away from participation in Russian socialist organizations.

It is another question entirely whether socialism could have become
the platform for all Ukrainians, for the whole of the national-liberation movement. Drahomanov asserted that "a Ukrainian who has not become a communalist demonstrates only that he has not thought the matter through to the end and failed to learn his lesson fully..." (140). In essence, then, Drahomanov denied the right of existence to other, non-socialist Ukrainian intellectual and political currents, seeing in them only products of backwardness. Intelligent and educated people of good will cannot, as it were, fail to be socialists. In my opinion, it was the doctrinaire in Drahomanov who was speaking at this point.

True, there are passages in Drahomanov's writings in which he treats this problem quite differently. In 1876, only two years before the "Introduction," he wrote as follows: "We truly see that throughout the whole of the nineteenth century all sorts of political, social, and religious ideas—from monarchist to republican, from oligarchic to socialist, from the prayer-book to atheism—have been expressed and continue to be expressed in the Little Russian language." If this statement was true, however, Drahomanov ought to have asked himself whether the socialist current to which he himself belonged had any chance of swallowing up the other Ukrainian currents, such as conservatism, clericalism, liberalism, and nationalism. If not, then there ought logically to have followed an acceptance of pluralism in ideas and politics as a lasting feature of Ukrainian life. But Drahomanov did not draw this conclusion. There was no room in his political conception for the co-existence of various camps, each representing certain positive values.

Drahomanov's doctrinaire attitude revealed itself most glaringly in his attitude to religion and the church. In his "Introduction" he went so far as to say the following: "In Austria our communalisists must come out against the clergy perhaps even more strongly than in Little Russian Ukraine, precisely because the clergy there has not renounced Ukrainian nationality so openly and, at times, deceives itself and others and even peasant communities into thinking that it stands behind these communities and can improve their lot" (134–5). There is room for considerable doubt whether the lot of the Galician Ukrainian peasantry would have improved if the Greek Catholic Church, which was, after all, a Ukrainian national institution, had been replaced by Polish Roman Catholicism or Russian Orthodoxy!

The point here is not that Drahomanov was not personally a believer or that he called for the secularization of Ukrainian civic and cultural life. Drahomanov was right when he pointed out the undesirable effects of Galician clericalism. But as a result of specific historical conditions, the clergy was dominant in the educated Ukrainian stratum in Galicia. Secularization, therefore, depended on the growth of the lay intelligentsia, and this was a protracted process. In the face of incontestable facts,
Drahomanov did not wish to recognize that the Greek Catholic Church and clergy, whatever their faults, had rendered great historical services to the Galician Ukrainians. Nor could he accept the idea that in the future, despite progressive secularization, church organizations would continue to have the right to exist and to carry out important social and spiritual tasks.

In treating problems of social and economic organization, Drahomanov correctly asserted that the denationalization of the upper classes in Ukraine had deprived the popular masses of necessary social and cultural services. But he did not conclude that the Ukrainian people required their own “nobles, priests, and merchants,” for, if they were absent, these necessary functions would be fulfilled by nobles, priests, and merchants of foreign nationality.

To this one might reply that Drahomanov clearly saw the bitter social injustice suffered by the Ukrainian people. How, then, could one demand that he approve of the unjust contemporary social order?

But this rebuttal is based on a misunderstanding. Drahomanov had every reason to condemn social conditions in the Ukraine of his day; he also correctly saw that the national liberation of Ukraine was inseparable from the social emancipation of its people. But the heart of the matter lies in the direction of the proposed social change. A colossal distance separated the pauperized, illiterate, enserfed Ukrainian peasant masses from the well-off, educated, free Swiss people among whom Drahomanov lived at the time. This does not mean, of course, that Switzerland was an “earthly paradise,” although in comparison with Ukraine it might indeed have appeared to be one. But instead of proposing such a realistic model for the Ukrainian liberation movement—to make the Ukrainian social structure approximate that of the advanced “capitalist” countries of the West—Drahomanov put forward the utopian conception of “communalism.”

The utopian nature of “communalism” consisted not so much in the slogan of socialization of the means of production—which Drahomanov did not, after all, emphasize particularly—as in its populist egalitarianism. This problem is too complex to be considered exhaustively in this paper. Christianity teaches that “everyone is equal before God,” which is interpreted in secularized terms as a demand to respect the human dignity of every individual. Abraham Lincoln said that he wished to be neither a slave nor a slave-owner, which is very close to Shevchenko’s ideal of Cossack liberty “with neither serf nor master.” A democratic order is based on the equality of all citizens before the law. Appropriate measures of socio-economic policy make it possible to redress inequality in wages and salaries, to improve social mobility for groups that have suffered discrimination, and to provide special care for
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those who require it. All this is self-evident, and, in criticizing "populist egalitarianism," I have none of these measures in mind. I am concerned rather with a peculiar bias, extremely widespread among the East European intelligentsia of the nineteenth century, which was characterized by a distaste for social differentiation as such, an inclination toward leveling to the lowest denominator, toward the assessment of all social and cultural phenomena from the standpoint of the "younger brother's" interests, and toward the identification of the nation with the peasantry.

Drahomanov was probably less afflicted with the populist complex than were many of his Ukrainian and Russian contemporaries, but he was not free of it. Among the items attesting to this is the synthetic account of Ukrainian history in the "Introduction" to Hromada. It is noteworthy that Drahomanov begins this survey with the rise of Cossackdom, probably because medieval, princely, and boyar Kievian Rus' was not easily amenable to a populist interpretation. In his discussion of the cultural and religious movement of the late sixteenth and the first half of the seventeenth centuries, Drahomanov makes favourable mention of the repercussions of Protestantism in Ukraine and of the Orthodox lay brotherhoods, but says nothing of the activity of Metropolitan Peter Mohyla and his collaborators. As for Cossackdom, Drahomanov concentrates on the Zaporozhian Sich, but passes over the Hetmanate in silence. Yet we know that the Sich and the Hetmanate were the two poles of Cossack Ukraine and deserve the historian's attention in equal measure. In other words, Drahomanov gave a one-sided and therefore distorted picture of Ukrainian history, in which only the "left" side is illuminated, while the "right" side remains in obscurity.

In my judgment, the common root of all the above-mentioned views of Drahomanov was a unilinear, undialectical understanding of socio-historical development, and hence an inability to recognize the necessity of social differentiation and political pluralism. It should be added here that not only Drahomanov, but Ukrainian political thought in general, has experienced perpetual difficulty with the problem of differentiation and pluralism. Ukrainian left-wingers have dreamt of a "classless society" and Ukrainian right-wingers of "national solidarity," two opposing conceptions that nevertheless have in common a rejection of pluralism. Alone among Ukrainian political thinkers, Viacheslav Lypynsky clearly saw that modern society cannot help but be differentiated along class lines, that a nation cannot consist only of the "toiling masses," but must also include an elite, and that a state requires not only a government but also a legal opposition. (But it must be added that Lypynsky sought the solution to the problem of a pluralistic order on an undemocratic basis.)

We have concluded the critical analysis of the "Introduction" to Hromada of 1878, the first modern Ukrainian political program, but we
must round out our discussion with a few supplementary remarks. Anyone familiar with the whole of Drahomanov’s creative output cannot doubt that his thought is much richer than can be determined on the basis of the “Introduction” alone. Moreover, the “Introduction” does not necessarily display the author at his best. In order to verify this thesis, it suffices to compare the “Introduction” with another programmatic treatise of Drahomanov’s, Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka (Free Union) of 1884. Instead of the utopian ideal of “non-authoritarianism,” we find in Free Union a detailed proposal for the constitutional reordering of the Russian Empire on a democratic and federalist basis. Many of Drahomanov’s proposals, such as those for constitutional safeguards of human and civil rights and a system of local and regional self-government, retain their significance even today. In Free Union Drahomanov did not preach “communalism” but instead proposed a whole series of well-thought-out, concrete socio-economic reforms, almost all of which, it may be noted, were implemented in democratic countries in the following decades. Nor is there an apotheosis of the peasantry in Free Union, though there is a genuine concern for social justice and for the well-being of the popular masses. There is no summary condemnation of the “lords” simply because they are “lords”; on the contrary, Drahomanov appeals to noblemen, industrialists, and even army officers to take an active part in the struggle against tsarist autocracy. There are no appeals to struggle against religion; instead, there is a conception of the constitutional separation of church and state on the American model, along with constitutional guarantees of complete freedom of conscience and religious worship. At the centre of his entire program in Free Union, Drahomanov placed the idea of political freedom, subordinating to it all other postulates, whether social ones or Ukrainian national ones.

How is one to explain these divergences between the programs of the “Introduction” and Free Union? Can it be that Drahomanov’s worldview underwent a radical change during the six years that separate the two documents? Was he inconstant in his convictions? Such inconstancy was ascribed to him by Lypynsky: “For there is in history not one, but several Drahomanovs. . . . Under the influence of the Russian school, he lost the moral and political bearings that were in his family and in his home, and later sought such bearings for himself throughout his whole life, changing them constantly. . . .” This characterization is interesting, but it is mistaken. Contrary to Lypynsky’s assertion, Drahomanov never altered his basic principles. His worldview took shape early, and he held to it throughout his life. As Oleksander Mytsiuk correctly observed: “That the program of Free Union did not signal a ‘right-wing deviation’ in Drahomanov may be seen from the fact that he remained
faithful to his anarcho-socialist world-view to the end...''

Thus, the apparent contradictions between the "Introduction" and Free Union are to be explained otherwise. Drahomanov's political outlook was a complex synthesis of anarchist, socialist, democratic, liberal, federalist, and Ukrainian patriotic elements united on the basis of a positivist philosophy. Depending on time and circumstance, Drahomanov elaborated certain elements of this synthesis; other elements then receded into the background, as it were, but he did not renounce them, and, given the proper circumstances, they would return to the fore in his writings. The radicalism of the "Introduction" stemmed from the fact that in this work the accent was placed on theoretical principles and ultimate, ideal goals. Nor can there be any doubt that the character of the "Introduction" was influenced by Drahomanov's closeness to Russian revolutionary circles in the early period of his residence in Switzerland, as well as by his co-operation with Serhii Podolynsky. Drahomanov did not approve of Podolynsky's "spirit of revolt," but yielded at times to pressure from this colourful, dynamic individual. Free Union was written under different conditions. During the preceding six years, Drahomanov had become completely disillusioned with the Russian revolutionaries, with almost all of whom he was now at daggers drawn. Podolynsky, too, was gone, having fallen victim to an incurable mental illness. Free Union was addressed to the liberal Ukrainian zemstvo activists with whom Drahomanov had established contact. This programmatic document stressed practical goals in the struggle for freedom in Russia and Ukraine during the forthcoming years or decades. Oversimplifying somewhat, it may be said that the "Introduction" was Drahomanov's maximum program, while Free Union was his minimum program.

Which of these two programs is closer to us today? The answer to this question depends, of course, on the outlook of the contemporary student of the history of Ukrainian political thought. Speaking for myself, I confess that all my sympathies are on the side of Drahomanov the liberal, constitutionalist, and reformist; concerning Drahomanov the communalist, doctrinaire, and utopian, I have reservations in principle that I have attempted to explain in this article.

A host of new questions now arises in logical consequence—about the reception of Drahomanov's legacy of ideas in Ukraine (both Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia) and in Russia, as well as its influence on the formation of Ukrainian political parties and on the later development of Ukrainian political thought. In the Ukrainian and non-Ukrainian literature one may encounter the most contradictory opinions on these matters. At the same time as the well-known Socialist Revolutionary activist Mykyta Shapoval hailed Drahomanov as the "ideologue of the new Ukraine," the integral-nationalist publicists of the inter-war period
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were condemning him as the greatest evil-doer in modern Ukrainian history and the malevolent spirit responsible for the failure of the Ukrainian struggle for independence of 1917–21. In conclusion, I cannot forgo the pleasure of quoting two capable foreign scholars. The Polish historian of the Ukrainian movement, Stanisław Smolka, wrote during the First World War: "Contemporary Ukrainianism regards itself as nurtured by Drahomanov; not even moderate groups dare to dispute this." But the well-informed Soviet researcher David Zaslavsky asserted in the very first sentence of his as yet unsurpassed biographical study: "M.P. Drahomanov is one of the authors who are greatly respected but little read in Ukraine." In order to disentangle this bundle of contradictions, a separate work would be required.

Notes

1. Information has been drawn from the following sources: M.P. Drahomanov, "Avtobiograficheskaia zametka" in Literaturno-publitsystychni pratsi (Kiev 1970), v.1; M. Hrushevsky, Z pochyniv ukrainskoho sotsialitsychnoho rukhu: Mykh. Drahomanov i zhenevskyi sotsialistichnyi hurtok (Vienna 1922); D. Zaslavsky, M.P. Dragomanov: Kritiko-biograficheskii ocherk (Kiev 1924); M. Hrushevsky, "Misiia Drahomanova," Ukraina, no. 2–3 (1926); I. Zhytetsky, "Ostannii vyizd M.P. Drahomanova za kordon," Ukraina, no. 2–3 (1926).

2. See V. Kalynovych, Politychni protsesy Ivana Franka ta ioho tovaryshiv (Lviv 1967).

3. M.P. Drahomanov, Turki vnutrennie i vneshnie (1876); Vnutrennee rabstvo i voina za osvobozhdienie (1877); Do chego dovoevalis (1878). These brochures are reprinted in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii M.P. Dragomanova, 2 vols., ed. B.A. Kistiakovski (Paris 1905–6), v. 2.

4. The history of the relations between Drahomanov and the Stara Hromada is documented in Arkhiv Mykhaila Drahomanova (Warsaw 1937), v. 1.


7. "Perednie slovo" to Hromada is cited according to the text in M. P. Drahomanov, Vybrani tvory, 93–147.


9. On Drahomanov's attitude to the Poles and to the problem of Polish-Ukrainian relations, see E. Hornowa, Problemy polskie w twórczości Michała Drahomanowa (Wroclaw 1978).


18. The result of collaboration between Drahomanov and Podolynsky was the “Prohra” (Program), dated 1 December 1880, that appeared in the first issue of the so-called periodical Hromada over the signatures of M. Drahomanov, M. Pavlyk, and S. Podolynsky. It was written primarily by Podolynsky, but Drahomanov inserted his corrections. The tone and contents of this document were considerably more radical that those of the “Introduction” of 1878. This was the most left-wing of Drahomanov’s political statements, and he later regretted having yielded to Podolynsky’s demands. The text of the 1880 “Program” is reprinted in Drahomanov, Vybrani tvory, 1:148–51.


20. A characteristic product of the integral-nationalist camp is a pamphlet by M. Mukhyn, Drahomanov bez masky (Lviv 1934), in which Drahomanov is compared, inter alia, to Azef, and is termed the “true heir of Peter I,” 54–5.


Mykhailo Drahomanov and the Problem of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations

To Piotr Rawicz, friend of my youth

The outstanding Ukrainian political thinker of the second half of the nineteenth century, Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), envisioned the problems of his native country within a broad international context. He combined specific Ukrainian national goals with a program for the reorganization of Eastern Europe as a whole.¹

Among the issues which attracted Drahomanov’s attention were those of the Jewish minority in Ukraine and of Ukrainian-Jewish relations generally. To these he dedicated a prominent place in his writings. Drahomanov’s views on the Jewish problem contain both a sociological analysis of the condition of the Jewish people in Ukraine and a program for action. Drahomanov’s attempts to implement this program in the course of his political life met with little immediate success. But his concepts had a long-range, formative impact on the development of Ukrainian political ideologies.

Drahomanov’s first statement on the Jewish problem is his article, “Evrei i poliaki v Iugo-Zapadnom krai” (Jews and Poles in the South-Western Land),² written in 1875. “‘South-Western Land’” (Iugo-Zapadnyi krai) was the administrative term for the three provinces of Kiev, Volhynia, and Podillia. This territory is more commonly known as Right-Bank Ukraine. It belonged to Poland until the Second Partition (1793), and was contained within the boundaries of the Russian Empire’s Jewish Pale of Settlement. In the early 1870s, the South-Western Land counted some 750,000 Jewish inhabitants, or 13 per cent of the territory’s total population.³

Drahomanov once observed that the stances he was taking as a political writer usually led him into polemics on two fronts simultaneously.⁴ This is confirmed by the article under consideration. It contains a vigorous refutation of two schools of thought, both of which
Drahomanov regarded as erroneous: on the one hand, that of the supporters of the system of anti-Jewish discrimination as it existed in Russia at the time and, on the other hand, that of the advocates of Jewish emancipation who assumed that the problem would be solved by the granting of equal civil rights to the Jewish minority. As Drahomanov explained later, an equalization of rights was, of course, necessary, but "in itself it would change little the condition of the Jewish masses and their relations with the Christian masses"; an immediate improvement would accrue only to the minority of well-to-do and Western-educated Jews.5

In the article, "Jews and Poles in the South-Western Land," the author faced censorship, and so his criticism of current conditions had to be somewhat guarded. Even so, the drift of the argument is unmistakable. Drahomanov interpreted anti-Jewish discrimination in Russia as "a survival of medieval prejudices" and of "traditional notions about church-state relations. . . . But we no longer live in the Middle Ages."6 He expected that all men of democratic convictions "must settle for themselves once and for all, and as a matter of principle, the question of equal rights for Jews and Christians."7 Apologists for the status quo frequently rationalized the restrictions imposed on the Jews by the necessity to protect the peasants against usury and exploitation. Drahomanov rejected this argument as a fallacy. He demonstrated that the current Russian laws, while vexatious and humiliating to the Jews, did not safeguard the economic interests of the peasantry. Discriminatory laws and regulations were a breeding ground for graft. "Who but the lower ranks of the police benefited from the recent [forced] resettlement of the Jewish inhabitants of Kiev from one section of the city to another?"8

The partisans of Jewish emancipation also met with Drahomanov's criticism. The liberal Jewish press, he charged, "talks all the time about the oppression of the Jews by the Christians, but it does not apply any criticism to its own people, except for some indirect complaints against the orthodox members of their community, hardened in ritualistic observances."9 Drahomanov did not elaborate the point, but from what he said elsewhere it seems clear that he was thinking of the failure of the progressive, Westernized Jews to dissociate themselves from the exploitative practices which their small-town and village co-religionists often used in business dealings with the peasants. Drahomanov resented the attitude of the Jews who, invariably, regarded themselves as innocent victims and did not want to assume any responsibility for the difficulties of their situation and the hostilities which they encountered.

Drahomanov believed that a fruitful discussion of the Jewish problem required a consideration of all its essential aspects, and not an exclusive concentration on only one of them, such as the legal disabilities of the Jewish minority. He summarized his views on the condition of the Jews
in Ukraine in the following way: a) the Jews are predominantly concentrated in certain mercantile occupations; b) these traders and middlemen perform an important economic function, "especially now, at a time of transition from a natural to a monetary economy," but they are proportionally too numerous; c) the long-standing tradition of segregation has strengthened the cohesion of the Jewish community, whose members tend to close their ranks against outsiders and act in a monopolistic fashion; d) the Jewish community is internally divided into rich and poor, exploiters and exploited.

On the basis of these theoretical considerations, Drahomanov adumbrated a program of practical reforms "beneficial to the majority of both Christians and Jews" which, he hoped, would do justice to all the major aspects of the Jewish problem. This implied three areas of action: a) raising the educational and socio-economic standards of the Ukrainian common people, and their emancipation from exploitation by Jewish merchants and middlemen; b) "the emancipation of the Jewish masses from superstitions and from exploitation by their own zaddikim ("righteous men") and wealthy bosses"; c) finally, the easiest part, the emancipation of the Jewish people from legal discrimination, "until the time comes, which has already been reached in other European countries, when persons of all religious denominations possess equal rights."

As a result of the tsarist government's repressive measures against the Ukrainian national movement, Drahomanov left his homeland in 1876, and never returned. The secret organization of which he was a leading member, the Kiev Hromada (Community), authorized him to act as its representative abroad and as a spokesman for Ukrainian interests in Western Europe. Drahomanov settled in Geneva, where he developed an impressive range of activities as publisher, journalist, and political theorist. In his writings of the Geneva period Drahomanov repeatedly returned to the Ukrainian-Jewish problem, especially in the pages of the Russian-language journal Volnoe slovo (The Free Word), which he edited in 1881–3. His pronouncements in exile are concerned with the same themes that we encountered in the article written in 1875. But there is evidence that his thinking had developed and matured. Now, of course, he could express himself freely, without any regard for censorship.

Of major importance is the article "Evreiskii vopros na Ukraine" (The Jewish Question in Ukraine), which appeared in 1882. This was Drahomanov's response to the wave of anti-Jewish riots in Ukraine in 1881–2. The first part of the article contains a survey of Russian policies toward the Jewish minority since the annexation of the Right Bank in 1793. "The differences in the measures applied by the Russian government toward the Jews in the Ukrainian and the Great Russian regions re-
spectivefly are truly amazing, particularly during the reign of Catherine II, the destroyer of all autonomous institutions in Ukraine.”

Drahomanov contended that the Pale of Settlement was chiefly responsible for the excessive concentration of Jews in Ukraine, and that the Russian state should be held responsible for Ukrainian-Jewish tensions. He expressed his indignation against those spokesmen of the Ukrainian movement who “supported the sophisms of Suvorin and Aksakov [reactionary Russian journalists] in favour of the restriction of the Jews’ right to live everywhere in Russia.”

Drahomanov regarded the preservation of the Pale of Settlement as contrary not only to humanitarian principles, but also to Ukrainian national interests, which called for a dispersal of part of Ukrainian Jewry to other areas of the Russian Empire.

Next, Drahomanov addressed himself to the proclamation which the Executive Committee of the revolutionary Narodnaia volia (People’s Will) party had issued to the Ukrainian people on the subject of the anti-Jewish riots. The proclamation, which was written in Ukrainian, pointed to the exploitation of the Ukrainian masses by the “Jewish kulaks,” approved of the pogroms, but advised the peasants to revolt not only against the Jews, but also against the landowners, the officials, and the tsar. Drahomanov commented that some of the facts mentioned in the proclamation were “basically correct,” but that “the altogether excusable side of the proclamation was its complete disregard of the fact that among the victims of the riots there were also poor people, and that in many places, particularly in the towns, they were the only ones to suffer. These were people engaged in the same productive physical labour as the Christian peasants and craftsmen.”

We may add that, in another article written at about the same time and dealing with general issues of revolutionary strategy, Drahomanov called the proclamation of the Executive Committee “ill-considered.” He also pointed out that spontaneous popular revolts were bound to be “of purely negative significance” owing to the low educational and civic level of the masses.

The second half of the article, “The Jewish Question in Ukraine,” contains sociological and psychological observations about Ukrainian-Jewish relations. According to Drahomanov, “the Jews in Ukraine represent [simultaneously] a nation, a religion, and a social class” (soslovie, literally “estate”). As a nationality, they were differentiated from the rest of the population by certain characteristic traits in their physical and mental make-up and by a separate language, Yiddish. Their national identity was bolstered by Judaism as their religion. Moreover, “the Jews, including those who live in the countryside, belong here [in Ukraine] almost exclusively to the so-called urban classes, and among the latter predominantly to those not directly engaged in the production
of goods." Using various statistical data, Drahomanov demonstrated that the majority of Ukrainian Jews were occupied as petty tradesmen, innkeepers, pedlars, middlemen, etc. He concluded that "the Jewish nation in Ukraine... forms, to a large extent, a parasitic class.... In those regions the terms 'exploiter' and 'Jew' have become synonymous in the people's speech." In another article, written in the same period, Drahomanov somewhat modified this harsh judgment to the effect that only about one-third of Ukrainian Jewry should be considered "exploiters," a second third "workingmen," and the remaining third an undetermined, intermediary group.

Drahomanov was well aware of the fact that most Jews in Ukraine were poor, many of them living in abject poverty. But he asserted that even Jewish paupers had no feeling of solidarity with their working-class, gentile neighbours and tended rather to identify themselves with their wealthy co-religionists, whom they served as agents and operatives. "All Jews in Ukraine look upon themselves as a class superior to the Ukrainian peasants. I have myself heard extremely poor Jews say: 'The peasant is an idiot, a reptile, a pig.' I have heard expressions which indicate that the Jews consider themselves as belonging to the ruling class, together with the gentry, as distinct from the peasantry."?

Ukrainian-Jewish relations were fraught with reciprocal resentments. The memory of the massacres that accompanied Cossack and peasant uprisings in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, combined with present discrimination, had made the Jews hypersensitive, clannish, and often tactless and arrogant. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, remembered that the Jews had served as instruments of social and national oppression under the former rule of the Polish aristocracy. Ukrainian folk songs often referred to abuses inflicted upon the Cossacks by the Polish lords and their Jewish stewards. At present, they served another system of oppression. "As leaseholders of inns and collectors of tax arrears, the Jews are nowadays agents of the fisc."?

The article, "The Jewish Question in Ukraine," was to have had a third, concluding part, which was to have offered practical remedies, but it remained unwritten. Drahomanov's ideas on how to approach the solution of the Ukrainian-Jewish problem can be gleaned from numerous passages scattered in his writings.

Drahomanov noted that many participants in Russian and Polish socialist movements were of Jewish origin. But these were assimilated Jews who had lost touch with the mass of their own people, and who, therefore, were unable to influence and guide them. "This is why Ukrainian socialists consider it a matter of major importance that a propaganda campaign be organized with a double task: first, to separate Jewish workers from Jewish capitalists, and, second, to bring together
Jewish workers with workers of other nationalities." 27 This called for the formation of Jewish socialist organizations, and, first of all, of a socialist and progressive press in Yiddish, the Jewish vernacular.

As for the long-range perspective, Drahomanov assumed that although emigration might ease tensions, the majority of the Jewish people in Ukraine would remain permanently in the country. 28 It is also obvious that he did not believe that the Jewish problem would be solved by assimilation. The solution which he envisioned was closely connected with his general political philosophy. Drahomanov was an ardent federalist, and the federalist idea was the cornerstone of his programme for the future development of Ukraine and Eastern Europe. 29 He believed that the liberty of the Ukrainian nation would be secured either by a federalization of the existing empires, Russia and Austria-Hungary, or, a less likely alternative, by the formation of an independent Ukrainian republic, organized as a federation of autonomous communities and regions. 30 It was Drahomanov’s strong conviction that the national minorities living on Ukrainian soil—the Russians, Poles, Germans, Moldavians (Romanians), and, of course, the Jews—should enjoy not only equal civil rights, but also cultural autonomy. In those communities and districts where the minority nationalities formed local majorities, or constituted a sizeable portion of the population, their respective languages should have official standing. "Their [national minorities’] societies and communities ought to be free from any compulsion toward [conformity with] the customs and language of the Ukrainian people. They must have the right to establish their own schools—elementary, secondary, and institutions of higher learning—and to associate freely with those nations [outside Ukraine] whence they came. These labouring people of foreign extraction will serve as the link between the Ukrainians and their neighbours, with whom the Ukrainians ought to join in a great international federation." 31 Drahomanov hoped that this program would win the support of a large segment of Ukrainian Jewry. He was convinced that the Jews, as members of a religion which, in traditional Christian societies, was at best tolerated, were bound to favour the separation of church and state. For Drahomanov, a lifelong opponent of clericalism, this postulate was an essential part of his political program, and he assumed that, by their support of the secularization of the country’s public life, Ukrainian Jews would make a valuable contribution to the common cause of liberty. 32

Having reviewed Drahomanov’s ideas about Ukrainian-Jewish relations, I shall now report briefly on his attempts to implement these theoretical convictions in practice.

From Drahomanov’s printing shop in Geneva there appeared, in 1880, a small pamphlet entitled Ot gruppy sotsialistov-evreev (On Behalf of a
Group of Jewish Socialists). The tract appealed for the creation of a free Jewish press which would publish socialist literature in Yiddish; it also contained a questionnaire for the collection of data about the condition of the Jewish people in Russia and Galicia. The tract was signed: "On behalf of the initiators of the project: Rodin." We do not know the identity of the members of this group, but it has been suggested that the pseudonymous "Rodin" might have been a certain Aron Weiler, who shortly afterwards returned from Switzerland to Russia, organized the first Jewish labour circles in Minsk, and later committed suicide. It is, however, certain that the author, or authors, of the pamphlet were familiar with Drahomanov’s ideas, and it seems probable that the latter helped to edit the text. Particularly Drahomanovian in flavour is the strong rebuke to the Russified socialists of Jewish extraction who did not wish to work among their own people. A postscript, signed by Drahomanov and two collaborators, Antin Liakhotsky and Mykhailo Pavlyk, called upon Ukrainian socialists to render all possible aid to their Jewish comrades.

Drahomanov’s favourite idea was the creation of an international association of representatives of various East European ethnic groups with the purpose of publishing socialist literature in all the vernacular languages of Russia, including Yiddish. In 1880 he published a leaflet to this effect addressed to political exiles from the Russian Empire resident in Western Europe. This proposal was discussed at a public meeting of the émigré community in Geneva and was overwhelmingly rejected. Drahomanov later commented on this episode: "One might have been surprised that the idea of publishing the very same Khitraia mekhanika (A Clever Device), a well-known populist pamphlet of the 1870s, in yet another language, or even ‘jargon,’ met with any objections. As a matter of fact, however, it was due only to the extraordinary efforts and tact of the chairman of the meeting that a large scandal was avoided. The speakers belonging to Russian and Polish socialist parties, and particularly those of Jewish origin, treated the proposal with scorn."

Some years later, Chaim Weizmann, the future first president of Israel, was to have a similar experience. In 1898 he organized a meeting among Russian-Jewish students in Berne, Switzerland. The Zionist resolution, proposed by Weizmann and his friends, met with furious resistance and was finally adopted only after a debate which lasted two days and three nights. Weizmann noted in his memoirs: "Jewish students... could not become part of the revolutionary movement unless they did violence to their affections and affiliations by pretending that they had no special emotional and cultural relationship to their own people. It was an ukase from above."

This seems the proper place to introduce a few critical observations. Drahomanov’s greatest failure in his treatment of the Jewish problem
was, perhaps, his total lack of appreciation of Judaism as a living spiritual force, despite the fact that the survival and the very existence of the Jewish national community is inseparable from its religious tradition. Martin Buber has shown to the gentile world the rich spirituality of the Hasidic movement that originated on Ukrainian soil, had its main support among the Jews of Ukraine, and, in many ways, showed the unmistakable imprint of its Ukrainian milieu.\textsuperscript{38} But, for Drahomanov, all this was only a tissue of superstitions. This blind spot in his thinking is to be explained by the circumstance that, intellectually, he was a typical son of the positivist age.

Another of Drahomanov’s shortcomings was his inclination to speak in much too sweeping terms about “Jewish parasitism,” despite occasional attempts to qualify his judgment. This caused certain writers to accuse him of anti-Semitism, a charge refuted by more judicious Jewish scholars.\textsuperscript{39} Drahomanov was, on the whole, a sharp critic of the populist philosophy prevalent among the radical Russian and Ukrainian intelligentsia of his time. He was, however, tainted by the populist prejudice that only physical labour was economically productive and morally unexceptionable, and it seems that this bias influenced his approach to the Jewish problem. A more sophisticated view would have to acknowledge that management, trade, and credit, as much as farming and labour, are necessary elements of the economic process. By fulfilling these functions, Ukrainian Jews contributed to the economic welfare of the country. The well-known Russian philosopher and political scientist, Boris Chicherin, who had first-hand experience of conditions in both central Russia and Ukraine in the second half of the nineteenth century, observed in his memoirs: “Everyone who has been in touch with local life knows that the Russian kulak is ten times worse than any Jew.... I can bear witness that the business activities of the Jews not only do not ruin the peasantry, but, quite to the contrary, contribute substantially to their prosperity. Although the Great Russian is, in general, more active, smart, and enterprising than the Little Russians, the latter have more cash in hand, and are better able to pay their rents,” thanks to the presence of Jewish money-lenders in the country.\textsuperscript{40} On the other hand, it cannot be denied that the dominant position taken in certain leading branches of the national economy by the members of a minority group could not be considered a normal and healthy state of affairs. It was bound to provoke a reaction on the part of the native population once the latter had begun the struggle for social and national liberation. One is reminded of conditions in modern south-east Asia (Indonesia, Malaysia, etc.), where, during the period of colonial rule, the Chinese occupied a position similar to that of the Jews in nineteenth-century Ukraine under the domination of the Russian Empire. In both cases, the minority nationality played the role of an
intermediary between an economically backward and politically disenfranchised, predominantly rural, native population and an alien imperial superstructure. Such an intermediary position between conflicting social forces exposed the Jewish minority to serious danger, and Drahomanov was sincerely apprehensive that popular revolts against the existing system "might be accompanied by bloody anti-Jewish massacres, which [at present] would be even more unjust than similar scenes in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries." 41

Drahomanov's limitations are amply compensated by his humane, democratic disposition and by the intellectual courage with which he faced certain aspects of the Jewish problem commonly overlooked by political thinkers of his time. Golda Patz, a student of Russian federalism, says: "Drahomanov tried earnestly to fathom the Jewish question, and it is apparent that, at times, he was capable of grasping the tragedy of that people in its most essential point. The greatest trouble of the Jewish masses in Ukraine was the fact... that state laws severely limited their right to honest, productive work. Drahomanov searched for a humane solution to the Jewish question." 42 David Zaslavsky, the Soviet biographer of Drahomanov, hails him as a precursor of Jewish socialist and labour movements: "It is hardly necessary to stress the profundity of these observations [of Drahomanov's on the Jewish problem]. Drahomanov perceived phenomena and processes in the life of the Jewish people which the Jewish socialist intelligentsia began to see only ten or fifteen years later.... It would be impossible to formulate more clearly and precisely the tasks which subsequently became the foundation of the first Jewish labour groups, and still later of the Bund, and of the other socialist and communist organizations working among the Jewish proletariat." 43

Drahomanov's originality consisted in his conviction that the solution of the Jewish problem in Ukraine would require not only a social and occupational restructuring of the Jewish community, but also granting it a corporate existence and self-government, at least in cultural matters. This view ran counter to the assumption shared by most nineteenth-century European liberals, who believed that the assurance of equal individual rights would smooth the road for the absorption of Jewish minorities by the respective host nations. It was no accident that the program of Jewish national-cultural autonomy was formulated by a Ukrainian political thinker. The strength of Drahomanov's formula lay in the fact that it was more than a clever invention of an individual theorist. It was rooted in certain objective factors found in Ukrainian life.

The policy which most European nations, in the wake of the French Revolution and rising liberalism, had adopted toward their Jewish minorities was one of emancipation and assimilation. It worked success-
fully, despite occasional setbacks, in the countries of Western Europe. It met with added obstacles in Eastern Europe, where the large and compact Jewish groups could not, even had they wished to do so, easily merge with the host nations. A student of nineteenth-century Polish history says: "The great majority of Jews remained outside Polish society. . . . Those families of the Jewish intelligentsia who had enjoyed a Polish education became quickly assimilated. . . . The masses, however, remained almost untouched by these ideas." 44

In the case of Ukraine, an assimilationist approach to the Jewish problem was altogether inapplicable. Ukraine did not possess a national bourgeoisie, and so there was no Ukrainian social class with which the Jews might possibly have assimilated. The small-town or village Jew lived in close symbiosis with the Ukrainian peasantry, but there was no question of his becoming a peasant himself. Any conceivable assimilation could only take place to the profit of the Russian and Russified (or, in the western sections of Ukraine, Polish and Polonized) urban population—a development which Ukrainian patriots could hardly look upon with favour. Ukrainian political thought was, therefore, faced with the challenge of formulating an answer to the question of Ukrainian-Jewish relations on different, non-assimilationist lines. We have seen that the program evolved by Drahomanov implied a co-ordination between the Ukrainian and Jewish communities, without any thought of merging the latter into the former. This pluralistic approach was bound to appeal to Jewish groups, such as the Zionists and related currents, which rejected assimilation and were concerned with the preservation of their national identity. On this platform political co-operation between Ukrainians and Jews became possible. This, of course, did not apply to all Ukrainians and all Jews. Incapable of co-operation were, on the one side, adherents of anti-democratic, chauvinistic Ukrainian trends (particularly those which, in Western Ukrainian territories during the inter-war period, modelled themselves on the example of European fascist-type regimes), and, on the other side, the stratum of assimilated Jews who had espoused Russian culture and Russian political attitudes. Drahomanov's unpleasant experiences in 1880 served as an indication that Ukrainian patriots could expect no sympathy for their aspirations from Russified Jews.

The scope of this paper precludes any broad discussion of the history of Ukrainian-Jewish relations over the last three-quarters of a century since Drahomanov's death. I shall limit myself to a few hints which suggest how the Drahomanovian leaven continued to activate Ukrainian thinking on that issue. I do not imply that the examples I am going to cite have been directly inspired by Drahomanov's writings. It would probably be more correct to say that it was the very logic of reality which induced democratic Ukrainian thinkers and statesmen who were grappling
with the Jewish problem to follow in Drahomanov’s footsteps.

In 1907 the first election took place to the Austrian Reichsrat (parliament) on the basis of universal suffrage. The Ukrainians in Galicia took advantage of this democratization of Austria’s constitutional structure to attack the traditional Polish hegemony in the province. A Galician Ukrainian politician later wrote about this memorable election: “We established contacts with the Jewish Zionist party. Our purpose was to prevent the co-operation of the majority of the Jews with the Poles. We made clear to the Jews the alternative: the ally of my enemy is my enemy too, but the enemy of my enemy is my ally! The Zionists decided to join forces with us.”

The governor of Galicia, Count Andrzej Potocki, intervened with the Ukrainian leaders, trying to induce them to abandon the alliance with the Zionists, but to no avail. In urban constituencies, where the Ukrainians had no hope of winning seats, Ukrainian votes were given to Zionist candidates, while in rural districts the Jews supported Ukrainian candidates. Thanks to Ukrainian aid, the first two Zionist deputies were elected to the Vienna parliament.

The Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–21 confirmed Drahomanov’s forebodings of possible anti-Jewish disturbances; in the spring of 1919, the Right Bank became the scene of cruel pogroms. On the other hand, “Ukraine was the first country of the world to introduce extra-territorial cultural autonomy for minority nationalities.”

A solemn promise of self-government for minorities was incorporated in the Third Universal (Manifesto) of 20 November 1917, by which the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine, the Central Rada, proclaimed the creation of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. This pledge was redeemed by the Law on National-Personal Autonomy of 22 January 1918. An eminent student of Ukrainian-Jewish relations describes the effects of the autonomy law as follows: “Here [in Ukraine] Jewish national life was characterized by especially great achievements. The ideal of national autonomy, common to all Jewish groups, here found its realization. A Minister for Jewish Affairs participated in the government of the country as the official spokesman for the Jewish population and the advocate of its national rights and interests. Representatives of five Jewish parties sat in the country’s revolutionary parliament. Hundreds of local Jewish municipal governments were created through democratic elections. These communities then elected a Provisional Jewish National Assembly.”

The Law on National-Personal Autonomy, and the institutions based on it, were swept away by the fall of the independent Ukrainian Republic. Much of what had been achieved, however, survived during the first decade or so of Soviet rule. “Minorities in Ukraine continued through the 1920s to enjoy broad legal rights in the fields of education, local government, and the administration of justice; and everyday practice largely
conformed with the letter of the law." A student of Soviet affairs has stressed recently that this liberal attitude toward national minorities, and especially toward the Jews, as implemented by Mykola Skrypnyk and other Ukrainian communist leaders of the early period, actually represented a deliberate continuation, in Soviet forms, of the policy initiated in 1917 by the Central Rada.

It is not necessary to dwell here on the tragic events of the 1930s and 1940s—the famine of 1933, Stalin’s purges, the Nazi occupation with its attendant horrors—which brought to both the Jewish and the Ukrainian peoples terrible physical losses and cultural setbacks. While a limited improvement in the position of the Ukrainian nation can be noticed in the course of the last fifteen years, since the post-Stalin “thaw,” the Soviet regime continues to refuse any concessions to Jewish demands for national self-expression and cultural autonomy. In view of this, special value must be attached to the programmatic speech of the literary critic Ivan Dziuba, who is looked upon by many as the spokesman of the rising generation of Ukrainian intellectuals. This speech was delivered on 29 September 1966 at Babyn Iar in Kiev, at a meeting commemorating the victims of the Nazi massacre of Kiev’s Jewish population, and it took place at the very location of the tragedy. “The way to true fraternity lies not in self-betrayal, but in self-knowledge; not in renunciation of one’s identity and adaptation to others, but in being one’s own self, and respecting others. Jews have the right to be Jews; Ukrainians have the right to be Ukrainians, in the fullest and deepest sense of these words. Let Jews know their history, culture, and language, and take pride in them. Let Ukrainians know their history, culture, and language, and take pride in them. Let them know the history and the culture of each other, and of other nations, and let them value each other, and others, as brothers.”

A historian of social thought will have no difficulty in finding in this statement an echo of the ideas formulated by Mykhailo Drahomanov nearly a century ago.
Notes


1. The original draft of this paper was written before I became acquainted with the article of E. Hornowa, “Problem żydowski w twórczości Dragomanowa,” Biuletyn Żydowskiego Historycznego, no. 57 (January–March 1966):3–37. Mrs. Hornowa’s account is more detailed than mine, but it does not try to place the subject within the framework of the evolution of Ukrainian social thought. One can also detect a certain tendency toward playing down those aspects of Drahomanov’s ideas which are patently incompatible with contemporary Poland’s official philosophy.

2. “Evrei i poliaki w Iugo-Zapadnom krae,” in M. P. Dragomanov, Politicheskiia sochineniiia, ed. I. M. Grevis and B. A. Kistiakovsky (Moscow 1908), v. 1 (all published): 217–67. I used the book edition. It may be noted that Drahomanov’s article was occasioned by the Trudy etnografichesko-statisticheskoi ekspeditsii v Zapadno-Russkii krai, ed. P. P. Chubynsky, 7 vols. (St. Petersburg, 1871–8). Drahomanov wrote an extensive review of v. 7 of the Chubynsky collection dealing with the Polish and Jewish minorities in Right-Bank Ukraine. He used the data which he found in Chubynsky, but the interpretation and conclusions were completely his own.


7. Ibid., 227.

8. Ibid., 225.

9. Ibid., 224.

10. Ibid., 227.


12. Ibid., 226.

13. Ibid.


16. Ibid., 2:527.

17. Ibid., 529.

18. Ibid., 531.


20. Drahomanov, “Evreiskii vopros na Ukraina,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:540. This statement, which is the cornerstone of Drahomanov’s view of the Jewish problem, can already be found in the 1875 article. See Politicheskiia sochineniiia, 218.


22. Ibid., 534 and 537.


25. Ibid.

26. Two pieces are particularly significant: Drahomanov’s editorial postscript to the
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29. For a general discussion of Drahomanov’s political philosophy, with special reference to his federalist and constitutional ideas, see my article, “Drahomanov as a Political Theorist,” pp. 203–53 of this volume; also Ie. Pyziur, “Konstytutsiina prohrama i teoriiia M. Drahomanova,” *Journal of Ukrainian Studies* 6, no. 2 (Fall 1981):28-42. For a contemporary Soviet treatment of this subject, see V. G. Sokurenko, *Demokraticheskie uchenia o gosudarstve i prave na Ukraine vo vtoroi polovine XIX veka* (Lviv 1966).

30. Drahomanov’s detailed proposals for the reconstruction of the Russian Empire on federalist lines are contained in his treatise “Volnyi soiuz—Vilna spilka: Opyt ukrainskoi politiko-sotsialnoi programmy,” in *Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii*, 1:273–375. A translation of the central core of this work—the constitutional proposals themselves, without the author’s extensive commentary—is included in *Mykhaylo Drahomanov: A Symposium and Selected Writings*, *Annals of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S.* 2, no. 1 (Spring 1952):193–205. The alternative concept of an independent Ukraine, organized as a federation of self-governing communities and regions, is expressed in “Prohrama,” which appeared, under the signatures of Drahomanov and his two collaborators, M. Pavlyk and S. Podolynsky, in the journal *Hromada*, no. 1 (1880); reprinted in M. P. Drahomanov, *Vybrani ivory* (Prague 1937), v. 1 (all published): 148–51.


33. See n. 26 above.


44. W. Feldman, *Geschichte der politischen Ideen in Polen seit dessen Teilungen*
MYKHAILO DRAHOMANOV AND UKRAINIAN-JEWISH RELATIONS (1795–1914), a reprint of the 1917 edition (Osnabrück 1964), 423.

45. K. Levytsky, Istoriia politychnoi dumky halitshkykh ukraintsiv 1848–1914 (Lviv 1926), 440.

46. S.M. Schwarz, The Jews in the Soviet Union (Syracuse, N.Y. 1951), 88, n. 27.


50. “Do problemy ievreiv na Ukraini,” Suchasnist 1, no. 8 (August 1961):116–21. This is a résumé of a paper by Vsevolod Holubnychy read at a meeting of the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the United States, New York, on 10 June 1961.

The Problem of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations in Nineteenth-Century Ukrainian Political Thought

Martin Buber relates in his biographical sketch of the great Hasidic teacher, Rabbi Nachman of Bratslav (1772–1810), that when Rabbi Nachman felt the approach of death, he decided to move to the town of Uman.¹ In 1768, a few years before Rabbi Nachman’s birth, Uman had been seized by Ukrainian peasant and Cossack rebels, the haidamaks, who slaughtered the Jewish inhabitants, together with the Polish nobles and Catholic clergy.² In Uman, Rabbi Nachman took a house whose windows overlooked the Jewish cemetery. He believed that the souls of the martyred victims still hovered over the burial place, and he wished to be close to them.

What this moving tale fails to convey is that the perpetrators of the massacre were victims and martyrs too. They were victims of social and religious-national oppression, against which they revolted. Soon after the uprising had been put down by the joint forces of the Polish magnates and the Russian army, thousands of the haidamaks were tortured to death or mutilated. For the Jews, the haidamaks were assassins. But in the Ukrainians’ eyes the haidamaks were avengers of the people’s wrongs and freedom fighters, while the Jews were agents of a system of injustice and degradation. This traditional popular view later found powerful expression in Taras Shevchenko’s poem, *Haidamaky* (The Haidamaks, 1841), a classic of Ukrainian literature.

This episode may serve as an illustration of the tragic nature of the Ukrainian-Jewish involvement: two peoples living for centuries side by side on the same soil, both victims of unfavourable historical circumstances over which they had no control, and yet separated by a wall of incomprehension, mutual fears, resentments, and recriminations, by memories of past grievances, and by present conflicts of interest.

It should therefore be evident that the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish re-
lations presented a special challenge to the political thought of the two peoples. Because of the difficult and emotionally charged nature of the problem, its treatment placed high demands on the thinkers who felt compelled to approach it. It called for an attitude that would be at once realistic and idealistic. Realistic—in order to do justice to the complexities of the situation; idealistic—in order to rise above ingrained prejudices and mental clichés in search of a workable solution acceptable to both sides. And if a totally satisfactory solution could not be found at once, it was extremely important at least to open up channels of communication, to create a platform for continual rational dialogue, to break out of the vicious circle of blind emotional reactions and counter-reactions. The work of the theorists had great practical relevance, inasmuch as ideas serve as catalysts of social and political actions.

A consideration of "Jewish answers to the Ukrainian question" does not enter into the plan of this paper. Let me only observe that the first Jewish publicist to have dealt extensively and constructively with the Ukrainian problem during the pre-World War I era seems to have been Vladimir Jabotinsky (1880–1940), the future founder of the revisionist wing of the Zionist movement.\(^3\) I propose to discuss "Ukrainian answers to the Jewish question" in the nineteenth century, concentrating on the ideas of three men, Mykola Kostomarov (1817–85), Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), and Ivan Franko (1856–1916). It is noteworthy that Ukrainian efforts to deal with the problem considerably preceded those by Jewish authors.

The first major Ukrainian statement concerning Ukrainian-Jewish relations was the article by Kostomarov, "Iudeiam" (To the Jews), published in the January 1862 issue of the monthly Osnova (Foundation) in St. Petersburg.\(^4\) Kostomarov, a brilliant and prolific historian, may be considered the ideologist of Ukrainian populism. Osnova, the organ of the Ukrainian national-cultural movement during the short period of liberal "thaw" in the Russian Empire following the Crimean War, published material in both Ukrainian and Russian. Kostomarov was the journal's chief contributor of programmatic articles. "To the Jews," like most of his scholarly and journalistic productions, was written in Russian.

"To the Jews" was a contribution to the polemic between Osnova and the Russian-language Jewish journal in Odessa, Sion.\(^5\) In his article Kostomarov spoke out against any persecution of the Jews and in favour of Jewish emancipation from existing legal restrictions:

We must wish that the Jews obtain completely equal rights and that the widest possible field [of activity] be opened to them. . . .

We sympathize with every effort on the part of the Jews to preserve
and develop their age-old peculiarities. Any hostility toward the Jews on the grounds of religious differences is in our eyes a symptom of extreme ignorance and stupid fanaticism, contrary to the spirit of Christian piety. We respect the Jewish religion, especially as the high teachings of our own religion oblige us to do so.\textsuperscript{6}

At the same time, the article contained a number of anti-Jewish barbs. Thus, Kostomarov stated, "The Little Russians candidly acknowledge that they generally dislike the Jewish tribe [Іудейською племеню] living in the midst of their homeland,"\textsuperscript{7} and he charged the Jews with clannishness and indifference toward the welfare of the host country. He recalled the past role of the Jews as instruments of the oppression and exploitation of the Ukrainian people by the Polish lords, and he alleged their present inclination ruthlessly to take advantage of the ignorance, helplessness, and even vices of the peasantry.

The irritated tone of Kostomarov's article was due to the circumstance that, in the course of their controversy with \textit{Osnova}, the editors of \textit{Sion} had assumed the stance of Russian super-loyalists; they insinuated that the work of the Ukrainophiles (as Ukrainian patriots were referred to at the time) was subversive to the cultural and potentially also to the political unity of the Russian Empire. This smacked of a denunciation, and, indeed, \textit{Sion}'s arguments were picked up by the chauvinist Russian press. The members of the \textit{Osnova} circle strove to convince the Russian authorities and public opinion of the politically harmless character of the Ukrainian cultural-literary revival. This explains the acerbity of Kostomarov's polemic against \textit{Sion}, but it does not excuse his aspersions against the Jewish people as a whole. One must agree with Mykhailo Hrushevsky's comment that Kostomarov had been carried away by his "subjective emotions," and that this prevented him from elucidating adequately the causes of Ukrainian-Jewish friction, although in principle he wished to overcome it.\textsuperscript{8}

Kostomarov's relative failure will help us to appreciate better Drahomanov's intellectual achievement. Drahomanov, the outstanding Ukrainian political thinker of the second half of the nineteenth century, dealt at considerable length and systematically with the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. His ideas on the subject, therefore, merit special attention.\textsuperscript{9}

Drahomanov's perception of the Jewish question must be seen against the background of his general social and political world-view.\textsuperscript{10} His thought represented a sophisticated blend of liberal-democratic, socialist, and Ukrainian patriotic elements, with positivistic philosophical underpinnings. Drahomanov envisaged the final goal of mankind's progress as anarchy: a voluntary association of free and equal, harmoniously devel-
oped individuals in which compulsory and authoritarian features in social life would be eliminated. He assumed that the practical approach toward implementing this ideal was federalism, implying decentralization of power and self-government of communities and regions. Drahomanov insisted on the priority of civil rights and free political institutions over economic class interests, and of universal human values, which he saw embodied in the world-wide progress of science, over exclusive national concerns. However, he believed that nationality was a necessary building stone of mankind, and he coined the slogan: “Cosmopolitanism in ideas and ends, nationality in foundations and forms.” Drahomanov declared himself a socialist without fully subscribing to any school of current socialist thought; he rejected Marxism as theoretically erroneous and ill-suited to Ukrainian conditions. He was convinced that in agrarian Eastern Europe, including Ukraine, socialism ought to be oriented toward the peasantry. Because of this, he may be classified as a populist in the broad meaning of the term. However, he strongly objected to certain typical features of Russian populism, such as reliance on terror, glorification of elemental peasant revolts, and disregard for Western-type liberal political institutions. Drahomanov regretted that the Ukrainian people had not preserved an independent state in the past, since in principle they were entitled to independence, but he thought that a policy of separatism was unrealistic under current circumstances. Moreover, his philosophical anarchism did not allow him to envisage national statehood as a wholly desirable objective. He admonished his fellow countrymen to concentrate their efforts on the democratization and federalization of the existing states, Russia and Austria-Hungary, and he assumed that this would ensure sufficient scope for the free development of the Ukrainian nation. Such a policy necessitated collaboration with the libertarian and progressive forces of all the other peoples of Eastern Europe, particularly those with whom the Ukrainians lived in closest contact, namely the Russians, the Poles, and the Jews. While staunchly defending the legitimate social and national claims of the Ukrainian people, Drahomanov consistently combated all expressions of xenophobic Ukrainian nationalism.

Drahomanov devoted two major papers to the Jewish problem, “Evrei i poliaki v Iugo-Zapadnom krae” (The Jews and the Poles in the South-Western Land, 1875) and “Evreiskii vopros na Ukraine” (The Jewish Question in Ukraine, 1882). The former was written when Drahomanov was still a Russian subject, and it appeared in a “legal” St. Petersburg periodical; thus the author had to be somewhat guarded in the expression of his views. The latter belongs to the period when Drahomanov lived as an exile in Switzerland and could speak out in full freedom. In addition, comments on the Jewish problem are scattered through many of Drahomanov’s writings. Over the years, one can notice
certain minor variations in the formulation of his ideas, but the basic conception remained constant. I shall present Drahomanov's thoughts on this subject as an organic whole, culling together statements made by the author at different times.

Drahomanov estimated the Jewish population in the Ukrainian lands of the Russian and Habsburg Empires at over one million. According to him, "the Jews represent in Ukraine [simultaneously] a nation, a religion, and a social class" (soslovie, literally "estate"). As a nationality, they were differentiated from the rest of the population by certain specific traits in their physical and mental make-up, and by a separate language, Yiddish. Their national identity was bolstered by the religious distinctiveness of Judaism. Moreover, "the Jews, including those who live in the countryside, belong here [in Ukraine] almost exclusively to the so-called urban classes, and among the latter predominantly to those not directly engaged in the production of goods."15

Using various statistical methods, Drahomanov demonstrated that the majority of Ukrainian Jews were occupied as petty tradesmen, innkeepers, pedlars, middlemen, etc. He concluded that "the Jewish nation in Ukraine... forms, to a large extent, a parasitic class... In those regions the terms 'exploiter' and 'Jew' have become synonymous in the people's speech."16 In another article Drahomanov qualified this harsh judgment to the effect that one-third of Ukrainian Jewry should be considered "workingmen," by which he meant labourers and craftsmen.17

Drahomanov was well aware of the fact that most Jews in Ukraine were poor, many of them living in abject poverty. But he asserted that even Jewish paupers had no feeling of solidarity with their working-class Christian neighbours, but rather identified themselves with their wealthy co-religionists, whom they served as agents and operatives. According to Drahomanov, the Jews tended to display a supercilious and arrogant attitude toward the Ukrainian peasantry. "All Jews in Ukraine look upon themselves as a class superior to the Ukrainian peasants. I have myself heard extremely poor Jews say: 'The peasant is an idiot, a reptile, a pig.' I have heard expressions which indicate that the Jews consider themselves as belonging to the ruling class, together with the gentry, as distinct from the peasantry.'18

Drahomanov held the Russian government largely responsible for the unenviable condition of Ukrainian Jewry and the growth of Ukrainian-Jewish tensions. The tsarist regime, contrary to its general policy of centralization and levelling of all regional distinctions, maintained the so-called Pale of Settlement, which caused an excessive concentration of the Jewish population in the western provinces. "This accumulation has been created quite artificially by the Russian legislation which, in this instance, was motivated not only by narrow Great Russian considerations,
In 1881 a wave of anti-Jewish riots occurred in Ukraine. Many Russian and Ukrainian revolutionary populists were tempted to approve the pogroms, since their ideology implied a positive attitude toward all expressions of social protest and popular rage, and also because they deluded themselves with the hope that ethnic disorders might escalate into a general revolt against the established order. Furthermore, sheer anti-Semitic prejudice was also present among certain members of the socialist-populist milieu. Thus the prominent Ukrainian socialist Serhii Podolynskyy (1850–91), the one-time collaborator of Drahomanov in Geneva, confessed in a letter to a friend, in 1875, that he had “not yet resolved [for himself] the question of Judaeophobia.”

Drahomanov’s reaction to the 1881 pogroms differed markedly from that prevalent in populist circles. He noted, in the first place, that owing to the Russian revolutionaries’ habitual neglect of the multinational character of the Empire, the Ukrainian events had caught them quite unprepared and without any consistent policy. “The mass of the Russian revolutionaries, which consists [to a large extent] of Jews, Poles, and Ukrainians, was confused by abstract formulas and centralist proclivities, and hence unready to comprehend local social and national relations in their concrete forms.” In his article, “The Jewish Question in Ukraine,” Drahomanov addressed himself to the proclamation issued by the Executive Committee of Narodnaia volia (the terrorist People’s Will Party) on the occasion of the pogroms. The proclamation, which was written in Ukrainian, elaborated on the exploitation of the popular masses by the “Jewish kulaks,” and advised the peasants to revolt not only against the Jews, but also against the landowners, the officials, and the tsar. Drahomanov commented that some of the facts mentioned in the proclamation were “basically correct,” but that “the altogether excusable side of the proclamation was its complete disregard of the fact that among the victims of the riots there were also poor people, and that in many places, particularly in the towns, they were the only ones to suf-
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fer. These were people engaged in the same productive physical labour as the Christian peasants and craftsmen." In another article, written at about the same time and dealing with general issues of revolutionary strategy, Drahomanov called the proclamation of Narodnia volia "ill-considered" and pointed out that, because of the low educational and civic level of the masses, elemental popular riots and revolts were bound to be "of purely negative significance."  

Passing now from the critical to the constructive side of Drahomanov's program, one may ask what measures he proposed toward the alleviation of the distressful condition of Ukrainian Jewry and an improvement of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. He certainly supported full emancipation of the Jewish people from all legal restrictions, which he dubbed "medieval survivals." He cautioned, however, that the granting of equal civil rights "would in itself change but little the condition of the Jewish masses and their relations with the Christian masses"; an immediate benefit would accrue only to the minority of well-to-do and Western-educated Jews. He rebuked the liberal Russian-Jewish press for concentrating solely on the single issue of emancipation, while neglecting other, equally vital dimensions of the problem. What was needed, according to Drahomanov, was action on several fronts simultaneously, in order to achieve results "beneficial to the majority of both Christians and Jews." The areas of action included: first, a raising of the Ukrainian people's educational and socio-economic standards, second, a weakening of the Jewish workingmen's dependence on their own wealthy bosses and obscurantist religious leaders, and, third, comparatively the simplest task, the emancipation of the Jews from legal discrimination, "until the time comes, which has already been reached in other European countries, when persons of all religious denominations possess equal rights."  

Drahomanov believed that there was an urgent need for a specifically Jewish socialist movement. He noted that many participants in Russian and Polish socialist groups were of Jewish origin, but that these were assimilated Jews who had lost touch with their own people and who, therefore, were unable to influence and guide them. "This is why Ukrainian socialists consider it a matter of major importance that a propaganda campaign be organized with a double objective: first, to separate Jewish workers from Jewish capitalists, and, second, to bring together Jewish workers with workers of other nationalities." This called for the formation of Jewish socialist organizations, and, first of all, of a socialist press in Yiddish, the Jewish vernacular.

During his Geneva years, Drahomanov undertook certain steps, which I shall not discuss here, to start a Yiddish-language socialist press. The attempt failed because of the opposition of Russian and Polish socialists, among whom those of Jewish background were often most hostile.
Thus his efforts had no immediate practical result. Still, Drahomanov’s biographer, David Zaslavsky, hails him as the precursor of Jewish socialist and labour movements:

It is hardly necessary to stress the profundity of these observations [of Drahomanov’s on the Jewish question]. Drahomanov perceived phenomena and processes in the life of the Jewish people which the Jewish socialist intelligentsia began to see only ten or fifteen years later [that is, by the 1890s]... It would be impossible to formulate more clearly and precisely the tasks which subsequently became the foundation of the first Jewish labour groups, and still later of the Bund, and of other socialist and communist organizations working among the Jewish proletariat.

Let us also consider the long-range perspective in Drahomanov’s ideas concerning the future development of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Here the originality of his conception is most strikingly apparent. The common assumption of nineteenth-century Western liberals was that the Jewish problem would ultimately be solved by the assimilation of the Jewish minorities to the respective host nations. Drahomanov demurred. He maintained that the assimilationist program, whatever its merits in the West, was impractical under East European conditions.

In respect of the Jews, Russia is no Switzerland, nor even Germany. In any event, in the western half of Russia there live more than three million Jews. This is an entire nation. Somebody should be concerned about them, particularly as they find themselves in the most abnormal relations with the other nations who live there.

The crucial point in the cited statement is the thesis that the Jews ought to be considered a distinct nation, and that in Ukraine, as well as in other East European lands, they constitute an ethnic-national minority. This basic position entailed portentous practical consequences.

Drahomanov defended the notion that after the coming overthrow of the tsarist autocracy Ukraine’s national minorities, prominently including the Jews, should not only possess equal civil rights with the Ukrainians, but also be endowed with national-cultural rights of self-government, protected by appropriate constitutional guarantees. In those communities and regions where the minorities formed local majorities or a sizeable portion of the population, their respective languages ought to have official standing. In other words, Drahomanov was a pioneer of the concept which in our time has become known as multiculturalism.

Their [national minorities’] societies and communities ought to be free from any compulsion toward [conformity with] the customs
and language of the Ukrainian people. They must have the right to establish their own schools—elementary, secondary, and institutions of higher learning—and to associate freely with those nations [outside Ukraine] whence they came. These labouring people of foreign extraction will serve as a link between the Ukrainians and their neighbours, with whom the Ukrainians ought to join in a great international federation.\textsuperscript{36}

I propose to conclude the presentation of Drahomanov’s ideas on the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations by submitting a few critical observations. Certain limitations of his thought are obvious. Thus Drahomanov tended to speak much too sweepingly of Jewish “parasitism.” In this one can discern a reflection of the prejudice common to Ukrainian and Russian populists of his time, who often equated productive work with physical labour. Another blind spot in his thinking was a lack of appreciation of the spiritual value of Judaism as a religion and of its irreplaceable function in the preservation of Jewish national identity. In this respect, Kostomarov’s insight was better than that of Drahomanov. One can only add that Drahomanov, the agnostic and militant anti-clericalist, displayed the same bias in his treatment of the role of religion in the life of the Ukrainian people. Drahomanov’s shortcomings, however, are amply compensated by the manifestly high merits of his intellectual attainment. The pioneering nature of his conception has been recently stressed by the Israeli historian Moshe Mishkinsky: “Indeed, Drahomanov was apparently the first radical political thinker to try to formulate a comprehensive view of the Jewish question in the empire and particularly in the Ukraine.”\textsuperscript{37} Drahomanov rightly maintained that the normalization of Ukrainian-Jewish relations depended on the socioeconomic restructuring of both the Jewish community and Ukrainian society at large; with his proposal for an institutional system of national-cultural pluralism he was far ahead of his time. Most praiseworthy and exemplary is his basic humane and democratic orientation and his striving for objectivity and rationality in dealing with a problem of whose complexity he was fully aware.

The third figure whose ideas I shall discuss was the Galician Ukrainian writer and scholar, Ivan Franko. He was a man of truly prodigious productivity and versatility. His \textit{oeuvre} included poetry, prose fiction, literary criticism, historic and folkloristic studies, and political journalism. In all these fields he made outstanding contributions. Ideologically, Franko was a disciple of Drahomanov, who exercised a formative impact on his intellectual development. In his later years, however, Franko moved gradually away from the pure Drahomanovian doctrine. The political philosophy of the mature Franko may be defined as democratic nationalism.
Jewish topics of various kinds occupy a prominent place in Franko’s writings. Thus in his scholarly works he studied Hebrew influences in Old Rus’ literature and Ukrainian folklore. Biblical motifs loom large in Franko’s poetry, as exemplified by the narrative poem Moisei (Moses, 1905), which is considered his masterpiece. In his novels and short stories based on contemporary Galician life, Franko frequently depicted Jewish characters. All this, however, falls outside the scope of the present paper.

Here my concern is with Franko the social and political thinker, not the man of letters and the scholar. In his publicistic writings, he repeatedly dealt with the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. Franko’s earlier pronouncements on this subject have a Drahomanovian flavour, although they refer specifically to Galician conditions, while Drahomanov had in mind primarily Russian Ukraine. Franko’s later statements are more original, and hence of special interest to the historian of ideas.

The article “Semityzm i antysemityzm v Halychnyi” (Semitism and Anti-Semitism in Galicia, 1887) is representative of Franko’s Drahomanovian phase. In it the following declaration of his political faith can be read: “No religion, no persuasion, no race, and no nationality has ever been or can ever become the object of our hatred. Such an object was and shall forever remain only every kind of oppression, exploitation, and hypocrisy.” Franko expatiated on the preponderance of Jews in Galicia’s economy: nearly all of the province’s commerce and industry was in Jewish hands, and a growing portion of landed estates were also passing from Polish nobles to Jews. In the author’s view, these phenomena threatened not only Galicia’s non-Jewish nationalities, but also the Jews themselves. Ukrainians and Poles should strive to become equal to the Jews in the economic sphere, and the provincial government ought to support these efforts. The internal reform of the Jewish community was the responsibility of the Jews themselves, but relations between Jews and non-Jews must be settled by mutual discussion. Finally, in reviewing some recent Polish proposals, Franko expressed himself on the issues of Jewish assimilation and emigration. He gave a restrictive interpretation to the concept of assimilation, reducing it to “the task of [achieving] civic equality on the basis of equal rights and equal duties.” He stressed that assimilation rightly understood implied neither religious apostasy nor absorption of the entire Jewish mass into the host nations, which, under Galician conditions, was unfeasible and undesirable. As to emigration, it might be useful as a safety valve, and, therefore, would be welcome, provided that it was partial, gradual, and well planned; it might also serve as a basis for the future national independence (samostiiinist) of the Jewish people.
The hint at possible Jewish national independence is intriguing, but Franko did not elaborate on it in the 1887 article. He confronted this issue nine years later in a review of Theodor Herzl’s celebrated treatise, Der Judenstaat (The Jewish State, 1896). We know that Franko and Herzl (1860–1904), the founder and prophet of Zionism, met in Vienna in February 1893, and were mutually favourably impressed. Franko’s review appeared only three weeks after the publication of Herzl’s work, which not only testifies to his extraordinary intellectual alertness, but also suggests that the book must have struck a responsive chord in his mind. Franko sympathetically recapitulated Herzl’s arguments; his only reservation was that Herzl probably underestimated the practical difficulties of the establishment of a Jewish state. The conclusion of the review reads: “‘The plan, however, undoubtedly has a future before itself; and if the present generation turns out to be yet immature for it, it is bound to survive to see, in the course of time, young people who will be willing and able to implement it.’”

The positive evaluation by Franko of the idea of Jewish statehood must be seen in the context of the evolution of his Ukrainian national-political program. After the death of Drahomanov in 1895, Franko dissociated himself from his mentor’s philosophical anarchism and embraced the concept of Ukrainian state independence. We can only wonder whether his reading of Herzl’s Der Judenstaat prompted him to move in this direction. But it is significant that in his defence of the idea of Ukrainian statehood Franko advanced arguments which closely paralleled those in his review of Herzl’s work. In the case of Ukraine, as in that of the Jewish nation, Franko believed that the idea of independence was unrealistic, “beyond the bounds of the possible,” from the viewpoint of current practical politics. At the same time, he asserted that this idea, or rather ideal, could provide an inspiring beacon for the national-liberation movement, and that its future realization ultimately depended on the dedicated will of the Ukrainian people itself.

The fullest formulation of Franko’s thoughts concerning the Jewish question and Ukrainian-Jewish relations is to be found in the novel Perekhresni stezhky (Crossroads, 1900). They are voiced by one of the novel’s protagonists, Wagman, but we have the full right to assume that they represent Franko’s own position. Let it be said by way of introduction that Wagman is a Jewish money-lender who at first is presented as a supposedly sinister character, but then is gradually revealed in the course of the narrative as a wise and good man. He discreetly helps the novel’s hero, a young Ukrainian lawyer, in defending the peasants’ interests against the local Polish landowners. The action is set in an unnamed Galician provincial town in the early 1880s. Wagman expresses his ideas during an encounter with the city’s mayor (burmistr), an assimilated Jew
and former participant in the Polish insurrection of 1863.

The discussion between Wagman and the mayor turns on the issue of Jewish assimilation. The mayor confesses that all his life he has tried to eradicate in himself the feeling of Jewishness, but has not yet fully succeeded. Wagman replies:

— "These modern Jews of yours, the assimilants or assimilators, have split their old Jewish soul into two halves [by rejecting the better, and retaining the worse part].... You have started assimilation by throwing out from your heart the remnants of the community spirit that used to be the strength of our nation.... You ceased to love your people, its tradition, and to believe in its future. From all the nation's treasures, you retained only your ego and your family, like a splinter from a wrecked boat. You cling to this splinter, and try to attach it to another boat, to find a new fatherland, to buy another mother who is not your own. Do you not deceive yourself in thinking that a strange mother will love and fondle you as if you were her own? Do you not deceive this adoptive mother when you assure her that you love her more than your true mother?.... But I also see certain good sides in your assimilationist movement, although they are small.... You are our tribute to those peoples and countries which gave us shelter and sanctuary in hard times. but you should not demand that this tribute be excessive. It is unreasonable to ask of a wanderer who has drunk water from a well that in repayment he should jump into the well and drown in it. What you are doing and what others like you often have done before is justified and necessary from the historical point of view, and is even beneficial for the Jewish nation, but it cannot be its program, because this would amount not to a program, but to suicide."

"What is this benefit to the Jewish nation?" asked the mayor without any shade of mockery in his voice.

"What, indeed? That is quite clear. You are the intermediaries between us and those nations which have received us. You are the bridge over the chasm.... Formerly, in the Middle Ages, when we lived completely isolated among foreign peoples, we were much worse off than today.... Now you will concede that I am no such enemy of your assimilation as the ordinary Hasidim, and that I recognize to some extent its rationality and usefulness. But there is one thing which largely detracts from its value and reveals its insincerity. This is the circumstance that the Jews usually assimilate not to those nearest, but to those more powerful. In Germany they are Germans—this I understand. But why are they also Germans
in Bohemia? In Hungary they are Magyars, in Galicia Poles—but why are they Russians in Warsaw and Kiev? Why do the Jews not assimilate to those nations that are weak, oppressed, injured, and poor? Why are there no Slovak Jews, Ruthenian Jews?” . . .

"Listen, Wagman! This is really too much. You begin to talk like that Ruthenian lawyer who upbraided me for my Polish patriotism."

"And rightly so," said Wagman, "because Polish patriotism is somewhat out of place here, on Ruthenian land."

"In the end you will try to convert me to Ruthenian patriotism!" guffawed the mayor.

"God forbid! In my opinion, no Jew can or should be either a Polish or Ruthenian patriot. And there is no need that he be one. Let him be a Jew—this will be enough. However, one can be a Jew and yet love the country where we were born, and be useful, or at least not harmful, to the people who, although not our own, are closely connected with all the memories of our lives. It seems to me that if we were to uphold this view, the entire assimilation would become unnecessary. . . . You see, the pogroms in Ukraine showed me that we, Jews living on Ruthenian land, are collecting the fire of Ruthenian hatred over our heads. Even when we strive to assimilate, we do so only to those who oppress and exploit the Ruthenians, and thus we increase the burden which weighs them down. We forget that more than half the Jewish people now live on Ruthenian soil, and that their hatred, accumulated over the centuries, may well burst forth into such a flame and assume such forms that our protectors, the Poles and the Russians, will be unable to help us in any way. This is why I felt the need to start building a bridge from our shore also to the Ruthenian shore, in order that the Ruthenians keep us not only in bad memory. I know well that as soon as they advance a little and attain some strength, more and more Jews will begin to incline to their side. But, in my judgment, it is important to assist them now, when they are still weak, downtrodden, and unable to straighten up." 48

Franko’s quoted passages were written at the very turn of the century. Thus it seems fitting to end with them this survey of nineteenth-century Ukrainian thought on the problem of Ukrainian-Jewish relations. I hope that I will not stand alone in the belief that they might still today, more than eighty years later, serve as a starting point for a continued fruitful debate on a subject of vital importance to both nations.
ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY

Notes

1. M. Buber, The Tales of Rabbi Nachman (Bloomington, Ind. 1962), 32.
2. W. A. Serczyk (Koliszczyzna [Cracow 1968], 97) estimates the number of Jewish victims in the Uman massacre at c. 3,000.
5. The exchanges between Osnova and Sion are summarized in M. Hrushevsky’s introductory essay, “Z publitsystychnykh pysan Kostomarova,” ibid., xiii–xv.
6. Ibid., 123.
7. Ibid., 122.
8. Ibid., xiii.
9. The following account is based on my earlier, more detailed article, “Mykhailo Drahomanov and the Problem of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations,” 283–97 of this volume; certain passages from it have been incorporated into the present paper. See also E. Hornowa, “Problem żydowski w twórczości Dragomanowa,” Biuletyn Żydowskiego Instytutu Historycznego, no. 57 (January–March 1966):3–37.
11. Reprinted in M. P. Dragomanov, Politicheskiia sochineniia, ed. I. M. Grevs and B. A. Kistiakovskii (Moscow 1908), v.1 (all published):217–67. “South-Western Land” was the official administrative term for the three provinces of Kiev, Volhynia and Podillia, the territory commonly known as Right-Bank Ukraine.
15. Ibid., 534.
16. Ibid., 534 and 537.
19. Ibid., 527.
20. Ibid., 539.
21. Ibid., 529.

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30. Ibid., 227.
32. For details, see Rudnytsky, “Mykhailo Drahomanov and the Problem of Ukrainian-Jewish Relations,” 288–9 of this volume.
35. Drahomanov’s proposal of provisions that would secure ethnic minorities’ rights is contained in his draft of a democratic-federalist constitution for Russia, “Volnyi soiuiz—Vilna spilka: Opyt ukrainskoi politiko-sotsialnoi programmy,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 1:273–375; see esp. 280, 316.
36. M. P. Drahomanov, “Prohrama ‘Hromady’,” in M. P. Drahomanov, Vybrani tvory (Prague 1937), v.1 (all published), 149.
37. Mishkinsky, 193.
40. Franko, V naimakh u susidiv, 117.
41. Ibid., 129.
42. Ibid., 131.
44. The encounter between Herzl and Franko is described in the first half of A. Wilcher’s article, cited above, 233–8.
45. Ibid., 243.
47. Reprinted in I. Franko, Zibrannia tvoriv u piatdesiaty tomakh (Kiev 1979), v.20.
48. Ibid., 389–93, condensed.
On the eve of World War I, the Ukrainian inhabitants of the Austro-Hungarian Empire numbered some four million. They were divided among the Austrian provinces of Galicia (3,380,000) and Bukovyna (300,000), and the Kingdom of Hungary (470,000). In each of these three territories the Ukrainians lived under quite different conditions. This calls for the separate treatment of each of the three groups. As, however, the Galician Ukrainians were not only the most numerous, but also historically by far the most important, this paper will deal only with them.

The official designation for the East Slavic inhabitants of the Habsburg Empire was "Ruthenians" (die Ruthenen); in their own language they called themselves rusyny. Toward the end of the nineteenth century, the Galician and Bukovynian Ruthenians began to favour the adoption of a new national name—"Ukrainians"—which finally prevailed.

The Impact of Austrian Enlightened Despotism
Ethnic nationality was of no political consequence in the eighteenth century. At the time of the annexation of Galicia to the Austrian Empire in 1772, the nobility of the land had been Polonized for a long time. Thus it is not surprising that properly speaking the Austrian government had at first no "Ruthenian policy." Although the legal pretext used at the time of the First Partition of Poland was the alleged right of the Habsburg dynasty to the inheritance of the medieval Rus' Galician-Volhynian Kingdom, the newly acquired province was, for all practical purposes, treated as a slice of Polish territory. However, the Ukrainian population of Galicia was soon to feel the impact of the new regime. The reform measures of the Austrian "enlightened" monarchs, Maria Theresa and Joseph II, directly affected the two social groups that had retained their
Rus’ identity: the peasants and the Uniate clergy.

The most important measures enacted by the Austrian government between 1772 and 1790 in favour of the Galician peasantry were the following: the limitation of the corvée to a maximum of three days a week, and of 156 days a year, from a peasant household, with a decreasing scale of services from the poorer groups of villagers; a strict prohibition of any additional exactions beyond the statutory corvée; the creation of a cadaster and the securing to the peasants of the possession of the plots actually held and cultivated by them; the organization of villages into communities with elected officers; the granting of certain basic personal rights, such as the right to marry without the master’s permission and the right to complain and appeal against the decisions of the landowner to the organs of state administration.2

One has to recognize the limitations of these reforms. The Austrian government did not aim at a condition of civic equality. The empire was to remain a hierarchical “society of estates.” The peasant, technically no longer a “serf,” still continued to be a “hereditary tenant” of the dominium (manorial estate). Besides the right to the peasants’ unpaid labour, the dominium also retained important prerogatives of an administrative, judicial, and fiscal nature. After the death of Joseph II in 1790, and with the beginning of prolonged wars against France, further reforms were discontinued. The conservative tenor of the post-Napoleonic period made administrative practice more sympathetic to the landowners’ interests. Still, the Galician peasant had become “at least an object of law, and not, as before [under the old Polish regime], outside any law.”3 Writing on the eve of World War I, Ivan Franko stated: “Our people have not forgotten him [Joseph II], and they still speak of his wise and humane treatment of his subjects.”4 The pro-peasant reforms of Maria Theresa and Joseph II laid the foundation for the dynastic loyalty of the Ukrainian masses in Galicia, which was to last until the end of the monarchy.

The Greek Catholic, or Uniate, Church occupied a crucial place in the history of the Galician Ukrainians in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries.5 The Austrian government granted the Uniate church and clergy equal status with their Roman Catholic counterparts, which had been denied them by the former Polish regime. In 1774, Maria Theresa decreed a new official term, “Greek Catholics”; the purpose was to stress the parity of the “Greek” and the “Roman” rites. This principle of parity, repeatedly emphasized by Maria Theresa, Joseph II, and Leopold II, was implemented by a series of practical measures: the improvement of the legal and economic position of the Greek Catholic clergy, the creation of seminaries, and the creation of cathedral chapters in Lviv and Przemyśl, whose members were to assist the bishops in the administra-
The crowning reform, in 1808, was the elevation of the Lviv bishopric to the rank of Metropolitan See of Halych. This had been originally suggested, as early as 1773, by Bishop Lev Sheptytsky of Lviv (1717–79) with the argument that a Galician “Greek” metropolis would extend Austrian political influence among the Uniates of Western Ukraine, still part of Poland (until the Second Partition of 1793), and help to counter Russia’s “schismatic” propaganda there.

Polish cultural influence among the Greek Catholic clergy, which had its roots in pre-Partition times, increased during the early decades of Austrian rule. The lifting of the social and educational status of the clerical class made its members more susceptible to the tempting example of the way of life of the Polish gentry. But in spite of the dominance of the Polish language in Ruthenian clerical families, which was to last well into the second half of the nineteenth century, there were early symptoms of an anti-Polish political attitude. In 1809, when Galicia was temporarily occupied by the forces of Napoleon’s Polish satellite, the Grand Duchy of Warsaw, Metropolitan Antin Anhelovych (1756–1814) refused to participate in any Polish patriotic demonstrations, and suffered for his loyalty to the Habsburg cause.

The struggle of Cossack Ukraine for political independence in the seventeenth century was closely associated with the defence of Orthodoxy against Islam and Roman Catholicism. The Uniate church appeared at that time as an adjunct of alien Polish domination. By the nineteenth century, a curious reversal of roles had taken place. After the subordination of the Metropolitan See of Kiev to the Moscow Patriarchate (1685), the Orthodox church in Ukraine lost its autonomy, and gradually became completely Russified. The Uniate church, suppressed in the Russian Empire (1839), was limited to the Habsburg domains. But here it experienced a remarkable resurgence. The beneficial reforms sponsored by the Austrian government raised the educational and civic standards of the Greek Catholic clergy above those of the contemporary Orthodox clergy. At the same time, the impact of Austrian “Josephinism” enabled the Greek Catholic Church to rid itself of the Polish connection. It was now in a position to assume the role of a Ukrainian national church. From 1848 on, the Greek Catholic clergy provided the political leadership of the Ukrainian community in Galicia. Later, the leadership gradually passed into the hands of the lay intelligentsia, many of whom were, however, sons of clerical families.

The Intellectual Awakening
The end of the Napoleonic wars initiated a long period of international and internal peace. But during these drowsy Biedermeier years an indigenous intellectual life began to take shape among Galicia’s Greek Catholic
clerical intelligentsia. Beginning in the 1820s, a few scholars appeared among them: historians (Mykhailo Harasevych [1763–1836], Denys Zubrytsky [1777–1862]) and grammarians and ethnographers (Ivan Mohylntsky [1777–1831], Iosyf Lozynsky [1807–89], Iosyf Levytsky [1801–60]). However, their works were written in Latin, German or Polish. Some Polish scholars also published important collections of Ukrainian folklore.

The next step, in 1832, was the formation of a patriotic circle among the students of the Greek Catholic theological seminary in Lviv. The leader of the group was Markiian Shashkevych (1811–43), a talented poet and an inspiring personality. His closest associates were Iakiv Holovatsky (1814–88) and Ivan Vahylevych (1811–60). The three young men were nicknamed “The Ruthenian Triad.”

What differentiated the Triad from their predecessors and older contemporaries was their determination to lift the vernacular to the level of a literary language. They decided to publish an almanac containing samples of folk poetry and some original works. After many difficulties with censorship, a small volume appeared in 1837: Rusalka Dnistrovaia (The Nymph of the Dniester). It was printed in Buda in Hungary, where censorship was more lenient than in Galicia. The Rusalka was the beginning of modern Ukrainian literature in Galicia, and also a milestone in the formation of national consciousness.

The Rusalka Dnistrovaia may appear today as completely innocuous and devoid of political significance, but contemporaries felt this “linguistic revolution” to be radical and dangerous. Shashkevych and his friends had further plans: they started a systematic collection of folkloristic materials and intended to publish educational literature for the peasants. But their initiative was paralyzed by the establishment. Said the police director of Lviv: “We already have enough trouble with one nationality [the Poles], and these madmen want to resurrect the dead-and-buried Ruthenian nationality.” But even more crippling than bureaucratic obtuseness was the hostility of the Greek Catholic hierarchy. Metropolitan Mykhailo Levytsky (1774–1858) and his collaborators felt that the use of the “peasant language” in print was undignified, indecent, and possibly subversive. Ecclesiastical censorship confiscated the edition of Rusalka, and prevented other vernacular publications. The humiliations and persecutions to which the members of the Ruthenian Triad were exposed contributed to Shashkevych’s premature death, and finally drove Vahylevych to the Polish camp.

Shashkevych and his circle were well aware that the Galician “Ruthenians” and the “Little Russians” across the Austrian-Russian boundary were one and the same people. They were stimulated by the young vernacular literary movement in eastern Ukraine, and by personal contacts
with some scholars of Ukrainian background at Russian universities (Izmail Sreznevsky, Mykhailo Maksymovych, Osyp Bodiansky). The latter were by no means Ukrainian nationalists, but they encouraged their Galician friends' romantic enthusiasm for the popular language and folkloristic studies.

Another inspiration emanated from the Czechs. The spectacular achievements of the Czech national movement were an obvious model for Galician "Awakeners." Through the mediation of Karel Vladislav Zap, a Czech man of letters employed in the Galician administration, Holovatsky and Vahylevych established contacts with the leading Czech Slavists, and contributed to Prague periodicals. Both the Czechs and the Galician Ukrainians inclined to an Austro-Slavic political program. In an article published in 1846, the outstanding Czech publicist, Karel Havlíček, called Ukraine "a lamb between two wolves," Russia and Poland, and "an apple of discord thrown by fate between these two nations." He advised Austria to support the Ukrainians in Galicia, who then would be in a position to influence their compatriots in the Russian Empire. Iakov Holovatsky expressed, also in 1846, strikingly similar views in an article published in a German journal. After describing the social plight and cultural stagnation of his people, oppressed by the Polish aristocracy and neglected by their own reactionary high clergy, Holovatsky explained why, in spite of these unsatisfactory conditions, the Galician Ruthenians felt no attraction toward Russia. The peasants knew that in Russia there was no legal protection for the serf against abuse; the Greek Catholic priests had a better life than Russian Orthodox popes. Moreover, in Russia "there is little hope for their literature and nationality. Muscovitism swamps everything. . . . The centralizing Russian government looks askance at the emergence of a Little Russian literature." Holovatsky concluded that "by favouring Ruthenian literature [in Galicia], Austria could exercise influence on Little Russia."

The anti-Russian revolt in Congress Poland (1830–31) caused a burgeoning of underground activities in Galicia. These culminated, fifteen years later, in the ill-starred revolt of 1846. Polish conspirators, who thought of their country in its pre-Partition frontiers, extended their propaganda to the Ukrainian community. The attempts at proselytizing among the peasantry gave birth to a propagandistic literature in the Ukrainian vernacular. But this agitation met no favourable response. Revolutionary propaganda was more successful with educated Ukrainians. At least some segments of the Greek Catholic intelligentsia were susceptible to the libertarian appeal of the Polish cause. A conspiratorial group formed, in 1833–4, among the students of the Lviv seminary. But even before its suppression by the authorities, in 1838, it met with opposition from the ranks of the young people themselves. Some Ukrainian
members of the underground Association of the Polish People demanded that its name be changed to "of the Polish and Ruthenian People," but this proposal was rejected with scorn. This rigidity of the Polish revolutionaries led to an anti-Polish reaction, and the Ruthenian national current, headed by the Shashkevych circle, gained the upper hand among the seminarians. The wider question of the Polish impact on the Galician "Awakeners" requires a double-edged answer. European liberal ideas reached Ukrainians of that generation mostly through Polish channels. On the other hand, the assertion of a separate Ukrainian nationality necessarily implied a struggle against the traditional Polish hegemony. "The work was accomplished quietly and without much ado. The Poles lost their hold on a nation which only a few years before had been closely associated with and hardly distinguishable from them. There was no need for [the governor of Galicia] Count Stadion to ‘invent’ the Ruthenians in 1848; he already found them there."  

The 1848 Revolution
Immediately following the outbreak of the Viennese revolt, the Poles staged large-scale patriotic demonstrations in Galicia. On 18 March 1848, they addressed a petition to the emperor, demanding extensive autonomy for Galicia, which they treated as a purely Polish land. One month later, on 19 April, the Ukrainians submitted a petition of their own; they asked for the recognition of their nationality, and for equal rights for the two peoples inhabiting Galicia. The formation of a Supreme Ruthenian Council (Holovna Ruska Rada) on 2 May contradicted the claim of the Polish National Council to speak for Galicia as a whole. The Supreme Ruthenian Council, presided over by the Greek Catholic bishop-coadjutor of Lviv, Hryhorii Iakhymovych (1792–1863), formulated its program in a manifesto of 10 May.

Some of the more important acts of the Galician Ukrainians during the revolutionary period were the following: the formation of a network of thirty-four local branches of the Rada throughout the country; the founding of Zoria halytska (The Galician Star), the first Ukrainian-language newspaper not only in Galicia, but in all Ukrainian lands; participation in the Slavic Congress in Prague in June 1848; a campaign for election to the first Austrian Reichstag and participation in parliamentary work; formation of a Ruthenian National Guard and military detachments, which took part in the war against insurgent Hungary; organization of public meetings; presentation of addresses to the provincial and the central government; collection of signatures under petitions; and the holding of an Assembly of Ruthenian Scholars (Sobor Ruskykh Uchenykh), 19–26 October 1848, to determine guidelines for cultural and educational policies.
The Supreme Ruthenian Council was launched with the blessing of the governor of Galicia, Count Franz Stadion. This brilliant eccentric has been called "a conservative reformer in the style of [Baron von] Stein and Robert Peel," an exponent of "enlightened conservatism in the spirit of a revised and refined Josephinism." Appointed to Galicia after the disastrous Polish revolt of 1846, Stadion sought in 1848 to frustrate the irredentism of the Polish gentry and intelligentsia by an appeal to the class interests of the peasants (both Ukrainian and Polish), and by support of Ukrainian national claims. Without waiting for a law applying to the whole empire, on 22 April he abolished by decree the corvée and "hereditary tenancy," thus stealing the thunder of the Polish democrats, who themselves had intended to claim credit for this necessary and overdue reform. Similarly he established close links with Iakhymovych and the leaders of the Rada, giving the Poles an opportunity for the quip that "Stadion invented the Ruthenians."

The position of the Galician Ukrainians was analogous to that of the smaller nationalities of Hungary, who also made common cause with the dynasty and the Vienna government against the brand of "liberty" offered them by the Magyar gentry. In the Austrian half of the monarchy the Ukrainians stood closest to the Czechs, those chief defenders of a united empire reorganized on Austro-Slavic lines. During the Slavic Congress in Prague a deadlock occurred within the Polish-Ruthenian Section. The Czechs, working behind the scenes, mediated a compromise resolution, adopted by the section on 7 June 1848: the Ukrainians agreed to postpone the issue of Galicia's division, and the Poles conceded the principle of the equality of the two nations in all administrative and educational matters. The subsequent forced dissolution of the Slavic Congress buried the resolution of 7 June. Yet it remained, until the reform of the electoral law for the Galician Diet in February 1914, the only instance of a Polish-Ukrainian compromise.

In the Austrian constituent Reichstag, in Vienna and Kroměříž, the Ukrainian deputies usually followed the example and advice of their Czech colleagues. During the debates of the Constitutional Committee, the Pole Florian Ziemiafkowski had called the Ruthenians "an artificial nation, invented last year." He was vigorously refuted by the Czech spokesmen, František Palacky and František Ladislav Rieger. Said Rieger on 24 January 1849: "Let us respect the national strivings of a people persecuted by both the Russians and the Poles, and called to an independent existence."

The question of national identity was answered by the Supreme Ruthenian Council in the "Ukrainian" sense, that is, by asserting the distinctness of their people not only from Poland, but from Russia as well. The Rada's manifesto of 10 May 1848 stated: "We Galician Ruthenians
(rusyny halytsky) belong to the great Ruthenian people who speak one language and count fifteen millions, of whom two and one-half inhabit the Galician land." It is, however, noteworthy that in all the pronouncements of the Rada and of its individual leaders we do not find any specific reference to the condition of their compatriots in Russia and to the reciprocal relations of the two parts of the nation, divided between the Russian and the Austrian empires. The politically sophisticated Czech leaders realized the international implications of the Ukrainian revival in Galicia. Rieger said in the Constitutional Committee: "The liberty of the press [in Austria] will give full scope to the Ruthenian element. Their freedom-breathing literature will bring about the melting of the rigid ice of Russian absolutism... This, gentlemen, is the most important thing in the question: the fall of the European despot, the enemy of liberty, is near at hand, once this people enters the ranks of the Slavic peoples." Yet such wider perspectives were absent in the thinking of the leaders of the Supreme Ruthenian Council, men of good will, but timid and provincial in their intellectual outlook.

Another blind spot in the thinking of the Supreme Ruthenian Council was its neglect of social and economic problems. The abolition of the corvée and "hereditary tenancy" still left many issues unsolved: there was the question of indemnity to be paid to the landowners and the question of forests and pastures, which previously had been used jointly by the manors and the villagers and which now were claimed by the former as their exclusive property. These problems were of burning urgency to the peasants. A Ukrainian peasant deputy, Ivan Kapushchak, in an impassioned speech in the Reichstag on 17 August 1848, denied that the demand of indemnity was justified: serfdom was in itself a cruel abuse, and therefore ought not be compensated. "Let them keep the rods and whips with which they used to beat our weary bodies, and may this serve them as indemnity!" The speech made a strong impression on the chamber. But the Rada, which consistently advocated the rights of the Greek Catholic Church and clergy and their equality with the "Latin" church and clergy, failed to take into account the social grievances of the bulk of their people.

The emergence of the Supreme Ruthenian Council was a direct challenge to the Polish claim that Galicia was an organic part of Poland. Polish leaders tried to undermine the Council's position by opposing to it a body which was supposed to represent a pro-Polish current among the Ruthenians. On 23 May 1848, a Ruthenian Assembly (Ruskyi Sobor) appeared, composed of a handful of Polish noblemen whose families were of Rus' extraction and of a few Polonized Ukrainian intellectuals. The Sobor started the publication of a paper, in Ukrainian, but with Polish characters, and engaged as its editor Ivan Vahylevych, the former com-
panion of Markiian Shashkevych. But the experiment folded quickly. The bulk of the Ukrainian intelligentsia, grouped around the Rada, denounced the Sobor as a sham. Polish patriots of Ukrainian background, on the other hand, aspired to full membership in Polish society. An irreversible result of the 1848 Revolution was the permanent separation of the Poles and the Ukrainians into two distinct national communities.

The primary practical goal of the Supreme Ruthenian Council was the separation of the Polish and the Ukrainian areas of Galicia into two provinces, formed along ethnic lines. The issue had originally been raised by the Austrian government itself, without any regard to Ukrainian demands, as a punitive measure after the Polish revolt of 1846 and in connection with the annexation of the former Republic of Cracow. This program was energetically pursued by the Supreme Ruthenian Council in 1848. A memorandum was submitted to the Ministry of Interior on 17 July and again on 28 October. In August, a petition with 15,000 signatures brought the matter to the attention of the Reichstag; ultimately 200,000 people signed the petition. The plan was not only vigorously opposed by the Poles, but also became entangled with the wider issue of a territorial reorganization of the whole empire.

Radical proposals of a new administrative structure based on ethnic principles, like the one submitted to the Reichstag’s Constitutional Committee by Palacký, raised a host of conflicting interests and claims. The Constitutional Committee decided to retain the historical provinces, but, as a concession to the ethnic point of view, to create within the framework of the provinces new, ethnically homogeneous, self-governing units, named Kreise. These provisions were taken over in the constitution proclaimed, after the forcible suppression of the Reichstag, by imperial fiat on 4 March 1849. After the collapse of its architect, Stadion, however, the constitution of 4 March, like its parliamentary predecessor, remained a dead letter. The historical provinces survived the revolutionary crisis; the compensating Kreise never became a reality. During the neoabsolutist era the government continued for a time to toy with plans for a territorial reorganization of Galicia, but nothing came of it.

From Neoabsolutism to the Austro-Polish Compromise

The transition to the neoabsolutist decade (1849–59) brought about a decline of overt political activity among all Austrian nationalities. The Supreme Ruthenian Council dissolved in 1851. Its former leaders reverted to predominantly ecclesiastical preoccupations. The internal cohesion of the Ruthenian community was weakened by the internal rift into a Russophile and a Ukrainophile faction. At the same time, a most dangerous opponent arose to the Ruthenian cause in the person of Count Agenor
Goluchowski, appointed governor of Galicia in 1849. He was at first scorned by his Polish compatriots as a tool of Vienna. But, as a matter of fact, Goluchowski rendered invaluable services to the Polish cause. He was instrumental in the final defeat of the plans for Galicia’s territorial division. He undermined the central government’s trust in the loyalty of the Ruthenians by denouncing them to Vienna as Russophiles. Furthermore, he filled the ranks of the civil service, which had been predominantly German prior to 1848, with Poles. Goluchowski’s governorship thus smoothed the path for the Polish takeover in 1867.

Austria’s defeat in the Italian war in 1859 led to an era of constitutional experiments. The Galician provincial Diet met for the first time in 1861. The Ruthenian membership was still comparatively strong, one-third of the chamber. But the situation was much less favourable for the Ukrainians than in 1848; the relative strength of the Poles had increased both in the province and in Vienna, and the support of the central government had become vacillating. The leadership of the Ukrainian community rested with the conservative “Old Ruthenians,” who were quite unequal to the requirements of a complex and shifting political constellation. Their paternalistic approach to the peasantry prevented them from building up a strong and reliable mass base among their own people, which would have enabled them to brave the storm. They failed to come to terms with the Poles when this might perhaps still have been possible. The Old Ruthenian leaders leaned blindly on the Austrian German centralists, whose exponent was the administration headed by Anton von Schmerling (1861–5).

The period of constitutional experiments came to an abrupt end with Austria’s defeat by Prussia in 1866 and the establishment of the Dualist system. The Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867 found its corollary in the simultaneous Austro-Polish Compromise. The more ambitious Polish plan to obtain a special constitutional position for Galicia miscarried; legally Galicia remained on the same footing as the other “crownlands” of the Austrian half of the Dual Monarchy. Yet for all practical purposes, full control over the land was turned over to the Polish upper classes. The fate of the Ukrainians was similar to that of the non-Magyar nationalities of Hungary. In both cases, the dynasty and the central government sacrificed their loyal supporters of 1848. To one of the chief authors of the Dualist system, Foreign Minister Count Friedrich Ferdinand von Beust, is attributed the saying that “whether and to what extent the Ruthenians may exist is left to the discretion of the Galician Diet.”

A few brief indications must suffice to give an idea of the power structure in Galicia and the respective position of the two nationalities during the Dualist epoch. The viceroy of Galicia was always appointed from
the Polish aristocracy. In Vienna a special “Minister for Galician Affairs” guarded Polish interests. The electoral system, based on the representation of curiae, or economic groups, secured a strong Polish preponderance both in the provincial Diet and in Galicia’s representation in the Reichsrat (central parliament). Ukrainians could expect to be elected only from the peasant curia, but their share was further reduced by administrative pressure and electoral corruption. Both the state administration, headed by the viceroy, and the autonomous provincial administration, under the jurisdiction of the Diet, were staffed almost exclusively by Poles, and transacted business in Polish. The land’s two universities, which had been German during the absolutist era, became Polonized (a few Ukrainian chairs remained at Lviv University). The same applied also to secondary education, and for many years the Ukrainians were restricted to a single secondary school (Gymnasium). The entire social, economic, and educational policy was geared to the interests of the Polish ruling class. With only minor changes, this system remained in operation for forty years, until the electoral reform of 1907.

Twenty years after their political debut in 1848, the Galician Ukrainians had suffered a disastrous defeat. What they saved from this shipwreck was very little—the entrenched position of the Greek Catholic Church, elementary schools in the native languages, a token recognition of their claim to a place in secondary and higher education, certain minimal linguistic rights in their dealings with authorities. However, despite the upper-class bias of the Austrian constitution and the malpractices of the Polish-controlled Galician administration, the Ukrainians in Austria still enjoyed that most important benefit, a constitutional rule of law. They could publish newspapers and books, form associations, hold public meetings, take part in elections (even if against great odds), express their grievances from the parliamentary tribune, and fight legally for the improvement of their position. First, however, they had to learn how to make effective use of these opportunities. This necessitated a profound change of attitude on the part of their leaders; they had to learn how to stand on their own feet politically, not to expect favours from the government, or any outside help, and to rely, first and last, on the organized strength of their own people.

**The Nature of the Polish-Ukrainian Conflict**

The Polish-Ukrainian relationship was the major internal problem of Galicia. The struggle between the two communities, which broke out overtly in 1848, went on relentlessly with an ever-increasing intensity and bitterness, from year to year and decade to decade. The conflict shaped not only those sections of the Polish and Ukrainian peoples who lived in the Austrian Empire, but also exercised a fateful influence on the
historical destiny of all of Poland and Ukraine.

The distribution of nationalities in the province of Galicia, according to the 1910 census, was 47 per cent Roman Catholics (Poles), 42 per cent Greek Catholics (Ukrainians), and 11 per cent Jews. A distinction, however, should be made between western and eastern Galicia, divided approximately by the San River. The former was overwhelmingly, 89 per cent, Polish. The latter was a land of mixed populations: the Ukrainian majority of 62 per cent was faced by Polish and Jewish minorities of 25 and 12 per cent respectively.\(^\text{32}\) A distinguished Polish social historian made the observation: ‘‘The distribution of Poles in eastern Galicia is unfavourable, because they are spread out over the entire area, but with the exception of the city and district of Lviv, they are nowhere in a majority. . . . The Polish population of eastern Galicia is concentrated mostly in the cities and manorial estates.’’\(^\text{33}\)

Whatever one may say about the Polish-Ukrainian conflict, ‘‘race’’ played no role in it. Ethnic intermingling between the two communities had been going on for centuries. The Polish nobility was largely of Rus’ ancestry. On the other hand, hundreds of thousands of Polish peasant settlers had imperceptibly blended with the surrounding Ukrainians. Even in times of sharpening nationalist disputes, intermarriage remained very frequent. There was a saying in Galicia that ‘‘the Polish-Ukrainian frontier runs across the marriage bed.’’

The identification of the Poles with Roman Catholics, and the Ukrainians with Greek Catholics, requires some qualification. There still existed in the second half of the nineteenth century the vanishing breed of \textit{gente Rutheni, natione Poloni}: educated Greek Catholics who considered themselves culturally and politically as Poles. On the other hand, there was the much more numerous stratum of the so-called \textit{latynnyky} (‘‘Latins,’’ that is, people of Latin rite), Roman Catholic peasants who in language and customs had become assimilated to their Ukrainian fellow villagers. These intermediary groups tended to melt away in the heat of the nationality struggle. Despite these exceptions, religious allegiance provided a simple and clear-cut means of national identification. Uniatism represented a synthesis of Eastern and Western cultural elements. The Galician Ukrainians were the most Westernized branch of Eastern Slavdom. Nevertheless, next to their Polish neighbours they still felt themselves heirs to the Eastern tradition. Thus the line separating the Poles and the Ukrainians in Galicia was an extension of the age-old boundary between the worlds of the Roman and Byzantine civilizations.

The dominant position of the Polish nationality was bolstered by the social privileges of the landed nobility and upper middle class. Conversely, for the Ukrainians, the struggle for national and social emancipation was one. A Polish student could state: ‘‘The fact that ‘peasant’
and 'Ruthenian,' on the one hand, and 'Polish' and 'squire,' on the other, have become synonymous, is fatal to us.... The social element of the national question tremendously facilitates the Ruthenians' work of national education of their people, and makes it difficult for us to defend our position.'

Beyond the clash of actual social interests, there was an invidious conflict on the psychological plane. The outlook of the Polish intelligentsia and middle class was largely derived from the tradition of the gentry. The origins of the Ukrainian intelligentsia were plebeian; every educated Ukrainian was only one or two generations removed from either a parsonage or a peasant hut. Thus even those Polish and Ukrainian groups whose formal education and living conditions were similar displayed a divergent social mentality. Both communities viewed their present conflict in the image of the great seventeenth-century wars between Polish nobles and Ukrainian Cossacks. These stereotypes were reinforced by literature. The talented and extremely popular historical romances of Henryk Sienkiewicz contributed much to the picture in Polish minds of the Ukrainians as rebellious barbarians.

Lastly, the two nations were separated by incompatible political ideologies. Polish political thought took as its point of departure the pre-Partition Commonwealth, in which the corporate unity of the noble class was identical with the unity of the nation. Such an attitude made it extremely difficult for the Poles to reconcile themselves to the idea of a separate Ukrainian nation. The claim that the Ruthenians constituted a nation, in principle endowed with equal rights with the Poles, seemed to the latter preposterous. Hence the inveterate Polish tendency to explain the Ukrainian movement as a foreign 'intrigue': Austrian (Stadion!), Russian or, later, Prussian.

As early as 1833, Waclaw Zaleski, the distinguished collector of folklore, directed a barb against the Ruthenian Triad: 'The Slovaks, the Silesians and the Moravians have united with the Czechs; with whom should the Ruthenians unite? Or should we perhaps wish for the Ruthenians to have their own literature? What would happen to German literature if various Germanic tribes attempted to have their own literatures?' The Polish democratic leader, Florian Ziemialkowski, proclaimed in January 1849 in the Constitutional Committee of the Austrian Reichstag: 'As for Galicia, it belongs to the Polish nationality.... Before March 1848 a Ruthenian was a person of Greek, and a Pole a person of Catholic religion. There were Ruthenians and Poles in the same family. It is unnecessary to say who has created the split, but this is a difference of religion, and not of nationality.... The Polish language is not that of the Masurians [the ethnically Polish peasants of western Galicia], but is rather a literary language, common to the several
tribes inhabiting Galicia, although they talk in their different dialects.'"36 The eminent historian, the Reverend Walerian Kalinka, an advisor to Prince Adam Czartoryski, "the uncrowned king of the Polish exiles," wrote in 1858: "The nations have their age-old boundaries, and it would be foolhardy to want to trespass them. History concentrated the Ruthenian nationality on the far [eastern] side of the Dnieper; its heartland is today in Slobodian Ukraine [province of Kharkiv]. Ukraine of the near [western] side of the Dnieper, conquered and defended by Polish arms, and inhabited by a people from whose bosom the [Polonized] nobility has sprung, is, and, God willing, shall never cease to be, a Polish province.'"37 Count Leszek Borkowski stated bluntly in 1868 in the Galician Diet: "Rus' does not exist. There is only Poland and Moscow.'"38

Large segments of Polish public opinion never retreated from this basic position. Others, more flexible and realistic, did so, although grudgingly and slowly. Some Poles considered the possibility of a future Polish-Ukrainian alliance against Russia, of course under Poland's leadership. This was, for instance, the opinion of the Cracow conservative, Count Stanisław Tarnowski, in 1866: "We must not oppress, but should rather nurture, the Ruthenian nationality here in Galicia, and it will grow strong also on the Dnieper. . . . It will remain Rus', but a Rus' fraternally united with Poland, and dedicated to one common cause.'"39

Left-wing Poles and Ukrainians were temporarily, in the 1870s and 80s, brought together by their common opposition to the ruling conservative regime in Galicia. The outstanding Ukrainian writer and scholar of the period, Ivan Franko (1856–1916), had an important part in the formation of the Polish Peasant Party.40 But co-operation tended to break down once the former fringe groups assumed political responsibility.

The Polish position is well summarized by the statement made shortly before the fall of the Austrian Empire not by an extreme nationalist, but by a perceptive scholar of moderate views and a self-proclaimed partisan of Polish-Ukrainian reconciliation: "Polish public opinion looks upon this province as a trust whose splitting up in whatever form is inadmissible; its unity must remain a noli me tangere. . . . The Poles are bound by a sacred obligation to regard Galicia as a 'historical area' where they are called to fulfill the duties of the master of the house. . . . [The demand of equal status for the two languages, Polish and Ukrainian] means the wish to create a pretended justice, which would consist in putting on a footing of equality two totally unequal things.'"41 What the Poles were willing to concede to the Ukrainians was, at most, the position of a tolerated minority; but Ukrainian hands had to be permanently kept off the levers of political control, and the educational and economic opportunities of the Ukrainian community were to be carefully restricted in order not to inconvenience the "masters of the house."
The Ukrainian point of view was formulated by Ivan Franko: "We wish the Poles complete national and political liberty. But there is one necessary condition: they must, once and for all, desist from lording it over us; they must, once and for all, give up any thought of building a 'historical' Poland in non-Polish lands, and they must accept, as we do, the idea of a purely ethnic Poland."  

The divergence of national ideologies was too wide to be bridged by compromise. This basic incompatibility often frustrated or delayed the solution of practical issues, which were treated not in a pragmatic way but as pawns in a power struggle. A thick cloud of pent-up emotions and mounting hostility settled over the land.

The Russian and the Ukrainian Idea in Galicia

In 1848 the Galician Ruthenians broke away from the idea of "historical" Poland. The next step in their search for national identity was the defining of the contents of their recently rediscovered Rus' individuality. This question permitted two alternative answers: "All-Russian" or "Ukrainian."  

We have seen that the Supreme Ruthenian Council was in favour of the Ukrainian thesis, but that this decision carried little internal conviction. The issue had indeed a certain air of unreality. Galicia's contacts with the Russian Empire, including Ukraine, were tenuous, and the intellectual outlook of the Ruthenian intelligentsia, despite an abstract preference for either the All-Russian or Ukrainian ideology, was primarily Austrian and provincial Galician. The question of self-identification overlapped with that of a conservative or liberal-populist orientation in civic and educational work. As early as 1848, in the Assembly of Ruthenian Scholars, the issue came up in embryonic form; the partisans of the vernacular clashed there with those advocating the restoration of Church Slavonic as the language of literature. The problem was not resolved at that time, and for many years the life of the Ukrainian community was bedevilled by linguistic and orthographic controversies, which assumed a partisan political character.

The Old Ruthenian, or Russophile ("Muscophile"), current crystallized in the 1850s. It was nicknamed the "St. George Circle" (sviatotyurtsi), after the Greek Catholic cathedral in Lviv, where several leaders of the group were canons. Support of the Old Ruthenian trend came from the Greek Catholic clergy, and the whole movement was clerical-conservative. The Old Ruthenians wished to oppose to the Polish language not the lowly vernacular, but another language of equal gentility. Church Slavonic seemed the obvious candidate, but the utter impracticality of the scheme soon became evident. Some Old Ruthenian leaders began to point to literary Russian as the linguistic norm, with the argument that natives of Little Russia from seventeenth-century Kievian
scholars to Nikolai Gogol had contributed to the making of the Russian literary language. The leading Old Ruthenian publicist, Bohdan Didytsky (1827–1908), devised a theory that Great and Little Russia should have a common written language, pronounced in two different ways, each of which would be admitted as correct. This was suggested to Didytsky by the circumstance that educated Galicians were able to read Russian, but could not speak it. The idiom the Old Ruthenians actually used in their publications was an odd mixture of Ukrainian, Church Slavonic, and Russian, with Polish and German additions, ironically called iazychiie (jargon) by their opponents. This macaronic language remained the hallmark of the Russophile party for many years.

Another important feature of the Old Ruthenian ideology was the insistence on such formal traits of the Rus’ identity as the Byzantine liturgy, the Julian calendar, and the Cyrillic alphabet with the historic “etymological” spelling. The Russophiles believed that only by upholding these venerable traditions would their people succeed in resisting Polish wiles. The Austrian administration had indeed tried to impose the Latin script on the Galician Ukrainians during Goluchowski’s governorship. This attempt was beaten off by the St. George Circle. A typical expression of the Old Ruthenian mentality was the “ritualist movement” (obriadovyi rukh) of the 1850s and 60s; its purpose was to purge the Greek Catholic ritual of all “Latin accretions.”

At first, the Old Ruthenians had a certain general, rather vague sympathy for Russia. The ritualistic traits of the Rus’ tradition, which they valued most highly, were common to the entire East Slavic world. Their lack of first-hand experience masked the differences between Russia proper and Ukraine. Their ingrained conservatism made them admire the mighty monarchy of the tsars. But the decisive factor in their Russophilism was an anti-Polish animus. They felt that whatever weakened the unity of the Rus’ world played into the hands of the Polish enemy, and they suspected their populist opponents of collusion with the Poles. The rupture with Polish society was so difficult that the generation of Ruthenian intellectuals which had effected the break tended to lean to the opposite direction. The anti-Polish resentment induced even the surviving member of the Ruthenian Triad, Iakiv Holovatsky, who in his 1846 article had spoken as a Ukrainian “separatist,” now to assume a pro-Russian stand. Appointed in 1848 to the newly created chair of Ruthenian literature at Lviv University, he was forced to resign his professorship because of his participation in the Moscow Slavic Congress of 1867 and ended his days in Russia.

Political events in the 1860s speeded the transformation of Old Ruthenianism into outright Russophilism. The rapprochement between the dynasty and the Poles was a terrible shock to the St. George Circle. It
not only destroyed their hopes, but also outraged their moral sense. They felt let down by the emperor and the Vienna government, whom they had loyally served since 1848. In the face of the impending Polish takeover in Galicia, only one hope seemed left: salvation from the East. There was a saying among the Galician Ukrainians: "If we are to drown, we prefer the Russian sea to the Polish swamp." Austria's critical international situation made the disintegration of the Empire look probable. At the height of the Austro-Prussian war, in the summer of 1866, several articles appeared in the Old Ruthenian newspaper, Slovo (The Word), which, while stressing loyalty to Austria, at the same time proclaimed the doctrine of the ethnic and cultural unity of the Russian nation "from the Carpathians to the Urals."47

At about the same time, individual Russophile leaders entered into relations with the Russian Pan-Slavists. The liaison man was the Reverend Mikhail Raevsky, chaplain of the Russian embassy in Vienna. He organized a salon for Ruthenian and other Slavic intellectuals and students in the Austrian capital, and through his hands flowed subsidies from the Slavic committees of Moscow and St. Petersburg. The sums which reached Galicia were not large, but this dependence on secret Russian aid helped to keep the key figures of the Russophile party "in line."48

The spontaneous growth of pro-Russian sentiment in the 1860s was not limited to the Galician Ukrainians. All the Slavic nationalities of the Habsburg Empire, with the exception of the Poles, reacted similarly to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise. Even the linguistic theories of the Old Ruthenians, odd as they may seem, were not without parallels among other Slavic peoples. For instance, the Slovak writer and publicist L'udovít Štúr proposed the adoption of Russian by all Slavic peoples as a common literary language.49 Yet to the Ukrainians the issue possessed certain especially ominous aspects. For them Russophilism was not simply a question of political orientation; it contained a threat to their national identity. The bulk of their people lived within the boundaries of the Russian Empire, which denied the existence of a Ukrainian nationality. The Ukrainian movement there could maintain itself only with difficulty against persecution by the tsarist government and against tremendous societal pressures. If the section of the Ukrainian people who lived outside Russia, and to whom the opportunity of free choice was given, had embraced the ideology of a Russian nation, one and indivisible, this would have doomed the prospects of Ukrainian nationalism. If, on the other hand, the nationalist trend prevailed in Galicia, this was bound to have serious repercussions in east-central Ukraine.

The opponents of the Russophiles were referred to as the Young Ruthenians, or, more commonly, the populists (narodovtsi), the Ukrainophiles, or simply Ukrainians.50 Even in the 1850s, voices were raised
against the reactionary linguistic policy of the St. George Circle, in favour of the vernacular as a literary language, in accordance with the precepts of the Ruthenian Triad. The populist movement was born, around 1860, under the inspiration of the poems of Taras Shevchenko (1814–61), which were received by young Galician intellectuals as a prophetic revelation: they “enthusiastically read Shevchenko, the first and greatest peasant poet of all Europe.”\textsuperscript{51} A programmatic pamphlet published in 1867 summarizes the main points of the populist philosophy: “We are the upholders of the great testament of our unforgettable bard, Taras Shevchenko... We are proud of belonging to a nation of fifteen million, whose name is Ruthenians or Ukrainians, and whose country’s name is: our Mother Rus’-Ukraine... Our sworn enemies are the Polish nobility and the Muscovite government... We shall always stand on the side of our poor, rag-covered peasant people.”\textsuperscript{52} The pamphlet professed loyalty to the Greek Catholic Church and the Austrian Empire, but rejected clericalism and servility toward Vienna.

In the 1860s there was an air of youthful romanticism about the narodovtsi. This showed, for instance, in the sporting of Cossack costumes. The first organizational expressions of the movement were semi-secret circles (hromady) among university and Gymnasium students. The populists were joined by a few veterans of the 1848 generation who disapproved of the reactionary policy of the St. George Circle: the Reverend Stefan Kachala (1815–88), Iuliian Lavrivsky (1821–73), and Ivan Borysykevych (1815–82). The leading figures among those who entered public life in the 1860s and 70s, and who may be regarded as the founders of modern Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia, were Danylo Taniachkevych (1842–1900), Omelian Partytsky (1840–95), the brothers Volodymyr (1850–83) and Oleksander Barvinsky (1847–1927), the brothers Omelian (1833–94) and Oleksander Ohonovsky (1848–91), Natal Vakhnianyn (1841–1908), and Iuliian Romanchuk (1842–1932). It is noteworthy that although some were priests, most were not: this was the first generation of Galicia’s Ukrainian lay intelligentsia. The majority became teachers of secondary schools, and the narodovtsi assumed the character of a “professors’ party.”\textsuperscript{53}

Until the 1880s the “Old” party controlled the metropolitan’s consistory, the major Ruthenian institutions (for example, the “National Home” in Lviv, founded in 1849), the leading newspaper Slovo, and the parliamentary representations to the Reichsrat and the Galician Diet. The narodovtsi did not yet feel ready to venture into “high politics,” and concentrated their efforts in the educational field. They were supported, from the outset, by the great majority of the elementary school teachers in the countryside. The populists tried at first to work through the older institutions, controlled by the Russophiles, but co-operation proved im-
possible. Their first major organizational undertaking was, in 1868, Prosvita (Enlightenment), an association for adult education, which founded reading halls in the villages and published popular literature. Prosvita was the parental body from which, in the course of years, sprang other institutions and organizations. Populism gradually spread among the masses and laid a firm organizational groundwork. The first populist periodical, in 1862, failed, as did repeated later attempts. Only in 1880, thanks to the initiative of Volodymyr Barvinsky, were the narodovtsi able successfully to launch a representative newspaper, Dilo (The Deed), transformed into a daily in 1888. Its title implied a polemic against the Russophile paper, Slovo (The Word).  

The dynamism of the populists contrasted with the stagnation of the “Old” party, whose reliance on outside aid had imbued it with a quietist spirit. The turning point came in 1882. The high command of the Russophiles was affected by the treason trial against some of its best-known personalities, among them Adolf Dobriansky (1817–1901), a native of Carpatho-Ukraine, and the Reverend Ivan Naumovych (1826–91), the party’s chief orator and journalist. The trial actually ended in an acquittal, but it showed, at the same time, the duplicity of the Old Ruthenian leaders, who publicly had always asserted their allegiance to the Austrian Empire and the Catholic church while secretly favouring Russia and Orthodoxy. After the trial, the most compromised defendants, especially Naumovych, emigrated to Russia, thus weakening the movement in Galicia. As another result of the 1882 trial, the Austrian government asked for and obtained the resignation of Metropolitan Iosyf Sembrovich (1821–1900), blamed for having tolerated Russophile propaganda. This was the beginning of the end of the “St. George Circle.” Many ordinary patriots of Old Ruthenian persuasion became painfully aware that Russophilism represented, ideologically and politically, a blind alley. By 1890, the leadership of the Ruthenian community in Galicia had definitely passed to the “Ukrainians,” while the Russophile camp showed signs of disintegration.

The Emergence of the Radicals

As more and more former Old Ruthenians passed over to the populists, the latter assumed a more conservative and clerical colouring. It was a deliberate policy of the Barvinsky brothers to make the Ukrainian national idea palatable to the Greek Catholic clergy, still the leading element in Galician Ukrainian society. In this they succeeded, but, as a result, the Ukrainian national movement sloughed off much of its original democratism and non-conformism. Such a tame, “respectable” version of populism could no longer satisfy the bolder minds of the young generation. Repeating the pattern of the 1860s, a new youth movement
emerged among the students in the second half of the 1870s. The outstanding members of the group were Ivan Franko, Mykhailo Pavlyk (1853–1915), and Ostap Terletsky (1850–1902). The Weltanschauung of the "Radicals," as they called themselves, was one of positivism and non-Marxian socialism. Their informal circle was construed by the authorities as a revolutionary conspiracy. The trial of Franko and his friends, in 1878, was the first anti-socialist trial in Galicia. The Radicals had to suffer not only persecution by the Austro-Polish administration, but also the ostracism of their own compatriots, who were particularly shocked by the militant agnosticism of the youthful rebels. In spite of many hardships and setbacks, the Radical trend maintained itself through the 1880s, producing pamphlets and short-lived journals.56

Growing contacts with Russia and east-central Ukraine were instrumental in overcoming Russophile myths. Typical in this respect were the experiences of Kornylo Ustiianovych, the painter and poet, as related with many colourful details in his reminiscences. As a student he had belonged to the Raevsky circle in Vienna, and was an ardent "Pan-Russian." He visited the country of his dreams, in 1867 and 1872, to find out that the Galician Ruthenians, despite all their handicaps, enjoyed constitutional liberties far beyond the reach of Russian subjects. He saw that tsarism, admired by the St. George Circle from afar, was scorned by the best elements of Russian society. And he convinced himself that, all official denials to the contrary, the Russians and Ukrainians were essentially different, and that the latter suffered national oppression. Ustiianovych returned from Russia a determined Ukrainian nationalist.57 This was by no means an isolated case. The eminent eastern Ukrainian scholar and civic leader Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), professor at the Kiev University, and after 1876 an exile in Switzerland, tells in his "Autobiography": "I conceived [c. 1872] the plan of spreading the Ukrainian trend in Galicia with the aid of modern Russian literature, which by its secularist and democratic character would undermine Galician clericalism and bureaucratic spirit. This would make young intellectuals turn to the demos, which is Ukrainian there, and Ukrainian national consciousness would follow by itself. . . . I dare to say that no Slavophile from Moscow had distributed as many Russian books in Austria as did I, a Ukrainian 'separatist'."58 The plan succeeded brilliantly when in 1876, under Drahomanov's influence, the Russophile student organization of Lviv adopted a Ukrainian platform. Through his writings and an extensive correspondence, Drahomanov acted as a mentor of Franko and other progressive Galician intellectuals. He may be regarded as the spiritual father of the Radical movement there; he not only formulated its program, but also advised its leaders on current questions of policy. Drahomanov himself said retrospectively, in 1894: "Of all
parts of our country, Rus’—Ukraine, Galicia has become to me equally as dear as my own region of Poltava; it has become my spiritual homeland.”

Relations between “Dnieper” (east-central) Ukraine and Galicia, whose educated classes were bred in different intellectual traditions, were fraught with psychological difficulties. In spite of this, collaboration was a vital necessity for both regions of Ukraine. For Galicia, it was necessary because the Habsburgs’ Ukrainians derived formative ideas from Dnieper Ukraine; for the Dnieper Ukrainians, because Galicia was a sanctuary from tsarist persecution. After the Ukase of Ems (1876), which prohibited Ukrainian cultural activity in the Russian Empire, Galicia became, for thirty years, the place of publication of works of eastern Ukrainian writers. Journals such as Pravda (The Truth, 1867–96, with interruptions) and Zoria (The Star, 1880–97), which appeared in Lviv, united local and Dnieper Ukrainian contributors. Funds collected by eastern Ukrainian donors were used for the foundation of the Shevchenko Society of Lviv (1873), which later evolved into a representative, all-Ukrainian scholarly institution. Modern Ukrainian nationalism owes much of its character to the interaction of Dnieper Ukraine and Galicia.

An example of this was the elaboration of a standard literary language based on the Poltava dialect, but incorporating significant Galician elements, particularly in scientific, political, and business vocabulary. In the 1890s Galician Ruthenians embraced the terms “Ukraine,” “Ukrainian,” as their national name. Such a change in nomenclature had obvious inconveniences, but it was dictated by the desire to stress moral unity with Dnieper Ukraine, and also by the determination to prevent any further confusion of “Rus’” with “Russia.”

An eastern Ukrainian leader, speaking in his memoirs of his first trip to Galicia in 1903, observed: “At that time, Galicia was for us a model in the struggle for our nation’s rebirth; it strengthened our faith and hope for a better future. Galicia was a true ‘Piedmont’ of Ukraine, for prior to 1906 a Ukrainian press, scholarship, and national life could develop only there.” The “Piedmont complex”—the conviction that their small homeland was called to take the forefront of the whole nation’s struggle for liberation—occupied a large place in the thinking of the Galician Ukrainians on the eve of the Great War.

“The Ukrainian Conquest”

“As nothing gives more pleasure to a doctor than to observe the gradual recovery of a patient... similarly the greatest pleasure of a historian is to watch the rebirth of a nation which from a morally and politically degraded state advances toward a normal life.” These words of Franko, a distinguished contemporary witness, may be supplemented by the
statement of a historian writing in the inter-war period: “In a short stretch of twenty years preceding the Great War, a tremendous change has taken place in eastern Galicia: in the place of a depressed peasant mass arose a politically conscious peasant nation.” The same historian, in comparing the balance of strength of Galicia’s two nationalities, concluded that “although the Polish upper class considerably surpassed the Ukrainian leading circles in culture and material power, the Ukrainian peasantry, on the other side, were superior to the Polish peasantry [of western Galicia] in national consciousness, civic spirit, discipline, and even in culture and morality.”

Toward the end of the century Galicia went through a grave economic crisis. “A dozen and more years after the administration of the province had passed completely into Polish hands, it was still one of the poorest crownlands of the monarchy. . . . There is no doubt that during the first twenty-five years of Polish rule little was done to raise the country from poverty, and that Galicia’s [Polish] great landowners and bourgeoisie showed insufficient economic and social initiative.” Some 40 per cent of Galicia’s territory belonged to the latifundia. The yield of agriculture was the lowest of all Austrian provinces. The peasants used primitive, almost medieval, implements and methods of production. The countryside was entangled in a tragic net of illiteracy, usury, and alcoholism. The progress of urbanization and industrialization was slow; at the turn of the century the number of industrial workers had not yet reached 100,000. Mounting population pressure caused endemic famine; approximately 50,000 people died every year of malnutrition. The Vienna government showed little interest in the development of a distant and strategically exposed province. The provincial Diet and administration combined incompetence with callousness.

The new militancy of the Ukrainian masses was dramatically expressed in the agrarian strikes which, in 1902, encompassed over 400 village communities in twenty districts of eastern Galicia. The peasants refused their labour to the manorial estates, trying to obtain improved wages and more humane treatment. The strike movement had started spontaneously, but organization and guidance was soon given to it by the Ukrainian political parties.

Other forms of economic self-help were less spectacular, but perhaps more effective in the long run. Population pressure was eased by emigration overseas, mostly to the United States, in part also to Canada and Brazil. It is calculated that from 1890 to 1913 approximately 700,000 to 800,000 Austro-Hungarian Ukrainians (from Galicia and Transcarpathia) left the country; this amounted to between a third and a half of the total population increase for the period. Of importance also was the movement of seasonal workers to various European countries, mostly Ger-
many. About 75,000 migrants went there on the average every year from 1907 to 1912. Ukrainian organizations made agreements with German authorities concerning the recruitment and working conditions of the migrants, which the Polish press interpreted as evidence of a Prussian-Ukrainian, anti-Polish “intrigue.” Both American immigrants and European seasonal workers were able to save money, a large proportion of which was sent back home. Cash appeared for the first time in the hands of the eastern Galician peasants. This was used for purchase of land. The large estates were frequently badly managed and deeply in the red. The process of breaking up the latifundia among small-holders was known as “parcelling” (German Parzellierung). This involved complicated legal and credit operations. Moreover, it also had political overtones: Polish leaders used “parcelling” to bring to eastern Galicia settlers from the western part of the province. The Ukrainians formed a special Land Bank in 1908. The percentage of eastern Galician land in great estates decreased from 40.3 per cent in 1889 to 37.8 per cent in 1912. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian co-operative movement made spectacular advances. Its modest beginnings lay back in the 1880s, and it gained momentum in the 1890s. By 1914 the whole country was covered with a tight network of credit unions, co-operative stores, associations for the purchase of agricultural products, co-operative dairies, and so forth. The association Silskyi Hospodar (The Farmer) spread agricultural instruction. A Polish observer noted: “Militant ‘Ukrainianism’ has secured in them [the co-operatives] a number of entrenched strongholds and many outposts, and their work has contributed greatly to the rise of nationalist spirit among the masses. Practical peasant minds can be most easily attracted to a movement when they see that it coincides with their vital, everyday interests.” Similar conclusions were reached by a Russian student of the nationality problems of the Austro-Hungarian Empire: “The lot of the Galician peasant is a hard one, and... he needs aid from the educated class. Neither the Polish gentry nor the ‘Muscophiles,’ who expected salvation from a mythical Russian intervention, gave this needed aid. There is no question that the ‘Ukrainians’ have done a praiseworthy job.”

The veteran Prosvita association continued to expand. In 1914 it counted 77 branches and nearly 3,000 local reading halls. Private Ukrainian schools supplemented the deficiencies of the public educational system, especially in the field of secondary and trade schools. In the last pre-war decade there was also an upswing of the gymnastic and sport associations Sokil (Falcon, following the well-known Czech model) and Sich (named after the Cossack stronghold of the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries). Assessing the achievements of two decades, Franko in 1907 reached an optimistic conclusion: “Our impoverished
people, who for many years were the object of systematic exploitation and stultification, have by their own strength and energy pulled themselves out of this humiliating condition. . . . They look with cheerful confidence toward a better future.”

Besides the mobilization of the people, the progress of the Ukrainian community involved the development of an intellectual life corresponding to the needs of a diversified, modern society. Two men were leaders in this endeavour, Ivan Franko and Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934). Franko was amazingly productive and versatile. He made outstanding contributions as poet, novelist, literary historian and critic, translator, student of folklore, and political publicist. He was also a living model of intellectual integrity and selfless civic service. A university career had been denied him because of his radical views, but he acted as a mentor to the rising generation of writers and intellectuals. Hrushevsky was a native of Dnieper Ukraine. Appointed in 1894 to the newly established Ukrainian-language chair of East European history at Lviv University, he deployed there an activity which has well been called “gigantic.” His standard History of Ukraine-Rus’ reached the eighth volume by 1913. Elected president of the reorganized Shevchenko Scientific Society, he raised it to the level of an unofficial Ukrainian Academy of Sciences. “For sixteen years (1897–1913) Hrushevsky stood at the helm of the Shevchenko Scientific Society, and during that time the society gained wide recognition in the world of scholarship, published hundreds of volumes . . . built up a large library and a museum, gathered around itself scores of Ukrainian scholars . . . While lecturing at Lviv University, Hrushevsky trained several scholars who later made great contributions to Ukrainian historiography.” Next to Drahomanov, Hrushevsky was the eastern Ukrainian who made the strongest impact on Galicia. Franko and Hrushevsky collaborated closely in the Shevchenko Society and on the editorial board of the monthly Literaturno-naukovyi vistnyk (Literary and Scientific Herald), founded in 1898. This journal united the best literary talent of Russian and Austrian Ukraine, and exercised great influence as an organ of opinion.

Relations between the Ukrainian national movement and the Greek Catholic Church had not been happy in the second half of the nineteenth century. Authoritative circles of the clergy favoured the Old Ruthenian trend while, at the same time, Uniate metropolitan and bishops often displayed obsequiousness toward the province’s Austro-Polish administration. Clerical tutelage over the society was resented by the growing lay intelligentsia, and militant anticlericalism was one of the chief driving forces of the Radical movement. A new chapter opened with the elevation of Count Andrei Sheptytsky (1865–1944) to the Metropolitan See of Halych. A descendant of a Polonized family which had produced sev-
eral Uniate bishops, Sheptytsky reverted to the Eastern rite and was made metropolitan when only thirty-five, in 1900. Sheptytsky is universally recognized as one of the outstanding Slavic churchmen of the century. His pastoral labours cannot be discussed here; it suffices to mention his founding of new monastic orders, liturgical reforms, and promotion of theological studies. While keeping aloof from current politics, Sheptytsky rendered great services to the Ukrainian cause by the tactful use of his connections in Vienna, and also as a generous patron of the arts. In 1910 Sheptytsky delivered a great speech in the Austrian House of Lords in support of the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv. Intellectually alert and aware of the needs of the times, he encouraged the clergy’s participation in civic life. The fact that the Greek Catholic Church was now headed by a grand seigneur who was also an impressive, colourful personality gave a new self-assurance to the Ukrainian national movement. Sheptytsky, however, was not a narrow nationalist but a man of supranational vision: the idea to which he had dedicated his life was the reconciliation of Western and Eastern Christianity. This implied a respect for all the traits of the Oriental religious tradition compatible with Catholic dogma. He made several incognito trips to Russia, and kept in touch with Russian groups sympathetic to the idea of union.

The “New Era” and the Formation of Ukrainian Political Parties
The year 1890 brought an attempt at a Polish-Ukrainian compromise, known as the “New Era.” The origins of that important episode were complex, and they stretched from Vienna to Kiev. The period was marked by growing tension between Russia and Austria-Hungary, and there was a possibility of Galicia’s soon becoming a theater of military operations. The Austrian minister of foreign affairs, Count Gustav von Kálnoky, advised the viceroy of Galicia, Count Kazimierz Badeni, to placate the Ruthenians. Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), a professor at Kiev University, an eminent historian, and a leader of the national movement in Dnieper Ukraine, also intervened in Galician affairs. The prospects of Ukrainian nationalism in the Russian Empire seemed bleak then, and Antonovych was concerned with the strengthening of the sanctuary in Galicia. In this his views coincided with those of his former friend and rival of many years, the exile Drahomanov. But the approaches of the two men diverged. Drahomanov connected Ukrainian national gains in Galicia with political democratization, defence of the social interests of the peasantry, and anticlericalism; this implied a struggle against the conservative Austro-Polish regime. Antonovych, on the other hand, believed that the consent of the Polish ruling circles was essential for the satisfaction of pressing Ukrainian cultural needs. Some spokesmen of the Polish minority in Dnieper Ukraine, who favoured the idea of
a Polish-Ukrainian collaboration against Russia, served as intermediaries between the group headed by Antonovych, the so-called "Kievan Hromada," and the authoritative Polish aristocratic circle in the Austrian Empire. Antonovych's chief contact among his Galician compatriots was the leader of the moderate Populists, Oleksander Barvinsky. Preliminary negotiations, which were shrouded in secrecy, took place in Lviv and Kiev.

The New Era was inaugurated in November 1890 by an exchange of declarations of good will between Governor Badeni and the spokesmen of the narodovtsi in the Diet. No precise terms had, however, been agreed upon. Thus the attempt at compromise was, from the very first, vitiating by a basic misunderstanding. The Poles were willing to make certain minor concessions to the Ukrainians in the field of education and linguistic rights. For instance, Antonovych was to be appointed to a newly created Ukrainian-language chair of history at Lviv University. Antonovych declined, and designated his most brilliant disciple, the young Hrushevsky. But what the narodovtsi had expected was a change in the political system, and this was not forthcoming. Soon the Ukrainians felt that they had been deceived, while the Poles were incensed over the ingratitude and lack of moderation of their partners. By 1894 the New Era had petered out. The elections to the Diet, in 1895, and to the central parliament, in 1897, took place under conditions of shocking administrative abuse, unusual even in Galicia. 79 But the Ukrainian movement could no longer be intimidated. The indignation provoked by the "Badeni elections" was the signal for beginning of a general Ukrainian offensive against the existing regime in Galicia.

The New Era had stirred up Ukrainian public opinion and led to a regrouping of political forces. The first to organize were the Radicals, who, in 1890, created the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party. 80 After the death in 1895 of Drahomanov, whose authority had kept the movement together, both the nationalist wing (including Ivan Franko) and the Marxist wing broke away from the Radical party. The nationally oriented former Radicals merged with the populists, most of whom by that time had abandoned the New Era policy. In 1899, the rejuvenated narodovtsi formed the Ukrainian National-Democratic Party. 81 From that time on, a two-party system was in operation among the Ukrainians. The National Democrats were in strong preponderance, the Radicals forming a permanent opposition. In the Reichsrat and the Diet, however, both parties mostly worked together. The National Democrats were a broad coalition party, perhaps comparable to the Congress Party of India, and included a spectrum of shades, from near-socialists to Greek Catholic priests. The common platform, in whose formulation Franko and Hrushevsky had a hand, was one of democratic nationalism and social
reform. The leaders of the party were Iuliiian Romanchuk, Kost Levytsky (1859–1941), Ievhen Olesnytsky (1860–1917), Teofil Okunevsky (1858–1937), and Ievhen Petrushevych (1863–1940). After the separation of the right- and left-wing dissidents, the Radicals continued as a party of agrarian socialism and militant anticlericalism. Its character may be defined as standing halfway between the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries and the peasant parties of east-central Europe. Its leaders, besides the old guardian of Drahomanovian orthodoxy, Mykhailo Pavlyk, were Lev Bachynsky (1872–1930), Kyrylo Trylovsky (1864–1941), and Ivan Makukh (1872–1946). Most leaders of both parties were lawyers by profession, but there was in that generation also a remarkable crop of "peasant politicians," talented orators and organizers risen from the masses. The program of the National-Democratic Party stated: "The final goal of our striving is the achievement of cultural, economic, and political independence by the entire Ukrainian-Ruthenian nation, and its future unification in one body politic." A similar statement was in the program of the Radicals. This was, at that time, a distant ideal rather than a practical goal, but the proclamation of the principle of an independent national state by the major Ukrainian parties in Galicia was a turning point in the evolution of Ukrainian political thought.

The two minor parties, the Social Democrats, with a Marxist program, and the conservative Christian Social Party, exercised only limited influence, but they included some respected personalities and stimulated ideological discussions. Ukrainian Social Democrats played a certain role in the trade-union movement, which was making its first steps in Galicia; the trade unions were nationally mixed, but in them too there was a perceptible tension between the Polish and Ukrainian factions.

**Political Struggles, 1900–1914**

From the turn of the century until the eve of the Great War, a great political battle was fought unremittingly in Galicia. It is impossible, in the framework of this paper, to discuss the episodes of the struggle. This was a time when elections, either to the Reichsrat or to the Diet, were taking place at frequent intervals. Each election was accompanied by a wave of mass rallies, demonstrations, and clashes with the police, which in turn led to arrests and trials. Parliamentary oratorical duels were accompanied by complicated behind-the-scenes negotiations on the provincial level and in Vienna. Political struggle overlapped with social strife, such as the agrarian strikes. Simultaneously, the Ukrainian community was engaged in building its cultural and economic institutions. One has to turn to contemporary fiction to get the feeling of the deep groundswell which was running through the Ukrainian people. A symptom of this excitement was the assassination of the viceroy of Galicia, Count
Andrzej Potocki, by a Ukrainian student, Myroslav Sichynsky (1887–1980) in 1908. This was, however, an individual act, not the outcome of a plot. The Ukrainian movement, despite its increased militancy, continued to adhere to legal and evolutionary methods.

Beginning with a series of mass rallies in 1900, Ukrainian agitation concentrated on the issue of electoral reform: the abolition of the curiae, and introduction of the universal, secret, and direct ballot. Many other groups in Austria desired a democratization of the franchise, and, under the impact of the 1905 Russian Revolution and in connection with difficulties with Hungary, this cause was espoused by the imperial government. The reform became law in January 1907. “One Slav national group, the Ruthenians, was the chief winner in the franchise reform, by more than trebling its previous parliamentary representation at the expense of the Poles. Still, the new Ruthenian quota remained less than half the representation due them on the basis of the proportional system.”

Through a gerrymandering of electoral districts, one Reichsrat seat was granted to the Poles in proportion to 52,000, and to the Ukrainians to 102,000 inhabitants. In the parliamentary elections of 1907 the Ukrainians gained twenty-seven seats in Galicia (seventeen National Democrats, three Radicals, two Social Democrats, and five Russophiles), and five seats in Bukovyna. In the cities, there was an electoral alliance between the Ukrainians and the Zionists; with the support of Ukrainian votes, two nationalist Jewish deputies appeared for the first time in the Vienna parliament.

The problem which dominated the Galician political scene for the next six years, 1907–13, was reform of the provincial statute, especially of the Diet’s franchise. Three parties were involved: the Ukrainians, the Poles, and Vienna. The central government regarded a Polish-Ukrainian compromise as highly desirable because of the threat of war with Russia. Moreover, since 1907 the Ukrainians had become a powerful factor in the Reichsrat. While suggesting to the Poles a conciliatory policy, and offering its good offices as a mediator, the central government did not intend to impose a new provincial statute from above. The reform was to come as the result of an agreement between Galicia’s two nationalities. A “compromise” meant, however, under the given conditions, the Poles’ abdication of their monopoly of power in Galicia. As a Polish publicist acutely observed, the chief difficulty consisted in the lack of a basis for a quid pro quo. Whatever the Poles as a nationality could desire in Austria was already their own. Polish public opinion violently resisted the idea of making unilateral sacrifices without receiving compensation. Also, the dynamic nature of the Ukrainian movement made it evident that concessions which the Poles might consider acceptable if they were to be final would rather turn out to be a down payment, and that the
Ukrainians would soon come up with further demands. A deadlock ensued on the question of the provincial statute’s reform. To force the hand of the Polish majority of the Diet, the Ukrainian members repeatedly had recourse to “musical obstruction” (1910–12): armed with whistles, trumpets, and drums, they raised an uproar which completely disrupted the Diet’s work. The provincial legislative machinery had come to a virtual standstill.

The other major issue, besides franchise reform, was the question of the founding of a Ukrainian university. At Lviv University there existed, in 1914, ten Ukrainian-language chairs. The original Ukrainian plan had been gradually to increase the number of these chairs, and thus to prepare the future division of the school into two independent institutions, a Polish and a Ukrainian one, as Prague University had been divided into a Czech and German school. This, however, was prevented by the refusal of the university administration to create additional Ukrainian chairs and to admit the “habilitation” of Ukrainian scholars. From 1901 the Ukrainians concentrated their efforts on the foundation of a new, separate university. Lviv University became the scene of clashes between the school administration and Ukrainian students and of brawls between Polish and Ukrainian students. In 1912 the Austrian government promised to create a Ukrainian university in Galicia by 1916, but Polish objections delayed the implementation of the decision.

During the last pre-war years the Russophile trend entered its final transformation. Its traditionalist, “Old Ruthenian” wing had all but disappeared by that time. The remaining hard core, under the leadership of Volodymyr Dudykevych (1861–1922), abandoned the macaronic iazychii and attempted to square theory with practice by introducing literary Russian in its publications, at least in those for the educated class. A lease on life was given to moribund Russophilia by outside aid. The viceroys Leon Piniński (1898–1903) and Andrzej Potocki (1903–8), wishing to divert the rising Ukrainian tide, threw their support to the Russophiles. The latter also received financial and moral aid from Russia. After the failure of its Far Eastern designs (1905), imperial Russia returned to an active policy in the Danubian-Balkan area. The tsarist government was also worried about the impact of Ukrainian nationalism in Galicia on the population of Russia’s south-western provinces. At the 1908 Slavic Congress in Prague, “a Polish-Russian pact was concluded concerning the attitude toward Ukraine. . . . The gist of the pact was that the national movement of the Ukrainians in Galicia ought to be impeded and combated [by the Poles]. As a counterpart, the Russian government promised in general terms to satisfy Polish national needs [in Congress Poland].” With abundant financial means provided by Russia and with the tacit toleration of many Polish officials, the “Galician Russians”
conducted a brisk propaganda, out of proportion with their real strength.\textsuperscript{90} The decline of Russophilism was reflected in their continual loss of votes. In the last elections to the Diet in 1913, only one Russophile deputy was elected, as against thirty-one seats gained by the Ukrainian parties. Yet this did not deter the Russophile leaders. Having lost the competition for the minds of the people, they staked their hopes on the coming Russian invasion. A well-qualified Polish observer stated: ‘This [Russophile] trend ought to be regarded as an outpost of the Russian government in our land. . . . A comparison of the Ruthenian national institutions with those of the Muscophiles shows conclusively that the former result from the natural development of a people full of strength and vitality, eager to expand its achievements in breadth and depth; the latter, on the other hand, are an artificial product, planted from outside, without a firm foundation and future.’\textsuperscript{91}

By 1913 a Polish-Ukrainian agreement concerning the provincial statute reform seemed near at hand. The opposing camps had reached the point of exhaustion in their negotiations, and Vienna was prodding for a settlement.\textsuperscript{92} A last-minute delay occurred when Viceroy Michal Bobrzyński, the architect of the compromise, was forced to resign by an intrigue of the Polish opponents of the reform. Negotiations, however, went on. A decisive role in the smoothing away of the last difficulties was played by Metropolitan Sheptytsky. The Diet finally passed the reform bill on 14 February 1914. The new provincial statute, which embodied most features of the preceding year’s compromise platform, was a marvel of complexity. It retained the system of representation by curiae, and established within each curia the ratio of Polish and Ukrainian seats.\textsuperscript{93} The Ukrainians were to receive 62 seats out of 228, or 27 per cent of the membership of the Diet. This was the same ratio as obtained in Galicia’s representation to the Reichsrat, according to the 1906 law. The Ukrainians were also the obtain two places on the eight-person Provincial Board (Landesauschuss), and to be represented on the various committees of the Diet. The Polish and Ukrainian members of the Provincial Board and of the committees were to be separately elected by the Diet’s deputies of each nationality.

The implications of the reform were greater than its rather modest explicit terms. The provincial statute of 1914 was the first instance of a Polish-Ukrainian compromise; the agreement reached at the 1848 Slavic Congress in Prague had remained on paper, and the 1890 New Era had founded on a basic reciprocal misunderstanding. The 1914 compromise did not grant the Ukrainians what they felt to be their due, but at least it broke the monopoly of power which the Poles had had in Galicia since 1867. The Ukrainians were now to become partners in the provincial government, from which they had previously been virtually ex-
cluded. Moreover, the Poles would no longer be able to discriminate against the educational and cultural advancement of the Ukrainian community. It had been a consistent policy of the Polish-dominated Diet to restrict the creation of Ukrainian secondary schools. Now control over Ukrainian elementary and secondary education was to be taken from Polish hands. As an immediate result of the changed situation, the opening of ten new Ukrainian secondary schools was planned for the fall term of 1914. As part of the compromise, the Polish side promised to desist from further obstruction against the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv. There was at that time a universal feeling that the compromise of February 1914 amounted to a turning point in the history of Galicia's two nationalities.

It is possible to extrapolate Galicia's further development, assuming that the Austrian regime had lasted. It is not likely that the Ukrainians would in the foreseeable future have been able to achieve their major goal—the province's partition on ethnic lines—because that issue depended on a territorial-administrative reorganization of the whole empire. But the balance of power in the undivided province was bound to shift considerably once the artificial handicaps on the Ukrainians were removed. With the continued economic and educational progress of the masses, and the accelerated formation of a native intelligentsia and middle class, political preponderance in eastern Galicia was likely to pass to the Ukrainians in the course of ten to twenty years. A Polish scholar prognosticated in 1908: "Our prospects in eastern Galicia are unfavourable. The fate of the English nationality in Ireland, of the German in Czech lands, and the probable future fate of the German nationality in Upper Silesia serve us as a bad augury."96

The Coming of the War

The threat of a European war had loomed on the political horizon ever since 1908. In 1912, 200 leading members of the National-Democratic, Radical, and Social-Democratic parties met in a conclave to discuss the international crisis caused by the Balkan War. The meeting issued a declaration (11 December 1912) which reaffirmed the loyalty of the Galician Ukrainians to the Austrian Empire and promised to support actively the Austrian cause in the event of a war against Russia. From that time, the gymnastic associations Sich and Sokil, following the example of earlier Polish efforts, started the military training of their members in view of the coming struggle against Russia.

When the war came, in the summer of 1914, Galicia's three leading Ukrainian parties formed a Supreme Ukrainian Council (Holovna Ukrainska Rada), electing as its president Kost Levytsky, the chairman of the National Democrats. On 3 August, the council issued a manifesto
to the Ukrainian people. The manifesto’s salient points read: ‘‘The Russian tsars have violated the Treaty of Pereiaslav [1654] by which they undertook the obligation to respect the independence of Ukraine. . . . For three hundred years the policy of the tsarist empire has been to rob subjugated Ukraine of her national soul, to make the Ukrainian people a part of the Russian people. . . . The victory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall be our own victory. And the greater Russia’s defeat, the sooner will strike the hour of liberation for Ukraine.’’ The first practical step of the Council was to sponsor the creation of a legion, named ‘‘Ukrainian Sich Sharpshooters’’ (Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi), which was to form a distinct unit within the Austrian Army and serve as the nucleus of a future Ukrainian national army.

The policy of the council was supported by a group of émigrés from Dnieper Ukraine residing in Galicia. On 4 August they founded a political organization, the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy), purporting to speak in the name of east-central Ukraine. The leading members of the Union were Oleksander Skoropys Ioltukhovsky (1880–1950), Volodymyr Doroshenko (1879–1963), Andrii Zhuk (1880–1968), and Mariian Melenevsky (1878–?). The platform of the organization called for the creation of an independent Ukrainian state with a constitutional-monarchical form of government, a democratic franchise, and a policy of agrarian reform.

It is important to realize that the attitude of the Galician Ukrainians and of the émigré Union was by no means shared by the spokesmen of the Ukrainian movement in Russia. They had never been ‘‘separatist,’’ and they believed that the future of the Ukrainian people was in a democratic and federated Russia. An outstanding representative of the federalist tradition in Ukrainian political thought was Mykhailo Hrushevsky. Although a professor at the University of Lviv, he had retained his Russian citizenship, and at the outbreak of hostilities he voluntarily returned to Russia.

In 1914 Galicia had been an Austrian province for 141 years. At the outbreak of the war only a few people guessed that this was the beginning of the end of an historical epoch.
Notes


9. A first-hand account of the Shashkевич circle is found in the reminiscences of Ia. Holovatsky, “Perezhitoe i perestradannoe” (1881), in Pysmennyky Zakhidnoi Ukrainy 30–50–kh rokiv XIX st. (Kiev 1965), 229–85. From the extensive literature on the Galician “Awakeners” the following works are of interest to a student of social thought: I. Zanevych (O. Terletsky), “Literaturni stremlinnia halytskykh rusyniv vid 1772 do 1872,” Zhytie i slovo, vols. 1–4 (Lviv 1892–5); H. Iu. Herbilsky, Rozvytok prohresyvnykh idei v Halychyni v pershii polovyni XIX st. (Lviv 1964); J. Kozik, Ukraiński ruch narodowy w Galicji w latach 1830–1848 (Cracow 1973); and M. Tershakovets, Halytsko-ruske literaturne vidrodzenie (Lviv 1908).


11. Several important studies on Czech-Ukrainian relations in the nineteenth century are to be found in Z istorii chekhoslovatsko-ukraïnskykh zviazkiv (Bratislava 1959). See also V. Hostička, “Ukrajina v názorech české obrozenecké společnosti do roku 1848,” Slavia 33 (Prague 1964):558–78.


14. S. Kieniewicz, Konspiracje galicyjskie (1831–1845) (Warsaw 1950); passages relevant to the question of Polish-Ukrainian relations are on 103–4, 155–61, 213–14.


16. Ibid., 102.

17. The text of the petition, and of the manifesto of 10 May, mentioned below, is in K. Levytsky, Istoriia politychnoi dumky halytskykh ukrainsiv 1848–1914 (Lviv 1926), 17 and 21–4. For accounts of Ukrainian participation in the 1848 Revolution, see S. Baran, Vesna narodiv v avstro-uhorskii Ukraini (Munich 1948); E. M. Kosachevska, Vostochna Galitsia nakanune i v period revolutsii 1848 g. (Lviv 1965); M. Bohachevsky-Chomiak, The Spring of a Nation: The Ukrainians in Eastern Galicia
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18. F. Friedung, Oesterreich von 1848 bis 1860 (Stuttgart and Berlin 1908), 1:100.


26. However, a prominent member of the Rada, Hryhorii Shashkevych (no relation to the “Awakener,” Markii Shashkevych), proposed to the Reichstag a bill to create in Galicia commissions of arbitration to adjudicate cases arising between the landowners and the peasants. Levytsky, Istoriiia politychnoi dumky, 37; Rosdolsky, Die Bauernabgeordneten, 167–9. For agrarian problems in Galicia during the 1848–9 Revolution, see Klavso borotba selianstv Skhidnoi Halychyny (1772–1849). Dokumenty i materialy (Kiev 1974).

27. For details of the Palacký plan, see Springer, Protokol des Verfassungs-Ausschusses, 26.


29. Levytsky, Istoriiia politychnoi dumky, 104.

30. For a full presentation of the intricacies of constitutional and legal arrangements, see K. Grzybowski, Galicia 1848–1914. Historia ustroju politycznego na tle historii ustroju Austrii (Cracow, Wroclaw and Warsaw 1959).

31. In 1861 there were forty-nine Ukrainian deputies to the Galician Diet. By 1867 their number had been cut to fourteen, out of a total membership of 144. From the Reichsrat elections of 1879 there emerged three Ukrainian deputies, as against fifty-seven Poles. See K. G. Hugelmann, ed., Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Oester-reichs (Vienna and Leipzig 1934), 693 and 713.

32. Rudnyckyy, Ukraina, 145. It is to be noted that the Polish minority in eastern Galicia had considerably increased in the course of the nineteenth century. In 1857 there were only 21.5 per cent Roman Catholics there. No precise data are available for the earlier period, but it is likely that the percentage of Poles was even smaller. “In Ruthenia there lived [in 1772] a small minority of Roman Catholic Poles; they were mostly noblemen and town dwellers, and here and there also unfree peasants,” A. J. Brawer, Galizien wie es an Oesterreich kam: Eine historisch-statistische Studie über
die Verhältnisse des Landes im Jahre 1772 (Leipzig and Vienna 1910), 21. The increase of the Polish population was due to several causes: higher mortality among Ukrainians; colonization by Polish settlers from the western part of the province; continued assimilation. The sons of the German officials who had come to Galicia during the absolutist period usually became Poles. The same applied to the Armenians and some emancipated Jews. Ukrainian villagers, when they moved to towns, or rose to a higher social status, frequently became Polonized, and this process began to slow down only in the second half of the nineteenth century.

34. Ibid., 1:84.
37. Wiadomości Polskie (Paris), 1858, no. 30, quoted from W. Kalinka, Dieta (Cracow 1894), 4, pt. 2:212.
38. S. Kaczala, Polityka Polaków względem Rusi (Lviv 1879), 306.
43. For a general introduction to the problem: O. Terletsky, Moskovofily i narodovtsi v 70-kh rr. (Lviv 1902); M. Andrusiak, Narovy z istorii hal'rts'koj moskovofilstva (Lviv 1935), and Geneza i kharakter hal'rts'koj rusofilstva v XIX–XX st. (Prague 1941); and F. Sivistun, Prikarpats'kaia Rus' pod vladением Avstrii (Trumbull, Conn., 1970; reprint in 1 volume of 2 volumes, Lviv 1896–7). On the initial stage of the controversy, see K. Studynsky, ed., Korespondents'ia iakova Holovat's'koho v litakh 1850–62, in Zbirnyk Filolohichnii sektii Naukovo tovarystva im. Shevchenka 8–9 (Lviv 1905). A penetrating contemporary analysis is to be found in the articles of M. Drahomanov, collected in Politicheskiiia sochenienia M. P. Dragomanova, ed. I. M. Grevs and B. A. Kistiakovsky (Moscow 1908).
44. B. Didytsky, Svoiezhy'tevyi zapsyky (Lviv 1906), 1:10–14 and 64–5.
45. Ibid., 1:72–81.
47. Levytsky, Istoria politychnoi dumky, 80–81.
49. H. Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History and Ideology (Notre Dame, Ind. 1953), 23.
50. Narod means both "people" and "nation" in Ukrainian. Thus narodovtsi may be rendered as either "populists" or "nationalists," but the former is, probably, more accurate.
51. Terletsky, Moskovofily i narodovtsi, 24.
52. F. Chornohora (D. Taniackevych), Pysmo narodovtsiv ruskykh do redaktora politychnoi chasopysy "Rus'" iako protest i memorial (Vienna 1867), 3, 5, 6, 15.
53. The best picture of the early stages of the populist movement is to be found in the reminiscences of O. Barvinsky, Spominy z moho zhyttia. Obrazky z hromadians'koho
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54. For a presentation of the organizational achievements of the Ukrainian movement up to the 1880s, see V. Hnatiuk, Natsionalne vidrodzhennia avstrouhorskych ukrainsiv (1772–1880 rr.) (Vienna 1916). On the history of the Prosvita association, see Storichchia materi “Prosvity” (Winnipeg 1968).


57. K. N. Ustianovych, M. F. Raevskii i rossiiskii panslavizm. Spomyny z Perepzytoho i peredumanooho (Lviv 1884).


62. Title borrowed from that of a chapter in Smolka, Die reussische Welt, 103–20.

63. I. Franko, Moloda Ukraina. Providni idei i epizidy (Lviv 1910), 17.


69. Entsyklopediia ukrainoznavstva, v. 1, pt. 1, 149.

70. The “parcelling” procedures are vividly described in the memoirs of T. Voinarovsky, “Spohady z moho zhyttia,” Istoriychni postati Halychyny XIX—XX st. (New York and Paris 1961). The Reverend Voinarovsky was an eminent agrarian reformer and a close advisor to Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky.

71. For a detailed survey, see I. Vytanovych, Istoriia ukrainskoho kooperatyvnoho

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73. A. L. Pogodin, Slavianskii mir. Politicheskoie i ekonomicheskoie polozhenie slavianskikh narodov pered voinoi 1914 goda (Moscow 1915), 185.
74. Franko, Beiträge, 434.
75. On Franko, see M. Vozniak, Veleten dumky i pratsi (Kiev 1958). See also the collection of reminiscences, Ivan Franko u spohadakh suchasnykiv (Lviv 1956). On Hrushevsky, see the biographical sketch by B. Krupnytsky included as an introduction to the first volume of M. Hrushevsky, Istoriiia Ukrainy-Rusy (New York 1954), 1:i–xxx.
77. C. Korolevskij, Metropolite Andrei Szeptyckij, 1865–1944, in Opera Theologicae Societatis Scientificae Ucrainorum (Rome 1964), vols. 16–17. This extensive biography, devoted primarily to Sheptytsky’s pastoral and ecumenical work, ought to be supplemented by two essays which deal with his public activity and influence on the life of the Ukrainian community: S. Baran, Mityropolit Andrei Sheptytskyi. Zhytta i diialnist (Munich 1947) and V. Doroshenko, Velkyi mityropolit (Yorkton 1958).
78. The background of the New Era, especially the extent of the involvement of the Austrian government, has never been fully explored. For the role played by the Kievan Ukrainians, see D. Doroshenko, Volodymyr Antonovych. Ioho zhytia i naukova ta hromadska diialnist (Prague 1942), 78–84. For developments in Galicia itself, see Levytsky, Istoriiia politychnoi dumky, 235–75. Important information is also found in Ie. Olesnytsky, Storinky z moho zhytia, 2 vols. (Lviv 1935), 1:221–43.
79. For a picturesque description of the electoral malpractices in a Galician provincial town during the 1895 elections, see Olesnytsky, Storinky z moho zhytia, 2:96–115.
80. Materials on the history of the Radical party are found in the memoirs of I. Makukh, Na narodni sluzhbi (Detroit 1958).
82. Levytsky, Istoriiia politychnoi dumky, 327.
83. V. Levynsky, Narys rozvytku ukrainskoho robitynychoho rukhu v Halychyni (Kiev 1914).
86. Viceroy Bobrzyński’s memoirs provide rich information: M. Bobrzyński, Z moich
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90. For a description of the Russophile propaganda in the pre-war years, see L. Wasilewski, Die Ostprovinzen des alten Polenreiches (Cracow 1916), 263–5.
91. Kulczycki, Ugoda polsko-ruska, 47 and 51.
92. For the 1913 “principles of compromise” see Buszko, Sejmowa reforma wyborcza, 226–8.
93. Levytsky, Istoriia politychnoi dumky, 685–91; Buszko, Sejmowa reforma wyborcza, 262–5.
94. In 1911–12 there were in Galicia seventy Polish and eight Ukrainian Gymnasiums for boys, twenty Polish and one Ukrainian Gymnasium for girls, fourteen Polish and no Ukrainian secondary technical schools (Realschule). Hugelmann, Das Nationalitätenrecht des alten Oesterreichs, 709; Sirka, The Nationality Question in Austrian Education, 110–35.
95. Levytsky, Istoriia politychnoi dumky, 686 and 693.
96. Bujak, Galicya, 1:94.
97. Extensive excerpts from the declaration are to be found in Bobrzyński, Z moich pamiętników, 296.
98. For the full text, Levytsky, Istoriia politychnoi dumky, 720–22.
Carpatho-Ukraine: A People in Search of Their Identity*

In loving memory of my pobratym, Orest Zilinsky (1923–76)

The Interest of Carpatho-Ukrainian History

In reviewing the state of research on Eastern Europe at the 1960 meeting of the American Historical Association, the late Henry L. Roberts referred to the dearth of regional and local studies: “On the whole I have found in Eastern European history comparatively little of what one might call the ‘flower in crannied wall’ approach to history: the sense that a single community, or a particular episode, warrants affectionate recording . . . and also contains within it much of universal value.”

A region of Eastern Europe which appears particularly well suited to serve as an illustration of Professor Roberts’s observations is Carpatho-Ukraine—a small land known also under several alternative names: Transcarpathian Ukraine, Transcarpathia, Subcarpathia, Subcarpathian Ruthenia or Subcarpathian Rus’, and, in earlier times, Hungarian Ruthenia (Rus’). The interest of Carpatho-Ukrainian history consists in its being a typical borderland or transitional territory, where for centuries various political, social, and cultural forces have met and clashed. Thus it is possible to study there, in an almost laboratory-like fashion, the interaction of factors which have shaped the evolution of that part of the world as a whole.

The term Carpatho-Ukraine designates the area inhabited by Ukrainians on the southern slopes of the Carpathian Mountain range and the adjacent foothills. All of Carpatho-Ukraine is contained within the basin of the upper Tisza River with its numerous tributaries, ultimately flowing into the Danube. The crest of the Carpathians is the territory’s border with Galicia in the north; toward the south, Carpatho-Ukraine merges into the Hungarian plain. The western and eastern neighbouring lands are, respectively, Slovakia and Transylvania. The contemporary popula-

*This paper was left unfinished by the author at the time of his death. It has been edited under the supervision of Peter L. Rudnytsky.
tion of the Transcarpathian province (*oblast*), an administrative unit of the Ukrainian SSR, is in excess of 1,100,000,² of whom c. 75 per cent are ethnic Ukrainians. In addition, some tens of thousands of Carpatho-Ukrainians live as a minority in the Prešov (Priashiv) region of eastern Slovakia.

Ethnically and religiously the people of Carpatho-Ukraine belong to the East Slavic and Byzantine sphere. The traditional political ties of the territory, however, have been with East-Central Europe: Hungary, the Habsburg Empire, and Czechoslovakia. The early medieval history of Carpatho-Ukraine is moot, owing to the scarcity of reliable sources, and the question of the origins of Slavic settlement in the region has been much debated.³ But it is certain that since the eleventh century the territory of Carpatho-Ukraine found itself permanently included in the Hungarian kingdom. In the course of the late Middle Ages, Hungarian latifundialism and serfdom were imposed on the Ukrainian (Ruthenian) peasantry, and this was to determine the social structure of the land until the twentieth century. As an organic part of Hungary, Carpatho-Ukraine passed under the rule of the Habsburg dynasty in 1526. From the sixteenth until the early eighteenth century, it was the ground on which Habsburg absolutism and the recurrent frondes of the Hungarian nobility fought out their battles. The land was affected by Turkish invasions from the south, while the eastern section was for some time controlled by the principality of Transylvania. During the same period, the conflict between the Orthodox and Greek Catholic (Uniate) churches in Carpatho-Ukraine was closely connected, on the one hand, with religious developments in Polish Ukraine, and, on the other hand, with the struggle between the Reformation and the Counter-Reformation in Hungary. In the second half of the eighteenth century, during the reigns of Maria Theresa (1740–80) and Joseph II (1780–90), Carpatho-Ukraine became the object of the policies of Austrian enlightened despotism, especially in the ecclesiastical and agrarian spheres. In the nineteenth century, Magyar nationalism came to grips here with the influences of Russian Pan-Slavism.

In the course of the present century, virtually all powers active on the East European scene have had, at one time or another, a stake in this land: most obviously Hungary and Czechoslovakia, but also Russia (both tsarist and Soviet), and, to a lesser extent, Germany, Poland, and Romania. The political status of Carpatho-Ukraine changed several times in this century. It belonged to the Hungarian half of the Dual Monarchy until 1918. As a result of the post-World War I peace settlement, it became a province of the newly created Czechoslovak Republic. Reannexed by Hungary in 1939, it was finally incorporated into the Soviet Union in 1945.

The purpose of the preceding remarks has been to give a glimpse of the
rich texture of Carpatho-Ukrainian history and to intimate that this history may indeed contain "much of universal value."

Paul R. Magocsi's Work: Some Critical Comments
The scholarly, semi-scholarly, and publicist literature on Carpatho-Ukraine in several European languages is surprisingly rich,¹ but it is Paul R. Magocsi's merit to have produced the first monograph on the modern history of the land in English. Recently Professor Magocsi has supplemented his major work with a study of the Ukrainian minority of the Prešov region in Czechoslovakia.⁵ I propose to examine in some detail the former, major publication; the second, supplementary study will be discussed briefly toward the end of this paper.

The Shaping of a National Identity: Subcarpathian Rus', 1848–1948, is a stout volume of over 600 pages, of which less than half contain the work’s principal text; the rest consists of four long appendices, the notes, an impressive bibliography of no less than 2,279 entries, and an index. The author has used published materials in a number of languages: among others in Hungarian, Czech, Slovak, Russian, and Ukrainian. In addition, he has consulted Czechoslovak archives and has conducted personal interviews with several surviving participants in Carpatho-Ukrainian political and cultural life of the inter-war period. Owing to its solid base of factual information and the clarity of presentation, Magocsi’s book is bound to remain the standard work on the subject. It has deservedly attracted the attention of specialists in East European history and politics, and it has already been widely reviewed.

It was not Professor Magocsi’s intention to write a complete history of Carpatho-Ukraine. Chronologically his study is limited to the century from 1848 to 1948, that is, from the Springtime of Nations to the aftermath of World War II. The two chapters on the pre-World War I era are somewhat sketchy; the interested reader may be referred to the German monograph by Ivan Žeguc, which deals more thoroughly with the same period.⁶ The treatment of the incipient Soviet era in the concluding chapter is in the nature of an epilogue. The core of the work is devoted to the twenty years of the Czechoslovak regime, from 1919 to 1939, and here the author indeed breaks new ground. However, while discussing at length political and cultural developments in inter-war Subcarpathian Ruthenia, as the territory was then officially known, he pays only scant attention to social and economic conditions.⁷

The thematic focus of Magocsi's work is indicated by its title—The Shaping of a National Identity. Carpatho-Ukraine is one of those backward areas of Europe whose population lacked, well into the present century, a crystallized national consciousness. Professor Magocsi has set himself the task of examining the groupings of the Carpatho-Ukrainian
people, and especially of their intelligentsia, in trying to find an answer to the elementary and vitally important questions: "Who are we? To what nationality do we belong?" The problem is of more than local significance, because it provides a case study of the nation-building processes which have played, and still continue to play, a major role in the modern world.

Three national orientations used to contend for the allegiance of the population of Carpatho-Ukraine: a pro-Russian, a pro-Ukrainian, and a third orientation, which Magocsi calls "Rusynophile." The Russophiles and Ukrainophiles identified themselves, respectively, with the Russian and the Ukrainian nations, while the Rusynophiles wished for their people to evolve into a separate nationality. These three trends originated in the second half of the nineteenth and the early years of the twentieth century, when the question of national identity began to be discussed in the tiny circles of the Subcarpathian intelligentsia, almost all of whose members were Greek Catholic (Uniate) clergymen. The peasantry, overwhelmingly illiterate and living under semi-feudal conditions, was still largely unaffected. The conflict came out into the open under the liberal Czechoslovak regime, and it played a crucial role in the province's political and cultural life during the 1920s and 30s. By that time, the issue of national identity had reached out from the intelligentsia to the masses. There is no doubt as to the final outcome of this struggle. Magocsi correctly describes the situation in present-day Soviet Transcarpathia: "Without exception, members of the younger generation identify themselves as being of the Ukrainian nationality and as part of one Ukrainian people" (267).

While applauding Professor Magocsi's choice of a valid subject of inquiry and paying tribute to his exemplary diligence, I find his study less than fully satisfactory. My reservations pertain not to points of fact, but rather to those of emphasis and interpretation. Factual errors are relatively easy to set straight. The task of a discussant becomes more difficult whenever he feels impelled to question a scholar's interpretation. This requires not only a careful retracing of the arguments of the work under review, but also the presentation, at least in outline, of an alternative, more cogent interpretation.

In his treatment of the three Subcarpathian national orientations Professor Magocsi is not truly even-handed. His studious façade of scholarly detachment notwithstanding, we shall do him no injustice in stating that his sympathies are clearly with the so-called Rusynophile orientation. Of course, Professor Magocsi, like everybody else, is entitled to his personal preferences, but, unfortunately, this bias has affected his historical judgment and, in certain instances, has induced him to bend the evidence in order to make it fit his preconceptions.
There is, in the first place, an issue of nomenclature. Magocsi consistently calls the people he is writing about “‘Rusyns,’” and he argues that “the name Rusyn was chosen because it is the name used by the inhabitants and by most of their leaders” (277). Today, however, the people in question call themselves Ukrainians. Thus, while it may be quite acceptable to use the old name in a retrospective frame of reference, the present tense in Magocsi’s cited statement is obviously misleading. Furthermore, there is little justification for using the native form of an ethnonym where there exists a standard English equivalent. (We do not call the Germans, in English, “Deutsche.”) The precise English equivalent of the Slavic term “Rusyn” is “Ruthenian,” which is legitimized by an old tradition. In its Latin and German forms (“Rutheni,” “die Ruthenen”) it was universally applied to the East Slavic (Ukrainian and Belorussian) inhabitants of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, and later to the Ukrainian subjects of the Habsburg Empire. In reference to the Subcarpathian region, it is attested already in medieval sources. In its French form, “les Ruthènes,” it is found in the post-World War I peace treaties, in the acts of the League of Nations, and in the diplomatic documents and official pronouncements of the Czechoslovak government. It has also been widely used by writers in the English language, including Magocsi himself in one of his earlier articles.* This makes one wonder about the motives which induced him to scuttle a well-established, traditional designation in favour of a newfangled one. By the exclusive use of the term “‘Rusyn,’” a bias in favour of the Rusynophile orientation is insinuated into the reader’s mind.

The map of “Subcarpathian Ethno-Geographical Features” (11) shows the area of “‘Rusyn” settlement in Subcarpathia only, without placing it within an ethnic map of Eastern Europe as a whole. By this artful device the false impression is created that the Slavic population of the Subcarpathian land is ethnically distinct from the rest of the Ukrainian people.

It is noteworthy that the author of the first scholarly history of Carpatho-Ukraine, published in 1862–7, the German Austrian historian Hermann Ignaz Bidermann, unhesitatingly classified the Subcarpathian Ruthenians as belonging to the same nationality as the people of Russian Ukraine (to whom he also applied the traditional Ruthenian name), while, incidentally, contrasting them with the Great Russians:

The Hungarian Ruthenians are not free from Magyar and Slovak admixtures. Nevertheless, the core of the Ruthenian people displays such a clearly formed individuality that against this all attempts must fail to deny their distinct national character. Their contrast with the Great Russians is particularly striking. Every

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traveller in Russia who at all possesses an open eye for national differences will immediately notice when he has passed from the area of settlement of the Great Russians to that of the Ruthenians. He will notice this in the manner in which the houses are built, in the dress and the physiognomy of the people, and in their entire way of life (in deren ganzen Tun und Lassen).9

Magocsi does not deny that the people of Subcarpathia are Ukrainian according to ethnolinguistic criteria, but the wording of this admission is characteristically guarded and somewhat ambiguous: "Subcarpathian Rusyns speak a range of dialects that are closely related to those spoken in eastern Galicia. The Subcarpathian varieties have been classified by linguists as belonging to the Ukrainian language, even if they diverge substantially from the Ukrainian literary norm" (13–14). Actually, the Subcarpathian dialects are not only "related" to those spoken in Galicia: the same dialectal-tribal groups of Ukrainian mountaineers (moving from east to west, the Hutsuls, the Boikos, and the Lemkos) inhabit both sides of the Carpathians. Magocsi, moreover, fails to mention that the Ukrainian ethnic character of Subcarpathia is attested not only by language, but also by folk culture and the Eastern Christian religious tradition, which until recently stood at the very centre of the people's spiritual life.

Professor Magocsi's principal argument, however, is that "language cannot simply be equated with nationality" (14). I concede that this point is valid in principle. Ethnicity, indeed, cannot be equated with nationality, because the latter is a phenomenon of a different, higher order than the former. An ethnos is constituted by objective traits, such as language, folk culture, and an inherited way of life, while the existence of a nation presupposes a subjective element of consciousness and will. Owing to their backward and oppressed condition under Hungarian rule, the people of Carpatho-Ukraine entered the twentieth century without a crystallized national consciousness. To be more precise, they possessed such consciousness only in rudimentary form, for instance, in being aware of their religion as the "Ruthenian faith." This state of national underdevelopment was the point of departure for the emergence of the above-mentioned rival national orientations.

In a recent paper, Hugh Trevor-Roper has eloquently pleaded for a non-deterministic approach to the study of history. He proposes that in dealing with past conflicts a historian ought to view them not only from the perspective of the known outcome; he should also make an effort of imagination and try to visualize them as open-ended, as they appeared at a time when the result was still in suspense. "History is not merely what happened; it is what happened in the context of what might have hap-
pened. Therefore it must incorporate, as a necessary element, the alternatives, the might-have-beens.”

I am in full agreement with this position, provided that the deterministic and teleological elements, which undoubtedly also play a major role in historical processes, are not short-changed. A historian should, so to say, accord full hearing to all alternatives which at a given time contended for supremacy, but he is also under an obligation to account adequately for the reasons of the success of the one that ultimately prevailed. Applied to the problem at hand, this means that we must strive to understand the raison d’être of the failed Russophile and Rusynophile national orientations in Subcarpathia, and the structural factors which determined the victory of the Ukrainian orientation. This is precisely the point in which I find Professor Magocsi’s interpretation of “the shaping of a national identity” wanting.

In the following sections, I shall briefly review the three Subcarpathian national orientations, concentrating on their underlying ideological premises, and I shall attempt to show to what extent these concepts jibed with social and political realities and how they accorded with the people’s needs and aspirations.

**The Rusynophile Orientation**

Professor Magocsi believes that there was a chance for the Subcarpathian Ruthenians to evolve into a separate nation: “Of these three, the separatist, or Rusyn, national orientation was the weakest. . . . This does not mean that Subcarpathian civilization did not possess the potential to be transformed into a separate nationality. It did. What the Rusyn orientation lacked, however, was purposeful leadership” (274). He blames this alleged failure on the inferiority complex of the Ruthenian intelligentsia, whose members preferred to adhere to existing larger national entities, the Russian or the Ukrainian, instead of building a distinct national identity on a purely local foundation.

The weakness of this reasoning consists in the plain fact that, on the level of ethnicity, a separate “Subcarpathian civilization” simply does not exist, since by language and folk culture the Subcarpathian Ruthenians are undoubtedly a branch of the Ukrainian people. But the problem may be approached from another angle as well. There are national formations that are not ethnically based, but owe their existence to a specific historico-political constellation. It is, therefore, permissible to speculate whether the Subcarpathian Ruthenians might under certain conditions have evolved a distinct national consciousness of a political kind while remaining ethnically Ukrainian. In that hypothetical event, their situation would perhaps have been comparable to that of the inhabitants of the
canton of Tession, who are Italian by language and culture, but who politically identify themselves with the Swiss nation.

In order to obtain a better understanding of the problem, it will be helpful to adduce the actual case of an incipient "political nation" in Eastern Europe. During the Civil War in Russia there appeared a trend toward the federalization of the several Cossack "Hosts" and the establishment of an independent Cossack state. The projected "Cossackia" would have been multi-ethnic, as it would have included the Russian-speaking Don and Terek Cossacks, the Ukrainian-speaking Kuban Cossacks, and the non-Slavic mountain peoples of North Caucasia. This concept came to naught because of the Soviet victory in the Civil War, but at the same time it enjoyed a measure of genuine popular support in each of these regions, and partisans of an independent "Cossackia" remained vocal in the emigration for decades.

The contrasting example of the Cossack lands demonstrates why in the case of Subcarpathia the Rusynophile national orientation did not represent a viable option. A national identity of the non-ethnic, political kind must possess an institutional focus capable of evoking the citizens' allegiance. The corporate organization of the Cossack "Hosts" provided such a focus. The Cossacks could take pride in the awareness of having always been freemen and warriors, and in glorious memories of past revolts against the autocracy of Moscow. Features of a comparable nature were altogether absent in the historical record of Carpatho-Ukraine. The Ruthenians had lived for centuries in the Kingdom of Hungary as an enserfed peasant people, without any institutions of their own except for the church. In contradistinction to Croatia and Transylvania, the Subcarpathian region had never formed a distinct body within the framework of the Lands of the Crown of St. Stephen. The modern Hungarian state, created by the 1867 Compromise, was from the very outset conceived as a unitary nation-state. What Hungary offered its minorities was the prospect of equal partnership in the life of the Magyar nation, to be obtained at the price of assimilation. This prospect was certainly attractive to many educated Ruthenians, among whom Magyarization made heavy inroads during the latter part of the nineteenth century. If the threat of Magyarization was to be averted, the only realistic foundation of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians' struggle for survival was the undeniable fact of their ethnicity—and this logically implied an orientation toward their ethnic kinsmen beyond the mountains. Where, then, we may ask of Professor Magocsi, were the building stones from which a separate "Rusyn" national identity could possibly have been constructed?

What did the Rusynophile orientation actually represent? Professor Magocsi subsumes under this label two phenomena which differed in
both time and character: on the one hand, the pre-World War I populists (narodovtsi), and, on the other hand, the circle around the weekly *Nedilia* in the 1930s. I shall discuss the populist movement further below. For the moment, the statement must suffice that Subcarpathian populism, which emerged around the turn of the century, should properly be viewed as the embryonic stage of modern Ukrainian nationalism in this land. As to the so-called *nedilianshnyky*, they may be fairly described as thinly disguised Magyarones. Under the conditions of the Czechoslovak regime, overt expressions of a pro-Hungarian attitude had become inopportune. Consequently, the Magyarized segment of the Ruthenian intelligentsia (mostly men of the older generation) assumed the protective colours of Rusynophilism, while secretly hankering after the good old days under the Crown of St. Stephen. These were the first, and also the last, proponents of the idea that the Subcarpathian Ruthenians should become a separate nationality. The true nature of the self-styled Rusynophiles was revealed between 1939 and 1945, when they acted as quislings of the Hungarian occupant. By this behaviour they damned themselves in the eyes of the great majority of their compatriots.

Professor Magocsi admits, apparently not without a touch of regret, that the Rusynophile orientation was the weakest of the three national orientations in inter-war Subcarpathian Ruthenia. But this weakness was not accidental. The idea of the “Rusyns” becoming the fourth East Slavic nation, alongside the Russians, Belorussians, and Ukrainians, was a phantom without ethnic and historic substance. A few local figures could trifle with it, some Czech politicians could patronize it for reasons of their own, Hungarian revisionists could covertly support it in order to subvert the territorial provisions of the St. Germain and Trianon Treaties—but it could never get off the ground. The Rusynophile concept was an artificial contrivance, incapable of evoking the spirit of uncompromising dedication and self-sacrifice that is the hallmark of every authentic national-liberation movement. An idea for whose sake nobody was ever willing to stake his or her life weighs as a negligible quantity on the scales of history.

**The Russophile Orientation**

The representative personality of the initial stage of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians’ national revival, in the middle of the nineteenth century, was the poet and educator Oleksander Dukhnovych (1803–65). In his writings he used a mixture of local dialect and traditional Church Slavonic. Dukhnovych had a strong sense of the national unity joining the Subcarpathian Ruthenians with their Galician brethren, and in a poem
dedicated to the Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Galicia, Hryhorii Iakhymovych, he made the famous and oft-quoted programmatic declaration: ‘Our own people, not strangers, live beyond the mountains. / One Rus’, one common idea, is in the souls of us all.’ At the same time, he lacked a clear perception of the national differences between the Ruthenians/Ukrainians and the Russians. Ivan Franko aptly characterized Dukhnovych as ‘a man of unquestionable good will and no mean talent, but incurably confused in his linguistic and political doctrines.’

This undifferentiated Ruthenian patriotism, in the manner of Dukhnovych, assumed a decidedly Russophile colouring in the second half of the century. Two men were most instrumental in spreading the pro-Russian orientation in Subcarpathia: the editor and publicist Ivan Rakovsky (1815–85), and the political activist Adolf Dobriansky (1817–1901). Rakovsky laboured strenuously at making the Ruthenians adopt Russian as their literary language. Dobriansky, who had served as the Austrian liaison officer with the Russian army in Hungary in 1849, continued to maintain contacts with Russian governmental and Pan-Slavist circles. Russophiles controlled the first Ruthenian cultural association, the Society of St. Basil the Great, founded in 1866.

An incisive contemporary analysis of the Russophile phenomenon was provided by the Ukrainian scholar and political thinker Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), a professor at Kiev University and after 1876 an exile in Switzerland and Bulgaria. Drahomanov visited Subcarpathia twice in 1875 and 1876, and was shocked by the condition of the people whom he called ‘the wounded brother.’ In his interpretation Russophilism represented a natural reaction against overwhelming Hungarian pressure, which made Ruthenian patriots look for outside help. Furthermore, the Ruthenian clerical intelligentsia were under the spell of the aristocratic mores of Hungarian society. Drahomanov wrote in his memoirs: ‘Hungarian Rus’ is a land neglected in every respect, and its oppression by Magyarism is not only of a national, but also of a social, noble character. This [bias] lives in the heads of Ruthenian patriots most opposed to Magyarism.’ Educated Ruthenians desired to match the ‘genteel’ Hungarian language and culture with an equally prestigious one, namely the Russian. A local editor, Nykolai Homychkov, responded to Drahomanov’s promptings with the following candid statement in his newspaper Karpat: ‘Mr. Drahomanov wants us to write in the language of the servants, but literature is everywhere being written for the masters.’ However, Drahomanov noted, with his own family Homychkov spoke only in Hungarian. ‘And rightly so, since the Russian ‘masters’ are far away, and the Magyars are nearby.’ Drahomanov concluded that Russophilism was self-defeating, because it deprived the Ruthenians of the ability to resist Magyarization effectively by alienating
the intelligentsia from the common people and by denying the latter educational services, which could not be provided in an alien idiom. The Russophiles’ infatuation with the mighty empire of the tsars by no means implied a close familiarity with things Russian. Quite to the contrary, it was nurtured by isolation from the outside world, including Russia, and went hand in hand with a profound ignorance of contemporary Russian conditions, including modern Russian literature. Subcarpathian Russophiles were only rarely capable of mastering the Russian language properly. The idiom they actually used in their publications was more often than not an artificial hybrid of Russian, Church Slavonic, and local Ukrainian dialect, interspersed with Hungarian and German phrases.

Drahomanov preserved his concern for Carpatho-Ukraine to the end of his days. In the answer to the greetings received on the occasion of the twenty-fifth anniversary of his public activity, written shortly before his death in 1895, and which may be considered his political testament, Drahomanov once again returned to this problem:

There is still another part of our common Fatherland which I can never forget, like a wounded brother. This is Hungarian Rus’. Having visited this land twice in 1875–6, I became convinced that nobody cares there about the common people, or [if somebody does care] it is being approached by methods which are doomed to failure in advance. There the most sincere Ruthenian patriots live in their thought and heart either with the princes and boyars of old, or with the Muscovite bishops and generals, but they do not see at all the living Ruthenian people with its distress right by their side. When they sometimes address the people, then always about dead topics only, and in a language which nobody speaks anywhere and which they themselves do not understand without a parallel Magyar translation. As I was the first Ukrainian to visit Hungarian Rus’, and as I saw that it is farther separated even from Galicia than Australia is from Europe—I swore to myself an “oath of Hannibal” to work for the integration of Hungarian Rus’ into our national democratic and progressive movement, in which lies its only salvation. Unfavourable circumstances nullified my early efforts…. Thus Hungarian Rus’ remains without the propagation of progressive ideas to this day. I have not been able to fulfill my oath, but now, having received greetings from such a great number of my fellow countrymen, I dare to lay this oath upon their heads.13

Under Russophile leadership, Ruthenian national life continued to decline in Subcarpathia in the late nineteenth century, thus confirming the accuracy of Drahomanov’s diagnosis. The business meetings of the
St. Basil Society were conducted in Hungarian by that time, and the Society became almost completely inactive. Russophile newspapers failed because of the lack of contributors and subscribers. A local writer, Oleksander Mytrak (1837–1913), complained in 1885: “We are only five men left, who stand nearer to the grave than to the cradle.” The mood of despair was voiced by another writer of the Russophile orientation, Iulii Stavrovsky-Popradov (1850–89), in a poem with the Dantesque title “Lasciate Ogni Speranza”:

Deprived of feeling and strength,
You, my defenceless Helot,
You unfortunate Ugro-Russian people,
Die, descend into the darkness of the grave!
Slavs, intone a sorrowful dirge,
Kindle a funerary torch!

The situation of the Subcarpathian Ruthenians was indeed extremely bleak, but Stavrovsky-Popradov’s exaggerated pessimism reflected the bankruptcy of the Russophile trend, whose partisans had reached a dead end: the hoped-for intervention of tsarist Russia was not forthcoming, while they did not know how to mobilize the resources of their own people against the ever-increasing pressures of Magyarization. Around the turn of the century, the older Russophile activists of the Dobriansky and Rakovský generation had largely passed from the scene, and their successors could not be identified. This did not mean, however, that Russophilism disappeared completely. Rather, it went into a state of hibernation from which it was to re-emerge to some extent after 1918. Russophile sentiment persisted also on the popular level, as evidenced by the Orthodox religious movement, which spread spontaneously in several Subcarpathian villages in the early years of the twentieth century. Conversions to Orthodoxy expressed the peasants’ social grievances and their dissatisfaction with the Magyarized Greek Catholic clergy. The authorities reacted by staging, in 1904 and 1913, trials of Orthodox agitators and believers charged with the disturbance of public peace and treason against the Hungarian state.

Subcarpathian Populism and the Origins of the Ukrainian Orientation

The emergence of the populist trend must be comprehended against the background of the dismal condition of the Carpatho-Ukrainian people at the turn of the century. The economic situation of the Ruthenian peasantry under the rule of Hungarian latifundialism deteriorated to the point of chronic famine in the mountain regions. Severe privations provided the
impetus for a movement of emigration to the United States, which assumed mass proportions. The Budapest government itself became alarmed by this demographic catastrophe. Upon the request of the Greek Catholic bishop of Mukachiv, Iulii Firtak (1836–1912, consecrated 1891), the government initiated, in 1897, the so-called Highland Action, which was meant to ameliorate the socio-economic condition of the Ruthenian peasantry. The practical results of the action, however, were insignificant.

Another element of the situation was an intensified Magyarization drive, stimulated to a frenetic pitch by the celebrations of the millennium of Hungary in 1896. The notorious Apponyi school law of 1907 led to the suppression of the few remaining Ruthenian-language elementary schools; secondary education had been totally Magyarized for decades. The assimilationist policy was abetted by a coterie of Magyarone intellectuals of Ruthenian origin centred in Budapest. Their objective was the transformation of the Ruthenians of Hungary into “Greek Catholic Magyars” in the course of the next one or two generations. This was to be accomplished by the eradication of those features of the Greek Catholic Church which still visibly tied it to the East Slavic world: the introduction of the Gregorian instead of the Julian calendar, the replacement of the Cyrillic by the Latin alphabet (with Hungarian spelling) in Ruthenian publications, and finally the imposition of the Magyar liturgical language, instead of traditional Church Slavonic, in church services. Despite some feeble protests, appropriate measures were implemented by the government by the time of the war. To round out the picture, one must mention the atmosphere of intimidation, marked by administrative harassment and vicious denunciations in the Hungarian chauvinist press of all persons suspected of being insufficiently loyal to Hungary.

These were the unprepossessing circumstances under which a few young Ruthenian intellectuals began a search after new ways to assure the survival and the possible future regeneration of their people. They had become convinced of the sterility of the Russophile orientation, which they held responsible for the decline of Ruthenian national life. The decisive step was the abandonment of the would-be literary Russian advocated by the Russophiles and the choice of the vernacular as a vehicle of education and literature. The weekly Nauka, started in 1897, became the organ of the populist movement. From 1903, its editor was Avhustyn Voloshyn (1874–1946), a Greek Catholic priest, who also distingushed himself as an educator and author of grammars and textbooks. Scholarly exponents of the populist orientation were the historian and ethnographer Iurii Zhatkovyich (1855–1920) and the literary historian Hiiador Strypsky (1875–1949). The latter published a monograph, Star-
sha ruska pysmennost na Uhorshchyni (The Older Ruthenian Literature in Hungary, 1907), in which he argued that the fairly rich manuscript literature which circulated in Subcarpathia in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was written in an idiom close to the vernacular; therefore, the Russifying linguistic tendency of the second half of the nineteenth century represented a deviation from the older native tradition.

The populist trend was stimulated by the example of and growing contacts with the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia, which was making great strides at that time. Zhatkovych and Strypsky contributed to the publications of the Shevchenko Scientific Society in Lviv, while several Galician scholars (Ivan Franko, Volodymyr Hnatiuk, Stepan Tomashivsky), following in Drahomanov’s footsteps, produced studies on Carpatho-Ukrainian topics. The Greek Catholic Metropolitan of Galicia, Andrei Sheptytsky, created a sensation among the Subcarpathian clergy when, during a visit to Uzhhorod, he publicly spoke in Ukrainian.

The populists’ turn to the vernacular implied a new national orientation. But how should this orientation be defined—in a Rusynophile or in a Ukrainian sense? Professor Magocsi asserts that Strypsky and Voloshyn were Rusynophiles (328, 331); the latter allegedly “started out as a Rusynophile, then by the 1920s [that is, during the Czechoslovak era] began to express openly the belief that Subcarpathian Rusyns were part of one Little Russian or Ukrainian nationality” (331). The findings of the Hungarian specialist in Carpatho-Ukrainian history, Mária Mayer, differ from those of Magocsi: “At the turn of the century the Ukrainophile tendency also appeared in the ‘nationalist’ circles of the learned Ruthenes, who were strongly influenced by the achievements of the Ukrainian nationalist movements in Galicia and Russia.” In this context, she specifically refers to Iu. Zhatkovych and “his followers,” A. Voloshyn and Ia. Strypsky. Mayer provides an extensive summary of the debates conducted in 1897–9 in the pages of Kelet, the Hungarian-language organ of the Greek Catholic clergy, edited by Zhatkovych. Taking a stand against Russophile spokesmen, “Zsatkovics [Zhatkovych] asserted with weighty scholarly arguments that there was ample proof of the separate existence of the Ukrainian nation and a Ukrainian literary language absolutely distinct from the Russian nation and literary language. He also professed that the [Subcarpathian] Ruthenian and Ukrainian peoples were related with regard to language.” The same position was defended by Strypsky. However, Zhatkovych and Strypsky left undecided, for the time being, the question whether the Subcarpathian Ruthenians should simply take over the Ukrainian literary language from Galicia or try to develop a literary language on the basis of local dialects; this was to be determined later by the natural course of events. Of greatest interest is Voloshyn’s
position in the debate. When an anonymous contributor advised that the Subcarpathian Ruthenians should dissociate themselves from both Russian literature and "the literature of Shevchenko," "Ágoston Volosin [Avhustyn Voloshyn], a beginner in journalism, a Ukrainophile teacher signing his article 'X,' objected to this Ruthenophile tendency. . . . At that time he was a Ukrainophile.'" This evidence, adduced by Mária Mayer, undermines the credibility of Magocsi's interpretation, which seems to be inspired by the wish to inflate the importance of the Rusynophile orientation.

The nature of the populists' national ideology has been correctly assessed by Ivan Žeguc. According to him, it is inappropriate to apply to the pre-World War I period the sharp distinctions derived from the experience of the 1920s and 30s. What mattered to the populists was the basic principle: the turn to the people and the people's living language. In this they saw the precondition of the lifting of Hungarian Ruthenia from the current deep crisis; the details could be worked out later.

Without identifying themselves unconditionally with the Ukrainian movement, particularly with the Ukrainian phonetic orthography, the Ruthenian [populist] leaders did not hide their sympathy for Ukrainian literature, which they attested by translating Ukrainian authors into Magyar. . . . It is undeniable that Voloshyn considered the Ukrainian movement the natural extension of the Ruthenian national idea, as he clearly stated in his programmatic contributions in Nauka.¹⁴

Thus Mayer and Žeguc support the interpretation of the populist trend as the embryonic stage of Ukrainian nationalism in Subcarpathia.

Certain limitations of populism should not be overlooked. In the first place, it was quite non-political, restricting itself to questions of language, literature, and education. The populists were not separatists in regard to Hungary; they did not dream about the inclusion of their homeland in a future Ukrainian state. They did not even raise the issue of self-government of the Ruthenian territory within the framework of Hungary, which seemed quite unrealistic under prevailing conditions. On the other hand, they were not averse to the search for potential allies and patrons in the Hungarian political system. This lack of an independent political platform was an ostensible regression from the Russophiles of the 1860s, whose spokesman Adolf Dobriansky had advanced the program of the formation of an autonomous "Russian" province in the Austrian Empire, to consist of eastern Galicia, Bukovyna, and Subcarpathia, or, alternatively, the program of home rule for Hungarian Rus' alone. Secondly, the populist movement was weak in numbers, being composed
of a handful of individuals. The bulk of the Ruthenian intelligentsia was more or less thoroughly Magyarized; the Magyar language dominated in the homes and families of the Greek Catholic clergy.

The Dynamics of Nation-building Processes in Inter-war Subcarpathian Ruthenia

My principal criticism of Professor Magocsi’s interpretation of the “shaping of a national identity” in Subcarpathian Ruthenia/Carpatho-Ukraine is that he presents it in essentially static terms, and not as a dynamic process. In his account, the three national orientations which were present in Subcarpathia at the beginning of the Czechoslovak era survived without much change over the next quarter of a century. He asserts that “as late as 1945 the Russian and Rusyn orientations were still very much alive” (275). The balance of the three trends was allegedly broken only by the Soviet regime, “which gave exclusive support to one orientation, the Ukrainian” (272).

Against this, I maintain that the Russophile and Rusynophile orientations were moribund by the 1930s, and that the victory of the Ukrainian national movement resulted from the dynamics of the internal development of Subcarpathian society, and not from the intervention of an outside deus ex machina. The Soviet regime did not impose, after 1945, a Ukrainian identity on the people of the Transcarpathian oblast; it only ratified the outcome of a preceding spontaneous local development.

The above interpretation is supported by certain facts that are mentioned by Magocsi, but from which he fails to draw the proper conclusions. For instance, he acknowledges that “by 1934 the [pro-Ukrainian] Teachers’ Assembly claimed 1,211 of the 1,874 ‘Rusyn’ teachers throughout Subcarpathian Rus’” (173). In the field of adult education, “the [Russophile] Dukhnovych Society was the less dynamic of the two cultural organizations during the 1930s” (160); it was far outdistanced by its Ukrainian rival, the Prosvita (Enlightenment) Society. The Prosvita congress, which took place in the province’s capital in October 1937, was “one of the largest manifestations ever organized in Uzhhorod” (160). Plast (Ukrainian Scouts) had 3,000 members in 1935, as against 500 Russian Scouts in 1929–30 (161). Among Subcarpathian students attending Czechoslovak universities (no institution of higher learning existed in the province in the pre-Soviet era), “by the late 1930s... the Ukrainophile student movement was the more active and certainly the more vociferous of the two factions” (174). Nevertheless, Magocsi blunts the impact of these statements by various qualifications, and winds up with the erroneous conclusion: “at the end of the period in question, the Russophile, Ukrainophile, Rusynophile, and by force of
circumstance the Magyarone currents all seemed to be as well entrenched as ever” (167).

In evaluating the dynamics of Carpatho-Ukraine’s nation-building processes, the generational factor is of outstanding importance. One of the book’s appendices contains brief biographical sketches of eighty-one individuals who played prominent roles in Carpatho-Ukraine between 1918 and 1945. This interesting prosopographic study suggests that the three orientations were evenly matched: 24 Russophiles, 28 Rusynophiles, and 29 Ukrainophiles. The author comments: “Whereas among the older generation (born before 1905) there was an equal number representing each orientation, among the smaller sample from the second-generation, Russophiles and Ukrainophiles were equal and outnumbered Rusynophiles four to one” (19). This in fact indicates a rapid decline of the Rusynophile orientation during the inter-war period. But what if we were to extend the survey to the next generation, those born after 1918? The members of that generation were too young to have achieved distinction before 1945, and therefore they have not been included in Magocsi’s comparative biographies. I am unable to offer hard statistical data, but I propose the following simple test. In his work Magocsi quotes from and refers to several scholars of Subcarpathian origin who, after World War II, settled in North America and who at the present are associated with American and Canadian institutions of higher learning. It is noteworthy that all of them, without exception, consider themselves Ukrainian.\(^1^5\) This fact cannot be explained by the impact of Soviet policy.

The thesis of the spontaneous and irrepressible rise of the Ukrainian national movement in inter-war Subcarpathian Ruthenia finds support in the testimonies of three well-qualified contemporary outside observers, one French and the others Czech; there is no reason to question their objectivity. The French Slavic scholar, René Martel, wrote in a book on the Subcarpathian Ruthenian problem published in 1935:

... the young people, by whom I mean those attending schools, no longer adhere to the Russians. They turn, en bloc, to the Ukrainians, joining their great national movement. This fact is recognized by all impartial observers. Hence the Great Russian movement has hardly any future in Subcarpathian Ruthenia... A constructive dynamism, which brings forth ever more abundant fruit, is clearly visible in many details of the life of the [Ukrainian] party. One could say that the latter is lifted up and carried forward by a huge wave of national and popular faith, by a will, at once ardent and tenacious, which characterizes the Ukrainian national movement in Ruthenia as well as in Galicia.\(^1^6\)
The comments of the Czech novelist Ivan Olbracht are equally illuminating. They are contained in a travelogue on "The Land Without a Name," written in 1931:

A struggle is going on in Subcarpathia whose object is to consolidate the ethnographic mass of the Ruthenian people and to give them a name. The linguistic confusion of the years 1919 and 1920 has become clarified and simplified at least to the extent that only two contestants remain at the centre of interest. . . . A great Russian-Ukrainian struggle is going on. . . . The contending forces of the Russians and the Ukrainians are equal: a half against a half. But the Ukrainian side will win. Whoever has observed Subcarpathia but a little more closely than a tourist can have no doubt about that. . . . Ukrainianism shall completely prevail in this land. While today a half stands against a half, the Russian half will gradually and steadily decrease. Because the Ukrainians are right: Russianism is nothing but old Slavophilism, the desire of a powerless tribe to lean on a big brother. In present-day Subcarpathia, the Russian language is a dead, paper language, and the Great Russian trend is an archaism. . . . It is out of touch with reality and the people. The opposite is true of the Subcarpathian Ukrainians, whose contact with their people is constant and close. 17

A Czech student of Subcarpathian literature, František Tichý, diagnosed the relative strength of the Russian and Ukrainian literary movements in the province in 1938 as follows:

[The Russian-language literature] has no influx of new forces, and, what weighs even more, has no public, no readers. It is a stranger at home, and even more of a stranger in Russia: nobody there has any knowledge of the Subcarpathian Ruthenian literature of the Russian orientation. Not a single Subcarpathian Ruthenian name has been admitted so far into the pages of the history of Russian literature. Russian literary criticism has not and does not preoccupy itself with Subcarpathian Ruthenian phenomena. Furthermore, a weakness of this faction is that by having adopted the Russian literary language it has, ipso facto, rejected the entire older Subcarpathian Ruthenian literary production, which was written in the local language. A literature without tradition is like a cut flower, a stream drying up.

The situation of the writers of the Ukrainian orientation is quite different. A Subcarpathian Ruthenian writer who adheres to this trend can draw on the spoken language of his native land; he can rely on a small but steadily growing circle of readers at home; and
he finds reassurance in the awareness that his works also evoke an active interest among his kinsmen abroad, in Galicia, Bukovyna, and [Soviet] Ukraine.\textsuperscript{18}

**Autonomous Carpatho-Ukraine, 1938-9: The End of the Search for a National Identity**

The Subcarpathian Ruthenians’ quest for national identity culminated in 1938–9, when their land, now officially renamed Carpatho-Ukraine, achieved autonomous statehood within a federalized Czechoslovakia.\textsuperscript{19}

Autonomous status for Subcarpathia had been pledged in the Treaty of Saint Germain (10 September 1919), which awarded that territory to Czechoslovakia, and in the Czechoslovak constitution of 29 February 1920, but the Prague government delayed the discharge of this obligation for nearly two decades. The autonomy of Carpatho-Ukraine was implemented only in the wake of the international crisis which culminated in the Munich conference in September 1938. The period of Carpatho-Ukrainian autonomy was to last but a few months, and it ended in mid-March 1939 with the final disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the re-annexation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary. The brief period of autonomy, however, had one lasting and irreversible effect: the mass of Subcarpathia’s population became permeated with a Ukrainian national consciousness. It is noteworthy that while the Czechs passively submitted to the German occupation, tiny Carpatho-Ukraine met the Hungarian invasion with a brave armed resistance. Magocsi barely mentions, in two scanty lines, the struggle of the Carpathian “Sich” militia. It is no exaggeration to say that this “baptism of fire” put the final seal on the Ukrainian national identity of the land.

Magocsi fails to appreciate the decisive importance of the 1938–9 events for “the shaping of a national identity.” On the one hand, he states: “it must be admitted that the Ukranophile orientation did increase its influence and prestige among large segments of the local population during the stormy months of autonomy” (245–6). On the other hand, he cancels out this admission by a rider: “this did not mean, as many Ukrainophile writers assert, that the local populace rejected the Russophile or Rusynophile national orientations” (245). A little later, however, he remarks that the old-time Russophile and Rusynophile leaders had compromised themselves by their collusion with “Hungarian and Polish intrigues against the homeland” (246). This misleading interpretation may be likened to an image reflected in a crooked mirror: all the objects are there, but the proportions have been distorted.

Carpatho-Ukraine attracted considerable international attention in 1938–9. Many foreign diplomats and political commentators speculated that this small land would serve as the stepping stone toward a future Greater Ukraine, to be created under German auspices; such plans were

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widely attributed to Hitler. Apprehensions of this kind also caused worry to Soviet leaders. "In a speech to the Eighteenth Congress of the CPSU on 10 March [1939], Stalin, while ridiculing the whole notion that a country of 30 million (Soviet Ukraine) could be annexed by a region of 700,000 (Carpatho-Ukraine), still devoted an unusually lengthy passage to this apparently ridiculous proposition of a 'merger of an elephant with a gnat.'"20 There are good reasons to assume that Carpatho-Ukraine served as a touchstone in German-Soviet relations. Hitler's authorization for the occupation of Carpatho-Ukraine by Hungary, which occurred only a few days after Stalin's speech, paved the way for the rapprochement between Berlin and Moscow and the German-Soviet pact of 23 August 1939. Magocsi does not mention Stalin's historic speech, and he generally shows little insight into the significance of the Carpatho-Ukrainian problem preceding the outbreak of World War II.

Notes

2. To be precise, 1,134,100, as of 1 January 1977. V. Kubijový and A. Žukovsky, Map of Ukraine (Munich and Paris 1978), attached brochure, 5.
3. The fundamental work on the early history of Carpatho-Ukraine, to the middle of the nineteenth century, is O. Mytsiuk, Narovy z sotsialno-hospodarskoi istorii Pidkarpatskoi Rus, 2 vols. (Prague 1936–8).
4. Attention should be called to P.R. Magocsi's "An Historical Guide to Subcarpathian Rus'," Austrian History Yearbook 9–10 (1973–4):201–56. This useful study may be considered a supplement to the books under review.
7. This criticism was previously voiced in the review article of John-Paul Himka, "The Formation of National Identity in Subcarpathian Rus': Some Questions of Methodology," Harvard Ukrainian Studies 2, no. 3 (September 1978):374–80.
8. Cf. Paul R. Magocsi, "The Ruthenian Decision to Unite with Czechoslovakia," Slavic Review 34, no. 2 (June 1975):360–81. It is worth noting that the title of this article has been changed in Magocsi's book (no. 1742 of the bibliographical section) to "The Subcarpathian Decision..." (emphasis added). One would like to know whether this inconsistency is due to oversight or to deliberate cosmetic alteration.


15. The names of these scholars are (in alphabetical order): Alexander Baran, Joseph Danko, John Fizer, Vasyl Markus, Athanasius Pekar, and Peter G. Stercho.


18. F. Tichý, Vývoj současného spisovného jazyka na Podkarpatské Rusi (Prague 1938), 125.

19. A history of the Carpatho-Ukrainian state is to be found in P.G. Stercho, *Diplomacy of Double Morality: Europe’s Crossroads in Carpatho-Ukraine, 1919–1939* (New York 1971). Despite its pretentious title, this is a useful study. Unfortunately, while concentrating on constitutional and international issues, the author largely neglects the territory’s internal development prior to and during the period of autonomy. Peter Winch’s *Republic for a Day* (London 1939) may be recommended as a colourful eyewitness account by an English journalist.

We may begin the discussion of the state of the Ukrainian national movement on the eve of the First World War by examining two events which occurred in early 1914 almost simultaneously in Kiev and Lviv, the respective capitals of Ukrainian lands in Russia and Austria-Hungary.

The Russian Minister of Internal Affairs, Nikolai Maklakov, had prohibited the public commemoration of the centenary of the birth of Taras Shevchenko (1814—61), Ukraine’s national bard. Protest demonstrations took place in Kiev on 10—11 March (New Style). They were organized by a students’ committee but found widespread support among the population, the number of demonstrators running into tens of thousands. The authorities were compelled to call upon mounted police and Cossack detachments to disperse the crowds. Similar manifestations occurred in other Ukrainian cities as well. This marked the first time that the national movement in east-central (Russian or Dnieper) Ukraine had “taken to the streets.” The events of 10—11 March were widely reported in the Russian press and caused a debate in the Duma. Russian spokesmen expressed apprehension at this surprising show of strength of the Ukrainian movement.

One of the organizers of the Kiev demonstrations, Mykola Kovallevsky, commented on them in his memoirs:

This was an impressive review of the growth of Ukrainian national forces. The demonstrations also gave evidence of profound changes in the structure of the Ukrainian liberation movement. It was no longer... an ethno-graphic-cultural trend, expressed in amateur theatrics, embroidery, and sentimental melodramas... .New forces had joined the Ukrainian liberation movement, turning it into a genuine mass movement in the full meaning of the term.1
Only three weeks earlier, on 14 February, another memorable event had taken place in Lviv: the adoption by the Galician Diet of a new provincial statute and a new provincial electoral ordinance. The Ukrainians received 27.2 per cent of the seats in the Diet (the same proportion which they had possessed since 1907 in Galicia’s representation to the Austrian parliament), and two places out of eight on the Provincial Board (Landesausschuss). These reforms fell far short of what the Ukrainians could legitimately claim on statistical grounds: they comprised 42 per cent of the province’s total population of eight million. Still, the virtual monopoly of power which the Poles had enjoyed in Galicia for decades was finally broken.

Here are the observations of Kost Levytsky, the leader of Galicia’s Ukrainian National-Democratic Party and chief Ukrainian negotiator of the 1914 settlement:

This was the first true, historical [Polish-Ukrainian] compromise ever achieved on Galician soil. It contained the promise of a new epoch in the struggle for the liberation of our people. . . . [These reforms] were the embryo of the Ukrainian people’s political autonomy.2

Both the Kiev demonstrations and the reform of Galicia’s provincial statute were symptoms of a breakthrough: in Dnieper Ukraine the national movement was beginning to assume a mass character; in the western, Austrian section, it had conquered a share of political power. To be able to appreciate adequately the significance of those events, we must review briefly the course of the Ukrainian national movement from its inception to the eve of World War I, stressing those factors which either favoured or retarded its progress.3

The beginnings of the modern Ukrainian national movement can be traced, chronologically, to the early nineteenth century, and, geographically, to the so-called Left-Bank area, i.e., to the provinces of Chemihiv, Poltava, and Kharkiv. In that region the traditions of the former autonomous Cossack order were still very much alive. Nearly all early protagonists of the Ukrainian revival were members of the Left-Bank nobility, descendants of the former Cossack officers. The movement was at first quite non-political. It was expressed in historical, folkloristic, and linguistic researches, and in literary (mostly poetical) productions in the Ukrainian vernacular. These cultural activities were unofficially connected with the universities of Kharkiv and Kiev, founded, respectively, in 1804 and 1835.

The next stage of the Ukrainian movement was its politicization. This decisive step was taken by a group of young intellectuals in Kiev, known as the Cyrillo-Methodian Society (1846–7). From their circle emerged
the first modern Ukrainian political program, which culminated in the vision of a future free Ukrainian republic as a member of a democratic Slavic federation. The Cyrillo-Methodian program stressed the abolition of serfdom and the elimination of class distinctions. This combination of national and social concerns was to remain a characteristic feature of the Ukrainian national movement, giving its ideology a distinct populist colouring. A member of the Society was the poet of genius, Taras Shevchenko, the prophet and living symbol of the Ukrainian liberation movement.4

The preceding résumé indicates that the rebirth of Ukraine followed a course essentially similar to that of several other emerging nations of Eastern Europe. For instance, in the case of the Czechs, too, we see a first stage of non-political, cultural revival followed by a second stage, when the national movement turned political. However, the process of nation-building was undeniably much tardier in Ukraine than in several other East European countries facing an analogous task. By “nation-building” I mean the penetration of all strata of the population by the national idea, the transformation of an ethnic mass into a culturally and politically self-conscious national community. The comparatively slow pace of the Ukrainian national movement needs to be accounted for.

There is no reason to assume that the drive toward nationhood was inherently weaker among the Ukrainians than among other emerging nations. But perhaps no other national movement had to overcome obstacles of the same magnitude. The chief, though not the only, source of these difficulties was to be found in Russian policies and attitudes toward Ukraine. The general oppressive and centralizing nature of Russian autocracy is too well known to need to be expatiated upon. But the treatment of Ukraine was distinguished by certain special features which went beyond the measures applied toward the Empire’s other non-Russian peoples. The basic principle of tsarist Russia’s Ukrainian policy was the negation of the very existence of a separate Ukrainian nationality. According to official doctrine, the Ukrainian people were considered the “Little Russian” tribal branch of the triune Russian nation. This fundamental assumption entailed two consequences. First, individuals of Ukrainian extraction willing to abdicate their own identity and to embrace the “all-Russian” concept were not discriminated against. Second, systematic and relentless repression was applied against all persons and groups who upheld Ukrainian national identity, whether in the political or in the cultural sphere. This extended even to the language. Ukrainian was to be permanently confined to the role of a peasant dialect. The raising of that idiom to the level of a language of literature and scholarship was deemed to constitute a threat to Russian unity, and, therefore, had to be prevented by administrative means. The prohibition of Ukrainian lit-
erature as such, irrespective of its contents, on the grounds of language alone, was, indeed, something unique even under the conditions of the Russian Empire. Let us mention, in contrast, that at no time, even during the era of severe anti-Polish measures implemented after the 1863 uprising, did the publication of Polish books and newspapers cease under Russian rule.⁵

The above statements require certain qualifications. The early nineteenth-century cultural revival in Left-Bank Ukraine met with no persecution. The tsarist authorities simply ignored it, looking upon it as an expression of harmless regional sentiment. It was the uncovering of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society which alerted the government to the Ukrainian menace, and the members of the circle were dealt with accordingly. The second major anti-Ukrainian measure was the so-called Valuev Ukase of 1863, followed, in 1876, by the infamous Ukase of Ems, which totally prohibited Ukrainian-language publications and Ukrainian cultural and educational pursuits.⁶ For the next thirty years, until the 1905 Revolution, no overt expression of the Ukrainian national movement was tolerated in the Russian Empire. Still, tsarist autocracy was not totalitarian, and men armed with determination, patience, and caution could find crevices in the walls of the ‘prison-house of nations.’ For instance, academic scholarship enjoyed a measure of relative freedom in old Russia. Both before and after the ominous year 1876 there appeared a number of valuable works in the field of Ukrainian studies. They were written in Russian, and therefore were credited to the achievements of Russian science, but they helped to keep alive the flame of a Ukrainian intellectual tradition.

The Ukrainian national movement suffered not only at the hands of the Russian government, but also from the hostility of Russian society. On the popular level, the Ukrainian and Russian peasant differed (as Donald Mackenzie Wallace noted) in ‘language, costume, traditions, popular songs, proverbs, folklore, domestic arrangements, mode of life and communal organization.’⁷ A khokhol and a katsap never considered each other as belonging to the same people. But educated Russian society completely shared the official doctrine of the triune Russian narodnost. In this respect, the liberal or even revolutionary Russian intelligent diverged but little from the tsarist bureaucrat. Of course, there were some rare exceptions, such as Herzen, and a few objective and humane scholars, among whom one should mention A.N. Pypin, F.E. Korsh, and A.A. Shakhmatov, who cultivated a sympathetic interest in Ukrainian topics. The prevalent mentality was exemplified by the progenitor of the radical Russian intelligentsia, Vissarion Belinsky, who back in the 1840s had heaped abuse on Shevchenko and gleefully applauded the predicament of the Cyrillo-Methodians.⁸ While only a few Russian radicals
revealed their anti-Ukrainian bias with Belinsky’s brutal honesty, their attitudes toward Ukrainian national aspirations usually varied between indifference, amused condescension, and thinly disguised hostility. The Ukrainian political theorist, Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95), who met many Russian revolutionary luminaries during his Geneva exile, commented on them:

Their pseudo-cosmopolitan sermons against nationalism are directed... not against those who oppress other nationalities, but rather against those who seek to defend themselves against this oppression. They seek to substitute denationalization for internationalism.9

Drahomanov’s criticism was directed against Russian revolutionary populists, but things did not change with the rise of Marxism. A memoirist said of Georgii Plekhanov, the founding father of Russian Marxism:

He literally hated any separatism. He treated Ukrainophilism [i.e., the Ukrainian national movement] with contempt and hostility. The Russian unifier and leveller was deeply rooted in him... With Dragomanov he was in openly hostile relations.... He treated Shevchenko and the Ukrainophiles with decidedly greater hatred than even for instance Katkov.10

Tsarist repression, compounded by the hostility of Russian society, created an inhospitable environment in which the Ukrainian national movement could make only slow headway. For decades the movement’s chief vehicles were the so-called hromady (communities), loosely structured, informal circles, composed mostly of intellectuals and professional men, which existed in most Ukrainian cities. The total membership of the hromady at no given time surpassed a few hundred.11 Strong faith was needed in the late nineteenth century to maintain one’s confidence in the future of the Ukrainian cause. The masses of the peasantry, it is true, preserved their native language and folk culture. But they were mostly illiterate, deprived of a modern civic and national consciousness, and politically amorphous. Except for a small band of dedicated patriots, everything rising above the popular level was, or appeared, Russified. I say “appeared,” because a hidden Ukrainian complex lived in the souls of countless outwardly conforming “Little Russians.” Socio-economic changes and the approaching political crisis of the autocracy were to offer new outlets to these pent-up forces.

A result of the repression of the Ukrainian movement in the Russian Empire was the moving of its center of gravity to Austrian Galicia.12 Ukrainian prospects there were at first discouragingly unprepossessing. Prior to its annexation by Austria, Galicia had for four hundred years be-
longed to the Polish Commonwealth, and the local Ukrainian (Ruthenian) population lacked the Cossack tradition which was the leaven of the national revival in Dnieper Ukraine. A cultural national movement started among the Galician Ukrainians only in the 1830s, a full generation after that in the Left-Bank area. The Galician Ukrainians made a modest political debut in the wake of the 1848 Austrian Revolution, but their gains were later mostly nullified by the Polish successes in the 1860s. It is to be kept in mind that Galicia was not ethnically homogenous. The river San approximately divided the province into a larger, eastern part which was predominantly Ukrainian, but which also included a sizeable Polish minority of some 20 per cent, and a Polish western part. In Galicia as a whole, the two nationalities were of about equal numerical strength, but the Poles possessed economic, cultural, and political superiority. In Polish eyes, Galicia was a parcel of the historical Polish state which in due time was to be handed back to a future restored Poland. Like the Russians, the Poles found unpalatable the very idea of a separate Ukrainian nationality, refused to treat the Ukrainians as equal partners, and were determined to keep them permanently in a nationally and socially subordinate position.

For most of the first century after its annexation by the Habsburg Empire in 1772, Galicia was ruled by the German-Austrian bureaucracy. In 1867, however, as a side effect of the Austro-Hungarian Compromise, Vienna transferred control over Galicia into Polish hands. Poles dominated the state administration, headed by the viceroy who was always a member of the Polish aristocracy, and the autonomous provincial institutions under the jurisdiction of the Diet. The civil service and judiciary became Polonized in personnel and official language. The electoral system, based on representation by economic interest groups (curiae) and indirect voting, was heavily weighted in favour of the Poles. Ukrainian representation in both the Vienna Reichsrat and the Galician Diet was further reduced to the point of political insignificance by gerrymandering, administrative pressure, and rampant corruption. "Galician elections" were a byword throughout Austria-Hungary. Ukrainians were systematically excluded from higher administrative positions, and their educational opportunities were severely curtailed. The Polish-dominated Diet blocked the creation of Ukrainian secondary schools. The institutions of higher learning were entirely Polish, with the exception of a few Ukrainian-language chairs at Lviv University. It should be added that Galicia was an economically backward land, suffering from agrarian overpopulation, and with a slow rate of industrialization and urbanization. Around the turn of the century, the economic condition of the Ukrainian masses was probably worse under Austro-Polish than under Russian rule.
One may wonder how it was possible for Galicia, in spite of these handicaps, to become the centre of the Ukrainian national movement. There were, however, also some important positive factors. In the first place, the religious situation in the province strengthened the sense of Ukrainian national identity. Virtually all Galician Ukrainians belonged to the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church. The Eastern rite differentiated them visibly from their Polish neighbours, while the allegiance to Rome protected them against the influences of Russian Orthodoxy. (Common Orthodox religion was one of the strongest ties which bound the people in Dnieper Ukraine to Russia.) The Greek Catholic Church, as an institution, was not at first identified with the Ukrainian national cause, and its outlook was rather "Ruthenian," i.e., narrowly provincial and marked by an excessive subservience to the Habsburgs. This changed later, and under the guidance of an outstanding personality, Andrei Sheptytsky (1865–1944), Metropolitan of the Galician ecclesiastical province from 1900, the Greek Catholic Church became closely associated with the Ukrainian struggle for independence.

The second asset of the Ukrainian movement in Galicia was the circumstance that it operated within the framework of a constitutional state. Despite all the shortcomings of the Austrian constitutional system, especially as applied to Galicia by the Polish administration, Ukrainians there enjoyed certain minimal civil rights. They were able to publish books and newspapers, to form associations of all kinds, and to hold public meetings. Elections provided opportunities for the political mobilization of the masses. Ukrainian deputies in the parliament and the Diet could at least voice the grievances of their constituencies. The conditions of an overt political life provided a training ground for leaders who became skilled in organizational matters and parliamentary procedures. All this gave Galician Ukrainians a definite advantage over their compatriots in Russia where, prior to 1905, the national movement had been driven underground.

Galicia’s third asset was the aid which the national movement there received from east-central Ukraine. After the Ukase of Ems, eastern Ukrainian writers began to contribute regularly to Galician periodicals and to publish their works in Lviv. Two natives of Dnieper Ukraine who exercised the greatest influence on the development of Galicia were Mykhailo Drahomanov and Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866–1934). Drahomanov acted, between the 1870s and the 1890s, as a mentor to a group of progressive Galician Ukrainian intellectuals. A member of this group was Ivan Franko (1856–1916), the most distinguished western Ukrainian writer, also eminent as a scholar and publicist. Drahomanov’s Galician disciples founded, in 1890, the Ruthenian-Ukrainian Radical Party, which was the first modern Ukrainian political party. Its program
embraced agrarian reforms, political democracy, and anti-clericalism. Hrushevsky was the first prominent eastern Ukrainian to settle in Galicia. Called in 1894 to a chair of history at Lviv University, he also assumed the presidency of the Shevchenko Scientific Society. This institution, funded with donations from Dnieper Ukraine, evolved under Hrushevsky’s energetic leadership into an important centre of research and publication—in fact, an unofficial Ukrainian academy of sciences.17

These impulses from east-central Ukraine transformed the outlook of the national movement in Galicia, ridding it of narrow provincialism and providing it with a pan-Ukrainian ideology. The aid received from their compatriots in the east strengthened the hand of Galician Ukrainians in their dealings with the domineering Polish neighbours. In turn, the rise of a strong and dynamic Ukrainian national community in Galicia radiated back, especially after 1905, on Ukrainian lands in Russia. Thus there took shape the concept of Galicia as the “Ukrainian Piedmont”: a small land with a great mission, called to serve as the geographical base and rallying point in the liberation struggle of the entire Ukrainian people.

For the Ukrainian national movement in Galicia, the quarter-century prior to the outbreak of World War I was a period of steady advance on all fronts. A contemporary Polish observer aptly characterized this trend of events as “the Ukrainian conquest.” The conquest was, in the first place, internal: the imbuing of the Ukrainian masses with a modern national consciousness. This was achieved through an ever-expanding network of popular associations: educational, professional, economic, paramilitary, etc. Participation in these associations, whose local branches reached down to every town and village, gave the peasantry a new sense of human dignity. There were also marked signs of the improvement of the economic lot of the Ukrainian population, owing to agricultural education, credit unions, a flourishing co-operative movement, organized seasonal or permanent migrations to Western Europe and North America, and purchases of land from indebted Polish great landowners.

On the political side, it now became possible to start a systematic, stubborn assault against Polish hegemony in Galicia. This was connected with the empire-wide struggle for the democratization of Austria’s constitutional system. A landmark in that struggle was the electoral reform of 1907, which introduced universal manhood suffrage in the elections to the Vienna Reichsrat. Ukrainian parliamentary representation trebled at once, in spite of the fact that, by the device of artful gerrymandering, Ukrainians still remained heavily under-represented in comparison with the Polish part of Galicia’s population.

During the next five years, from 1908 to 1913, the struggle concentrated on the issue of the reform of the electoral ordinance to the Galician
Diet and of the provincial statute. Conditions in eastern Galicia at times approached the state of a Polish-Ukrainian civil war. An expression of the mounting tension was the assassination in 1908 of Galicia’s viceroy, Count Andrzej Potocki, by a Ukrainian student. At this time, in contrast to the 1860s, Vienna was no longer willing to sacrifice the Ukrainians to Polish interests. Without imposing a solution from above, the central government offered its services as intermediary. What emerged from protracted negotiations was the February 1914 compromise mentioned at the beginning of this paper. We cannot know how the compromise would have worked in practice if the war had not intervened. It seems, however, most likely that after the removal of the artificial impediments which in the past had hampered the advancement of the Ukrainian national movement, the Ukrainians might have achieved, in another few years, political preponderance in eastern Galicia.

The Poles had for many years blocked the creation of a Ukrainian university in Lviv. The Ukrainian campaign on behalf of a national university had started in 1898. By 1913 a positive solution of the problem seemed at hand, and the final decision (in the form of an imperial re-script) was postponed only because of a technicality. The establishment of a Ukrainian university in Galicia was bound to have profound repercussions in Dnieper Ukraine as well. An English journalist, Henry Wickham Steed, commented thus on the political significance of the Ukrainian university problem:

... the University would be conceived not only as a means of spreading higher education among the [Austrian] Ruthenesis but as the instrument of an aggressive "cultural" policy against Russia.

An eastern Ukrainian historian and civic leader, Dmytro Doroshenko, who revisited Galicia in the early summer of 1914 after an absence of ten years, was impressed by the evidence of the achievements of the Ukrainian movement:

How everything has grown and expanded! ... When I met my Lviv friends, when I became acquainted with their mood, when I heard about their hopes and plans—I began to appreciate the progress which Ukrainian life has made in this land’s capital in the past ten years. I could see clearly that here in Galicia the Ukrainians were already evolving into a state nation, and that they were well on their way to becoming masters in their own country.

Let us again turn our attention to east-central Ukraine. An intensification of Ukrainian activities there became noticeable in the 1890s. In 1900 a group of Kharkiv University students founded the underground Revo-
volutionary Ukrainian Party which, using Galicia as a base for its operations, conducted a brisk propaganda campaign among the peasantry and urban workers. In 1905 it adopted a Marxist program and changed its name to Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party. The level of national consciousness of the Ukrainian masses was still so low that when the 1905 Revolution came it did not assume a distinctly national colouring in Ukraine. However, one of the results of the revolution was the lapse of the discriminatory provisions of the Ukase of Ems. Almost overnight, Ukrainian newspapers, journals, and books began to appear, and various Ukrainian cultural and educational associations sprang into existence. Particularly important among them were the Prosvita (Enlightenment) organizations, which followed a Galician model. These were reading halls that became the civic and cultural centers in the villages and small towns throughout the country. On the political side, both in the First and Second Imperial Duma (of 1906 and 1907, respectively), a Ukrainian caucus of some forty to fifty deputies was formed. Ukrainian members of the Second Duma prepared the draft of a law on the autonomy of Ukraine, but because of early dissolution the bill could not be placed on the legislature’s agenda.

The tsarist government had not abandoned its basic assumption with respect to the Ukrainian problem: the doctrine of the triune Russian nation, which logically entailed the non-recognition of a separate Ukrainian nationality. The government staunchly resisted even the most modest Ukrainian national-cultural demands. For instance, it would not allow Ukrainian language instruction even in elementary schools. After 1907, feeling itself again in control of the situation, the tsarist regime resumed its traditional repressive policy toward the Ukrainian movement. The changed electoral law, imposed by imperial decree in 1907, weighted the composition of the legislature in favour of the upper classes, which in Ukraine were Russian or Russified. In consequence, no organized Ukrainian clubs were to be found in the Third and Fourth Duma, although there were individual Ukrainian sympathizers who belonged to various Russian parties. Provincial governors dissolved Ukrainian associations (particularly those with a mass appeal, such as the Prosvita) on the slightest pretext. Ukrainian periodicals were driven into bankruptcy by continual confiscations, while their subscribers in the provinces suffered harassment from local authorities.  

To bolster the shaky foundations of the tsarist regime, the government, headed by Prime Minister Petr Stolypin, entered into an alliance with militant Great Russian nationalism. With the administration’s support, “Black Hundred” and chauvinist Russian organizations were created in Ukraine, e.g., the Club of Russian Nationalists in Kiev. They engaged in vociferous and often scurrilous anti-Ukrainian as well as anti-Semitic
propaganda. At that time the term *mazepinstvo* (Mazepism) was given wide circulation as a derogatory label for the Ukrainian movement. The word was coined from the name of Hetman Ivan Mazepa who, in 1708, during the Great Northern War, went over from the Russian to the Swedish side. The implication was that Ukrainian patriots were, like the so-called "Judas" Mazepa, traitors in the pay of foreign powers. In the wake of the policy of Neo-Slavism, inaugurated c. 1907, the tsarist government and Russian right-wing organizations attempted to undermine the Ukrainian movement in its stronghold. Financial and moral support was lavished on the Galician Russophiles, a moribund group of "Ruthenian" ultra-conservatives who accepted the idea of the unity of the Russian nation from the Carpathians to Kamchatka. The sterile intrigues of the Galician Russophiles were shielded by a part of the province's Polish administration. The Polish National-Democratic Party, influential both in Russian Poland and in Galicia, advocated a concerted Russo-Polish effort to crush the common Ukrainian enemy.  

The Ukrainian movement, however, could no longer be contained. Russia had become a semi-constitutional state, and wholesale repression in the style of the Ukase of Ems was no longer feasible. When the administration harassed and closed down Ukrainian associations, new substitute forms of activity were found. For instance, the co-operative movement was making great strides in all parts of Russia, but in the "South" it was controlled by Ukrainians.  

The Kiev street demonstrations in connection with the Shevchenko centenary, in March 1914, were a symptom of the growing momentum of the Ukrainian movement. Such an event would have been impossible ten years earlier.

If we try to assess how far the nation-building process had advanced in east-central Ukraine by 1914, the answer is not an easy one. No detailed empirical studies of this problem have been undertaken so far. Soviet historians, who have access to relevant and still untapped archival materials, have been reluctant to tackle this task. Therefore, in dealing with this problem we must use casual comments of contemporary observers. This admittedly fragmentary evidence will allow us to make some tentative generalizations.

In the first place, let us quote the anguished outcry of a leading member of the Kiev Club of Russian Nationalists, A. Savenko, who wrote in 1911:

> The fact must be acknowledged that the Mazepist movement is growing apace... From its Galician base, it is spreading through the whole of southern Russia... The flames of a conflagration are engulfing all of Little Russia.  

This might be dismissed as the alarmist voice of a Russian super-
patriot (and, typically, renegade Ukrainian). If one considers, however, what happened in Ukraine only a few years later, in 1917, one must recognize that Savenko’s diagnosis contained an element of truth.

On the other side of the argument, we have the reminiscences of a Ukrainian student activist, Dmytro Solovei, who in 1914 arrived in Poltava. He was dismayed by the Russification of this historical Ukrainian city, and by the numerical weakness and passivity of the local Ukrainian intelligentsia.26 How are two such contradictory opinions as those of Savenko and Solovei to be harmonized?

Probably closest to the truth were the judicious observations of Ievhen Chykalenko, the publisher of the Kiev Ukrainian daily, Rada. He noted in his diary in 1913 that in provincial towns, where one generation earlier one could hardly hear any Russian spoken, nowadays the Russian language predominated. But the number of nationally conscious Ukrainians was also increasing every year.27 Concerning the social composition of the Ukrainian movement, Chykalenko recorded that its active carriers belonged mostly to the so-called third element, i.e., to the rural intelligentsia and semi-intelligentsia. Financial support for Ukrainian cultural activities came from individual members of the bourgeoisie who had risen from the common people.

Among the peasantry [national] awareness has greatly spread and deepened in recent years. There are villages where nearly all the farmers are conscious nationalists, even Ukrainian chauvinists. This is the work of some school teacher or medical assistant [feldsher] who has awakened this consciousness.28

It should be added that the degree to which individual geographical sections of the country had been penetrated by the national movement varied considerably. The movement had made an impact in the provinces of Kiev, Chernihiv, and Poltava. Other parts of Ukraine, especially the ethnically mixed Black Sea coastal area and the industrial south-east, still remained but little affected.

One important difference between east-central Ukraine and Galicia ought to be stressed. In the latter territory, the line separating the Poles and the Ukrainians was sharp and clear, despite frequent intermarriages. One had to be either Pole or Ukrainian, and it was impossible to be both at once. Russian-Ukrainian differentiation, on the other hand, remained fluid and often blurred. For instance, all Russian political parties operated in Ukraine and found supporters not only among the local Russian minority but also among segments of the indigenous Ukrainian population.29 Participation in Russian political and cultural activities did not preclude a residual Ukrainian consciousness. Still, the prevalence of such hybrid forms of national identity was an indication that the Ukrain-
ian national movement still had a long way to go.

It is time to draw certain conclusions. During the pre-World War I era the Ukrainian national movement had undoubtedly made remarkable strides. But on the whole, except for the small Galician section, Ukraine in 1914 was not yet a fully crystallized nation. A period of peace was needed to consolidate the gains. Instead, the war came. The war and the subsequent revolution accelerated the nation-building process but at the same time placed the young nation under a tremendous burden which exceeded its strength. I speak of the task of creating an independent state in a country which did not yet possess elementary schools in its native language.

Notes


12. I.L. Rudnytsky, ‘‘The Ukrainians in Galicia under Austrian Rule,’’ 315—52 of this volume.
ESSAYS IN MODERN UKRAINIAN HISTORY

18. V. Mudryi, Borotba za ohnyshche ukrainskoi nauky na zakhidnykh zemliakh Ukrainy (Lviv 1923).
21. S.N. Shchegolev, Ukrainskoe dvizhenie kak sovremennyi etap iuzhnorusskogo separatizma (Kiev 1912); V. Doroshenko, Ukrainstvo v Rosii (Vienna 1917); O. Lottotsky, Storinky mynoloho, 4 vols. (Warsaw 1932–9).
22. Ie. Chykalenko, Shchodennyk (1907–1917) (Lviv 1931), passim.
28. Ibid., 289.
The Fourth Universal and Its Ideological Antecedents

The Fourth Universal adopted on 25 January 1918\(^1\) by the revolutionary parliament of Ukraine, the Central Rada, contained the following solemn and memorable words: "From this day forth, the Ukrainian People’s Republic becomes independent, subject to no one, a free, sovereign state of the Ukrainian people."\(^2\)

The purpose of this paper is to study the Fourth Universal as a document of social thought, placing it within the framework of Ukrainian intellectual history and the political circumstances of the time. The discussion will focus on the essential aspect of the Fourth Universal, the declaration of Ukrainian independence. Other concepts, such as the constitutional structure and the social organization of the Ukrainian state, will be touched upon only incidentally.

First of all, it is necessary to keep in mind that the Fourth Universal was not the act by which a Ukrainian state was called into existence. This had been done two months earlier, on 20 November 1917, by the Third Universal, which stated: "From this day forth, Ukraine is the Ukrainian People’s Republic." At the same time, however, the Third Universal preserved a federative link between Ukraine and the other lands of the former Russian Empire, and it even pledged to "stand firmly on our own soil, in order that our efforts may aid all of Russia, so that the whole Russian Republic may become a federation of equal and free peoples."\(^3\) In contrast, the Fourth Universal proclaimed the complete political separation of Ukraine from Russia.

The Third and Fourth Universals represent two successive stages in the building of a Ukrainian state. But they can also be viewed as expressions of two alternative concepts of Ukrainian statehood—federalist and separatist. At the time of the adoption of the Third Universal, an all-Russian central government no longer existed. Thus, the federalist tendency of
that act was not imposed from the outside; rather, it was quite voluntary. However, in the short span of time that separated the two Universals, there occurred a radical shift in the thinking of the Rada’s leaders. To appreciate fully the meaning of this epoch-making change of views, it is necessary to survey briefly the origins of the ideas of federalism and state independence (samostiiyntstvo)⁴ in Ukrainian political thought.

The federalist concept can be traced back to ideas prevalent among certain branches of the Decembrist movement which were active in Ukraine during the early 1820s—especially in the Society of United Slavs.⁵ In a more mature form one finds the same concept in the programmatic documents of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society of the late 1840s.⁶ The Society’s ideological legacy had a determining impact on the outlook of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement during the second half of the nineteenth and the beginning of the twentieth centuries. The doctrine of federalism found its classical theoretical formulation in the writings of the outstanding pre-revolutionary Ukrainian political thinker, Mykhailo Drahomanov (1841–95).⁷ On the eve of the First World War, this concept was upheld by the two main political groupings in Russian Ukraine: the Social Democrats, whose ideologist was Mykola Porsh (1877–1944);⁸ and the liberal populists, whose chief spokesman was the eminent historian Mykhailo Hrushevsky (1866-1934). In the pamphlet Iakoi my khochemo avtonomii i federatsii (The Kind of Autonomy and Federation We Desire), published in Kiev at the very beginning of the Revolution, Hrushevsky wrote:

The political goal of the Ukrainians is a broad national-territorial autonomy for Ukraine within a federated Russian Republic... The Ukrainians demand that one region, one national territory be formed from all Ukrainian lands... of the Russian state.... The Ukrainian territory ought to be organized on the basis of a broad democratic civic self-government, and representation must not be by curiae. This system of self-government ought to extend from the bottom—the “small zemstvo unit”—to the top—the Ukrainian Diet [soim]. The Ukrainian territory ought to be able to settle at home its own economic, cultural, and political issues; it ought to keep its own armed forces, and dispose of its roads, revenue, land, and natural resources; it ought to possess its own legislation, administration, and judiciary. Only in certain matters, common to the entire Russian state, should Ukraine accept the decisions of the central parliament, in which the proportion of Ukrainian representatives ought to be the same as that of the Ukrainian population to that of the population of the whole Russian Republic.⁹

During the first period of its existence, the actual policies of the Central Rada fully corresponded to this program.

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With regard to the separatist concept, its earliest literary expressions are to be found in the pamphlets *Ukraine Irredenta* (1895)\(^{10}\) by Iulian Bachynsky (1870–1934), and *Samostiina Ukraina* (Independent Ukraine, 1900)\(^{11}\) by Mykola Mikhnovsky (1873–1924). Starting from different premises, each author reached the idea of Ukrainian statehood independently. Bachynsky employed economic arguments within a Marxist frame of reference, while Mikhnovsky reasoned from an historical and legal standpoint. The prominent Galician writer and scholar Ivan Franko (1856–1916) also became an early supporter of the *samostiinist* concept, as seen in his article “Poza mezhamy mozhyvoho” (Beyond the Limits of the Possible, 1900).\(^{12}\) Somewhat later, in the years preceding the outbreak of the war, the separatist program found gifted advocates in the historian and sociologist Viacheslav Lypynsky (1882–1931) and the publicist and literary critic Dmytro Dontsov (1883–1973).\(^{13}\)

The two leading Ukrainian political parties in Galicia, the National Democrats and the Radicals, included the slogan of *samostiinist* in their respective programs. The platform of the National-Democratic Party, adopted in 1899, stated: “The final goal of our striving is the achievement of cultural, economic, and political independence by the entire Ukrainian-Ruthenian nation, and its future unification in one body politic.”\(^{14}\) This postulate had at first a declaratory rather than a practical political significance. But the worsening of the international situation, especially the growth of Russo-Austrian tension after 1908, moved it nearer to the sphere of political reality. The separatist concept found striking expression in the manifesto issued on 3 August 1914 by the Supreme Ukrainian Council (Holovna Ukrainska Rada), a representative body founded at the outbreak of the war by the leaders of all Ukrainian parties in Galicia:

The Russian tsars violated the Treaty of Pereiaslav [1654] by which they undertook the obligation to respect the independence of Ukraine—and they enslaved free Ukraine. For three hundred years the policy of the tsarist empire has been to rob subjugated Ukraine of her national soul, to make the Ukrainian people a part of the Russian people. The tsarist government has deprived the Ukrainian people of their most sacred right—the right of the native language. In contemporary tsarist Russia the most oppressed people are the Ukrainians.... Therefore, our path is clear.... The victory of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy shall be our own victory. And the greater Russia’s defeat, the sooner will strike the hour of liberation for Ukraine.... May the sun of a free Ukraine rise over the ruins of the tsarist empire!\(^{15}\)

In trying to assess the comparative influence of the federalist and separatist alternatives in pre-revolutionary Ukrainian political thinking, one...
must admit that the former was by far the more important. Not only did federalism enjoy chronological priority, but its theories were more impressively elaborated. The samostiinyky did not produce a theorist who could measure up to Drahomanov in intellectual stature or in the weightiness and sheer volume of his writings. As far as popular support is concerned, the idea of independent statehood had made headway only in Galicia prior to 1914. It is true that among the literary exponents of the separatist trend we find several natives of Dnieper Ukraine: Mykola Mikhnovsky, Viacheslav Lypynsky, and Dmytro Dontsov. But they were unable to recruit more than a handful of followers among their compatriots in the Russian Empire. Mikhnovsky’s attempt, in 1902, to organize a Ukrainian People’s Party (Ukrainska Narodna Partiia) with a nationalist-separatist program, proved stillborn. The bulk of the Ukrainian intelligentsia in Russian Ukraine—and let us keep in mind that some four-fifths of the Ukrainian people lived within the borders of the Russian Empire—continued to adhere to the federalist platform. The only notable separatist political organization whose members were central and eastern Ukrainians was the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine (Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy). But this was an émigré group, formed at the outbreak of the war by political exiles from Dnieper Ukraine who resided in Austria. The Union owed its existence to the impact of the Galician-Ukrainian environment, and the organization’s activities during the war years took place wholly outside Ukraine and within the camp of the Central Powers.¹⁶

The separatist, anti-Russian policy of the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine was definitely rejected by the representative spokesmen of the Ukrainian national movement in Russia, Mykhailo Hrushevsky and Symon Petliura (1879–1926). Hrushevsky was spending the summer vacation of 1914 in the Carpathian Mountains, and the beginning of the war caught him on Austrian territory. The leaders of the newly founded Union approached him with the suggestion that he move to Switzerland for the duration of the war and act on neutral soil as an authoritative representative of Ukrainian interests before world opinion. Hrushevsky refused and against considerable odds returned voluntarily through Italy to Russia. Upon his arrival in Kiev in November 1914, he was immediately arrested as a dangerous Ukrainian nationalist and spent the years before the fall of the tsarist regime in enforced residence in Kazan and Moscow.¹⁷

Petliura’s political attitude is reflected in his letter (dated 18 December 1914) to Osyp Nazaruk (1883–1940), a prominent Galician journalist and politician sent to Stockholm by the Union for the Liberation of Ukraine in order to re-establish contacts with the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in Russia. Petliura wrote: ‘‘Every step, word, or deed which
tends toward creating in Russian Ukraine conditions subversive to the unity of the Russian state, or toward a weakening of that state at the present time [of war], is severely condemned in Ukraine [by public opinion], because it is considered harmful also to Ukrainian interests." Petliura roundly deprecated the orientation toward the Central Powers of the Galician Ukrainians and the émigré Union, and he expressed his conviction of Russia’s invincibility. He also predicted that the war would lead to Russia’s annexation of Galicia and Bukovyna, an event he was willing to welcome as desirable from the viewpoint of Ukrainian interests. Hrushevsky’s and Petliura’s demonstrations of loyalty to Russia in 1914 are, indeed, remarkable in view of the fact that only three years later they were to be counted among the founding fathers of an independent Ukrainian People’s Republic. One of them, Petliura, was also to emerge soon afterward as the standard-bearer and living symbol of Ukraine’s armed struggle against the Russia of both Lenin and Denikin.

One wonders, then, why the federalist concept predominated in pre-revolutionary Ukrainian political thought. First, we must take into account that Ukraine had belonged to the Russian Empire for about 250 years (although for the first century, it is true, it enjoyed an autonomous status), and that this prolonged connection had formed a pronounced material and psychological bond between Ukraine and Russia proper. Despite their grievances against the centralism of St. Petersburg, the Ukrainians did not feel themselves strangers in an empire to whose development many individuals of Ukrainian origin had made significant contributions. However, the acceptance of the empire, which appeared as an overwhelming and unshakable reality, could, and did, co-exist in Ukrainian minds with an awareness of a distinct Ukrainian ethnic identity and an allegiance to the special political and cultural interests of the homeland.

Two currents can be distinguished among the educated classes of Ukraine in the second half of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries: the “Little Russian” trend, whose supporters affirmed the merger of their people with Russia to the point of complete assimilation; and the Ukrainian nationalist trend, which attempted, with varying degrees of intensity, to preserve and strengthen a Ukrainian cultural and to some extent political identity. Not only the “Little Russians” but also the so-called “conscious Ukrainians” experienced the strong impact of Russian imperial civilization and, so to speak, stood with one foot in the all-Russian world. Prominent Ukrainian civic figures often belonged simultaneously to various Russian revolutionary and oppositional groups or made their living as Russian civil servants or zemstvo functionaries. Many eminent Ukrainian writers—from Hryhorii Kvitka-Osnovianenko (1778–1843) to Volodymyr Vynnychenko (1880–1951)—were bilingual. Outstanding Ukrainian scholars—such as the historians Mykola
Kostomarov (1817–85), Volodymyr Antonovych (1834–1908), Dmytro Bahalii (1857–1932), the linguist Oleksander Potebnia (1835–92), the sociologist Bohdan Kistiakovsky (1868–1920), the economist Mykhailo Tuhan-Baranovsky (1865–1919)—occupied chairs at Russian universities and published their works in Russian. And one cannot forget, of course, the ecclesiastical unity between the Ukrainian and Russian peoples and the close economic links between the Empire’s Great Russian north and the Ukrainian south.¹⁹

An astute Polish student of Russia’s nationality problems, Leon Wasilewski, wrote on the eve of the First World War:

A Ukrainian intellectual always remains a Russian. Educated in Russian schools, and raised on Russian literature, in his public life—as a civil servant, lawyer, teacher, physician, scientist, etc.—he constantly uses the Russian language. . . . This symbiosis with the Russian element has created among the Ukrainian intelligentsia a feeling of complete national unity with Russia.²⁰

Wasilewski’s observations call for some critical comments. The fact that educated Ukrainians had experienced the strong impact of Russian imperial civilization did not mean that they had been turned into true Russians in the ethnic sense of the word. Moreover, the existence of an irreducible Ukrainian ethnic identity generated an awareness—if sometimes only in rudimentary form—of a separate cultural and political tradition. The extreme case of the “Little Russians” is particularly instructive. Close scrutiny shows that although they wished to identify themselves completely with Russia, they retained certain specifically Ukrainian traits in their mental make-up.²¹ Under favourable circumstances, this repressed “Ukrainian complex” broke through with a force comparable to that of a religious conversion. In 1917, when the spell of the Empire was broken, thousands of former “Little Russians” rediscovered themselves almost overnight as nationally conscious Ukrainian patriots and potential separatists. While correctly assessing the extent of the Russification of Ukraine on the eve of the First World War, Wasilewski underestimated the potential strength of deep-seated Ukrainian nationalism.

A student of history must be sparing in the use of analogies. Nevertheless, a judicious application of comparisons may contribute to the illumination of a specific problem. If we search for cases paralleling that of pre-revolutionary Ukraine, we will have to look toward other nationalities submerged in great empires and struggling for survival against the pressures and lures of a prestigious imperial civilization. The great historian and “Father of the Czech Nation,” František Palacký, declared in 1848: “Certainly, if the Austrian Empire had not existed for ages, we would be obliged in the interests of Europe and even of mankind to create
it as quickly as possible.’’ Throughout the nineteenth century, Czech spokesmen continued to view the future of their nation within the framework of the Austrian Empire, which they wished to reorganize as a federation of nationalities among whom the Czechs would inevitably play a distinguished role. This view was shared prior to 1914 by Thomas Masaryk, the future founder of the Czechoslovak Republic. It was the frustration of the hopes for Austria’s constitutional reform, particularly after the Austro-Hungarian Compromise of 1867, which undermined this original loyalty of the Czechs to the Habsburg Monarchy. But, despite the growing political disaffection and the acrimonious ethnic rivalry between the Czechs and the Germans in Bohemia, the impact of Austrian mores on Czech society was very deep, and its marks are still clearly visible today.

The fate of the nationalities of the “Celtic fringe” of the British Islands may also be considered. The emergence of a world-wide British Empire in the eighteenth century weakened the national identity of Scotland and Ireland by providing their traditional leading classes and the most energetic elements of the common people with new outlets: participation in Britain’s economic enterprise and colonial expansion. Still, the Celtic nations of Great Britain, which seemed moribund a century ago, did not perish. Ireland, despite terrible population losses and the virtual extinction of the native language, regained political independence after the First World War. In our own times, we have witnessed a resurgence of Welsh and Scottish nationalism—a trend certainly connected with the passing of the old British Empire.

We must not forget, of course, that the case of Ukraine differs in certain essential aspects from the examples mentioned above. For instance, linguistically the Ukrainians certainly are closer to the Russians than are the Czechs to the Germans; nor are the Ukrainians differentiated from the Russians by religion, as the Irish are from the English. The most important difference, however, was of a political nature. The Ukrainian national movement was hampered by the Russian Empire’s absolutist structure, which did not exist either in liberal England or even in conservative-constitutional Austria.

With these factors in mind, we are perhaps better prepared to understand the meaning of the prevalence of the federalist concept in pre-revolutionary Ukrainian political thought: it was an attempt to strike a balance between national and imperial interests. Ukrainian patriots connected the prospects of national liberation with hopes for a future democratic and decentralized Russia. As their final goal, they envisaged the transformation of the centralistic Russian Empire into a commonwealth of free and equal peoples, within which Ukraine would enjoy not only free cultural development but also political self-government. This ideal
was already clearly formulated in the basic programmatic document of the Cyrillo-Methodian Society, *Knyhy bytiia ukrainskoho narodu* (The Books of the Genesis of the Ukrainian People), composed by Mykola Kostomarov in 1846: "And Ukraine shall be an independent republic within the Slavic Union." The ideology of the Society was coloured by romantic Pan-Slavism.

The spokesman of the next, positivist generation, Mykhailo Drahomanov, restated the same ideal in more sober terms in 1882: "The independence of a given country and nation can be achieved either by its secession into a separate state (separatism) or by the securing of its self-government without such separation (federalism)." Of these two alternatives, Drahomanov definitely preferred the latter. It is noteworthy, however, that both Kostomarov and Drahomanov considered federalism not as an abdication from national independence but rather as the most rational and convenient form of achieving independence. This explains how it was possible, once faith in the feasibility of federalism collapsed, for Ukrainian political thought to turn quickly toward the concept of *samostiinist*.

The strength of the federalist concept lay in its correspondence to the objective conditions of the Ukrainian people prior to 1917. It was obvious that the progress of the Ukrainian national cause depended on the evolution of Russia as a whole. But federalism had also certain weak spots, which, if not fully visible to contemporaries, are easily identifiable in retrospect.

The fate of the federalist idea depended on the presence of forces within the dominant Russian nation that were willing to back this program. The prospects were not encouraging. Since the Muscovite period, the Russian state had been highly centralized; a transition to federalism would have implied a break with the national past and the abandonment of a deeply ingrained tradition. Moreover, it was with regard to the question of Ukraine that the Russians displayed a particularly defensive and intransigent attitude. Many Russians were willing to recognize that Poland, Finland, and perhaps the Baltic provinces possessed national identities that could never be fully assimilated, and thus these areas possibly merited a more or less autonomous status. Caucasia and Central Asia, whatever their strategic and economic importance, were recent colonial acquisitions, profoundly alien by race and culture, and their position in the Empire was obviously marginal.

The case of Ukraine was altogether different. The emergence of the modern Russian Empire was based on the absorption of Ukraine in the course of the second half of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The undoing of the work of Peter I and Catherine II appeared to threaten Russia's position as a great European power. The idea that Ukraine was a
distinct nation, and not a regional subdivision of an all-Russian nation, was unpalatable to Russian public opinion. The distinguished Russian historian and social philosopher, Georgii Fedotov, wrote in 1947:

The awakening of Ukraine, and especially the separatist character of the Ukrainian movement, surprised the Russian intelligentsia, and remained incomprehensible to them to the very end. We loved Ukraine, its land, its people, its songs—and considered all this our very own.  

A full generation after the Revolution, Fedotov did not yet realize that the separatist character of the Ukrainian movement appeared only at a later stage and that its appearance was a result precisely of the Russians’ peculiar ‘‘love of Ukraine,’’ which amounted to a denial of the Ukrainians’ right to a national identity of their own.

The policy of the tsarist regime toward the Ukrainian national movement was, despite some minor tactical shifts, fully consistent: it was one of relentless repression. It was no wonder that Ukrainian patriots in their search for potential Russian allies pinned their hopes only on Russian radical and revolutionary forces. There were a few Russian revolutionary leaders—for example, Herzen—who showed an understanding of the plight of the Empire’s oppressed nationalities and who leaned toward federalism. Unfortunately, they were by far outweighed by the intellectual descendants of Pestel, partisans of a centralized revolutionary dictatorship, whose attitude toward the claims of the non-Russian nationalities was one of indifference at best, and who met all federalist schemes with undisguised hostility. It was by no means a fortuitous personal bias that made the celebrated leader of Russian radical thought, Belinsky, attack with savage scorn the Ukrainian literary revival of the 1830s and 40s. Drahomanov was hardly mistaken in his conviction that the ‘‘Jacobin’’ proclivities of the Russian revolutionaries (he was referring to the populists of the 1870s and 80s) constituted a potentially grave threat to the cause of liberty of all peoples in the Russian Empire: ‘‘[The Russian revolutionaries] do not desire to shake the idea of a centralized and autocratic state, but only to transfer power into other hands.’’  

And elsewhere:

These mores . . . make the [Russian] revolutionary circles similar to the governmental circles: consequently, the future political system founded by the revolutionaries would be similar to the one existing now [i.e., to the system of tsarist autocracy].  

It should be remembered that these words were pronounced by a man who always believed in the necessity of Ukrainian-Russian co-operation, one based on genuine freedom and equality for both sides. Shortly before
his death, Drahomanov responded to a right-wing Ukrainian critic:

If we were to concede that the policy of Russification is an outflow of the "spirit," the "character," etc., of the Great Russian people, then only the choice between two alternatives would be left to us. The first alternative: resolutely to embrace separatism, either by forming an independent state, or by seceding to another state. The other alternative would be to fold our hands and to look forward to our death, if we were to decide that separatism is beyond our will and strength.31

Drahomanov rejected the premises of this reasoning, and, therefore, refused to accept the dilemma as genuine. Despite his skepticism regarding Russian revolutionaries, he continued to uphold to the last the program of an alliance between Ukrainian and Russian progressive forces. But the day was not too distant when Drahomanov’s intellectual descendents, taught by bitter experience, were to reach the conclusion that a complete break-up of the Russian imperial state was a more realistic goal than its democratization and federalization, and that for Ukraine the alternatives were, indeed, either independent statehood or national annihilation.

The second major drawback of the federalist concept was that it exercised, to some extent, a debilitating effect on the morale of Ukrainian society. Renunciation of the ideal of sovereign statehood dampened the energy of the national movement and lessened its militancy and fervor. The historian of Ukrainian political ideologies, Iuliian Okhrymovych (1893–1921), made a critical observation about Drahomanov which could be applied also to the entire Ukrainian national movement of the second half of the nineteenth century: "He did not appreciate sufficiently the educational importance of maximal demands."32 The fact that the basis of the federalist program was a compromise between Ukrainian and all-Russian interests gave it a lukewarm and timid air. This was at least one of the reasons why many young Ukrainians—an example being the heroic leader of the Narodnaia volia (People’s Will Party), Andrei Zheliabov33—joined the ranks of the Russian revolutionaries and thus weakened the national movement.

It is instructive to compare Drahomanov’s attitude with that of his former disciple, Ivan Franko. The latter also believed that "the ideal of national independence lies for us at present, from today’s perspective, beyond the limits of the politically and culturally possible." But Franko continued:

[Samostiinist belongs to the ideals] capable of inflaming the heart of the masses, of inducing people to the greatest efforts and the
harshest sacrifices, and of giving them strength in the most severe trials and ordeals. . . . The thousand paths which lead to the realization [of the ideal of an independent Ukrainian state] are to be found directly under our feet. If we are aware of this ideal, and give our assent to it, we shall move along these paths, otherwise we may turn onto some very different roads.  

But pre-revolutionary Ukrainian political thinking found it too difficult to take the bold step suggested by Franko. A great shock—the experience of 1917—was needed to effect a change in the mind of the Ukrainian community.

It was no accident that prior to the First World War the idea of samostiinist found a mass following only in Galicia. The Galician Ukrainians, who lived under the rule of the Habsburg Monarchy, were directly exposed neither to Russian governmental pressure nor to the allure of Russian imperial civilization. The Russian impact, however, was also felt in Galicia, in the form of the so-called Muscophile, or Russophile, trend. But the Galicians' separatism with regard to Russia had a reverse side—namely, their loyalty to Austria. It was true that the Austrian constitutional system had glaring shortcomings and that the Galician administration was controlled by the Poles, but the Austrian constitutional system assured the "Ruthenians" certain basic civil liberties and prerequisites for cultural and national-political advancement. The Dnieper Ukrainians, for their part, had no reason whatever to sympathize with Austria. This explains why anti-Russian separatism, in its specifically Galician version, failed to make many proselytes among the population of east-central Ukraine.

At the outbreak of the war, the Galician Ukrainians pinned all their hopes on the final victory of Austria-Hungary and Germany. As we have seen, this pro-Central Powers orientation was definitely rejected by the leaders of the Ukrainian movement in Russia. In their opinion, Vienna and Berlin intended to exploit the Ukrainian trump card propagandistically, to use Ukrainian nationalism as a subversive force against Russia without subscribing to any political commitments in favour of the Ukrainian cause. A great danger existed that the Central Powers, even in the event of a victorious outcome of the war, would finally come to an agreement with Russia, leaving most Ukrainian lands under the rule of the latter. Was it worthwhile, for the sake of dubious foreign aid, to compromise the Ukrainian national movement in Russia by provoking the Russian government and society into cruel reprisals? Hrushevsky and certain other Ukrainian leaders thought in historical terms; they could not forget that the Cossack hetmans struggling against Muscovite encroachments tried to lean on the unreliable and often treacherous support of for-
eign powers—as in the case of Ivan Vyhovsky (ruled 1657–9) with Poland, Petro Doroshenko (1665–75) with Turkey, and Ivan Mazepa (1687–1709) with Sweden. All these ventures brought great misfortune to the Ukrainian people.

The formation of Ukrainian statehood passed through two distinct stages during the era of the Central Rada. The first lasted from spring to late fall, 1917; the second encompassed the winter of 1917–18. The former may be defined as autonomist and the latter as separatist. Paradoxically, the task of building an independent state devolved not on the old samostiinyky, but rather on the self-professed federalists. Neither the followers of Mikhnovsky, who, after the outbreak of the revolution, organized the Party of Socialist Independentists, nor the émigré Union for the Liberation of Ukraine had any major impact on the country’s political development in 1917. The leadership of the Ukrainian Revolution rested in the hands of three parties, all of which had a definitely federalistic outlook: the Marxist Social Democrats, the peasant-oriented Socialist Revolutionaries, and the party of the liberal intelligentsia, which assumed the name of Socialist Federalists. They found themselves at the helm because at the time they in fact represented the Ukrainian political elite. Their purpose was to build an autonomous Ukraine as a component of an all-Russian federation, but within a few months the logic of events carried them beyond their original goal.

Students of the history of the Ukrainian Revolution must never lose sight of one crucial fact: the process of the crystallization of a modern nation was markedly retarded in Ukraine. In this respect, there was a great difference between the Ukrainians and other Eastern European peoples. In the case of the Finns, the Poles, and the Czechs, national formation preceded the attainment of political independence. The Ukrainians, on the other hand, had the problem of statehood thrust upon them at a time when they were just beginning to emerge from the condition of an amorphous ethnic mass. Memoirists and historians of the period rightly stress the structural deficiencies that hampered the Ukrainian cause in 1917: an inadequate mass national consciousness, the insufficient numerical strength and lack of experience of the leading cadres, and the predominance of alien ethnic elements in the country’s cities.

Despite these obstacles, the Ukrainian movement demonstrated amazing strength soon after the fall of the tsarist regime. Volodymyr Vynnychenko, a prominent member of the Rada and head of the first autonomous Ukrainian government (General Secretariat), noted in his reminiscences: "In those days we were truly like gods; we were creating a whole new world out of nothing." 39 One may speak of the year 1917 as the Ukrainian annus mirabilis. Of decisive importance was the national awakening of the Ukrainian masses.
Furthermore, the Central Rada achieved some remarkable political success. The inclusion of representatives of the local Russian, Polish, and Jewish minorities transformed the Rada from an organ of the Ukrainian national movement into an authoritative legislative body, a territorial parliament. The Russian Provisional Government—the heir of the tsarist government which only yesterday had denied the very existence of a Ukrainian nation—was obliged to recognize the autonomy of Ukraine in principle, although it tried to curtail both the size of the autonomous territory and the extent of the autonomous administration’s competence. Since the suppression of the Hetmanate and the Zaporozhian Sich in the late eighteenth century, this was the first major political concession that Russia had ever made in favour of Ukraine.40

It should be noted that even while adhering to a federalist program, the Rada initiated certain policies which claimed for Ukraine, at least by implication, the rights of a sovereign state. An example of this was the drive for concentrating Ukrainian soldiers serving in the Russian army into special national units, the so-called “Ukrainization of the bayonet.”41 The Rada also demanded the admission of a special Ukrainian delegation to the future peace conference. Finally, it was decided to convokе a separate Ukrainian Constituent Assembly, which was to meet independently of the All-Russian Constituent Assembly. However, the leaders of the Rada loyally supported Russia’s war effort and avoided all contacts with those Ukrainian groups across the front line—either Galician or émigré—that co-operated with Russia’s enemies. Thus, as late as the summer of 1917, the Rada was still fully committed to the federalist concept.

The Third Universal—the proclamation of a Ukrainian People’s Republic within the framework of a federated Russian Republic—was the climax of the entire preceding policy of the Rada, the fulfillment of the sincere aspirations of its leaders. But the historical process has a logic of its own which transcends the plans and wishes of the actors. By the fall of 1917, the entire political constellation had changed so radically that the Third Universal was already an anachronism at the time of its adoption. The swift current of events had eroded the foundations of the federalist concept. Two new factors entered the political scene: the disintegration of the Russian army and the Bolshevik seizure of power in Petrograd and Moscow.

It could not have been expected that Ukraine, with its own meagre resources or even with the aid of the Entente, would be capable of carrying on the war against the Central Powers.42 But as long as the war continued, there existed the acute danger that the Germans and Austro-Hungarians might move into Ukraine, treating it merely as an occupied Russian territory. Even more threatening to the security of the country
was the presence, in Right-Bank Ukraine, of demoralized Russian troops, among whom Bolshevik agitators wielded much influence. While these remnants of the old imperial army did not offer any effective protection against Germany, they spread violence and anarchy in the country. Thus, it had become imperative for Ukraine to terminate the war as quickly as possible by negotiating a separate peace with Germany and her allies. The circumstances were propitious because Germany, locked in deathly combat with her Western adversaries, also wished to end the war in the East. Moreover, Germany and Austria-Hungary needed Ukrainian foodstuffs and raw materials. This gave Ukraine a certain bargaining strength, in spite of the disparity in military power. The circumstances demanded that Ukraine embark on an independent foreign policy, which in turn necessitated breaking the constitutional links that still bound the country to Russia.

Separation had also become inevitable because of the nature of the new regime in Russia proper, which had come to power as a result of the October coup d'etat. The crux of the matter was not that Lenin was more of a Russian chauvinist than his predecessor Kerensky. Quite to the contrary, among Russian leaders of that time Lenin was the most broad-minded on the nationalities issue and the most realistic in his appreciation of Ukraine as a political force. But, from the outset, Lenin’s regime was marked by dictatorial and terrorist traits. To use latter-day terminology, this was an incipient totalitarian regime. The Central Rada, on the other hand, was an outgrowth of the libertarian and humanistic traditions of the pre-revolutionary Ukrainian national movement. With all its shortcomings, the Rada strove to give Ukraine a democratic socialism of the European type. It was quite impossible to unite Russia and Ukraine under a common federative roof; they were two countries whose respective internal developments were incompatible. Against those “blessings” which Bolshevism was bringing from the north, Ukraine was obliged to protect herself by erecting the barrier of a state frontier.

In stressing the essentially democratic character of the Ukrainian People’s Republic of 1917–18, it is not intended to make this body politic appear in a more favourable light than it actually merits. The long subjugation under the rule of tsarist autocracy had lowered the Ukrainian community’s level of civic culture. In this respect, the Galician Ukrainians, who had passed through the school of Austrian constitutionalism and parliamentarianism, were more fortunate than their compatriots under imperial Russian rule. The inadequate political and legal training of the Rada’s leaders was reflected in the drafting of the Universals. These major state papers, which possessed the significance of fundamental laws, were wordy and overloaded with secondary matters, while the formulation of the salient points often lacked precision.
Another weakness of the Rada was its inclination toward utopianism in dealing with social and economic problems. Conditions in Ukraine were such that a revolution necessarily had to be both national and social. Thus, the hegemony of left-wing elements in Ukrainian politics in 1917 is not difficult to understand. Ukrainian socialist parties were essentially democratic, and this differentiated them from the Russian Bolsheviks. They bore, however, the hallmarks of the populist tradition, a nineteenth-century movement that profoundly affected the outlook of the radical intelligentsia both in Russia proper and in Ukraine. The parties that controlled the Rada displayed a naive worship of "the people"—the peasantry. Moreover, the desire not to be outbid by Bolshevik demagoguery strengthened the tendency toward utopian schemes. This found striking expression in the land law adopted by the Rada on 18 January 1918, whose main feature was the abolition of private ownership of the land.43 It is true that the slogan of "socialization of land" enjoyed considerable popularity among the masses of the poorer peasants and agricultural workers, but this did not mean that the peasants really desired a collectivist organization of agriculture. In fact, this was quite unimaginable to them. A contemporary observer, well acquainted with conditions in the Ukrainian countryside, noted: "All peasants understand socialization simply as taking over the land from the landowners without compensation."44 The Russian repartitional village commune (obshchina) was alien to the highly individualistic Ukrainian peasantry. A wiser Rada might have effected the necessary agrarian reform without overturning the principle of private land ownership, an ill-considered measure that caused a profound disturbance in the life of the countryside.

Mykola Kovalevsky (1892–1957), a leading Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionary and minister of supplies in the Rada government, records in his memoirs the conversations that he had with the German envoy to Ukraine, Baron Adolf Mumm von Schwarzenstein, and the financial councillor at the German legation, Carl Melchior. The exchanges took place in the spring of 1918, after the Rada had returned to Kiev with German military support:

During our conversations, Baron von Mumm and he [Melchior] tried to convince me of the impossibility of having agricultural production organized without the right of private ownership of land. What worried them most was that the breaking-up of the great estates would lower the productivity of Ukrainian agriculture. In addition, they tried to convince me that such an agrarian reform would ruin the finances of the state. Therefore, they thought, it would be preferable to demand from the peasants the payment of a so-called indemnity. The Frankfurt banker
[Melchior] argued that by this measure the state would profit both politically and financially. According to him, the political advantage was to consist in the following: if the peasants were to pay an indemnity, the influential class of great and middle landowners would not become alienated from the Ukrainian state. At the least, the hostility of that class, which still possessed some strength in Ukraine, would be neutralized. As to the financial profit, the indemnity payments of the peasants—who, according to Melchior, had much cash hoarded—would flow into the state treasury, while the landowners would be reimbursed in long-term bonds. Thus, the state would make a huge profit on this transaction, and, most important, the country’s finances would be put on a firm foundation. This stressing of a double profit was most characteristic of the German mind. I was somewhat shocked by this cynicism of the German negotiators, but I felt obliged to report the gist of each conversation to my government.45

As revealed in his memoirs, Kovalevsky was generally a man of excellent political judgment. It seems surprising, then, that the advice which he received from Mumm and Melchior struck him as “cynical.” To someone less influenced by populist myths, this advice might have sounded rather like the voice of common sense. The Rada certainly committed a blunder by alienating the moderate and proprietary segments of the community. But for this, the rightist coup d’état of General Pavlo Skoropadsky (1873–1945) on 29 April 1918 could probably have been avoided.46

In criticizing the doctrinaire character of the Rada’s social and economic legislation, we should not overlook its constructive achievements in other fields. The record was particularly brilliant in dealing with the problem of the national minorities. A concerted effort was made to dispel the apprehensions of the minorities about Ukrainian statehood and to win their collaboration. The crowning achievement of this policy was the Law on National-Personal Autonomy of 22 January 1918, which guaranteed the national minorities in the Ukrainian People’s Republic full self-government in educational and cultural matters.47 This law did honour to the humane and democratic disposition as well as to the statesmanship of the Rada’s leaders.

Bismarck once said: “A statesman cannot create anything himself. He must wait and listen until he hears the steps of God sounding through events, then leap up and grasp the hem of His garment.”48 Translated from the language of poetical metaphor, this means that a statesman must have a feeling for the right moment, for the unique and unrepeatable opportunity; he must know how to adjust to this opportunity and how to
take advantage of it. In the Ukrainian past such a great "opportunist" was the leader of the mid-seventeenth-century Cossack revolution, Bohdan Khmelnytsky, whom contemporary Western observers compared with Oliver Cromwell.\textsuperscript{49} But the men who stood at the helm of the Rada were not of the stuff of a Bismarck, a Cromwell, or a Khmelnytsky. They made the transition from federalism to independence not from free volition, but under compelling circumstances. For them it was a hard and painful decision— in a sense a denial of their own past, a rejection of an old and beloved ideal. The inevitable step was finally taken, but not until much precious time had been lost. The Rada's leaders confused the public by their hesitant policy, which consequently weakened the country's cohesion in the face of the impending Soviet Russian invasion.

Some Ukrainian publicists of the inter-war period, particularly those of the "integral-nationalist" persuasion, blamed the Central Rada for not having proclaimed the independence of Ukraine at an earlier stage of the Revolution.\textsuperscript{50} These strictures now appear as rather naive. During the first months after the fall of tsarism the Ukrainian people were not yet ready for independence, either organizationally or psychologically. Moreover, the Provisional Government in Petrograd still possessed forces sufficient to suppress such an attempt. By autumn 1917 the situation had radically changed. The Bolshevik coup d'état precipitated the disintegration of the Empire. The old Russian army had succumbed to anarchy, while the new Red Army was still in an embryonic stage.

Let us for a brief moment give free rein to our imagination. What would have happened if the complete separation of the Ukrainian People's Republic from Russia had been proclaimed at the time of the Third Universal in November 1917, and if the peace treaty between Ukraine and the Central Powers had been signed before the end of the year? It would have been easy for Ukraine to receive from the Germans the needed technical assistance and the release of the Ukrainian military formations organized in Germany from among war prisoners. Also, Austria-Hungary would probably have been willing to lend the Kiev government the legion of the Ukrainian Sich Riflemen (Ukrainski Sichovi Striltsi), a volunteer unit of Galician Ukrainians within the Austrian army.\textsuperscript{51} In addition to the troops that the Rada already had at its disposal, these forces would have sufficed to uphold internal order in the country, to crush local Bolshevik uprisings, and to repulse the Soviet Russian Bolshevik occupation with its attendant chaos, destruction, and terror. The Rada would not have been forced out of Kiev, nor would it have needed to ask for German armed intervention. As we know, this intervention soon changed into an occupation which did great harm to Ukraine, morally and politically even more than materially.

Enough of these imaginative speculations. We are, however, entitled
to stress the point that in the struggle between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Soviet Russia, the Ukrainian side, although finally defeated, also scored successes. In the field of military operations there was the disarming and the expulsion of the undisciplined and Bolshevik-controlled remnants of the old Russian army concentrated in Right-Bank Ukraine, and the suppression of the Bolshevik revolt in Kiev, the so-called Arsenal Uprising of January 1918. Among the political successes of the Rada, the following were of outstanding importance: the brilliant victory of the Ukrainian national parties in the elections to the Russian Constituent Assembly; the complete triumph of the supporters of the Rada over the Bolsheviks at the First Congress of Soviets of Ukraine, despite the fact that the Congress had convened on Bolshevik initiative; and the firmness and astuteness displayed by the young Ukrainian diplomats during the Brest-Litovsk peace negotiations.

The main accomplishment of the Rada was its determination not to bow to Bolshevik threats and violence, but rather to accept the challenge of the Petrograd Sovnarkom and resist the Soviet Russian invasion. The attitude of the Rada toward the Bolsheviks is documented by the text of the Fourth Universal:

In an attempt to bring the Free Ukrainian Republic under its rule, the Petrograd Government of People’s Commissars has declared war against Ukraine and is sending its armies of Red Guards and Bolsheviks to our lands; they rob our peasants of their bread and without any remuneration export it to Russia. They do not even spare the grain set aside for seed; they kill innocent people and spread anarchy, thievery, and apathy everywhere.... As for the Bolsheviks and other aggressors who destroy and ruin our country, we direct the government of the Ukrainian People’s Republic to undertake a firm and determined struggle against them, and we call upon all citizens of our Republic—even at the risk of their lives—to defend the welfare and liberty [of our people]. Our Ukrainian People’s state must be cleared of the intruders sent from Petrograd who trample the rights of the Ukrainian republic.

Similar ideas were expressed even more forcefully in a speech delivered on 1 February 1918 by Mykola Liubynsky (1891–193?), the youthful member of the Ukrainian delegation at the Brest-Litovsk peace conference:

The loud declarations of the Bolsheviks about the complete freedom of the peoples of Russia are nothing but a coarse demagogic device. The government of the Bolsheviks, which has chased away the Constituent Assembly and which is upheld by the bayonets of
the mercenary Red Guards, will never decide to implement in Russia the just principles of self-determination, because it knows quite well that not only the several Republics—Ukraine, the Don Region, Caucasia, and others—will not recognize it as their legitimate authority, but that even the Russian people themselves would gladly refuse them that right. The Bolsheviks, with their congenital demagoguery, have proclaimed the principle of self-determination both in Russia and here at the peace conference exclusively because of fear of national revolution [in the borderlands of the former Russian Empire]. They rely on the mercenary gangs of the Red Guards to prevent the implementation of this principle in practice. They use evil and intolerable means: they close down newspapers, disperse political meetings, arrest and shoot civic leaders, and they engage in false and tendentious insinuations by which they attempt to undermine the authority of the governments of the young republics. They accuse noted socialists and veteran revolutionaries of being bourgeois and counterrevolutionary. . . . In this they follow the ancient French proverb: “Slander and calumny, some of it will always stick.”

An American historian recently commented on the contrast between the Rada spokesmen and the Russian democratic leaders: “Nothing in the feeble and tearful accusations of the Martovs and Chernovs had come up to this standard of violence.” The universal historical significance of the struggle between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Soviet Russia lies in that it was not only a conflict between nations, but also a clash of two social and political systems—a contest between democracy and totalitarian dictatorship. This statement holds true in spite of all the obvious shortcomings of the Central Rada and in spite of the fact that the totalitarian nature of the Soviet regime was not yet fully developed.

From the point of view of the historical evolution of Ukrainian political thought, the importance of the events in the fall and winter of 1917 lay in the tremendous shift from federalism to a program of state independence. The federalist concept had already been undermined by the insincere and ambiguous policy of the Provisional Government toward Ukraine. Now Bolshevik aggression delivered the death blow to this traditional Ukrainian ideology. Hrushevsky called this great upheaval in Ukrainian political thought “purification by fire,” and in several programmatic articles written in February and March 1918, he concluded:

The bombardment, occupation, and destruction of Kiev were a summit and a culmination; this was the focal point in which were concentrated the immense and incalculable results of the Bolshevik invasion. . . . All our losses, painful and irreplaceable as they may
be, we shall count as a part of the price for the restoration of our national statehood. . . . All our customary notions and formulas, all ideas handed down from the past, all plans formulated in other circumstances—all this must be set aside now; or, to be more precise, it must be thoroughly scrutinized and re-evaluated from the point of view of compatibility with the new task which history has placed before us. . . . What I consider outdated and dead, "a thing destroyed by fire in my study," is our orientation toward Moscow, toward Russia. For a long time this orientation was imposed on us by means of a forcible, insistent indoctrination until finally, as often happens, a large part of the Ukrainian community accepted it.  

Hrushevsky’s impassioned words illustrate the great change that had occurred in Ukrainian political thinking in the wake of the experiences of 1917.

An independent Ukrainian People’s Republic, proclaimed by the Fourth Universal, did not survive. But the idea of samostiiinist—confirmed by an armed struggle that lasted until 1921 and by the incessant efforts and sacrifices of the following decades—had become a common possession of Ukrainian patriots of all political persuasions, not only the democrats who claimed to be the rightful heirs of the Central Rada tradition but also the partisans of the monarchist-conservative and the “integral-nationalist” camps. The above statement applies in principle also to Ukrainian communists. The brilliant publicist and member of the first Soviet Ukrainian government, Vasyl Shakhrai (d. 1919), wrote during the Civil War: “The tendency of the Ukrainian movement is national independence.” Shakhrai wanted Ukraine to achieve the status of an equal partner within an alliance of independent socialist states. In the course of the revolution, the left-wing factions of the Ukrainian Social Democrats and Socialist Revolutionaries adopted the Soviet platform and merged with the Bolsheviks, while retaining their nationalist loyalties. A “national-communist” ferment was strong in the Ukrainian SSR in the 1920s, and, although it was subjected to severe repression during the Stalin era, recent evidence indicates that this tendency still thrives today.

The men of the generation that made the great step from a program of federalism to that of national independence embraced the new ideal with the zeal of neophytes. They repudiated their pre-1917, federalist past, now rejecting it as a symbol of national immaturity and shameful weakness. This anti-federalist reaction of the inter-war period is understandable from a psychological point of view, but it implied the partial loss to Ukrainian society of a valuable intellectual heritage. Pre-revolutionary
Ukrainian political thinkers and publicists had formulated a number of fruitful ideas, some of which became obsolete under the changed circumstances of a new reality, while others retained their validity. The strength of the old federalist concept was its breadth of vision. It placed the Ukrainian problem within a wide international context, organically connecting the goal of national liberation with the cause of political liberty and social progress for Eastern Europe as a whole. In contrast, an exclusive and almost obsessive concentration on the attainment of samostii-nist increased the militancy of the national movement, but narrowed its intellectual insights and blunted its moral sensibility. As early as the 1890s, the democratic thinker Drahomanov was worried by the first symptoms of a xenophobic Ukrainian nationalism and raised his voice in warning against the dangers of chauvinism and national exclusiveness.65

Two parallel trends are noticeable in contemporary international relations: on the one hand, the continued drive for the emancipation of formerly submerged peoples and a movement toward the formation of new nation-states; on the other, a tendency toward an ever closer political, economic, and cultural interdependence of states and peoples and the emergence of new forms of international co-operation. Viewed from this angle, the two currents of Ukrainian political thought, federalism and separatism, may no longer appear mutually exclusive; rather, they are complementary. Still, their synthesis lies in the future.

In conclusion, it seems fitting to quote a passage from the work of the eminent historian of the Ukrainian Revolution, Vasyl Kuchabsky (1895–1945), who as a young officer played an active role in the struggle for Kiev in January 1918:

The national self-consciousness and the elemental striving for freedom of a people—who in their area of compact settlement between the Carpathians and the Don number some thirty million—will not disappear from this world again. This self-consciousness and this striving have been awakened by a tireless educational effort, and they have been tempered by the blood spilled in a hundred battles. The great ills by which this people is now afflicted can still handicap it politically for decades. But when there arises from this nation’s great sufferings a new stratum of leaders—equipped with boldness, and intellectually equal to the country’s very difficult international situation—then Ukraine shall become, so it seems, the problem of the future Eastern Europe.66

These words were written in 1929, but we can endorse them today, more than half a century after the Fourth Universal proclaimed the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation and the independence of the Ukrainian People’s Republic.
Notes

1. The vote on the Fourth Universal took place in the Mala Rada (the executive committee of the Central Rada) during the night meeting of 24–5 January 1918 (New Style), and the bill was passed in the early hours of 25 January. The document was, however, antedated to 22 January, as this was the date previously set for convening the Ukrainian Constituent Assembly. The Assembly had been unable to meet because of the outbreak of military hostilities between Soviet Russia and the Ukrainian People’s Republic. See P. Khristiuk, Zamityki i materialy do istorii ukrainskoi revoliutsii (Vienna 1921), 2:106. The incorrect date, 22 January, became traditionally associated with the event, and Ukrainians outside the USSR still celebrate it as their national Independence Day.

The term “universal” applied originally to the proclamations of the hetmans and other high-ranking Cossack officers of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. The archaic term was revived by the Central Rada for its solemn manifestoes, which were addressed to the entire people of Ukraine and which contained major statements and decisions of constitutional importance.

2. The Fourth Universal, as printed in various works dealing with the history of the Ukrainian Revolution, shows slight textual variations. This study follows the full text of the Universals, which appear in The Ukraine, 1917–1921: A Study in Revolution, ed. T. Hunczak (Cambridge, Mass. 1977).


4. The Ukrainian terms are: samostiinist—the political independence of a country, its status of sovereign statehood; samostiinystvo—the ideology, or mental attitude, aimed at the achievement of independent national statehood; samostiynyk (pl., samostiiniki)—a supporter of the program of samostiinist. English seems to lack precise equivalents. “Nationalism” is too broad, as it covers any striving toward national self-assertion, even without full political sovereignty. “Independence” may be somewhat confusing, because it does not only refer to the political status of a country but may have other connotations. For instance, a Ukrainian Party of Socialist Independentists (Ukrainska Partiia samostiinikiv-sotsialistiv) existed during the revolution. It would be quite misleading to refer to this party as one of independent socialists; what the party’s name really implied was “supporters of an independent Ukraine with a socialist internal structure.” To avoid redundancy, I shall use, depending on the context, any one of several terms as more or less synonymous: “independence,” “sovereignty,” “nationalism,” as well as the original Ukrainian samostiinist and its derivatives.

There is also a need to clarify one other point of semantics. The English term “autonomy” denotes a country’s self-government, which may or may not include its complete independence. In Ukrainian, as in other Slavic languages, “autonomy” means home-rule, short of full state sovereignty.

5. See M.V. Nechkina, Obschestvo soedinennykh slavian (Moscow and Leningrad 1927), and G. Luciani, La Société des Slaves units (1823–1825) (Paris 1963). Luciani asserts (66) that “the United Slavs . . . lacked the idea of a Ukrainian nationality distinct from the Great Russian nationality.” Without entering into a detailed discussion, the opinion can be registered here that the United Slavs, despite the underdeveloped stage of their national consciousness, belong to the tradition of Ukrainian social thought; they had a considerable impact on the elaboration of later nineteenth-century Ukrainian political programs. See O. Hermaize, “Rukh dekabrystiv i ukrainstvo,” Ukraina, no. 6 (1925):25–38.
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8. On this distinguished Ukrainian interpreter of Marxism, see A. Zhuk, “Pamjati Mykoly Porsha (1877–1944),” Sichasnist 2, no. 1 (1962):52–66. Porsh attempted to prove in his writings that the centralistic structure of the Russian state impeded the growth of the Ukrainian economy, and that the fiscal and budgetary policies of the Russian government toward Ukraine amounted to colonial exploitation. “Porsh’s book, On the Autonomy of Ukraine [Kiev 1909], was in its time the only publication which offered, within the limits set by censorship, a broad interpretation of the national-political side of the Ukrainian movement. His book exercised a great influence on the political thinking not only of the [Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour] Party, but also of the Ukrainian community at large” (61).


13. See the articles on Dontsov by V. Ianiv and on Lypynsky by I.L. Rudnytsky in Entsiklopediya ukrainoznavstva, v. 2, pts. 2 and 4 (Paris and New York 1949 ff.), 375–6 and 1292–3. It is to be noted that both Dontsov and Lypynsky achieved their full stature as political thinkers only after the Revolution.


15. Ibid., 720–22.


17. See L. Vynar, “Chomu Mykhailo Hrushevsky povernuvshia na Ukrainu v 1914 roti?,” Ukrainskyi istorik 4, nos. 3–4 (1967):103–8. Vynar stresses Hrushevsky’s wish to refute, by his voluntary return, the charge frequently raised in the Russian reactionary press that the Ukrainian movement was allegedly pro-Austrian. Thus, Hrushevsky hoped to deter persecution against his political friends. One need not deny that this motive played a part in Hrushevsky’s decision, but it may still be asserted that the primary motive derived from his general political philosophy.

18. S. Petliura, Statti, lysty, dokumenty (New York 1956), 188–90. One has to take into account that Petliura was probably trying to provide an alibi for himself and his political friends in case his letter should fall into the hands of the Russian authorities. This
would explain the almost exaggerated phrasing of the letter. Still, there is no reason
to doubt that the expressed opinions corresponded with his basic convictions, which
can be corroborated from other sources. In a conversation with a friend at the begin-
nning of the war, Petliura defined his political creed in the following manner: ‘In this
critical moment we must make a clear decision. Our decision is the logical conse-
quence of our old principles: to build the future of our people together with the
peoples of Russia, and with their support.’” See O. Lototsky, Storinky mynuloho
(Warsaw 1932–9), 3:264.

19. This statement, though essentially correct, needs to be qualified. While most Ukrai-
nians belonged to the Russian Orthodox Church, the religious situation of the Ukrai-
nian and Russian peoples showed some significant divergent features. Also, the fact
that Ukraine was economically integrated into the Russian Empire did not preclude
the fact that the economic interests of the Ukrainian south were often opposed to
those of the Great Russian north. Limitations of space prevent the discussion of these
important and highly complex issues, but the existence of the problems can be sig-
nalled and two works mentioned which, though by no means exhaustive, may pro-
vide a preliminary orientation. For the religious problem: E. Winter, Byzanz und
Rom im Kampfe um die Ukraine, 955–1939 (Leipzig 1942); for the economic prob-
lem: K. Kononenko, Ukraine and Russia: A History of the Economic Relations Be-
tween Ukraine and Russia (1654–1917) (Milwaukee 1958).

20. L. Wasilewski, Ukraina i sprawa ukraińska (Cracow 1911), 194–5.

21. A study of the problem would have to begin with an investigation of Russian writers
of Ukrainian origin. The best-known case is Nikolai Golgol, but other numerous, if
less illustrious, examples could be adduced. A brilliant treatment is found in the es-
say of Ie. Malaniuk, “Malorosiistvo,” Knyha spošterezhen (Toronto 1962–6),
2:229–41.

22. Palacký’s letter of 11 April 1848, addressed to the Preparatory Committee of the
German National Assembly at Frankfurt; cited in H. Kohn, Pan-Slavism: Its History

23. It might be interesting to note that the example of Wales has been recently referred to
by a Soviet Ukrainian publicist writing in defence of Ukrainian linguistic and cultural
rights in the USSR: “The Welsh language, which was considered to be on the point
of extinction and which in 1921 was spoken in Britain by 930,000 people, is to be-
come an official language in Wales, since it is now used by 3,000,000! All over the
world nations are not dying out but, on the contrary, are developing and growing
stronger, in order to offer as much as possible to humanity, to contribute as much as
possible to the creation of the universal human race.” I. Dziuba, Internationalism or
Russification?: A Study in the Soviet Nationalities Problem (London 1968), 207.


politichekikh sochinenii, 1:253.

26. For a general discussion of this problem, see G. von Rauch, Russland: Staatliche
Einheit und nationale Vielfalt, Föderalistische Kräfte und Ideen in der russischen
Geschichte (Munich 1953).


28. Belinsky’s attitude toward Ukraine was scrutinized by Drahomanov in the preface to
his publication of “Pismo V.G. Belinskogo k N.V. Gogoliu,” in Sobranie
politichekikh sochinenii, 2:231–50. For a recent discussion of this problem, see V.
Swoboda, “Shevchenko and Belinsky,” The Slavonic and East European Review 40
(December 1961):168–83. A sophistic attempt by a Soviet literary historian to clear
Belinsky of the charge of Ukrainophobia is found in I.I. Bass, V.H. Belinskyi i
31. M. Drahomanov, Chudatski dumky pro ukrainsku natsionalnu spravu (Vienna 1915), 94.
33. In a letter to Drahomanov on 12 May 1880, Zheliabov rationalized his leaving the Ukrainian national movement for Russian revolutionary activities in the following manner: “Where are our Fenians, where is our Parnell? The state of affairs is such that... while one sees salvation in the disintegration of the empire into autonomous parts, one is obliged to demand an [all-Russian] constituent assembly.” The purpose of Zheliabov’s letter was to offer Drahomanov the position of representative of Narodnaia volia in Western Europe. The text of the letter, with Drahomanov’s comments, is to be found in “K biografii A.I. Zheliabova,” in Sobranie politicheskikh sochinenii, 2:413–35; the quoted passage is on 417.
36. An exception to this pro-Austrian orientation of the Galician Ukrainians during the First World War was a small secret group of left-wing university and secondary school students. The group called itself the Drahomanov Organization (Drahomanivka), and adopted in the spring of 1918 the name of International Revolutionary Social-Democratic Youth (Internatsionalna revoliutsiina sotsial-demokratychna molod). Later it became the nucleus of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine. See Anonymous [Roman Rozdolsky], “Do istorii ukrainskoho livo-sotsialistychnoho rukhu v Halychyni,” Vpered, nos. 3–4 (Munich 1951).
37. A glaring example of Austria’s duplicity toward the Ukrainians was the imperial rescript of 4 November 1916, which extended the scope of Galicia’s provincial autonomy and perpetuated Polish domination in the province, thus dashing Ukrainian hopes for the division of Galicia on ethnic lines. The rescript implied that at a later time an undivided Galicia would be united with a Polish Kingdom which the Central Powers had proclaimed on the territory they occupied in Russian Poland. If Vienna was willing to disregard so cavalierly the vital interests of its own loyal Ukrainian subjects, what could the Dnieper Ukrainians expect from it?
38. The Russian jingoists persistently accused the Ukrainian movement of serving foreign, Austrian interests. For instance, the governor of Poltava province, Baggamut, reported on 4 February 1914 to the Minister of the Interior that “the Ukrainian movement—whose basic idea is the creation of an autonomous Ukraine under the sceptre of the Habsburg dynasty—has been assuming ever greater expansion in recent times.” The text of Baggamut’s report has been published in Ukrainskyi istorichnyi zhurnal, no. 1 (Kiev 1969):114–16. The Club of Russian Nationalists in Kiev sent, on 13 January 1914, a telegram to the Chairman of the Council of Ministers in St. Petersburg which contained the following denunciation: “The plans of the mazepintsy consist in tearing away from Russia the whole of Little Russia, as far as the Volga River and the Caucasus, with a view toward incorporating it as an autonomous entity into Austria-Hungary.” The telegram is reproduced in O. Lototsky, Storinky mynuholo, 3:255–6. (The term mazepintsy, “the followers of Mazepa”—the Cossack hetman who in alliance with Charles XII of Sweden revolted against Peter I in 1708—was a Russian word of abuse for Ukrainian patriots. It implied that Ukrainians were traitors in the service of foreign powers.) Similar accusa-
tions appeared frequently in reactionary Russian newspapers such as Novoe vremia, Moskovskie vedomosti, Kieviianin, and others. Samples are to be found in S.N. Shchegolev, Ukrainske dvizhenie kak sovremennyi etap uzhnorusskogo separatism (Kiev 1912), 476 ff.

39. V. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii (Kiev and Vienna 1920), 1:258.

40. The Provisional Government recognized Ukrainian autonomy in principle by its Declaration of 16 July 1917. (For the text of the document, see Doroshenko, 1:114–15). By its “Instruction” of 17 August, however, the Provisional Government limited the autonomous territory to five provinces (Kiev, Volhynia, Podilia, Poltava, and Chernihiv), excluding from it the industrial areas of southern and eastern Ukraine. The number of departments of the General Secretariat (the autonomous Ukrainian government) was to be reduced from fourteen (as proposed by the Rada) to nine; not only military affairs, railways and communications, but even judicial matters and food supplies were to be removed from the competence of the Ukrainian administration. Ibid., 124 ff.

nizovani viiskovi formuvannia v 1917 r.,” Ukrainskyi istorychnyi zhurnal, no. 8 (1967):75–84.

42. Relations between the Entente powers and the Ukrainian People’s Republic in November-December 1917 have been extensively discussed by O.S. Pidhainy, The Formation of the Ukrainian Republic (Toronto and New York 1966), 283–400. However, it would seem that the author gives excessive importance to these tentative contacts. As a matter of fact, neither side was able to deliver the goods desired by the other party: Ukraine was not in a position to shoulder the burden of a continued war against the Central Powers, while France and Great Britain could not offer effective protection against either the Germans or the Bolsheviks. Thus, objective conditions were adverse to co-operation between Ukraine and the Allies at that time.


44. Ie. Chykalenko, Uryvok z moikh spomyniv za 1917 r. (Prague 1932), 22.


46. One could argue that the radical nature of the Central Rada’s agrarian legislation was a necessary result of the plight of the Ukrainian peasantry, whose interests it was bound to defend. This view, however, is refuted by the following observation. Agrarian conditions in Galicia were more unsatisfactory and the poverty of the peasants was greater than in Dnieper Ukraine. Nevertheless, the law on agrarian reform adopted on 14 April 1919 by the National Council (parliament) of the Western Region of the Ukrainian People’s Republic (eastern Galicia) preserved the principle of private land ownership by the small landholders; the question of indemnity for the great landowners, whose estates were to be expropriated, was to be settled by a separate future enactment (Vytanovych, 52–6). The contrasting Galician example proves that the Rada’s policy of socialization of land was not simply a response to objective economic conditions; it was also determined by ideological preconceptions.


49. P. Chevalier in his Histoire de la guerre des Cosaques contre la Pologne (Paris
1663) calls Khmelnytsky a “second Cromwell, who has appeared in Rus’, and who is no less ambitious, brave, and clever than the one in England.” Quoted from the Ukrainian translation: P. Shevale, Istoriia viiny kozakiv proty Polshchi, trans. Iu. I. Nazarenko (Kiev 1960), 51.

50. This view has been restated recently by P. Mirchuk, Tragichna peremoha (Toronto 1954), 51 ff.

51. On the history of this formation, see S. Ripetsky, Ukrainske Sichevo Striletstvo: yzvolna ideia i zbroinyi chyn (New York 1956).

52. A detailed description of the Arsenal Uprising is to be found in Peremoha Velykoi Zhovtnevoi sotsialistichnoi revoliutsii na Ukraini (Kiev 1967), 2:49–58.

53. “In Ukraine, the Bolsheviks obtained only 10 per cent of all the votes [in the election to the Russian Constituent Assembly], while in the central regions of Russia they received about 40 per cent.” J. Borys, The Sovietization of Ukraine, 1917–1923 (Edmonton 1980), 167, 169. The Ukrainian parties collected 4.3 million votes, or 53 per cent of all votes cast in the Ukrainian provinces. In addition, the Ukrainian Socialist Revolutionaries obtained 1.2 million votes in joint lists with the Russian Socialist Revolutionaries.

54. On the All-Ukrainian Congress of Soviets, 17–19 December 1917, see Khrystiuk, 2:69–74.

55. Perhaps the greatest Ukrainian diplomatic success during the Brest-Litovsk negotiations was the secret protocol between the Ukrainian People’s Republic and Austria-Hungary, signed on 9 February 1918, simultaneously with the main peace treaty. Austria-Hungary undertook the obligation to form a new “crown land” out of eastern Galicia (thus dividing the province of Galicia on ethnic lines) and Bukovyna. The Ukrainian delegates were able to win this important concession by taking advantage of the difficult food situation in Vienna. The minutes of the Brest-Litovsk negotiations have been reprinted recently in Hornykiewicz, 2:49–222. The memoirs of the participants in the conference are collected in I. Kedryn, ed., Beresteiskyi myr (Lviv 1928).


59. Hrushevsky’s house, including his library and papers, burned down during the bombardment of Kiev by Bolshevik troops in January 1918. It was rumoured at the time that Bolshevik artillery deliberately aimed at the building owned and inhabited by the Rada’s president. The building was located on Pankivska Street, in an elevated part of the city. See Kovalevsky, 444.

60. Hrushevsky, Vybrani pratsi, 52–7.

61. These political trends could, obviously, find overt expression only outside the USSR: among the Ukrainian populations of Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia during the inter-war period; among the exile communities in the countries of Western Europe; and among the Ukrainian immigrants in the United States and Canada. There is, however, some evidence that these non-Communist ideologies had a potential following also in Soviet Ukraine—certainly during the 1920s and probably even later.


63. On the subject of “nationalist deviations” within the Communist Party of Ukraine, see J. Lawrynenko, Ukrainian Communism and Soviet Russian Policy Toward the Ukraine: An Annotated Bibliography, 1917–1953 (New York 1953).

64. The two most important documentary works available in English which reflect the ideas of the contemporary intellectual opposition in the Ukrainian SSR are the treatise of Ivan Dziuba (see n. 23), and *The Chornovil Papers*, ed. V. Chornovil (New York, Toronto and London 1968). See also G. Luckyj, “Turmoil in the Ukraine,” *Problems of Communism* 17, no. 4 (1968): 14–20.

65. Drahomanov’s polemics against the excesses of Ukrainian nationalism are contained in his last two works, which may be considered his political testament. *Chudatski dumky pro ukrainsku natsionalnu spravu* (1892) and *Lysty na Naddnipriansku Ukrainu* (1894). In these writings Drahomanov stressed the necessity of basing national aspirations on universal scientific and ethical values: “I acknowledge the right of all groups of men, including nationalities, to self-government, and I believe that such self-government brings inestimable advantages to men. But we may not seek the guiding ideas for our cultural, political and social activities in national sentiments and interests. To do this would lose us in a jungle of subjective viewpoints and historical traditions. Governing and controlling ideas are to be found in scientific thoughts and in international, universal human interests. In brief, I do not reject nationalities, but nationalism, particularly nationalism which opposes humanity and cosmopolitanism.” *Lysty na Naddnipriansku Ukrainu*, 2d ed. (Vienna 1915), 38.

Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s Ideas in the Light of His Political Writings

There can be little dispute that Volodymyr Kyrylovych Vynnychenko was one of the most talented and colourful figures in Ukrainian history of the first half of the twentieth century. He achieved prominence both as a writer (of fiction and plays) and as a politician. It is enough to mention that Vynnychenko was the first Ukrainian writer to support himself exclusively by his literary work, and the first to achieve a measure of international recognition in his own lifetime. It is also well known that Vynnychenko the politician played one of the leading roles in the Ukrainian Revolution. In 1917, he headed the embryonic Ukrainian government, the General Secretariat of the Central Rada. A year later, as Chairman of the Directory of the Ukrainian People’s Republic, he served as head of state for a few months.

Nevertheless, along with these triumphs, Vynnychenko also experienced monumental defeats. His international literary successes did not last and his plays did not remain in the repertory of the world’s stages. Even in Ukraine his literary fame declined to such a low point that he has been recently designated—though with a question mark—as “the forgotten writer.” Vynnychenko’s political record was also severely criticized, or even unconditionally condemned, from various quarters. In Soviet Ukraine he is officially declared a “counter-revolutionary” and “bourgeois nationalist.” During the inter-war era, Vynnychenko became an odious figure among Ukrainians outside the USSR, and found himself in almost complete isolation. Only after the Second World War, during the last years of his life, did he again meet with some understanding and a friendly response among the leftist circles of the new Ukrainian emigration.

Vynnychenko’s activities were not restricted to belles lettres and politics. In his later years, he developed an interest in painting, which be-
came his favourite hobby. In Sviatoslav Hordynsky's judgment, "Vynnychenko was a painter far above amateur stature, although he did not create anything truly original." Here, incidentally, Winston Churchill comes to mind—Vynnychenko's social and philosophical antipode. Both men found in painting a form of creative relaxation.

The flamboyant, many-sided talents of Vynnychenko—one could describe him as a "Renaissance personality"—manifested themselves in yet another area, namely in his politico-philosophical and journalistic writings. He left behind numerous articles, a string of pamphlets, and two large works, *Vidrodzhennia natsii* (Rebirth of a Nation) and "Kon-kordyzm" (Concordism). To date, this heritage has not attracted the attention of researchers. Vynnychenko's journalistic writings are difficult to obtain today, except for the lengthy, three-volume historical-political treatise, or rather polemical tract, *Rebirth of a Nation*, which was published in 1920 in an edition of 15,000 copies.

Let me state immediately that I do not consider Vynnychenko's writings to possess an intrinsic scholarly and theoretical value. In this respect, he cannot be compared with such original thinkers—to mention only Ukrainians—as Mykhailo Drahomanov and Viacheslav Lypynsky. In spite of this, Vynnychenko's political works are interesting and deserve attention. They provide an insight into his world-view and are an important source for the study of his intellectual biography. And, insofar as his writings display not merely his own ideas, but also reflect the outlook of an influential political trend of the revolutionary era, they contribute to the understanding of that crucial period in modern Ukrainian history. Furthermore, they are rich in factual information, acute observations, and interesting, if often controversial, comments on various personalities and events. Because of the incontestable documentary value of these articles and pamphlets, one might wish that at least a selection of them be made available in book form. It would also be worthwhile to publish the philosophical and political treatise, "Concordism," which still remains in manuscript. Vynnychenko invested much time and effort in it, and it may be considered the testament of his ideas.

The scope of this paper does not allow for a complete study of Vynnychenko's legacy as a publicist. Therefore, I shall concentrate mostly on one topic: Vynnychenko's interpretation of the Ukrainian Revolution and his own role in it. This is the subject of *Rebirth of a Nation*. The book was written in the span of six months, between July 1919 and January 1920, during the time when Vynnychenko, having withdrawn from the Directory, lived as an exile in Austria. One can only wonder at the energy of a man who made haste to preserve for himself and others the experiences of the immediate past and to draw from them certain pro-
grammatic conclusions. While Vynnychenko was working on *Rebirth of a Nation*, the Ukrainian Revolution was still in progress, and he assumed that his own active political role in it was not over. He wished not only to present an apologia for his activities as revolutionary and statesman during the previous two and one-half years, but also to prepare the ground for the next political action: his return to Ukraine under Soviet rule and his future collaboration with that regime. These expectations surely influenced many of the formulations found in *Rebirth of a Nation*. However, it would be a mistake to reduce Vynnychenko’s interpretation of the history of the Ukrainian Revolution to such opportunistic motives. Although his world-view was to change, his understanding of the Ukrainian Revolution remained constant. The basic tenets of *Rebirth of a Nation* are repeated in Vynnychenko’s political writings of his final years.

Vynnychenko saw the historical tendency of the Ukrainian Revolution in the striving of the peasant and worker masses toward total or “omnilateral liberation” (*vsebichne vyzvolennia*). In his opinion, the main tragedy of the Ukrainian Revolution was that “the Central Rada lacked sufficient understanding of the moment, unanimity, and determination to stand in forefront of the masses and to become the mouthpiece not only of their national, but also of their social and economic interests.” Because of this one-sidedness of the Central Rada, its neglect of the social issues, the Ukrainian masses did not give it their support at the critical moment. According to Vynnychenko, the same mistake was also made later by the Directory.

Vynnychenko characterized his own political position as follows: “Therefore, the current to which I have belonged since the earliest stage of my social consciousness... is the current of universal (social, national, political, moral, cultural, etc.) liberation; such a total and radical liberation is usually known under the name of revolutionary.” According to Vynnychenko, the “universal current” of the Ukrainian Revolution, which represented a correct synthesis of social and national aspirations, included the Ukapists (members of the dissident Ukrainian Communist Party), the Borotbists (Left Socialist Revolutionaries), and the oppositional elements within the official Communist Party (bolsheviks) of Ukraine—in other words, the partisans of Ukrainian national communism.

Let us take a closer look at the concept of “omnilateral liberation,” which occupies a central place in Vynnychenko’s political philosophy. What was the actual content of this attractive slogan? As far as national liberation is concerned, the answer is simple. Obviously, Vynnychenko did not belong to the old, pre-revolutionary *samostiinyky* (supporters of state independence), of whom there were only a handful in Dnieper
Ukraine before 1917. At the onset of the revolution, he expected to build a free Ukraine in fraternal union with a regenerated Russia. However, having become disillusioned with the Provisional Government and Russian democratic and socialist parties because of their unfavourable stance toward Ukrainian national demands (the process of this disillusionment is described in the first volume of *Rebirth of a Nation*), he soon became a partisan of independence. Vynnychenko was one of the architects of the Third Universal (20 November 1917) and the Fourth Universal (22 January 1918), which proclaimed, respectively, the establishment of the Ukrainian People’s Republic and the latter’s complete sovereignty. He never withdrew from this position, even when he later accepted the Soviet regime’s social platform in an attempt to come to terms with the Bolsheviks. There is no cause to question Vynnychenko’s sincerity and steadfastness concerning his pro-independence convictions.

It is more difficult to ascertain the precise meaning that Vynnychenko assigned to the concept of “social and economic liberation.” From his youth, he had always possessed the temper of a social revolutionary who rebelled against all forms of social injustice, oppression and exploitation of man by man. During the early stages of the revolution, however, he did not take a pro-communist position. It cannot be said that, at this time, he had a clear conception of the future social and economic order in the Ukrainian People’s Republic, which was in the process of formation. The most urgent social issue in Ukraine was the agrarian problem. As head of the General Secretariat, Vynnychenko accepted the program of socialization of the land which was advocated by the Ukrainian Party of Socialist Revolutionaries (UPSR), even though the Social Democrats, to whom he belonged, “approached the agrarian program of the Socialist Revolutionaries extremely critically, because, according to the Social Democrats, the Ukrainian SRs had simply copied this program from the Russian SRs, not taking into account the differences in conditions between Ukraine and Russia.”77 Vynnychenko realized that the Ukrainian peasantry, in contrast to the Russian, with its traditional *obshchina* (repartitional commune), had “a thoroughly individualistic land tenure system,”8 but he failed to draw any practical conclusions from this accurate observation.

Thus, the gist of Vynnychenko’s social and economic views can perhaps best be defined by their negative rather than positive objectives. He passionately rejected the social system of his age, “capitalism,” in which he saw the embodiment of sheer social injustice. In this, he did not make any distinction between the underdeveloped, semi-colonial capitalism of Russia, including Ukraine, and the capitalism of the advanced countries of the West. He hated from the depths of his heart the landlords and the bourgeoisie, whom he considered parasitical classes, and desired
their destruction. He believed that only physical labourers, the industrial
workers and peasants, were economically productive and socially useful.
In contrast, the bourgeoisie was "a class of non-workers, . . . perma-
ently idle, eternally debauched people." Working men starve while the
burzhui gorge themselves with caviar and truffles and wash this down
with champagne and expensive liqueurs. The image of bourgeois gluttony
reappears obsessively in Vynnychenko’s writings. He felt sincere
indignation against all those who wished Ukraine to become a state "like
that of other people (iak u liudei)," i.e., with class differentiation and the
usual social inequalities.

As mentioned above, during the initial stages of the revolution Vyn
nychenko did not yet adhere to a communist position. However, under
the impact of the setbacks suffered by the Central Rada and the Direc
tory, he moved to the left in the course of the next two years (1917–19).
One should take notice of the Declaration of the Directory, dated 26 De-
cember 1918, the author of which was Vynnychenko, as a milestone in
this leftward drift. The Declaration stated that "governmental power in
the Ukrainian People’s Republic ought to belong to the labouring classes,
the workers and peasants. . . . The exploiting, non-working classes,
which live off and enjoy the luxury from the labour of the toiling
classes, . . . have no voice in the affairs of the state." As a practical con
sequence, the Declaration resolved that only the workers, peasants, and
"the labouring intelligentsia, who directly serve the working people"
;elementary school teachers, paramedics, agronomists, employees of co
operatives, etc.) would participate in the elections to the Congress of
Toilers (legislature); the "non-working classes" of the population were
deprived of the franchise. It apparently did not occur to Vynnychenko
that such discrimination in reverse was incompatible with the democratic
principles he professed. He took a further step in this direction a short
time later, after he had gone abroad. His Rebirth of a Nation was written
from a national-communist perspective.

Vynnychenko’s political opponents attacked him most frequently from a
nationalist position, even going so far as to accuse him of national
treason. To these charges he gave the following dignified reply:

Never and nowhere did we under any circumstances betray the na
tional side of the liberation struggle. In no negotiations or treaties
did we ever consent to giving away into bondage even one part of
the united Ukrainian nation. . . . Never, nowhere, nor for any per
sonal or group [class] subsidies, privileges, or other advantages did
we ever agree to reduce the sovereignty of the Ukrainian nation
even by an iota.
In my opinion, the primary target of criticism ought rather to be Vynnychenko’s social ideas, which have not been given due attention. It was his erroneous social philosophy that also led him into taking wrong steps in the area of national policy, notwithstanding his patriotism and his good intentions, which must not be doubted.

Let us once again examine Vynnychenko’s favourite slogan of “omnilateral liberation.” What objections can one raise against this apparently noble ideal? The crux of the matter is that in real life there exists an inescapable necessity of choosing, time after time, among alternatives, of establishing an order of priorities, of concentrating efforts on that which at the given moment is most pressing. Whoever wants “everything, and everything at once,” usually ends up with empty hands.

The disintegration of tsarist Russia in 1917 offered the Ukrainian people a unique and, to date, unrepeated historical chance: to break away from imperial clutches and create their own independent state. If they failed to take advantage of that opportunity, the responsibility—discounting external and internal difficulties of an objective nature—lies primarily with the “omnilateralists,” the social utopians, whose most typical representative was Volodymyr Kyrylovych Vynnychenko. Disdaining statehood “like that of other people,” chasing after mirages of “total liberation,” they contributed to the outcome that Ukrainians, whom they loved and whom they wished well, fell into a condition of truly total national and social servitude. This was their tragedy, as well as that of the Ukrainian people as a whole.

By the preceding remarks I do not intend to imply that the Ukrainian governments of the revolutionary era should have abstained from an active policy in the field of social and economic relations. This is not the place to go into details, but it is clear that above all the urgent agrarian question called for radical measures. The Central Rada can be justifiably blamed for not having undertaken promptly an independent initiative toward solving this burning issue, because of a misplaced regard for Petrograd and the future All-Russian Constituent Assembly. (The same could also be said about the delay in concluding a separate peace with the Central Powers.) The “omnilateralists” failed to recognize the primacy of raison d’état, but instead were motivated by utopian fancies.

The utopian character of Vynnychenko’s social and economic conceptions manifested itself, among other ways, in a simplistic egalitarianism. His mind refused to accept the plain truth that the landlords and the bourgeoisie not only “lived luxuriously,” but also, despite all their faults, performed certain useful social functions. To remove them suddenly, without providing a suitable replacement (for instance, in the form of a well-trained managerial elite, which simply was not available at the time), meant plunging the country into chaos. In any event, if Ukraine
was not to remain an amorphous ethnic mass but to become a modern nation and state, it was imperative that it develop a differentiated social structure capable of performing all the complex functions inseparable from the existence of a modern nation-state. The root of the trouble did not lie in Vynnychenko’s humanitarian concern for the well-being of the workers and the uprooted, pauperized stratum of the peasantry. But by orienting himself solely toward those classes, by identifying himself uncritically with their grievances and resentments, he alienated from Ukrainian state-building processes the prosperous and educated segments of the population, including the so-called village bourgeoisie, “the counter-revolutionary kulak forces”—precisely those elements that might have served as the most reliable foundation for a state. It must be acknowledged that these aberrations were more or less shared by most of the Dnieper-Ukrainian socialist “revolutionary democrats.”

Vynnychenko’s attitude toward Bolshevism was ambivalent. On the one hand, he clearly recognized the chauvinist and colonial character of Bolshevik policy toward Ukraine, and the continuity that in this respect existed between tsarist and Bolshevik Russia. He strikingly and truthfully depicted the misdeeds that accompanied the first and second periods of the Soviet occupation regime in Ukraine (respectively, the beginning of 1918, and the spring and early summer of 1919). On the other hand, he believed in the historically progressive, socialist character of the October Revolution and that it served the interests of the working masses. In the last chapter of Rebirth of a Nation, he addressed the following panegyric to the Bolsheviks:

The Russian workers’ and peasants’ revolution has provided an object lesson in the realistic implementation of the proletariat’s social tasks. Soviet Russia, by carrying out a gigantic work of destruction of the old social order and by creating a new one, . . . and by accomplishing this task with such success and such consequences, has truly given Europe the example of a social miracle. This uplifts the revolutionary, vital elements with enthusiasm while it chills with deadly fear the parasitic, criminal and corrupt elements.  

Wishing to be consistent at any price, Vynnychenko excused the system of terror introduced by the Bolsheviks. “The class which seizes power must fight for it and its class objectives by whatever means necessary. . . . It was for the sake of such goals that the Bolsheviks used force against the idle people, against a small minority, on behalf of the interests of the huge working masses and all mankind.” Vynnychenko felt that it was altogether normal that “the press of the idle classes was sup-
pressed, as well as of those groups of ‘democrats’ who defended the inviolability of the bourgeois order.’” Vynnychenko rejected, as a matter of course, the parliamentary system of government which, he asserted, the bourgeoisie used as a “well-tried way to speculate comfortably.”\textsuperscript{13} It is disconcerting to read these apologias for tyranny from the pen of a man who not long before had stood at the helm of a would-be democratic Ukrainian government.

Vynnychenko basically disagreed with the Soviet regime on only one point: the question of nationality policy. However, he did not admit the thought that this policy flowed from the very nature of the regime. On the contrary, he comforted himself with the argument that such expressions of traditional Russian imperialism contradicted the principles of self-determination of peoples and proletarian internationalism solemnly proclaimed by the October Revolution. Therefore, he tended to explain Bolshevik practices in Ukraine as a painful misunderstanding that sooner or later must be overcome, because this was what the logic of history and the interests of the world socialist revolution demanded. The task of the Ukrainian communists (“omnilateralists”) was to persuade Moscow of the erroneousness of its policy toward Ukraine. (Similarly, their task was to persuade the Ukrainian patriots (“unilateralists”) that they should drop their objections to the social goals of communism.) Characteristically, Vynnychenko called Soviet rule in Ukraine “Piatakovism” (piatkovshchyna), after Iurii Piatakov, the chieftain of the Kiev Bolsheviks. In this one can perceive his attempt to shield the Moscow elite of the Russian Communist Party from responsibility for the “mistakes” allegedly perpetrated by the short-sighted local Bolshevik leaders.

Thus, Vynnychenko sought a synthesis of the two revolutions, the Ukrainian national and the communist. Herein lay the essence of his political conception. While writing \textit{Rebirth of a Nation}, he strove to convince others and, it seems, primarily himself that such a synthesis was not only desirable, but also historically necessary. However, it may be surmised that in the depths of his heart he doubted whether this synthesis was feasible. The artist’s intuition in him pointed toward other conclusions than his pseudo-rational cerebrations. Vynnychenko’s brilliant play, \textit{Mizh dvokh syl} (Between Two Powers), written in 1918 under the impression of the first Soviet occupation of Ukraine, reflects this.\textsuperscript{14} The play’s heroine portrays the tragedy of the idealistic Ukrainian communists who found themselves in a doomed position, at the crossroads between the irreconcilable elemental forces of the national-liberation movement and Bolshevism. In the end, Sofiia Slipchenko, the play’s protagonist, commits suicide. In her demise Vynnychenko foretold not only the fate of the whole national-communist camp, but also his own personal political bankruptcy.
A study of Vynnychenko’s practical political activities does not fall within the scope of this paper. Nevertheless, while discussing his social and political ideas, we cannot but emphasize that he undoubtedly possessed certain authentic qualities of leadership. For instance, the memoirists of the Ukrainian Revolution frequently mention his exceptional oratorical skills. The Galician journalist Osyp Nazaruk, who had the opportunity to observe Vynnychenko at close range when the latter was Chairman of the Directory, characterized his public personality in these laudatory terms:

He is a man in the full meaning of the word who keeps his promises, knows how to confide fully in others, understands well situations and people, has the necessary energy, and—what I consider particularly important—has a sense of humour.... As a statesman, he was fully equal to his difficult responsibilities and had bold plans. It was not his fault that he was unable to realize them.¹⁵

One would like to know what these “bold plans” were, but, unfortunately, Nazaruk is not specific. However, in another context, Nazaruk reports in his memoirs that Vynnychenko often discussed with him “a glorious dream”: the founding of several cultural centres to be located in the most beautiful regions of Ukraine (the Carpathian Mountains, the high bank of the Dnieper near Kaniv, etc.). The centres would consist of complexes of residential buildings, workshops, and other facilities, providing a favourable environment for writers, painters, sculptors, and musicians. Vynnychenko expected that such centres would stimulate a flowering of Ukrainian culture.¹⁶

Another sample of Vynnychenko’s “bold plans” is to be found in the memoirs of Lonhyn Tsehelsky, a member of the government of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic (eastern Galicia), who in December 1918 and January 1919 negotiated with the Directory concerning the unification of the two Ukrainian states. According to Tsehelsky, Vynnychenko complained to him about the difficulties caused by the pro-Russian outlook of the Orthodox church hierarchy in Ukraine, and then proposed that Andrei Sheptytsky, the Metropolitan of the Greek Catholic (Uniate) Church in Galicia, be made the head of the entire Ukrainian church. When Tsehelsky observed that such a step would imply a break with Orthodoxy, Vynnychenko reportedly replied:

We shall abolish Orthodoxy! It has led us under the Eastern Orthodox tsar and has been instrumental in the Russification of Ukraine. Orthodoxy will always gravitate toward Moscow. Your [Galician] Uniatism is good for separating from both Poland and Moscow. A Uniate naturally becomes a [nationally conscious]

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Ukrainian. We shall convoke a synod of bishops, archimandrites, and representatives of laymen from all Ukraine, and we shall advise them to accept the Union [of churches] and to put Sheptytsky at the head. We will reach an understanding with Rome in order to make him [Sheptytsky] patriarch of Ukraine. . . . This is a serious plan.\(^7\)

The examples provided by Nazaruk and Tsehelsky support the notion that Vynnychenko was indeed endowed with great vision. However, as a politician, he also had great shortcomings, which were partly rooted in his character and partly in his intellect. Among his character flaws, one must count Vynnychenko’s unrestrained, “man of the steppe” temperament, which threw him into extremes and made him prone to alternating moods of elation and depression. His excitable temper manifested itself in the tone and style of his polemics. Thus, in *Rebirth of a Nation* he characterized Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky as a “slobbering manikin,” “a wretched, politically illiterate figure,” “a degenerate,” and the Chief Otaman Symon Petliura as “a ridiculous man, detrimental to our whole movement,” “a little philistine with a morbid, maniacal vanity,” and more of the same kind. It is worth noting that in his polemics against the Bolsheviks Vynnychenko maintained a completely different tone: while criticizing their policies toward Ukraine, he used factual arguments and did not indulge in personal abuse of the Kremlin leaders. He reserved his gross insults for his Ukrainian political rivals.

Nazaruk felt that Vynnychenko “understood well situations and people,” in other words, that he was a political realist. To a certain extent, this is corroborated by the political writings of Vynnychenko himself, which contain many keen observations. Along with this, however, we find numerous judgments which impress us with their naiveté. Vynnychenko often saw the facts correctly, but under the influence of his ideological preconceptions, he arrived at erroneous conclusions. It appears that in Vynnychenko’s mind realistic and doctrinaire tendencies opposed each other in a perennial, unconscious conflict, and it was the latter that usually prevailed in the long run. This was his primary intellectual defect.

The literary critic Mykhailo Rudnytsky made a similar observation concerning Vynnychenko’s belletristic writings. According to him, the strength of Vynnychenko’s literary talent lay in his ability to grasp scenes and situations of real life. However, he also liked to inject into his novels and plays “ideas” which were replete with didacticism and naiveté. “From that moment on, an ever-growing fissure opens in his works, through which an ever larger stream of water flows in.”\(^1\)

As an example of Vynnychenko’s political realism, it is worthwhile to
quote a long passage from *Rebirth of a Nation* which shows that he had a clear perception of the immense difficulties of Ukrainian state-building.

For what does it mean, our own national Ukrainian state? This means, first of all, that all the organs of state administration and management should be created in Ukraine, where they have not existed to this day. This does not mean the reconstruction of old, organized apparatuses adapted to life by the passage of centuries, nor the substitution of one set of persons for another. No, it is to create everything from the very beginning, from the smallest details, to create in one or two months all that which in other lands has been formed through the ages. To create these organs without having at your disposal any military power, and, at the same time, having against you the military, police, and administrative power of an old state and facing the hostility of the entire non-Ukrainian population.

But let us assume that the enemy's might has somehow been defeated. Where, then, are those human forces with which apparatuses could be built, that huge, complex machine called the state? There is a need for thousands of experienced, educated, and nationally conscious people in order to fill all the government posts, all the institutions, starting with the ministries and ending with the petty clerks in the offices. Where are they, these people, where could they be found, when we did not have our own schools or the opportunity to develop a mass of our own intelligentsia from whose ranks one could select experienced, educated, and nationally conscious personnel? But even if there were enough of them for the ministries—what next? And all the directors, heads of bureaus, commissars, and the tens of thousands of civil servants—where could they be found? And how were they to be maintained? How could one conduct the whole business of state without any financial resources?¹⁹

A question arises at this point. If the quoted statements corresponded with the actual situation at that time, how can one justify Vynnychenko's decision, as a matter of principle, to exclude from participation in Ukrainian state-building the members of the well-to-do and educated strata who might have given the young state the badly needed cadres? It must be said in his defence that, in this matter, Vynnychenko the practical politician was often wiser than Vynnychenko the ideologue. Thus, in the fall of 1917, while chairman of the General Secretariat, he invited to take the position of associate general secretary (vice-minister) of internal affairs Fedir Lyzohub, an experienced public administrator, but—one hardly dares say it—a great landowner, a conservative, and the future
premier in Hetman Skoropadsky's cabinet. Following the hetmanite coup d'état, Vynnychenko advised the leaders of the moderate Ukrainian Party of Socialist Federalists to take advantage of the proposals of Skoropadsky and the German army command to enter the government in order to ensure the Ukrainian national character of the new regime. We know from the memoirs of Pavlo Zaitsev (who at that time was the director of the presidial department of the Ministry of Education) that Vynnychenko praised him warmly when, upon Zaitsev's urging, the collective of the ministry's functionaries decided not to resign (as the Ukrainian employees of the other ministries had done in protest against the hetmanite coup). Rather, they remained at their posts and under the changed conditions continued with the work demanded by national and state interests. From the point of view of revolutionary purity, these were Vynnychenko's "sins," of which he later even publicly repented, but, in my judgment, these so-called lapses save his honour as a statesman.

To balance the picture, here are some examples of Vynnychenko's doctrinaire naiveté. In Rebirth of a Nation he explained the outbreak of the First World War as "the commercial gentry coming to blows among themselves as to who was to clothe the African Blacks in aprons"—which amounts to a caricature of the familiar Marxist theory of imperialism. Vynnychenko's friend Oleksander Shulhyn recorded in his reminiscences that "he would say outrageous things, such as that under socialism a person would need to work only two hours per day."

The source of these "outrageous things" in Vynnychenko, noticed by Shulhyn and others, was, despite his exceptional and multiple inborn talents, his lack of solid political education. I say this not to denigrate his memory, but to state a fact. Vynnychenko's writings as a publicist do not provide any evidence that he seriously studied even Marxist political, sociological, and economic literature. It seems that the only thing that Vynnychenko got out of the Ielysavethrad gymnasium was a rebellious spirit and a hatred for all established authority. Even in his old age he still bitterly recalled the humiliations inflicted on him by his teachers and the "young gentlemen" among the fellow students, who treated him as a "little muzhik" and "little khokhol." In 1902, when he was only twenty-two, Vynnychenko was arrested for the first time, and in this connection expelled from Kiev University. That same year, he made his debut in literature with his first published short story. In the following fifteen years, up to the revolution, the course of his life ran along a double track, that of a professional writer and that of a professional revolutionary. As a writer, Vynnychenko worked very productively and intensively. New publications of his appeared every year: collections of short stories, novels, and plays. At the same time, Vynnychenko was an active and leading member of the Revolutionary Ukrainian Party.
(Revolutsiina ukrainska partiia, RUP) and its successor, the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party (Ukrainska sotsiial-demokrytchna robitynya partiia, USDRP). Several times he was thrown in prison, had to flee the country, illegally returned to Ukraine, wandered around various European countries, participated in party conferences, edited party organs, etc. Between literary work and revolutionary bustle, there was no time left for extending his political education. Activity in underground groups gave him a certain practical organizational experience, but not of the kind which would provide training in statesmanship.

What was the specific character of Vynnychenko’s Marxism? Throughout the greater part of his life, from his student days to the mid-1930s, he presented himself as a convinced and militant Marxist, but his Marxism was peculiar. It was not without reason that Jaroslav Pelenski once called Vynnychenko “the illegitimate offspring of Karl Marx and a good-looking and sexy Ukrainian village wench. . . . He was extremely representative of our way of thinking, or, to put it more accurately, of our unsystematic and illogical way of thinking.” In a nutshell, Vynnychenko assimilated from the teachings of Marx and Engels only the eschatological and utopian, but not the cognitive and scientific, parts. What captivated him in Marxism were topics such as the denunciation of the iniquities of capitalism, the myth of the proletarian revolution, and the vision of a future, perfect socialist society. Furthermore, he appropriated the typical Marxist phraseology. However, Karl Marx was not only the prophet of the proletarian revolution, but also an erudite and eminent scholar and thinker. Marx and Engels adapted and reinterpreted—some will say perverted—the achievements of certain schools of thought which belong to the mainstream of the European intellectual tradition: the French Enlightenment, German classical philosophy, and English liberal economics. All this did not leave any noticeable mark on Volodymyr Vynnychenko’s intellectual outlook. In Ukrainian scholarly and political literature, too, there are several authors who more or less successfully applied Marxist methodology for historical and social analysis: Iuliian Bachynsky, Mykola Porsh, Valentyn Sadovsky, Lev Iurkevych, Volodymyr Starosolsky, Volodymyr Levynsky, Roman Rozdolsky. We cannot add Vynnychenko to this list. His understanding of Marxist theory did not rise above the level of popular brochures. One can regard Vynnychenko as an ideologist of Ukrainian national communism in the sense that in Rebirth of a Nation and his pamphlets and articles of the following years the mood, the emotional climate, peculiar to this milieu is clearly expressed. If, however, we were searching for a more logical and intellectually more solid formulation of the conception of the Ukrainian path to communism, of Ukrainian Soviet statehood, we should have to turn to the well-known treatise of Vasyl Shakhrai and Serhii Mazlakh, On the
Current Situation in Ukraine, or to the writings of Mykola Skrypnyk.

Soon after his much-publicized journey to Moscow and Ukraine and his unsuccessful attempt to reach an understanding with the Bolshevik regime (May-September 1920), Vynnychenko published under the imprint of the Emigré Group of the Ukrainian Communist Party the pamphlet Revolutsiia v nebezpetsi (Revolution in Danger), in which he voiced a protest against the Soviet "system of absolute centralization" and asserted that "the nationality policy of the Russian Communist Party in Ukraine is a policy of 'one and indivisible' Russia." This, however, by no means signified that Vynnychenko had broken with communism. The pamphlet was addressed to "the communists and revolutionary socialists of Europe and America," and was written "from the perspective of the revolution, in the interests of the revolution, and from the standpoint of an ideological, social, and political affinity with that very same Russian Communist Party." When the era of "Ukrainization" was initiated in the Ukrainian SSR, Vynnychenko accepted it in the belief that the Bolsheviks had now met his demands and had started to implement his programme in practice. In 1926 he published a pamphlet in which he called on the Ukrainian émigrés "to return to Ukraine and take part in the work and struggle for a socialist order." In the 1920s, his fiction was often published and his plays staged in Soviet Ukraine.

One can regard Vynnychenko's pamphlet, Za iaku Ukrainu (For What Kind of Ukraine?), published in 1934, as the swan song of his national communism. Having taken notice of such alarming facts as the recent suicides of two leading Ukrainian communists, Mykola Skrypnyk and Mykola Khvylovy, Vynnychenko once again declared his devotion to communist ideology and loyalty to the Soviet regime. In the pamphlet, he addressed the Kremlin grande as "comrades," and reminisced about the friendly discussions he had held with Comrade Stalin while travelling by train from Kharkiv to Moscow in 1920. Next, Vynnychenko asked what was more beneficial for the Ukrainian working people: a (hypothetical) independent bourgeois Ukraine, or the present Soviet socialist Ukraine, "in close alliance with other Soviet republics'? He resolved this dilemma, without reservation, in favour of the second alternative. "One can bet one's head that an 'independent' Ukrainian bourgeois government would not have cared as much for the education, the advancement, and the cultural betterment of the toiling masses as is now being done by the Soviet government." This was written shortly after the Soviet government had starved to death several million of the so-called toilers in Ukraine, and at the very time when the Ukrainian cultural cadres were being destroyed en masse, including the entire early leadership of the CPU. One can only wonder at the appalling influence of
doctrinaire thinking upon the politics of a man who was lacking in neither intelligence nor patriotism.

Stalinism inflicted the death blow to Ukrainian national communism. Vynnychenko moved away from this conception sometime in the mid-1930s. At the same time, he also abandoned Marxism, but not the final goal that Marxism sets for itself: the striving toward a “paradise on earth,” a classless and non-antagonistic social order. Characteristically, in the writings of his last fifteen years, Vynnychenko never overtly repudiated the errors of his former Marxist and pro-communist positions.

Vynnychenko, it seems, belonged to that species of human being that cannot live without a utopia. Perhaps it is because he rejected the idea of a transcendent Absolute so vehemently that he could not do without the belief in an earthly divinity, in the image of an ideal future society. When Marxism failed to satisfy him, he immediately began fashioning his own personal utopia, for which he coined the terms “collectocracy,” or “concordism.” He expounded this self-made ideology in the large treatise, “Concordism,” which unfortunately remains unpublished to this day. However, a fairly accurate idea of the contents of this doctrine can be derived from Vynnychenko’s last novels, Nova Zapovid (The New Commandment) and “Slovo za toboiu, Staline!” (“Take the Floor, Stalin!”), which are dedicated to propagandizing the ideas of concordism by using fiction as a vehicle; the latter novel even has the subtitle, A Political Conception in Images.

Hryhorii Kostiuk, who read “Concordism” in manuscript, says the following about it:

And so Volodymyr Vynnychenko begins to think and write about a new code of human life, “a new commandment.” During many years of hard labour and deep thought, he completed his great philosophical-political work, “his best child” — “Concordism.” According to the author’s intention, this was to be the primer of a renewed social life. This was his utopian theory of building a new, reconciliatory, and harmonious social order and new people... “Concordism” is not a dogma. It is merely a number of signposts pointing to a path away from the world’s leprosarium onto a path of renewal, toward healing, and to the flowering of a new concordist, reconciliatory, happy co-existence of people, to a “sunny way of life” (sontseizm).

The practical way to achieve collectocracy, or concordism, is through the establishment of a universal system of producers’ co-operatives in which all the workers of a given enterprise would be its co-owners and would receive a share of profits according to a certain scale. Simultaneously,
Vynnychenko calls for a moral renewal of mankind through a "return to nature." The first step toward this is abstinence from tobacco, alcoholic beverages, and meat dishes which entail the killing of animals. Vynnychenko himself became a strict abstainer and vegetarian (a "carrot-eater," as he was jokingly called in Ukrainian émigré circles), and he placed a great deal of importance on this issue, considering it a matter of principle.

There will be time for detailed criticism of the theory of concordism once Vynnychenko's work has been published. Here we shall limit ourselves to a few preliminary observations. I do not believe that antagonisms, conflicts, or, using Vynnychenko's terminology, "discords" can be eliminated from social life, because life itself unceasingly and with unfailing necessity gives birth to ever new conflicts of interests and ideas. Social peace is a desirable ideal, but this is not the same as the absence of antagonisms. Rather, it means the channelling of antagonisms into a framework of a rule of law, which curtails them and subjects them to norms. An example of this may be the situation that prevails in a country where, instead of civil war, we have a legal electoral campaign. The struggle of antagonistic social forces, although often entailing dangers, is the motor of progress. Therefore, on principle, one must be suspicious of preachers of ideally harmonious, "reconciliatory" social systems, of inventors of panaceas "for the salvation of mankind." The experience of history teaches that when such cure-all doctrines are attempted in real life, they usually lead to the violent suppression of individual and group autonomy, to tyranny and totalitarianism.

One additional comment concerning Vynnychenko’s programmatic vegetarianism may be ventured. At the very time he was working at his "Concordism," there appeared, in 1937, a brochure by a prominent publicist of the Ukrainian integral-nationalist movement, Volodymyr Martynets, entitled Za zuby i pazuri natsii (For the Nation's Teeth and Claws). Martynets advised the Ukrainian public to adopt a carnivorous diet, to eat steaks as often as possible in order to foster among Ukrainians bloodthirsty instincts, which he considered most praiseworthy from the point of view of nationalist ideology. Vynnychenko’s and Martynets’s dietary ideas stand intellectually on the same level of naive stomachic determinism, in accordance with the old German saying "Der Mensch ist was er isst" (Man is what he eats).

The final phase of Vynnychenko’s philosophical evolution is interesting in that it coincides with tendencies which emerged later, in our day, among some left-wing circles of the West, especially the young. I have in mind those elements that became disillusioned with official, Soviet-type communism but did not reconcile themselves to the tenets of "bourgeois" parliamentary democracy. There are many things in com-
mon between their outlook and Vynnychenko's ideology of concordism: the ideal of a "return to nature," pacifism, concern for special dietary rules and sexual liberation, the call for the formation of small communities (communes) in which people would live and work collectively, and finally the concept of participatory democracy, in opposition to traditional representative democracy. Thus Vynnychenko may be considered a forerunner of the contemporary New Left, or at least of some of its offshoots.

While examining the socio-political world-view of Volodymyr Vynnychenko, I unexpectedly discovered similarities between his ideas and those of the theorist of Ukrainian integral nationalism, Dmytro Dontsov. The similarities are not in the content but in the style of their thinking. To conclude my reflections, I shall attempt to demonstrate this instructive parallel.

Vynnychenko and Dontsov belonged to the same generation. (Dontsov was born in 1883, and thus was three years younger than Vynnychenko.) Both were sons of southern, steppe Ukraine. Both in their youth were active in the Ukrainian Social-Democratic Labour Party, although afterwards their paths diverged.

The main similarity between Vynnychenko and Dontsov was that both were typical Russian intellectuals—"Russian," obviously, not in the ethnic-national sense, but in the style of their political culture. For instance, in their activities both closely tied together politics and literature. (In the case of Dontsov, he combined work as a political publicist with literary criticism.) Such a mixing of the political and literary spheres was characteristic of Russian social and cultural life in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. In the Western world, these spheres are usually separate and quite distinct from each other.

Both Vynnychenko and Dontsov manifested a doctrinaire turn of mind and an inclination toward ideological extremism, simplified and reductionist formulas, and radical solutions—all of which were typical of the Russian intelligentsia. This made their thinking revolutionary and totalitarian. Both were more interested in changing the world than in understanding its real structure. Such an outlook brought them to paradoxical conclusions, notwithstanding their great innate talents. It is said that old age makes a person wise, but this did not happen in the case of Vynnychenko or Dontsov. In their later years, both turned into philosophical eccentrics: the former elevated vegetarianism to the rank of an article of faith, and the latter became a devotee of theosophy.

Both Vynnychenko and Dontsov shared a disdain for Western, "bourgeois" democracy, its pluralism, evolutionary methods, and the parliamentary system of government. They had little use for "formal" demo-
cratic liberties and civil rights. Vynnychenko fell under the spell of the communist dictatorship of Lenin and Dontsov under that of the fascist dictatorships of Mussolini and Hitler, and they recommended these tyrannical systems as models to their own people. But fate played a joke on both Ukrainian worthies: in their declining years, they were obliged to find sanctuary under the protective wings of democratic countries whose regimes they scorned.

Both Vynnychenko and Dontsov illustrate the paths and dead ends of Ukrainian political thought of the first half of the twentieth century: the crisis of Ukrainian democracy and the appearance in Ukrainian society of left- and right-wing anti-democratic, totalitarian movements. Therefore, these figures have a symptomatic significance and, because of this, deserve the attention of historians and political scientists.

Finally, I see an analogy between Vynnychenko and Dontsov in that both were representative of that type of political ethos which Max Weber calls Gesinnungsethik. In his classic essay, "Politics as Vocation" (1918), Weber defined two models of socio-political ethics, Verantwortungsethik and Gesinnungsethik. The first term translates simply as "the ethics of responsibility." On the other hand, the German word Gesinnung is difficult to translate. It means something like "spiritual orientation"; Weber’s translators have rendered Gesinnungsethik in English as "ethics of ultimate ends." Politicians of the first type strive to foresee and take into account the probable consequences of their actions. Being guided by the maxim that "politics is the art of the possible," they attempt to attain the optimum of that which might be achieved within a given situation. Politicians of the second type are guided by absolute demands, in the name of which they radically oppose existing reality. In their struggle to attain the ideal, no price is too high to pay. They condemn pragmatic accommodation to reality as rotten opportunism, moral capitulation. What is important to them is the purity of intentions and uncompromising dedication to ideals, not practical results. Their maxim is "let the world perish if justice will thereby come to pass" (pereat mundus, fiat iustitia). In accordance with this view, Dontsov in his Natsionalizm (Nationalism, 1926) and in numerous other works insistently propagated "romanticism, dogmatism, and illusionism"; he opposed "principled" politics to Realpolitik, identifying the latter with opportunism. As for Vynnychenko, he advocated the slogan of "honesty with oneself" (chesnist z soboiu), which corresponds exactly to Weber’s concept of Gesinnungsethik.

Let us give Vynnychenko his due: throughout his life he was, indeed, truly "honest with himself." His deeds at all times conformed with his convictions: when, for his revolutionary activities, he was thrown into a tsarist prison; when he was building the Ukrainian People’s Republic and
stood at the helm of its government; when, for the sake of the phantom of “omnilateral liberation” and utopian social schemes, he was destroying the chances of an imperfect but real Ukrainian state; when, perhaps risking his own neck, he travelled to Moscow to negotiate with the Bolshevik leaders; and when, already an old man, he took up hard physical labour on his small farmstead in southern France, while adhering to strict dietary rules. For this, his brave character and personal integrity, Volodymyr Kyrilovych Vynnychenko deserves sympathy and respect as a human being, no matter how one evaluates the theoretical validity of the ideas by which he was guided and the practical results which followed from the application of these ideas in Ukrainian politics of the revolutionary era.

Notes

1. This paper was originally presented at the Vynnychenko Centennial Conference held at the Ukrainian Academy of Arts and Sciences in the U.S., New York City, 26–7 April 1980. The Ukrainian text, entitled “Suspinio-politychnyi svitohliad Volodymyra Vynychenka u svitliioh publitsystychnykh pysan.” appeared in the monthly Suchasnist 20, no. 9 (September 1980):60–77. The draft of the present English version, prepared by Bohdan Klid, was revised and expanded by the author.


4. V. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, 3 vols. (Kiev and Vienna 1920).

5. V. Vynnychenko, Rozlad i pohodzhennia. Vidpovid moim prykhilynykam i neprykhilynykam (n.p. n.d.), 6. From the introductory note by the publishing firm, “Nasha borotba,” one can deduce that the brochure appeared in Germany in 1948 (“three years after the end of the war”).

6. V. Vynnychenko, Pered novym etapom: Nashi pozytsii (Toronto 1938), 9.

7. Vynnychenko, Vidrodzhennia natsii, 1:182.

8. Ibid.

9. Ibid., 1:150.


13. Ibid., 2:178, 185, 188.
14. V. Vynnychenko, Mizh dvokh syl (Kiev and Vienna 1919).
15. O. Nazaruk, Rik na Velykii Ukraini: Konspekt spomyniv z ukrainskoi revoliutsii (Vienna 1920), 66.
16. Ibid., 67.
18. M. Rudnytsky, Vid Myrnoho do Khvylovoho (Lviv 1936), 309.
22. V. Vynnychenko, “Malenke poiasnennia. Odvertyi lyst do redaktsii Ukrainskykh visti,” Ukrainska literaturna hazeta (Munich), September 1959, no. 9 (51), 2.
26. Ibid., 7.
27. V. Vynnychenko, Povorot na Ukrainu (Lviv and Pribram 1926), 13; cited in M. Molnar’s introductory essay in Vynnychenko, Opovidannia (Bratislava 1968), 14.
28. V. Vynnychenko, Za iaku Ukrainu (Paris 1934).
29. Ibid., 41.
30. V. Vynnychenko, Nova zapovid (New Ulm 1950); first published in French translation, Nouveau commandement (Paris 1949).
33. V. Martynets, Za zuby i pazuri natsii (Paris 1937).
Viacheslav Lypynsky: Statesman, Historian, and Political Thinker

Viacheslav Kazymyrovych Lypynsky (1882–1931), born Władysław Lipiński, was the son of a wealthy landowner in Right-Bank Ukraine in the province of Volhynia. The Lypynsky or Lipiński family had emigrated from Mazowia, Poland, and settled in Ukraine in the eighteenth century. The decisive event in Lypynsky’s life occurred when he was in his last grade of secondary school. He proposed to the Polish Student Organization to which he belonged—these student organizations were illegal at the time in Russia—that it merge with the Ukrainian Student Hromada (Community). When this idea was rejected by his colleagues, he left the Polish organization and became a member of the Hromada, and from the age of seventeen or eighteen he declared himself to be Ukrainian.

To understand this event, one has to see it against a certain historical background. In the three Right-Bank provinces of Ukraine—Kiev, Volhynia, and Podillia—the landed nobility had been Polish since the time of the Polish partitions, marking a continuation of the old historical Commonwealth. This Polish element constituted about ten per cent or less of the population of the area. Throughout the entire nineteenth century, there were symptoms of Ukrainophile tendencies among the local Polish minority which expressed themselves in various ways—the so-called Ukrainian school of Polish Romantic poetry, political factions, and so forth. Many of the upper-class Polish families of the region were originally of Ukrainian (Ruthenian) origin, descendants of the old Rus’ aristocracy or boyars who from the sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries had become Roman Catholic and hence Polonized, but still retained regional allegiances to the Ukrainian home country.

For the most part, these Ukrainophile Poles tried to balance their two allegiances—Ukrainian territorial or regional patriotism and Polish na-
tional consciousness. They envisioned a future restored independent Poland as a federation composed of three entities—Poland proper, Lithuania, and Rus’-Ukraine. Only in exceptional cases would individual representatives of that trend take the decisive step and identify themselves fully with the Ukrainian nationality. A number of such instances occurred in the 1860s involving the well-known khlopomany (peasant-lovers) group. Its outstanding member was Volodymyr Antonovych, who later became the leader of the Ukrainian national movement in the Russian Empire at its peak in the 1870s—80s. The other member of that group was Tadeusz Rylski (Tadei Rylsky), the father of the twentieth-century Soviet Ukrainian poet Maksym Rylsky. This was the unusual tradition to which Lypynsky consciously belonged.

There is one difference, however, between Lypynsky and his predecessors, the khlopomany of the 1860s. The khlopomany were populists—radical democrats—and envisaged their transition to the Ukrainian nationality as a breaking away from aristocratic society, a renouncing of the establishment, and an identification with the common people. This was demonstrated in the religious sphere by Antonovych, who converted to Orthodoxy from Roman Catholicism, not for spiritual reasons, for he was philosophically a positivist, but as a symbol of his identification with the common people. Lypynsky’s attitude was different in that his idea was to lead over to the Ukrainian side the entire noble class of Right-Bank Ukraine, which would join the Ukrainian national movement and supply the elite which it had been lacking.

Lypynsky pursued his university studies at Cracow in history and agriculture and at Geneva, where he studied sociology. One should add that his Western European intellectual background was French. He knew the French language well and also was quite familiar with French political and sociological literature. He did not read English, and his German was probably poor; when he quoted German or English writers he would usually do this through French translations. Lypynsky did two years of military service and, as was obligatory, became a reserve officer in the Russian army. After finishing his studies and military service, he settled on his inherited estate, Rusalivski Chahary, in the district of Uman, Kiev province, and managed this estate until World War I.

From around 1908, when he was no more than twenty-six years old, Lypynsky started agitating among the Polish gentry of the Right Bank for their Ukrainization. He was able to find support among a group that had about thirty members on the eve of the war. They called themselves ‘‘Ukrainians of Polish culture’’ or ‘‘Roman Catholic Ukrainians.’’ In 1909, a conference of these Ukrainians of Polish culture was held in Kiev, and Lypynsky delivered a brilliantly written programmatic address which was later published as a pamphlet, Szlachta na Ukrainie; jej udział

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Lypynsky was one of the early Ukrainian samostiiny (partisans of state independence) at a time when most spokesmen of the Ukrainian movement in Russia supported a program of federalist autonomy, that is, home rule for Ukraine within a democratized Russian Empire. In Galicia, the concept of independence had already gained considerable ground prior to 1914, but in Russian Ukraine there were only a few individuals who were separatists. In March 1911, there took place in Lviv, on the Austrian side of the boundary, a secret conference initiated by Lypynsky of a group of Ukrainian émigrés from Russia. These were men from Dnieper or Russian Ukraine who had been overly compromised by their involvement in the 1905 revolution and then, after the victory of the reaction, had had to go abroad and found themselves in Austria, Germany, or elsewhere in Western Europe. Among the participants in this secret meeting were some figures who later became well-known, such as Andrii Zhuk, Volodymyr Stepanivsky, and the left-wing social democrat Lev Iurkevych. At the meeting, Lypynsky proposed the establishment of a political organization dedicated to the struggle for Ukraine’s independence in the event of war. The international situation was already clouded; since 1908, there had been general talk about the possibility of war between Russia and the Central Powers. Lypynsky’s project was actually implemented in 1914 by the founding of the Soiuz Vyzvolennia Ukrainy (Union for the Liberation of Ukraine), an organization of Eastern Ukrainian émigrés who worked in the camp of the Central Powers during the war. As the war found him in Russia, however, Lypynsky himself did not participate.

Lypynsky’s scholarly work was proceeding at the same time as his publicistic and political activities. He published several scholarly papers in the Zapysky (Proceedings) of the Shevchenko Scientific Society and, in 1912, there appeared a sizeable volume in Polish, Z dziejów Ukrainy (From the History of Ukraine), edited by Lypynsky and largely written by him. All the papers deal with problems of seventeenth-century Ukrainian history before, during, and after the Khmelnytsky era and centre on one major problem—the role of Ruthenian nobles in the national struggles of seventeenth-century Ukraine and especially their par-
ticipation in the Khmelnytsky revolution. The work immediately made a strong impression on the scholarly community, and Lypynsky was elected a full member of the Shevchenko Scientific Society.

In 1914, upon the outbreak of the war, Lypynsky was mobilized by the Russian army as a cavalry reserve officer and participated in the East Prussian campaign of the summer and autumn of 1914. This was a major military disaster for Russia that culminated in the battle of Tannenberg, where the invading Russian army was surrounded and destroyed by the Germans. Lypynsky was able to escape from the encirclement, but contracted pneumonia, which led to tuberculosis; from that time on, he was never again completely well.

At the outbreak of the revolution, Lypynsky was stationed with a reserve military unit in Poltava, and in 1917 we find him as one of the founders of a political organization, Ukrainska democratychna khliborob ska partiia (Ukrainian Democratic Agrarian Party); he drafted the party’s program. This group was interesting in that it was the only Ukrainian political party in 1917 which did not have the adjective “socialist” in its name. The two main principles of the Democratic Agrarian Party were those of Ukrainian statehood and the preservation of the private ownership of land—the latter in contrast to the revolutionary platform of the socialization of land. The Democratic Agrarian Party stood in opposition to the leftist regime and the policies of the Central Rada. Lypynsky was not involved in Skoropadsky’s coup d’état of 29 April 1918, learning about it only after the fact. However, he approved of the new right-wing Skoropadsky regime, and was appointed its envoy to Vienna. The Austro-Hungarian Empire was on its last legs, but was still technically a great power. Lypynsky’s most important diplomatic accomplishment was his management of the ratification of the Brest-Litovsk peace treaty between Ukraine on the one hand and Germany, the Ottoman Empire, and Bulgaria on the other. The peace treaty was not ratified by Austria-Hungary because of the Galician issue. In a secret appendix to the Brest-Litovsk treaty, Austria had undertaken to divide the province of Galicia along ethnic lines into Polish and Ukrainian sections and to create a separate autonomous province of Ukrainian eastern Galicia. Under Polish pressure the Austrian government had second thoughts and reneged on this promise, preventing ratification of the peace treaty.

Lypynsky considered the anti-Skoropadsky uprising of November 1918 a national calamity, but in spite of his misgivings about the Directory of the restored Ukrainian People’s Republic, his sense of obligation kept him at his diplomatic post in Vienna until June 1918, when he finally resigned. Thus, after having been a prominent Ukrainian diplomat, Lypynsky became a political émigré until the end of his life.
From 1919 until his death, Lypynsky continued to live in Austria, except for a one-year stay in Berlin. For health reasons, he lived in small mountain towns. By the 1920s his material circumstances had become very difficult, to the point where he lived in virtual penury. In 1920 Lypynsky founded a monarchist and conservative political organization, Ukraïns'kyi soiuz khliborobiv-derzhavnykiv (Ukrainian Agrarian Statist Union), becoming its leader and ideologue. Also in 1920, Lypynsky’s major historical monograph, Ukraina na perelomi 1657–59 (Ukraine at the Turning Point 1657–59) was published. It is actually a revised and expanded version of an essay from Ž dziejów Ukrainy which deals with the final period of Khmelnytsky’s life and policies after Pereiaslav. From 1920 to 1925 Lypynsky edited several volumes of a journal entitled Khliborobska Ukraina (Agrarian Ukraine), the ideological organ of the hetmanite movement. His major political treatise, Lysty do bratív khliborobiv (Epistles to Brethren Farmers), was serialized in the journal. A book edition of the Epistles came out in 1926. Although Lypynsky’s health was steadily deteriorating, he also conducted a huge correspondence which remains unpublished to this day. He had literally hundreds of correspondents throughout the entire world and directed, as it were, the hetmanite movement by letter, as he was living in a small isolated Austrian town and had only one secretary.

In 1927, Lypynsky went to Berlin on Skoropadsky’s invitation. Skoropadsky had used his connections in German governmental circles to obtain funding for the creation of a Ukrainian Scientific Institute, and Lypynsky was invited to occupy the chair of Ukrainian history. This Berlin venture was disastrous to Lypynsky in various respects. First of all, the foggy Berlin climate led to the drastic deterioration of his health. In addition, the physical proximity to Skoropadsky and his entourage increased personal and political friction. In brief, the root of his conflict with the ex-Hetman was that Lypynsky believed the Hetman should be a symbolic figure who would represent the hetmanite movement but would not be the actual political leader. Lypynsky felt that he himself should direct the movement, either personally or through a man who had his confidence. Skoropadsky was not willing to let himself be confined to the role of a figurehead and engaged in various practical political actions which did not meet with Lypynsky’s approval. In 1930 Lypynsky openly broke with Hetman Skoropadsky and declared the Ukrainian Agrarian Statist Union dissolved. He died a few months later, on 14 June 1931, in a sanatorium in the Wienerwald suburb of Vienna. Lypynsky wished to be buried on Ukrainian soil, and his two brothers, who lived in Volhynia—at that time a Polish province—took the body for burial to the village of Zaturky, where Lypynsky had been born. According to recent information, the tomb still exists.
Having briefly outlined Lypynsky's life, I shall try to sketch a portrait of his character. It is very clear that he was a brilliant man, of outstanding and precocious intelligence. A major historical work of Lypynsky’s, \textit{Z dziejów Ukrainy} (From the History of Ukraine), which had a tremendous impact on Ukrainian historiography, appeared when he was thirty years old. It is not unusual to be a great mathematician or a great musician at an early age, because creativity in these fields depends on innate genius, and one who has a mathematical mind can make breakthroughs before the age of twenty. But history is a science or discipline of mature minds which requires a broad knowledge of human affairs. One French theorist of historiography said half-jokingly that the historian comes of age when he is seventy. Thus, to publish a fundamental historical work at the age of thirty is most unusual.

Lypynsky also had what is called an intuitive mind. What does this mean? There are various ways to work as a scholar—for instance, to accumulate as much empirical evidence as one can and then to draw cautious generalizations and conclusions. This is the sound way in which a normal scholar or scientist functions. But there is another way, that of intuitive insight, where a person is able to make discoveries or see deeply into issues and problems despite a rather slender empirical foundation. This was the case with Lypynsky. It would be easy to point out that, as a historian, he was to some extent an amateur, and this applies also to his sociological and political writings; he did not have the encyclopedic knowledge expected of a professional academic who spends his entire lifetime reading and writing. Nevertheless, he had original ideas, and this is perhaps more valuable. He was a master of style in both Ukrainian and Polish, and the form of his writings indicates an inborn aesthetic sense rarely found in scholars.

Lypynsky considered himself primarily a man of action. He aspired to be a political leader, a statesman. He looked upon his work as a scholar and publicist as subsidiary to his political vocation, but a decisive political role was denied him, and his enduring contribution proved to be his writings. He was a man of puritanical moral rectitude, intolerant of meanness and pettifogging, which made it difficult for him to become a full-time politician. On the other hand, he evoked respect, even among his adversaries. He was certainly a man of great civic courage who was able to go against the stream. Lypynsky was also a passionate man. In his earlier years, the passion was controlled by a strong will, but by the mid-1920s there is evidence that his personality deteriorated under the impact of illness. (In connection with the changes in personality brought about by tuberculosis, one is reminded of Thomas Mann’s novel, \textit{The Magic Mountain}.) One symptom of Lypynsky’s decline was that he became less and less able to control his temper. Although many of the conflicts which
pertained his last years had some objective grounds, Lypynsky’s irascibility greatly contributed to them. To conclude, I will quote an opinion of a follower of Lypynsky, the Galician journalist Osyp Nazaruk, with whom—as with many others—Lypynsky quarrelled before his death. In an obituary published in a Lviv newspaper, Nazaruk wrote: “The Polish nobility of the eastern borderlands (szlachta kresowa) produced in that age [the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries] four men of genius: Joseph Conrad-Korzeniowski, Józef Piłsudski, Felix Dzerzhinsky, and Viacheslav Lypynsky.”

As a historian Lypynsky was primarily a student of the seventeenth-century Khmelnytsky revolution. There are three traditional interpretations of the Khmelnychchyna. The standard Polish view was that the Cossack revolts against Poland were revolts of barbarians against a superior civilization. The Ruthenians, who were obviously culturally inferior—Asiatic barbarian people, so to speak—could not live in a civilized European country such as the Polish Commonwealth. The Russian view of the historical meaning of the Khmelnychchyna was that it paved the way for vossoedinenie, the reunification of Little Russia with Great Russia, and thus for the founding of the modern Russian Empire. The Treaty of Pereiaslav is seen as the preparatory step for the reign of Peter the Great, which is true. The traditional Ukrainian interpretation of nineteenth-century populist historians such as Kostomarov, Antonovych, Lazarevsky, and the last and greatest of the populists, Hrushevsky, is that the Khmelnychchyna, like the earlier Cossack revolts and the subsequent haidamak uprising of the late eighteenth century, must be seen as an elemental striving of the Ukrainian masses for a just, free social order.

To these three traditional interpretations Lypynsky added a fourth one: he saw the Khmelnytsky revolution as the first step toward the creation of a Ukrainian body politic, a Ukrainian state. As a seventeenth-century state, it had to be a stratified corporate society like all other European states and countries of the age, although it had certain local peculiarities. The other major point of Lypynsky’s interpretation is his stress on the major contribution made by Ruthenian nobles, who joined the Khmelnytsky revolution in considerable numbers and actually provided its leadership. He was able to demonstrate empirically that most of Khmelnytsky’s associates were Ruthenian nobles who merged with the Cossack officers’ stratum, the starshyna.

Lypynsky’s strength as a historian lies in his sociological insight and in his acute awareness of Ukraine’s international position between Poland, Muscovy, and the Ottoman Empire. Lypynsky’s impact on Ukrainian historiography was very great, especially if one considers that he was an amateur historian. He was the founder of the statist school (derzhavnytska shkola) in Ukrainian historiography, which largely domi-
nated the Ukrainian historiographical scene outside the Soviet Union during the inter-war period. Among the members of that school—a school of course not in a technical sense, since those influenced by Lypynsky were not his formal pupils—were Stepan Tomashivsky, the medievalist and church historian, Dmytro Doroshenko, Myron Korduba, Ivan Krypiakevych, and the most interesting historian of the Ukrainian revolution, Vasyl Kuchabsky. In the 1920s Lypynsky also exercised influence on Soviet Ukrainian historiography, and the Soviet Ukrainian historians visibly influenced by Lypynsky include Oleksander Ohloblyn, the legal historian Mykola Vasylchenko, and especially the recently deceased Lev Okinshyvych.

As a historian, Lypynsky was the antithesis of Hrushevsky, the grand old man of Ukrainian historical science. Hrushevsky started much earlier, he was older, and in the end he outlived Lypynsky. Since he was a professional historian, while Lypynsky was an inspired amateur, Hrushevsky’s contributions are incomparably more voluminous. But it is noteworthy that Hrushevsky himself experienced Lypynsky’s influence. The final volumes of Hrushevsky’s great История Украины-Руси (History of Ukraine-Rus’), dealing with the Khmelnytsky era, are largely a polemic with Lypynsky. Partly accepting and partly rejecting his insight, Hrushevsky felt that Lypynsky was an opponent of sufficient stature to be taken seriously. To repeat, Lypynsky was a historian of the seventeenth century. He planned to write a synthesis of Ukrainian history in one book, but was not able to accomplish this. Throughout his political and journalistic writings, however, there are remarks dealing with various topics in Ukrainian history from Kievan Rus’ to the 1917 revolution. Accordingly, given a familiarity with Lypynsky’s writings, one can divine a comprehensive interpretation of Ukrainian history. For example, whereas most Ukrainian historians, including Hrushevsky, were anti-Normanist on the issue of the origins of the Kievan state, Lypynsky determinedly believed that the Kievan state was the creation of the Varangian or Norman element.

In examining Lypynsky as a publicist and political thinker, I shall concentrate on his Письма к братиям крестьян. Ukrainian publicists and ideologists usually write thin pamphlets, but Lypynsky, though an ill man and the active leader of a political faction, managed to write a treatise of six hundred pages. This is perhaps the reason why the book is relatively little known today. It was written in parts, and Lypynsky planned it as he was working at it. The first two parts are a polemical tract dealing with the issues of the Ukrainian revolution. Lypynsky offered a conservative critique of Ukrainian revolutionary democracy, that is, of the leftist regimes of the Central Rada and the Directory. These two parts were written in 1919–20, just as the Ukrainian revolution was
drawing to a close. But this discussion of current topics induced Lypynsky to re-examine the foundations of his political thought, and the third part is the most important, because it contains his political philosophy. The fourth part applies his fundamental ideas to the problems of Ukrainian state-building. Finally, the introduction was written last, in 1926. Very briefly, the problem with which Lypynsky deals is that of the origin of the state and the typology of state forms. This typology is based on a political anthropology somewhat resembling that of Plato’s *Republic*, in which the theory of the state is also founded on certain human types.

Where can we place Lypynsky as a political theorist? The writer he quotes most often is Georges Sorel. Although Lypynsky was familiar with and certainly influenced by Sorel, the two are quite different. Both theorists criticize bourgeois democracy, but Sorel does so from the left and Lypynsky from the right. He is obviously close to Pareto, and seems to have known some of Pareto’s writings. He did not know Gaetano Mosca, although there are great similarities between them. He did read in French translation the sociologist Robert Michels, a German who worked in Italy and published mostly in Italian. Most of these writers—Pareto, Mosca, Michels—deal with theories of the elite, and this is the school of thought to which Lypynsky made an original contribution.

Two recent essays on Lypynsky as a political thinker and sociologist are just the first steps in studying his thought. The late levhen Pyziur’s essay, “Viacheslav Lypynsky i politychna dumka zakhidnoho svitu” (Lypynsky and the Political Thought of the Western World, *Suchasnist* 9, no. 9 (1969), 103–15), compares him with Sorel. A very fine paper by Professor Wsevolod Isajiw, to be published in the proceedings of the 1982 Harvard conference on Lypynsky, examines Lypynsky as a political sociologist. Unfortunately, Lypynsky’s legacy as political thinker has not been well studied. He left many articles, a very large body of unpublished papers, drafts of treatises, and a great deal of correspondence, the interest of which is by no means merely biographical or factual, since in his letters he often dealt with theoretical problems. The publication of Lypynsky’s correspondence in three volumes is in progress, and once this is completed it will be a very important contribution to the understanding of his thought.

Lypynsky’s impact as political theorist was much more limited than his impact as a historian. Unfortunately, he became the patron saint of a sect, the hetmanite movement, which was gradually dwindling and becoming irrelevant, and the writers or journalists of that faction continued to quote Lypynsky without really understanding him. Ukrainian publicists and political thinkers belonging to other trends—including the nationalists, most of whom were simply incapable of grasping what Lypyn-
sky was trying to say, and those belonging to democratic or leftist Ukrainian groupings—have not seriously responded to Lypynsky to this day. In the Western world, a few younger Ukrainian intellectuals and scholars have begun gradually to rediscover Drahomanov, but they have not yet become aware of the existence of Lypynsky. My view is that in the last hundred years Ukraine has produced two great political thinkers, Drahomanov and Lypynsky. They represent two poles in Ukrainian thought—the left and the right, the social-democratic and the conservative. Without the full integration of the legacy of these two men—meaning critical evaluation, not blind acceptance—progress in Ukrainian political thought is impossible.
Lypynsky’s Political Ideas from the Perspective of Our Time

Viacheslav Lypynsky’s treatise, *Lysty do bratikh-khiborobiv* (Epistles to Brethren Farmers) (Vienna 1926), contains an exposition of both his political philosophy and his practical political program. In this paper I shall address myself to the latter. Without examining his theoretical views on society, state, and history, I shall concentrate on Lypynsky’s ideas about concrete issues in Ukrainian politics. The half-century that separates us from Lypynsky allows for a critical evaluation of his legacy. To paraphrase the title of Benedetto Croce’s study of Hegel, I wish to inquire into “what is living and what is dead” in Lypynsky from the perspective of our time.

Lypynsky wrote *Lysty* in the years 1919–26. It is obvious that Ukraine and the world at large have since then undergone tremendous changes. In approaching *Lysty* today, the reader will encounter a number of topics which are bound to appear hopelessly dated. To give just one example, Lypynsky wished to base Ukrainian statehood on the *khliboroby*, a class of sturdy yeomen farmers. But, as we know only too well, an independent landowning peasantry has long been destroyed in the Soviet Union, including Ukraine. Moreover, owing to massive industrialization, the majority of Ukraine’s population is no longer rural but urban. It would, therefore, be easy to jump to the conclusion that Lypynsky’s precepts, whatever historical interest they may possess, have become quite irrelevant to our present-day world.

The thesis of this paper is that, on closer examination, Lypynsky’s ideas retain their relevance and validity to a high degree. They must, however, be translated into the idiom of our time, that is, critically reinterpreted in the light of present conditions. Of course, we will also have to identify the points on which we are obliged to register our disagreement with Lypynsky. In the powerful “Vstupne slovo dlia
chytachiv z vorozhykh taboriv” (Foreword to Readers from Hostile Camps), Lypynsky challenged his political adversaries to an honest combat of ideas. Without wishing to be counted among his adversaries, we cannot but try to respond to this challenge to the best of our ability.

Before embarking on a discussion of specific issues, we should remind ourselves that Lypynsky is, after all, not as distant from us in time as might appear. He formulated his program from the perspective of his experience of the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–21. But the historical epoch which started for Ukraine in 1917 is still in progress. Lypynsky’s central problem was Ukrainian statehood—an analysis of the reasons why the recent bid for independence had failed, and a search for the ways by which the lost independence could be regained and made secure. The solution of this fateful problem still lies in an uncertain future. From this point of view, we are Lypynsky’s contemporaries, because his problem is also our own problem.

Social Pluralism
What, then, is Lypynsky’s most enduring contribution to the problem of Ukrainian statehood? From among his many brilliant insights, I would single out the perception that the structure of the future Ukrainian state, if there is ever going to be one, will necessarily have to be pluralistic. In those countries whose political culture is Western, pluralism is usually taken for granted. In Ukrainian thought, however, Lypynsky’s stress on pluralism represented a radical innovation. The nineteenth-century populists’ vision of Ukrainian society was monistic, in the manner of Rousseau. They viewed “the people” (narod), identified with the peasantry, as a homogeneous mass; whatever rose above the narod they condemned as parasitic, morally tainted, and essentially non-Ukrainian. Populist historians, from Kostomarov to Hrushevsky, glorified elemental peasant revolts, but were suspicious of state-building efforts of Ukrainian elites. During the inter-war period, among Ukrainians outside the USSR the ideology of populism was largely superseded by that of integral nationalism. Nationalism was in many ways a reaction to and an antithesis of populism. But the political philosophy of integral nationalism, too, was monistic, and in this respect at least it carried on the populist tradition. It only replaced the concept of an undifferentiated “people” with that of a monolithic “nation.” Both populism and integral nationalism adhered to the conception of a homogeneous society, with no allowance for a variety of social strata and political trends.

Lypynsky sharply criticized monistic, reductionist ideologies which, by excluding large segments of Ukraine’s population as either so-called class enemies or alleged ethnic aliens, in fact perpetuated the nation’s incompleteness, and hence its perennial statelessness. He defended the no-
tion that Ukraine must evolve a differentiated class structure, encompassing all strata that are essential for the existence of a mature nation and an independent state. This was to be achieved partly by the rise of new elites from the popular masses, and partly by the reintegration of the alienated old elites. Lypynsky pointed out that the strata which populists and integral nationalists rejected as non-Ukrainian contained some of the economically most productive, best educated, and politically most experienced elements of the country's population.

In Ukrainian state-building processes Lypynsky assigned a preeminent, though by no means exclusive, role to the khliboroby, a somewhat archaic and poetic term for farmers. His khliboroby corresponded fairly closely to the stratum which communist propagandists called kulaks in Russian or, in Ukrainian, kurkuli. Within the context of the revolutionary era, this conception made political sense. Ukraine's population was still overwhelmingly rural, and prosperous farmers, those who had benefited from the recent Stolypin reforms, undoubtedly represented the economically most progressive force within the agrarian sector of society.

It might appear that Lypynsky's argument has been made pointless by the Soviet collectivization of agriculture. However, Lypynsky himself envisaged a possible future situation in which the urban and industrial sectors would become dominant in Ukrainian society. He thought that under such circumstances the industrial working class and its "labour aristocracy" would be called to assume political leadership. He referred approvingly to the contemporary example of England, where the Labour Party had formed the government for the first time in 1924.

The main point of Lypynsky's reasoning, and the one which retains enduring validity, was the thesis that the Ukrainian struggle for independence ought to be socially based on those classes—agrarian, industrial, or both—which control material production, possess economic clout, and have, so to say, "a stake in the country." In this emphasis on production and economic power Lypynsky approached Marxism, with which he was actually charged by his integral-nationalist critics. (But, contrary to Marxists, he ascribed an independent function also to the military, "the power of the sword," which in his theory was not merely a reflection of economic forces.) The populist conception of the Ukrainian struggle for social and national liberation was that of a movement of the dispossessed masses, that is, primarily of the impoverished, semi-proletarian segment of the peasantry, led by the intelligentsia. In response, Lypynsky asked ironically: what would have been the prospects of the American Revolution if it had been a revolt of the Indians and Negro slaves led by religious missionaries? The American Revolution could succeed only because it was based on the substantial elements
of colonial society and involved the former colonial elites.

Because intellectuals lack direct access to and control of levers of economic and military power, Lypynsky considered them ill-suited for political leadership and exercise of governance. This critique of the intelligentsia should not, however, be misinterpreted as a fundamental anti-intellectualism. Lypynsky believed that intellectuals have a vitally important function to fulfill, namely that of creators and guardians of cultural values and formulators of socio-political ideologies. But when intellectuals grasp after power, they only become untrue to their proper vocation, while aspiring to a role for which they lack the needed prerequisites.

The Problem of the Nobility
Lypynsky was convinced that Ukraine’s struggle for independence could not succeed without the support of a part of the historical nobility. The large place which this topic occupies in his thinking was doubtless existentially conditioned. He was a scion of the Right-Bank szlachta, and his early, pre-World War I activity was devoted to efforts to reintegrate that Polonized stratum into the Ukrainian national community. The underlying motive was a strong sense of noblesse oblige. It was Lypynsky’s belief that noblemen had a moral duty to serve their native country, and not the interests of a foreign metropolitan power. At the same time, he hoped that by fulfilling their duties as citizens of Ukraine, noblemen would vindicate the right of continued existence for their class. Lypynsky was primarily concerned with the Right-Bank Polonized szlachta, but his concept applied equally to the Left-Bank Russified dvorianstvo, which was descended from the Cossack officer stratum (starshyyna) of the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Hetmanate.

The whole issue has become obsolete, because the nobility in Ukraine has been completely swept away by the course of events. Still, we are entitled to ask two questions: what significance did Lypynsky’s conception possess within the setting of his time? And can it, with proper adjustment, in some way still be relevant under present conditions?

In respect to the first question, Tocqueville’s remarks about the fate of the old French nobility are noteworthy:

It is indeed deplorable that instead of being forced to bow to the rule of law, the French nobility was uprooted and laid low, since thereby the nation was deprived of a vital part of its substance, and a wound that time will never heal was inflicted on our national freedom. When a class has taken the lead in public affairs for centuries, it develops as a result of this long, unchallenged habit of
pre-eminence a certain proper pride and confidence in its strength, leading it to be the point of maximum resistance in the social organism. And it not only has itself the manly virtues; by dint of its example it quickens them in other classes. When such an element of the body politic is forcibly excised, even those most hostile to it suffer a diminution of strength.¹

Lypynsky assumed that Ukrainian society was bound, in any event, to retain a "plebeian" character, that is, to be basically peasant, proletarian, and petty-bourgeois. The access of a limited number of persons of noble background would not have changed this state of affairs. But it might have transmitted a modicum of traditional political culture to the raw and inexperienced leaders of the Ukrainian liberation movement—a quality which they conspicuously lacked. The Anglo-Irish gentry gave Ireland Parnell (an example cited by Lypynsky); the Swedish-Finnish aristocracy gave Finland Mannerheim (who, like Pavlo Skoropadsky, was a tsarist general before the Revolution); the Polish-Ukrainian aristocracy gave Ukraine Metropolitan Andrei Sheptytsky (Count Roman Szepycki). If one considers the incalculable services to the Ukrainian cause of that single individual, one is entitled to wonder whether the participation of more men of Sheptytsky's type could not have made the difference between victory and defeat in Ukraine's struggle for independence. It is, therefore, difficult not to agree with Lypynsky that the Ukrainian populist intelligentsia committed a grave error in repulsing rather than trying to attract Ukrainophile members of the historical nobility. Such Ukrainophile tendencies undoubtedly existed among both the Russified and Polonized wings of that class, but met with little encouragement.

Contrary to what his opponents have sometimes said, Lypynsky did not dream of preserving the old, pre-revolutionary social order and obsolete class privileges. He fully accepted the need and inevitability of far-reaching social changes. But he thought that the nobility could serve as a link between the "old" and "new" Ukraine, and thus supply an element of continuity in the life of a nation whose development was characterized by a high degree of discontinuity:

Our objective is not the conservation of the noble class, and even less a return to the status quo ante. . . . Nobody knows better than we that the mass of our Russified and Polonized nobility has already to a large extent become degenerate, and that the last Mohicans of the noble-Cossack era of our statehood must at last disappear in the same way as their predecessors, the last Mohicans of the Varangian-princely era. Such is the stern law of nature. But
it is also a law of nature that sound seeds can grow only on a mature tree. Before an old tree dies, it must deposit into the soil sound seeds from which a fresh, reborn life will sprout. (75)²

Lypynsky contended that only those revolutions can succeed whose leadership includes a dissident segment of the old elite. He derived this conception from his studies of the Khmelnytsky period in seventeenth-century Ukraine; it was the participation of Ruthenian nobles which lifted the Cossack revolution above the level of a mere jacquerie and made possible the establishment of the Ukrainian Cossack state.

The experience of universal history seems to bear out Lypynsky’s contention. It would be easy to adduce supporting examples from the experiences of the English, American, French, and Chinese revolutions, and of a number of national-liberation revolutions of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. Lypynsky himself referred to the Russian Revolution:

Ulianov would probably not have become Lenin if in his veins, and in the veins of his fellow-believers and associates—the Chicherins, Bukharins, Kalinins, Kamenevs (the chief of the general staff, not Nakhamkes)—there did not run the blood of the old Muscovite service nobility, which by the oprichnina and terror saved and rebuilt the Muscovite state under Grozny, during the Time of Troubles, under Peter the Great, and which is now saving and restoring it for the fourth time under the banner of Bolshevism. (39)

It is a matter of common knowledge that during the Civil War more former tsarist officers served with the Red Army than with the White Armies of Kolchak, Denikin, and Iudenich, and that the Soviet state apparatus incorporated from the very beginning numerous members of the old regime’s administrative personnel. We can, therefore, agree with Lypynsky’s thesis that the Bolshevik leadership derived its sure instinct for power and political know-how from the elite of imperial Russia.

What is the relevance of these historical insights for the problematic of the Ukrainian struggle for independence under present conditions? Assuming the correctness of Lypynsky’s reasoning, the following conclusion imposes itself logically: an independent Ukrainian state could be reborn only with the active support of a significant segment of the Soviet Ukrainian “service nobility,” that is, of those Ukrainian nationals who occupy positions of responsibility in the Communist Party, the administration and the economic management of the Ukrainian SSR, and the Soviet Army. Their situation resembles that of the nineteenth-century “Little Russian” nobles: they serve the imperial system and are to a considerable extent Russified. Yet, whether one likes it or not, they form the actual elite of contemporary Ukrainian society. There are reasons to as-
sume that, despite outward conformity, many among them do not lack a sense of Ukrainian identity, and that they harbour grievances against the Moscow overlord. Extrapolating from Lypynsky’s argument, one would have to say that a wise and statesmanlike policy on the part of the nationalist émigrés would consist in fostering dissident tendencies in the ranks of the Soviet Ukrainian elite. If, on the other hand, émigré nationalists were to damn indiscriminately all members of that establishment as renegades and traitors, they would only repeat the mistakes of the populists in their dealings with the historical nobility.

**Political and Religious Pluralism**

Lypynsky’s social pluralism was complemented by political pluralism. His point of departure was the firm conviction that there is not and can never be a paradise on earth, a perfect social and political order. The future Ukrainian state, too, will be no utopia; it will inevitably commit a full measure of mistakes, abuses, and injustices. The task of the opposition will be to strive for their correction. Therefore, “in our hetmanite Ukraine there will always be room for His Majesty’s opposition along-side His Majesty’s government” (xl). Furthermore, by exercising pressure on the establishment, the opposition prevents it from becoming complacent and stagnant. A legally recognized opposition is the mechanism which assures a continual rejuvenation of the national elite by an influx of fresh blood.

Most illuminating for Lypynsky’s understanding of political pluralism is his discussion with Osyp Nazaruk concerning the strategy to be adopted in regard to representative Ukrainian leftists. Nazaruk, a recent convert to the Hetmanite ideology, urged Lypynsky to “kill” (figuratively) such false prophets as Drahomanov, Franko, Hrushevsky, Vynnychchenko, and “even Shevchenko, as a propagator of ideas about society and the state.” Lypynsky replied:

Shevchenko, Franko, and Drahomanov are revolutionaries. I think it pointless to combat some of their harmful ideas by debunking their revolutionary authority. There shall always be Ukrainian revolutionaries who will, quite rightly, draw inspiration from them. The trouble is not at all that we have revolutionaries. The trouble is that we have only revolutionaries. In order to heal this lethal one-sidedness of the nation, we need conservatives with a positive program, and not merely with a negation of the revolutionaries. The formation of such positive conservative political thought is, in my judgment, much more important than a struggle against Shevchenko, Franko, and Drahomanov. Moreover, this struggle is hopeless without the existence of a strong Ukrainian conservative
organization. People must get their ideas from somewhere. As long as they have only the above-mentioned writers, they will draw on them, no matter how much one might criticize them. There is only one remedy: to produce writers who employ a different mode of thinking, a different tactic, a different style, and, above all, a preponderance of reason and will over romanticism and mindless emotions.  

In sum, Lypynsky's conservatism did not by any means imply the suppression of other, non-conservative Ukrainian ideological trends and political parties. He was quite willing to find something positive even in Ukrainian communists, provided that for them "Communism is for Ukraine, and not Ukraine for communism" (xl). What he actually desired was, first, to overcome the "lethal one-sidedness of the nation" by strengthening the hitherto underdeveloped right-wing, conservative side, and, second, to co-ordinate the several contending trends within a unified political system under a rule of law common to all.

To round out the picture, it should be mentioned that Lypynsky was also a pluralist in matters of church politics. Personally a faithful Roman Catholic in his ancestral Latin rite, he considered religious pluralism a permanent feature of Ukrainian life. He advocated parity for all denominations, although he thought that, on historical grounds, the Orthodox church had a rightful claim to be the prima inter pares among Ukrainian churches. Lypynsky was convinced that civilized politics presuppose Christian ethical principles, but he rejected with indignation all attempts to equate nationality with any specific denomination ("only an Orthodox can be a good Ukrainian," "only the Greek Catholic Church is the true Ukrainian national church," etc.). Lypynsky strongly opposed clericalism, the formation of political and civic organizations along denominational lines, and, generally, the mixing of political and ecclesiastical concerns, which, in his opinion, ought to be kept separate.

There can be little doubt that Lypynsky's ideas about the need for political pluralism and the importance of a legally recognized opposition retain their validity for the present and the future. A post-communist Ukraine would have to possess a pluralistic political structure lest it become another dictatorship. Pluralism is considered a hallmark of liberal democracy. And yet, paradoxically, among all Ukrainian political thinkers it was the anti-democrat Lypynsky who was the most consistent pluralist.

Monarchy and Legitimacy

Lypynsky's monarchism is the most questionable part of his program from our contemporary point of view. We are bound to wonder why this
exceptionally intelligent man so passionately defended the concept of a monarchical structure, in the form of a hereditary hetmanate, for the future Ukrainian state.

There exists an intimate connection between Lypynsky’s pluralism and his monarchism. Precisely because the Ukraine which he envisaged was to be socially and politically differentiated, this plurality called for a counterbalancing principle of unity. Without a unifying central point, without a universally recognized authority, there was the acute danger that conflicting social forces and rival political movements might split the Ukrainian body politic into chaotic fragments. Unfortunately, Ukrainian history shows only too many instances of such self-destructive feuds.

Lypynsky’s historical researches convinced him that one of the principal reasons why the seventeenth-century Ukrainian Cossack state did not establish itself permanently was the failure of Bohdan Khmelnytsky’s plans to make the hetmancy hereditary. The elective nature of the supreme office detracted from its authority, facilitated the spread of anarchic factionalism, and provided foreign powers with easy opportunities to intervene in internal Ukrainian affairs. Lypynsky applied this “lesson of history” to the contemporary Ukrainian situation.

Lypynsky believed that a state cannot be created without the use of physical, military force. States are born out of wars and revolutions. But force alone is not enough. What is equally necessary is that the government, which uses force, be legitimate, that its authority be based on a principle which is accepted by all, not only by the ruling minority but by the popular masses as well. Historically, it was the monarchical institution which provided the principle of legitimacy in the building of states and nations. “All great European nations were united by monarchies. Without a monarchy, would the unification of Germany, France, Italy, or the rebirth of smaller nations such as Bulgaria, Romania and Norway be conceivable? Why should we be an exception?” (47).

The problem of the legitimacy of power has been discussed by two twentieth-century Western theorists, the Spaniard José Ortega y Gasset and the Italian Guglielmo Ferrero. It is worthwhile to compare their ideas on that subject with those of Lypynsky. Ortega wrote:

Concord, the kind of concord which forms the foundation of stable society, presupposes that the community holds a firm and common, unquestionable and practically unquestioned, belief as to the exercise of supreme power. And this is tremendous. Because a society without such a belief has little chance of obtaining stability... Each of the European nations lived for centuries in a state of unity because they all believed blindly—all belief is blind—that kings
ruled "by the grace of God." . . . When the peoples of Europe lost the belief, the kings lost the grace, and they were swept away by the gusts of revolution.  

Ferrero’s argument runs along similar lines. According to him, European civilization has produced two great principles of legitimacy, the monarchic-hereditary and the democratic-elective. Both have proved capable of serving as foundations of stable political systems. Since the time of the French Revolution the monarchical principle has gone into decline, leading to the downfall of monarchy in most countries by the end of the First World War. However, the disappearance of monarchy was not followed, in most cases, by the establishment of a stable and legitimate democracy, for which the respective peoples were not ready. The vacuum of authority left behind by the collapse of monarchies was filled by regimes Ferrero terms "revolutionary" or "totalitarian," and whose first examples he sees in the Jacobin and Napoleonic dictatorships. Such regimes claim to represent the popular will. But their pretended democratic character is a sham, because they cannot face the test of free elections and the existence of an overt opposition. Revolutionary regimes try to compensate for the lack of authentic democratic legitimacy by appeals to an exclusive and militant ideology and to the personal charisma of infallible leaders, by engaging in foreign military adventures, and finally by the systematic repression of all dissident elements. Revolutionary or totalitarian regimes are necessarily terroristic, because the rulers, sensing the illegitimacy and instability of their authority, live in constant fear of society, and society lives in fear of the rulers. 

Lypynsky’s views fully coincide with those of Ortega and Ferrero in respect to the legitimizing function that the monarchical institution used to fulfill in the past. A basic divergence is to be found in the evaluation of the present and the prospects for the future. Both Ortega and Ferrero thought the only workable solution to the problem of legitimacy of power in our times to be democratic. Lypynsky denied this. His pessimistic assessment of democracy undoubtedly reflected the failure of Ukrainian and Russian democracy in 1917, as well as the sorry performance of Western liberal democracies which won the war against conservative-monarchical imperial Germany, but conspicuously failed in the creation of a viable and stable post-war order. Lypynsky was strongly dedicated to the idea of the rule of law. Therefore, he could not but reject the "revolutionary," that is, dictatorial and totalitarian, solution to the problem of the structure of power represented in Ukrainian politics by the communist and integral-nationalist movements. The only remaining option, and the one he passionately embraced, was to uphold the time-proven principle of monarchical legitimacy.

To avoid any possible misunderstanding, it must be emphasized that
Lypynsky was no partisan of absolute monarchy. He most definitely rejected absolutist monarchical regimes, such as tsarist Russia’s, calling them “hereditary dictatorships.” “Of course, we do not want the old tsarist autocracy, this semi-Asiatic, democratic [i.e., populist] despotism, which in moments of danger saved itself with the help of the mob, by pogroms” (42). The type of monarchy he advocated was “restricting by law and restricted by law,” in other words, a constitutional monarchy. He repeatedly referred to the example of England as the model of a regime Ukrainians should try to emulate. He believed that the seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Hetmanate was evolving toward this type of political system.

Lypynsky was not blind to the plain fact that the spirit of the age was altogether inhospitable to the idea of hereditary authority, the principle of monarchical legitimacy:

A new monarchy, a new dynasty, cannot be created at a time when the press and literature dominate life. Founders of monarchies and dynasties, “God-given” leaders of nations, cannot appear in an age in which the epic sense of life has vanished. Epic heroes (bohatyri) are not being born with the friendly assistance of the cinema and newspaper reporters. (89–90)

Lypynsky hoped that this difficulty could be overcome by an appeal to tradition—not the creation of a new dynasty, but the restoration of a dynasty whose claims were hallowed by historical precedent. Under the given conditions, this meant support for the Skoropadsky cause: a member of that family had already occupied the hetman’s office in the eighteenth century, and a descendant of the same family had recently validated these historical rights by assuming the hetmancy in 1918.

Lypynsky did not idealize Pavlo Skoropadsky’s regime; he was aware of its weaknesses and criticized some of its policies. But he asserted that the 1918 Hetmanate, despite its shortcomings, was the closest approximation to a desirable form of government for Ukraine, and, by the same token, the best chance to establish a viable Ukrainian state during the revolutionary era; he denied that the rival leftist regime of the Ukrainian People’s Republic had such potential. Therefore, when the hour of Ukrainian independence struck again, Ukrainian patriots would, according to Lypynsky, have to continue the work begun in 1918 by recreating a constitutional monarchy under the legitimate Skoropadsky dynasty.

In critically assessing Lypynsky’s monarchist conception, I shall discuss it on two levels, from the perspective of the era of the Ukrainian Revolution (which, of course, was Lypynsky’s perspective) and from that of the present generation.

There is considerable evidence that throughout the nineteenth and into
the early years of the twentieth century monarchical loyalism of a spontaneous and naive kind was widespread among the Ukrainian people. It centred on the alien Romanov and (in Galicia) Habsburg dynasties. Lypynsky was probably right in asserting that the Ukrainian masses had little understanding of statehood as an abstract concept; for them the state had to be personified in a living father-figure. It was, therefore, sensible to try to divert this feeling of allegiance, released by the abdication of the last tsar, toward the personified symbol of Ukrainian statehood. Also, the memories of the Cossack age were still very much alive among the population of east-central Ukraine. Thus it could seem reasonable to anchor the reborn Ukrainian state in the tradition of the old Cossack body politic.

On the other side of the argument stands the fact that the mainstream of the Ukrainian Revolution was undoubtedly populist and socialist. The regime of the Ukrainian People’s Republic was more broadly based than Skoropadsky’s Hetmanate. A native monarchical tradition did not exist in Ukraine; the Hetmanate of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries was, after all, elective and semi-republican. Thus Hetman Pavlo Skoropadsky’s quasi-dynastic claims did not suffice to endow his rule with an aura of legitimacy. Only massive popular support could have legitimized Skoropadsky’s regime. To achieve this would have required a leader of extraordinary genius and charisma, a second Bohdan Khmelnitsky. It is not to detract from the real merits of Skoropadsky to say that he was not a statesman of such stature. The general political constellation of the time must also be taken into account. With the fall of imperial Germany, the victory of the liberal-democratic Entente in the West, and the Bolshevik revolution engulfing Russia and spilling over into Ukraine, it is difficult to see how a conservative-monarchical regime could possibly have survived in Ukraine. It is noteworthy that two other recently reborn East European states, Poland and Finland, which originally were planned as constitutional kingdoms, switched to the republican form of government.

There was much justice in Lypynsky’s acerbic critique of Ukrainian “revolutionary democracy,” that is, of the left-wing parties which formed the governments of the Ukrainian People’s Republic during the Central Rada and Directory periods. But Lypynsky erred in thinking that these faults were congenital to the democratic character of the Ukrainian People’s Republic. They should be rather diagnosed as “infantile disorders” resulting from the immaturity and political inexperience of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement—a legacy of tsarist autocracy which denied training in self-government and responsible citizenship to the peoples under its domination. This interpretation is corroborated by the experience of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic, established on the territory of the former Austrian province of Galicia. The Western
Ukrainian state adhered basically to the same democratic-populist philosophy as the Ukrainian People’s Republic in east-central Ukraine. What made the difference was that the Galician Ukrainians had gone through the school of Austrian constitutionalism. The government of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic enjoyed the unquestioned allegiance of the entire Ukrainian population and successfully maintained law and order throughout the territory under its control. Western Ukraine was free of the scourges that afflicted Dnieper Ukraine: agrarian riots, anti-Jewish pogroms, and otamanshchyna (freelance military chieftains, or otamany, with their detachments). Lypynsky explicitly recognized the legitimate nature of the government of the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic. This means that, even on Lypynsky’s own terms, a stable and legitimate Ukrainian democratic regime was not impossible in principle.

Where does all this leave us today? Since the end of World War I monarchies have been disappearing in one country after another, to the point that kings have become an endangered species in our time. This trend is not to be hailed as necessarily “progressive.” In most cases, monarchies have been superseded not by stable democracies, but by dictatorships and tyrannies of the type Ferrero called “revolutionary” or “totalitarian,” and Lypynsky “ochlocratic.” (The Russians rid themselves of the tsar and received Lenin and Stalin. The Germans deposed the silly but rather harmless Kaiser Wilhelm and got Hitler instead. The Iranians overthrew the Shah, only to fall under the rule of the Ayatollah Khomeini.) In those countries where monarchies still exist, there may be good reasons for preserving them: out of a sense of respect and affection for tradition, and as a symbol of national continuity. It may also be advantageous to separate the office of the ceremonial head of state from that of the actual chief executive, and to keep the former non-political by removing it from partisan competition. It is not for nothing that those European countries where the institution of monarchy survives—Britain, the three Scandinavian kingdoms, the Netherlands, Belgium—are among those possessing the highest level of political culture and the best entrenched, most secure civil liberties. This applies also to Japan, in many respects the most advanced nation of Asia.

It is clear, however, that the institution of monarchy survives only on sufferance. By itself, it is no longer able to legitimize authority; rather, it is itself in need of being legitimized by popular will. And once a monarchy has fallen, it hardly ever can be restored, because whatever charisma it still may have possessed is gone forever. (Recent history has experienced only a single, isolated case of monarchical restoration—Spain. It remains to be seen whether the restored Spanish Bourbon royalty will last.) In countries such as Ukraine, whose entire traditional structure has been turned upside down and completely refashioned by
decades of communist rule, the prospects of monarchical restoration must be assessed as nil. The problem of legitimacy, of course, remains, but at this stage of world history it can be solved only along democratic lines. As Tocqueville correctly predicted as many as one hundred fifty years ago, the choice mankind faces is that between liberal democracy and “democratic despotism.”

There are indications that Lypynsky, despite his dogmatic monarchicalism, had an inkling of this state of affairs. We know from his biography that shortly before his death he despaired of the Skoropadsky cause. Conflicts with the Hetman certainly played a role in this, but it seems that he was also assailed by doubts concerning the fundamental validity of his conception. This was his personal tragedy, which should not be approached without a sense of compassion. In any event, in his last writings, while continuing to advocate a hereditary hetmanate as most desirable, Lypynsky now proclaimed that the determination of the form of government of the future Ukrainian state should be a prerogative of the constituent assembly. This amounted to the admission of the democratic principle of popular sovereignty—the principle he used to reject so vehemently.

It was Lypynsky’s great, undying merit to have been the first Ukrainian political thinker to have formulated the problem of the legitimacy of authority. This problem had never been raised by pre-revolutionary democratic publicists, because they did not think in terms of independent statehood; they accepted the existing empires, Russia and Austria-Hungary, as a fact of life, and their vision of the Ukrainian national-liberation movement was that of a revolutionary ferment, a permanent opposition to these established powers. Populists and Marxists tended to be concerned primarily with socio-economic issues, and to regard questions of political structure as secondary. Communists and integral nationalists, who dominated the Ukrainian political scene during the inter-war era, were attuned to the problem of power, but wished to solve it in a revolutionary manner: by the dictatorship of a single party standing at the helm of the masses and acting with unlimited authority in their name and on their behalf. Lypynsky alone understood that, in order not to be arbitrary and tyrannical, the power of the state must be based on a principle of legitimacy and be circumscribed by it. This is what Ukrainian democrats should try to learn from Lypynsky, while proposing a different solution.

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LYPINSKY’S POLITICAL IDEAS

Notes

2. Page references to Lypynsky’s *Lysty do brativ-khliborobiv* (n.pl. [Vienna] 1926) are given in parentheses following quotations.
The study of contemporary Ukraine is the domain of political science rather than of history, and most research in this field has been done by political scientists. Some valuable works written from a "Sovietological" viewpoint have appeared in recent years. The present writer is not a political scientist, but a student of history. It is, however, his hope that a historian can contribute to a better understanding of the contemporary scene by applying to it his sense of the temporal perspective and the dynamic aspect of events. This historical approach seems to be particularly fruitful in dealing with nationality problems in the USSR, since the current empirical data on which political scientists base their findings are incomplete and often inconclusive.

To an outside observer the USSR offers an essentially uniform appearance. A foreign traveller who passes through the republics of the Union will find everywhere the same political and social system, the same pattern of institutions, the same curricula in schools, the same propaganda slogans, and very similar living conditions. Thus the Soviet Union gives the impression of being a homogeneous country, and this is the point of view adopted by most Western students. In their opinion, differences of nationality in the USSR are primarily linguistic, and they are assumed to possess no great political relevance, particularly in consideration of the ever advancing spread of the Russian language in all parts of the Union.

One must not, however, forget that the nations which compose the Soviet Union are ethnic and cultural entities with a long past, predating by many centuries not only the October Revolution, but also the time when the respective peoples originally fell under the domination of tsarist Russia. Thus the linguistic variety that is to be found in the Soviet Union expresses underlying differences of collective mentality, ingrained social
attitudes, and intellectual and political traditions. It is difficult to appreciate fully the implications of the multinational character of the USSR unless one is familiar with the history of the peoples of the area. But this familiarity has been missing in most cases, as Western scholars usually approach the past of that part of the world from a centralist perspective, as the history of the growth of the imperial Russian state and of the metropolitan Russian society and culture.3

To Ukraine belongs the pride of place among the Soviet Union’s nationality problems. In size, population, and economic output the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic ranks with the larger countries of Europe. Geographically, Ukraine occupies an intermediary position between Russia proper and the so-called satellite countries of Eastern Europe. It can be said without exaggeration that the status of Ukraine has a direct bearing on the structure of the USSR and the whole socialist bloc, and on the position of the Soviet Union as a world power. This should warrant an interest in the Ukrainian problem on the part of the Western scholarly community.

The Nature of Soviet Ukrainian Statehood
The Ukrainian SSR can be best understood if we look at it as the embodiment of a compromise between Ukrainian nationalism and Russian centralism—of course not in the sense of a formal, negotiated agreement, but rather of a de facto balancing of antagonistic social forces, neither of which was strong enough to assert itself completely. If the Ukrainian Revolution of 1917–21 had been able to run its own natural course, the logical outcome would have been an independent nation-state. But the strength of the Ukrainian liberation movement was unequal to this task, and Ukraine had to acquiesce in the continued overlordship of Moscow. As a counterpart, Lenin—who prior to the Revolution had many times expressed his preference for large, unitary states, and his rejection of federalism—was obliged to recognize that the national rebirth of Ukraine (and of the other non-Russian nationalities of the former tsarist empire) was a fact of life, and that this fact had to be reckoned with. There can be no doubt that the willingness to make concessions to the non-Russian nationalities was a major factor in the Bolsheviks’ victory over their Russian competitors.4

The terms of the compromise can be described in the following manner: Russia retained political control over Ukraine and, by virtue of that, the position of the paramount power in Eastern Europe. Ukraine preserved, from the shipwreck of her greater hopes, the status of a nation (denied to her by the tsarist regime) and a token recognition of her statehood in the form of the Ukrainian SSR. A formal expression of the compromise was the creation of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics,
of which Ukraine became a constituent member. Thus Soviet federalism is of a "dialectical" nature. On the one hand, it assures Russian domination over the non-Russian borderlands; on the other hand, the existence of the union republics preserves and even consolidates the national identity of the respective peoples.

According to official doctrine, the Ukrainian SSR is a sovereign state, federated on a footing of equality with Russia and the other fraternal Soviet republics. The theoretical sovereignty of Ukraine finds expression in her membership in the United Nations and in the constitutional right of secession from the Union. A Soviet Ukrainian legal scholar states:

The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics is a union state, where sovereignty belongs to the federal union as well as to every union republic which is a socialist state within this union. One of these sovereign union republics with equal rights within the USSR is the Ukrainian SSR. . . . The union of sovereign states within one Soviet socialist federation did not affect their sovereignty, since this union was voluntary. . . . The rights of a union republic as a sovereign state cannot be determined by anyone save by the republic itself. 5

The reality, of course, departs drastically from theory. The Ukrainian SSR is today deprived of nearly all attributes and functions of a self-governing body politic. The list of deficiencies Soviet Ukraine suffers from is so long that it would be redundant to dwell on the details. Let us just mention a few examples, chosen at random. This nominally sovereign state does not control the railroads on its territory, does not possess a separate currency, or even postage stamps; it does not have any independent revenue, nor a citizenship legally distinct from the all-Union citizenship; offenders tried in Ukrainian courts serve their terms in prisons and labour camps outside the republic; the Ukrainian SSR does not entertain diplomatic relations with any foreign country; Ukraine participates in international scholarly meetings, cultural events and sport competitions, as a rule, only through joint delegations of the USSR.

Even more important than these specific disabilities, Soviet Ukraine lacks the most essential trait of any self-governing state: the ability to formulate and pursue policies of its own. The power of the central government in Moscow is all-pervasive, and it does not leave the organs of the Ukrainian Republic any sphere of independent jurisdiction. Any decision made in Kiev can always be overruled by Moscow. Thus the supposedly sovereign Ukrainian SSR reveals itself in practice as an administrative subdivision of a monolithic empire, endowed with a modicum of linguistic-cultural autonomy. And even the latter is being subverted by strong Russification pressures.

At this point, the reader might be tempted to jump to the conclusion
that the statehood of the Ukrainian SSR is nothing but a sham. But this is not the view taken by the Ukrainian people under Soviet rule who, according to all available evidence, place a high value on the nominal sovereignty of their republic. For instance, they are proud of their country’s membership in the United Nations. This does not mean that Ukrainians are unaware of the realities of the existing power structure. But the trappings of statehood which Soviet Ukraine enjoys, and which an outside observer will easily dismiss as an empty gesture, are cherished by the Ukrainian people as a symbol of their nation’s imprescribable rights.

American authors, trying to explain the unfamiliar with the aid of the familiar, have often likened Soviet union republics to the component states of their own country. Thus one can find comparisons of Ukraine with Texas (‘‘the Ukrainians are the Texans of Russia’’), or even with Pennsylvania. But the supposed parallel is thoroughly misleading. American federalism is purely political; its function is to assure a decentralization of power, and it has nothing to do with ethnic and nationality questions. Soviet federalism, on the other hand, is obviously ethnic, and is a concession to the multinational nature of the USSR, without any decentralization of political power. A Soviet union republic is at once less and more than an American state. Less, because the monolithic power structure in the USSR does not leave the constituent republics any independent sphere of jurisdiction. More, because the Soviet republics, among them Ukraine, are residual nation-states.

This situation is loaded with built-in tensions. An appearance of universal concord and solidarity of all Soviet peoples is being officially cultivated, but beneath the surface a stubborn tug of war goes on relentlessly, year after year. Neither of the parties has accepted the existing compromise as a final settlement. Moscow continues to press for greater centralization, for the levelling of national distinctions to the point of complete absorption of the non-Russian nationalities. The program of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union sets the goal of a gradual ‘‘drawing together’’ and an eventual ‘‘merging’’ of Soviet nationalities. The Russians, of course, are not expected to merge with the Chinese, but the non-Russians of the USSR are encouraged to merge with the Russians. But the non-Russian nationalities continue to pull in the opposite direction. Many of them still cherish the dream of complete independence, and in the meantime they avail themselves of every opportunity to strengthen their respective cultural identities and to expand the autonomy of their republics. It could seem that all the advantages in this protracted conflict are on the side of the centralist trend, which is backed by the organized might of a totalitarian regime. But, after more than half a century of Soviet rule and despite terrible losses suffered during the Stalin era, the non-Russian nations of the USSR continue to live, and they have even
become in many ways stronger and more consolidated that they were in 1917. Perhaps in no other part of the Soviet Union is the struggle more dramatic and of far-reaching historical consequence than in Ukraine.

To recapitulate: the nominal statehood of the Ukrainian SSR is, in terms of contemporary political reality, a sheer myth manipulated to the advantage of the rulers. But a myth which has entered the consciousness of a people becomes a latent force. The clever manipulators may well find themselves someday in the position of the sorcerer's apprentice, unable to master the genie whom they have conjured.

Stages in the Development of Soviet Ukraine
Owing to tsarist repression and other unfavourable circumstances, the process of nation-building was slow in gaining momentum in Ukraine. Prior to 1917, there was a Ukrainian ethnic community and a Ukrainian national movement with supporters mostly among the intelligentsia, but no fully developed Ukrainian nation. The peasant masses, profoundly Ukrainian by all their objective ethnic traits, possessed only an embryonic national consciousness, while the cities were strongly Russified. The underdeveloped condition of Ukrainian nationhood was, undoubtedly, the chief reason why the experiment of an independent Ukrainian state failed in 1917–21. However, the stirring events of the years of revolution and struggle for independence mightily accelerated the process of transformation of the Ukrainian ethnic mass into a modern, sociologically and culturally mature nation. The elemental drive of the Ukrainian people toward nationhood, which did not find its completion during the revolution, was carried over into the Soviet era.

The 1920s were the happiest period in the history of the Ukrainian SSR. Under the auspices of the New Economic Policy industrial production had more or less returned to the pre-revolutionary level, while the peasantry, still uncollectivized, enjoyed a modest prosperity. This was also the time when the Ukrainian Republic possessed genuine autonomy in cultural matters. Ukrainian achievements in the fields of education, scholarship, literature, and the arts were truly impressive. The cities quickly began to lose their former Russified appearance. By 1930 Ukraine was approaching the condition of a fully developed, culturally mature nation.

The scene changed radically in the 1930s. Stalin's reign of terror weighed heavily on all the peoples of the Soviet Union, but the dictator's fury was directed particularly against the recalcitrant Ukrainians. As a result of the enforced collectivization of agriculture, and the artificial famine of 1933, Ukraine suffered staggering losses in human lives. "Unofficial estimates of the death toll resulting from the famine comprise at least 10 per cent of the population (over 3 million), but if the reduction in the
birth rate and the increase in mortality were included, the figures would run, by some accounts, into 5 to 7 million, when extrapolated to the 1939 census.\(^{11}\) Stalinist terror had also destroyed two strata of the Ukrainian civic and intellectual elite: the populist-liberal intelligentsia of pre-revolutionary origins which had accommodated to Soviet conditions and which in the 1920s continued to play an active part in the country's cultural life; and, secondly, the Ukrainian communist leadership which had directed the republic during the first decade of its existence. One result of Stalinist policies was to stop, or even reverse, the process of Ukrainian nation-building. An expression of this was a return to bilingualism, which had been nearly eliminated by the end of the 1920s, and a restoration of the pre-revolutionary dichotomy between the Russian-speaking cities and industrial centres and the Ukrainian-speaking villages and rural towns. Ukrainian cultural activities were relegated to a subordinate and distinctly provincial level, while all the more prestigious forms of intellectual work were channelled into the "All-Union," i.e., Russian, sphere.

Little wonder that the Ukrainian people were looking forward to the coming great international conflagration with hope; and in 1941 hundreds of thousands of Soviet soldiers of Ukrainian nationality voluntarily surrendered to the Germans, who were greeted as liberators. This was not an expression of sympathy for the Nazi system, of whose nature the Ukrainian people, isolated from the outside world, had hardly any perception. The Germans were looked upon as representatives of the admired European civilization, and the Germany of Hitler was visualized in the image of that of William II. It was remembered that in 1918, at the time of the first German occupation, the Kaiser's army had behaved in a civilized manner. Ukrainian patriots expected that Germany would again, as during the Brest-Litovsk era, support Ukrainian national aspirations in her own self-interest.

It is hardly necessary to note that these hopes were totally disappointed. The horrors of the Nazi colonial regime in Ukraine confirmed and surpassed the most lurid predictions of communist propaganda, and made even the restoration of Soviet rule a preferable alternative. There can be little doubt that Nazi policies in the occupied Soviet territories, and especially in Ukraine, were a major factor in the outcome of the German-Soviet campaign. In the words of a former Nazi high official: "Hitler led his armies not into a war of liberation, but into a campaign of colonial conquest, in which they bled to death."\(^{12}\)

There are grounds to assume that Stalin and the Soviet leadership were much concerned during the war with the possibility that some foreign power might raise the Ukrainian issue.\(^{13}\) Fortunately for them, these apprehensions were quite unfounded. The Germans threw away the Ukrain-
ian trump card, while Western powers never thought of interfering in what they considered an internal affair of their Soviet ally. One of the ironies of World War II was the fact that of all the world’s leading statesmen it was Stalin—the perpetrator of unspeakable crimes against the Ukrainian people—who showed the greatest awareness of the potentialities of the Ukrainian problem. It was in the name of Ukraine, and not of Russia, that Stalin successfully claimed vast territories west of the pre-1939 frontier, thus extending the USSR into central Europe and the Danubian valley.

The Effects of World War II
From the viewpoint of Ukrainian national interest, the results of World War II were profoundly discouraging. It is true that the danger of colonial enslavement by Nazi Germany was avoided, but otherwise there was no improvement. For the price of terrible suffering, destruction, and losses in human substance, Ukraine received only a restoration of the same tyrannical rule which the country had experienced before the war. The goal of liberation and national independence was as distant and unattainable as ever.

The above pessimistic view, although plausible, is only partly correct. As a matter of fact, the war had caused some profound changes in the condition of Ukraine. But the impact of these new features asserted itself only gradually, and their effects are still far from exhausted today.

The greatest change resulting from the war was the annexation to the Ukrainian SSR of Western Ukraine, i.e., of the ethnically Ukrainian lands which were previously held by Poland, Romania, and Czechoslovakia. This added to the population of Soviet Ukraine about eight million new citizens, nearly all of whom were ethnic Ukrainians, thus partly compensating population losses in old Soviet territories and upholding the rate of Ukrainian nationals in the whole republic.

The qualitative effects of these changes were even more important than the statistical ones. For the first time since the Middle Ages, all Ukrainian lands found themselves united within one body politic. This implied, in the first place, a levelling of the social and cultural peculiarities of the western territories. It is hardly necessary to mention that this forcible *Gleichschaltung* was a painful process, and that it involved many victims. But territorial consolidation was an old goal of Ukrainian nationalism. The unification of Galicia (then organized as the Western Ukrainian People’s Republic) with the Ukrainian People’s Republic had been first proclaimed on 22 January 1919. This attempted unification foundered in the general collapse of Ukrainian independence. But what the independent Ukrainian state had failed to accomplish during the revolutionary era was now fulfilled by the Soviet regime. This meant a tremendous step
forward in the process of nation-building. The adjustments resulting from territorial consolidation were by no means a one-way affair: they implied not only an assimilation of the population of Western Ukraine to patterns prevailing in the Ukrainian SSR in its old frontiers, but simultaneously also a subtle but profound psychological mutation of the people in east-central Ukraine. This latter aspect of unification is obviously played down in official pronouncements, but it is nevertheless a major factor in the life of post-war Ukraine. One has to keep in mind that the western territories (with the exception of Volhynia and the Ukrainian sections of Bessarabia) had never belonged to tsarist Russia. The majority of Western Ukrainians had been Catholics of the Eastern rite, and the traditional cultural ties of the whole area were with Central Europe. It is well known that, owing to the more favourable circumstances of the Austrian constitutional system, nationalism developed more quickly in western than in east-central Ukraine. Already by the late nineteenth century Galicia had become the stronghold or, as it used to be called, the “Piedmont” of the Ukrainian national movement. There an active and militant national consciousness had penetrated the masses, down to the last village. Conditions were similar in the small neighbouring province of Bukovyna. During the inter-war era, Galician-type nationalism expanded to the remaining sections of Western Ukraine: Volhynia and Transcarpathia. For the last quarter of a century this Western Ukrainian leaven has been acting on the people of east-central Ukraine. The effects of this influence cannot be easily measured in empirical terms, but I am willing to surmise that they are deep, and that they possess considerable long-range political significance. The emergence of a vocal national dissidence in the Ukrainian SSR in the course of the 1960s is difficult to account for without taking into consideration the Western Ukrainian factor. At the same time, it is worth noting that among the prominent dissidents we find natives of literally all parts of Ukraine, including such strongly Russified areas as Donbas and Odessa. These are symptoms of the “psychological mutation” alluded to previously.

The unification of Ukrainian lands within the boundaries of the Ukrainian SSR has had another important result. A major past handicap of the Ukrainian independence movement was the division of the nation’s forces between the anti-Russian and anti-Polish fronts. Ukraine was not in the position of those comparatively fortunate stateless nations, such as the Irish, the Czechs, and the Finns, who had to face only one adversary. It has already been said that by the late nineteenth century Galicia had become the stronghold of the Ukrainian national movement. But Galicia’s potential could be brought only partly into play in the field of Ukrainian-Russian relations because of the entanglement with Poland. This situation not only caused a dispersal of the available phys-
ical resources, but was also conducive to the outbreak of debilitating internal dissensions within Ukrainian ranks about the order of priorities in dealings with Russia and Poland. The incorporation of Western Ukraine into the Ukrainian SSR, post-war population exchanges which removed the troublesome Polish minority from Ukrainian soil, the geopolitical re-orientation of Poland toward Silesia and the Baltic Sea—all this ended the ancient Ukrainian-Polish conflict, thus “unfreezing” considerable Ukrainian forces. The very fact that virtually all Ukrainian territories have been united under the rule of Moscow enables the Ukrainian nation to concentrate on the one paramount issue: a revision of the present Ukrainian-Russian relationship.

In this connection, I would like to refer to an illuminating precedent. The eminent Polish political thinker, Roman Dmowski (1864–1939), in trying to formulate a foreign-policy program for his nation in the years prior to the outbreak of World War I, stated that Poland’s restoration would have to proceed in two stages. The first stage was to be the unification of all the sections of partitioned Poland under the auspices of Russia; this, in turn, would lead to a shift in the balance of power between Poland and Russia, forcing the latter country to concede to Polish demands for autonomous status. Actually, the rebirth of Poland occurred in a different manner which nobody could have predicted before 1914: through the simultaneous collapse of all three partitioning powers. During World War II the Ukrainians hoped that this miracle would be repeated for their benefit: that first Germany would defeat Soviet Russia, and then the Western Allies would defeat Germany. These hopes were not justified by the course of events. But it seems as if Dmowski’s forgotten formula is finding an application in our time in the case of Ukraine.

The Second World War has led to an extension of the Russian sphere of influence over all of Eastern Europe. This has profoundly affected Ukraine, and must be considered the second major change in the position of that country, besides territorial consolidation. One must keep in mind that the Ukrainian SSR has common boundaries with Poland, Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Romania, and, across the Black Sea, also Bulgaria. The socialist countries of Eastern Europe have at all times, and especially in the post-Stalin era, enjoyed an incomparably higher degree of intellectual freedom than the USSR. Polish, Czech, etc., books and journals serve the Ukrainian intellectual elite as a major source of information about the outside world. An important role as cultural intermediaries has been played by the small but active Ukrainian minorities in Poland and Czechoslovakia. As far as communications with the outside world are concerned, Ukraine was, from the 1930s, in a worse situation than Russia. Russian scholars and writers in Moscow and Leningrad had at least
limited access to foreign books and sources of information, while Ukraine was kept in almost complete isolation. Thanks to the existence of the socialist bloc, conditions have improved in this respect. The Iron Curtain has not been removed, but it has developed many cracks and holes.

Politically, the Soviet domination of Eastern Europe brought an end to the terrifying Ukrainian-Russian tête-à-tête as it had existed during the inter-war period. Moscow's solicitude is now divided among more objects, and therefore it cannot devote to Ukraine the same exclusive attention as before. The apprehension that a return to Stalinist mass terror in Ukraine might provoke a panic reaction among the East European "allies" makes an application of former methods less likely. The establishment of the socialist bloc has strongly increased the number of people who have a vital stake in changing the status quo in Eastern Europe and the USSR, and thus has given Ukraine potential allies.

And, finally, the emergence of the socialist bloc has deprived the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics of its ideological legitimacy. The rationalization for the formation of the USSR was the necessity of a close alliance of socialist nations in the face of hostile capitalist encirclement. In the case of Ukraine, at least, this argument is no longer valid. The Ukrainian SSR is surrounded not by capitalist powers but by friendly socialist states. There is nothing in the teachings of Marxism-Leninism which could justify Ukraine's inferior status, for it is a country larger and more populous than any of the East European nations. In the early years after the October Revolution, when the communists believed that a proletarian revolution was also imminent in the West, they envisaged a system of Soviet republics embracing Germany, Hungary, and various other countries. Nothing was said at that time that indicated the Soviet republics built on the ruins of the former tsarist empire should be formally differentiated from those which were to spring up outside its boundaries. In fact, Soviet power found itself limited to the successor states of Russia. The formation of the Soviet Union amounted to a restoration of the Russian Empire, but this fact was disguised by a supra-national name and a quasi-federative structure. The USSR could never overtly admit to being a continuation of the Russian Empire, because this ran counter to the principles of internationalism and anti-colonialism which are an inherent part of Marxist-Leninist ideology. The contradiction has been brought into the open by the establishment of the so-called socialist bloc.

Many will think that in a world where politics are shaped by power relations philosophical antinomies are of little practical importance. But the experience of history suggests that a government which is entangled in insoluble contradictions with the principles from which it derives its legitimacy cannot endure for very long. What is going to endure, of
course, is Russia, which is, and will remain, one of the great nations of the world. But in the present age of the break-up of colonial empires, the USSR is an anachronism. Only when Lenin’s slogan, “self-determination to the point of separation,” has ceased to be a fraud will it become possible for Ukraine and Russia to live as good neighbours.

The problem has been correctly stated by Arnold Toynbee:

It will be seen that Stalin’s administrative map of the Soviet Union was not to be taken at its face value; but a moral commitment cannot be wiped out through being dishonored by its makers; and, in the world that had emerged from the Second World War, Stalin’s map might live to be translated, after all, from the limbo of camouflage into the realm of reality if, on either side of the dividing line between a Russian and an American demi-monde, the letter of the Soviet Union’s federal constitution were one day to be applied in the spirit of the Pan American Union of Republics and the British Commonwealth of Nations.¹⁹

Notes

1. Revised text of the Shevchenko Memorial Lecture delivered at the University of Alberta, Edmonton, on 23 March 1970.
2. Two substantial studies should be specifically mentioned: Y. Bilinsky, The Second Soviet Republic: The Ukraine After World War II (New Brunswick, N.J. 1964); B. Lewytzkyj, Die Sowjetukraine 1944–1963 (Cologne and Berlin 1964). Both works, however, appeared too early to include information on the recent intellectual ferment in Ukraine which has gained momentum since the middle of the 1960s.
3. In a review of a collection of essays published in connection with the fiftieth anniversary of the October Revolution (The New York Times Book Review, 5 November 1967), Hugh Seton-Watson observed that “a survey of the Soviet Union which from the outset excludes 45 per cent of its subjects cannot be regarded satisfactory... The main non-Russian nations still live in compact territories which have been their homeland for centuries and possess highly developed national cultures that are quite distinct from the Russian.” The blindness of many American scholars to Soviet nationality problems is to be explained, in Seton-Watson’s view, by the circumstance that “the United States grew great as a melting-pot of ethnic elements.” Americans tend to project the melting-pot concept on the former Russian Empire and the USSR.
4. This thesis has been incontrovertibly established by the émigré Russian historian of the Civil War, General N.N. Golovin, in Rossiiskaia kontrrevoliutsiia v 1917–1918 gg., 4 vols. (n.p. 1937). “In every instance when Bolshevism was defeated, this was only on the soil of ‘nationalism.’ It occurred in all sections which separated from Russia” (1:121). The rigid adherence of the White Armies’ leaders to the program
of “Russia, one and indivisible” alienated the non-Russian nations and even the Don Cossacks and Siberians, who were ethnically Russian but strove for regional autonomy.


6. What has been said of the American states applies also to Canadian provinces, save Quebec. The latter is a special case: the only instance in North America of the problem of political federalism being compounded by a nationality problem in the ethnicultural sense.

7. The practical implications of the program of “merging of nationalities” can best be seen from the example of the areas of compact Ukrainian settlement which have been incorporated into the Russian SFSR. For instance, in the stanitsa (Cossack village) Platnirovskaiia in the Kuban krai, “at present, as the inquiry had shown, not only the newcomers but also all the local inhabitants call themselves Russians, while as recently as 1926 there were in the stanitsa, according to the All-Union census, 83.5 per cent Ukrainians and only 13.4 per cent Russians.” See K. V. Chistov, ed., Kubanskie stanitsy (Moscow 1967), 29.

The number of Ukrainians decreased between the censuses of 1926 and 1959, in the southern zone of the Central Black Soil Region, from 1,633,000 to 262,000, and in Northern Caucasus from 3,126,000 to 370,000. See V. Kubitovych, “Natsionalnyi sklad naselennia URSR za perepysom 1970,” Suchasnist 11, no. 9 (1971): 77. The Ukrainian population of the Russian Republic, deprived of schools and all cultural facilities in its native language and exposed to strong administrative pressure, is undergoing a process of Russification which may lead to the loss to the Ukrainian nation of about one-fourth of its total ethnic territory. In Soviet sources, such as the book Kubanskie stanitsy cited above, this is being praised as a “progressive, internationalist trend.” There can be little doubt that, circumstances permitting, the regime would gladly apply this kind of “internationalism” to the entire Ukrainian people.

8. The main problems of the development of pre-revolutionary Ukraine are discussed in the essay, “The Role of Ukraine in Modern History,” 11–36 of this volume.


13. “Molotov’s statement [to the German ambassador, Werner von der Schulenburg, in connection with the intended Soviet annexation of Bukovyna, in 1940] reflected the real apprehension behind much of Soviet foreign policy of the last few years: in any
possible war Ukraine was the Achilles' heel of the Soviet Union. As everything since Stalin's speech at the Eighteenth Party Congress had indicated, the Ukrainian issue was felt to be the critical element in any internal danger within the integral parts of the Soviet Union.'" A.B. Ulam, *Expansion and Coexistence: The History of Soviet Foreign Policy, 1917–67* (New York and Washington 1968), 299–300. The wartime ambassador of the Polish government-in-exile to the USSR reported, on 3 January 1942: "During his farewell call [Sir Stafford] Cripps mentioned that Stalin has a feeling of great success, believes the Germans will be completely shattered, and above all is concerned that Russia, even at this stage, should be assured of strategically safe frontiers and such as will guarantee the annihilation of the Ukrainian movement." Cited in S. Kot, *Conversations with the Kremlin and Dispatches from Russia* (London 1963), 175.

14. Volhynia used to belong to tsarist Russia, and Transcarpathia (also known as Hungarian Rus', Subcarpathian Ruthenia and Carpatho-Ukraine) to the Hungarian half of the Habsburg Empire. Prior to World War I both areas were backward, and were little affected by the Ukrainian national movement. The progress of nationalism in those territories is illustrated by the fact that in 1938–9 an autonomous Ukrainian administration came into existence in Transcarpathia, while Volhynia served during the German occupation as the base of a patriotic anti-Nazi and anti-Soviet guerrilla force, the Ukrainian Insurgent Army.

15. A striking proof of this contention is provided by the events of the winter of 1918–19 and the spring of 1919. This was the critical moment in the war between Soviet Russia and the Ukrainian People's Republic. The best Ukrainian military force was the Ukrainian Galician Army, which in that chaotic era was distinguished by its exemplary discipline and imperviousness to Bolshevik propaganda. It is likely that an intervention of this force in the Russian-Ukrainian war would have decided the contest in favour of Ukrainian independence, but the Galician Army was tied down because of the necessity of defending Western Ukraine against the Polish invasion.

16. This occurred for the first time in the second half of the seventeenth century, in the era which in Ukrainian history is known as *Ruina*, or "the Time of Ruin." The struggle of Muscovy and Poland for dominion over Ukraine led to civil wars between pro-Muscovite and pro-Polish Cossack factions. This tragic situation was re-enacted in 1919–20. All Ukrainian patriots wanted their country independent and united. But as this optimal goal was no longer possible to achieve, they divided among themselves over the issue whether concessions were to be made to Russia or to Poland. The chief of state of Dnieper Ukraine, Symon Petliura, determined to carry on the war against Soviet Russia at all costs, entered into an alliance with the Poles, while declaring his *désintérèsement* in the fate of Galicia. But this surrender of their native land was unacceptable to Western Ukrainians, for whom the traditional primary enemy was Poland. Thus the Ukrainian Galician Army went over first to Denikin, and later to the Bolsheviks. In both the seventeenth and the twentieth centuries the final outcome was a partition of Ukraine between Russia and Poland.


18. The evidence on the connections between Ukrainian cultural groups in Czechoslovakia and the intellectual ferment in Soviet Ukraine has been assembled by G. Hodnett and P.J. Potichnyj, *The Ukraine and the Czechoslovak Crisis* (Canberra 1970).

The Political Thought of Soviet Ukrainian Dissidents

The movement of intellectual-political dissent which surfaced in Ukraine in the 1960s has evoked much interest among foreign students of Soviet affairs. Western scholars, however, have paid little attention so far to the content of the ideas formulated by Ukrainian dissidents. How is this omission to be accounted for? After half a century of massive and relentless repression, the very fact of a vocal opposition movement emerging in Ukraine appeared almost miraculous. Something of this amazement still lingers on today. Most Western analysts have been satisfied with registering instances of Ukrainian dissent, but have been slow to scrutinize the dissidents' pronouncements as documents of political thought.

This neglect is regrettable, because an ideologically oriented study of the Ukrainian dissidents is by no means merely a theoretical exercise. Ideas do have consequences. Under the conditions of an imposed conformity, heterodox ideas act as catalysts to forces of change. The statements of the dissidents may serve as an indication of the currents stirring in the depths of Ukrainian society, and they point to the direction in which Ukraine is likely to move should the iron lid of repression become loosened.

The approach I propose is to place the dissidents' ideas in historical perspective by relating them to older trends in Ukrainian socio-political thought. Within the scope of this paper, it will be necessary to limit the discussion to a few of the most important topics and representative cases.

In an article published in 1963, I surveyed the Soviet Ukrainian scene; this was before the existence of the emerging dissident movement became known in the West. Noting the many instances of the post-Stalin cultural revival in Ukraine, I concluded by making two predictions. The first was: "It is possible to predict that if this process of reconstruction and expansion continues for another few years, it is bound to enter into a
phase in which it will assume the form of political demands.’’ The second prediction was: ‘‘These [political] postulates will, in all likelihood, follow a ‘national-communist’ line—not, of course, because communist ideas, as such, are close to the hearts of the Ukrainian people, but because a policy must proceed from certain given data. Under Soviet conditions, a realistic point of departure for Ukrainian politics is the existence of the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist Republic as a body nominally endowed with the rights of a sovereign state. . . . ’’

Indeed, the first outstanding programmatic document of Ukrainian dissent was Ivan Dziuba’s treatise, Internatsionalizm chy rusyfikatsiia? (Internationalism or Russification?), written in 1965, only two years after the above prognosis had been made. As an American reviewer, Professor John A. Armstrong, noted, ‘‘the book constitutes a massive, expert work of research scholarship. . . . While . . . it appears established that Dziuba wrote the manuscript, it also seems probable that he developed it (perhaps over many years) through exchange of information and ideas with other intellectuals in the Soviet Ukraine. If this last hypothesis is correct, it indicates an extremely sophisticated and erudite opposition to Soviet policy among Ukrainian intellectuals.’’

For our inquiry, the significant aspect of Dziuba’s treatise is the fact that it is written from a Marxist-Leninist position. Dziuba denounced the deviations in Soviet nationality policy in Ukraine from true Leninist principles and called for the restoration of these principles. The work is addressed to Petro Shelest and Volodymyr Sheherbysky, who at the time were, respectively, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Ukraine and Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Ukrainian SSR. The book’s last chapter bears the programmatic title ‘‘The Government of the Ukrainian SSR as the Spokesman of National Integrity: Its Responsibility for the Nation.’’

It is, therefore, legitimate to evaluate Dziuba as a new incarnation of the ‘‘national’’ communist trend which in the 1920s played a prominent role in Ukrainian political life not only in the Ukrainian SSR, but also in Western Ukraine (then under Polish rule) and in the Ukrainian diaspora. But we must take notice of one important difference between the original Ukrainian ‘‘national’’ communism of the 1920s and its recent revival by Dziuba. The former was inspired by genuine revolutionary fervour, by a utopian faith in an imminent world-wide social upheaval and transformation of mankind, or—to use Mykola Khvylovy’s poetic image—a vision of the ‘‘commune beyond the hills’’ (zahirna komuna). No trace of this revolutionary chiliasm is to be found in Dziuba, whose strictly rational deductions resemble a legal brief. Without questioning the sincerity of Dziuba’s Marxist-Leninist convictions, there is no doubt that the intellectual and emotional strength of his work lies entirely in its patriotic ap-
peal, and not in the lengthy quotations from Lenin’s writings and party resolutions.

Under pressure, Dziuba retracted his heresies in 1973 after some vacillation.\(^6\) He is the only prominent Ukrainian dissident (discounting some minor and marginal figures) to have capitulated to the regime. His recantation has been a bitter disappointment to his numerous admirers both in Ukraine and abroad. Still, it is important to fathom his motives. A plausible interpretation has been advanced by Mykhajlo Savaryn.\(^7\) Let me elaborate his argument in my own terms: Dziuba was a mouthpiece for that segment of the Soviet Ukrainian establishment which, during Petro Shelest’s tenure as First Secretary of the CPU (1963–72), was pushing for the extension of the autonomy of the Ukrainian republic and for increased Ukrainian cultural rights. Dziuba’s demands were a theoretical extrapolation of what certain Soviet Ukrainian leaders were doing in practice during the era of the “revival of controlled Ukrainian nationalism.”\(^8\) These circles possibly encouraged Dziuba; they certainly tolerated him and, for several years, shielded him from extreme penalties. Thus, Dziuba’s opposition was fully an opposition within the framework of the system. After the purge of Shelest and his coterie in 1972, this stance became untenable. It lost its political raison d’être, and this accounts for Dziuba’s capitulation.

While Ivan Dziuba may be considered a continuator of the “national” communist trend in Ukrainian political thought, another prominent dissident, Valentyn Moroz, is a lineal descendant of the integral-nationalist movement, represented by the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN), which flourished in the western Ukrainian lands in the 1930s.\(^9\) Moroz could not overtly advertise his allegiance to integral nationalism in his samvydav writings, but perspicacious readers had little difficulty in detecting the sources of his inspiration; certain passages in Moroz sound like paraphrases of Dmytro Dontsov, the ideologist of Ukrainian integral nationalism. What connected Moroz with the Dontsovian-OUN tradition was his philosophical voluntarism, his insistence on the maintenance of the pure national ideal at all costs, his scornful rejection of any pragmatic accommodation to existing conditions, his cult of the strong, heroic, self-sacrificing individual, and, finally, his anti-intellectualism and advocacy of oderzhynist, which means approximately “frenzy” or “holy madness.”

Within a society paralyzed by fear, Moroz’s defiant call was bound to have a profound emotional impact. Leonid Pliuschch has compared Moroz’s essay, “Amid the Snows,” with Vissarion Belinsky’s celebrated open letter to Gogol. In 1847, Belinsky castigated Gogol’s spiritual subservience to the reactionary regime of Nicholas I; similarly, Moroz pilloried Dziuba for his capitulation to the KGB. It is to be kept in
mind that Pliushch represented a tendency within the dissident movement opposed to that of Moroz. Nevertheless, he paid Moroz the following well-earned tribute: "There appeared a new letter of Belinsky to Gogol—and one a thousand times more terrible to Gogol-Dziuba, a thousand times more convincing and soul-inspiring. This was Valentyn Moroz’s ‘Amid the Snows.’ By merging the logic of facts and ideas with the passion of a fighter against any concessions to the KGB, Moroz proved that Dziuba has delivered a blow to his own ideas and to the Ukrainian opposition movement..."10 This testimony must not be forgotten, especially in view of later events that have tarnished Moroz’s image.

There is nothing surprising in the fact that of all the dissidents it was precisely Moroz who became the favourite of the Ukrainian diaspora. Right-wing émigré circles correctly perceived his affinity with their own ideology. Ukrainian student groups in North America, although they had largely become detached from OUN-type nationalism, also idolized Moroz. This cult of Moroz fulfilled the young people’s psychological need for hero worship. Spearheaded by student activists, Ukrainians in Western countries mounted a large-scale ‘release Moroz’ campaign. But the Ukrainian diaspora failed to realize that Moroz’s views were by no means representative of the mainstream of Soviet Ukrainian dissent. Furthermore, it displayed no awareness of Moroz’s serious personal failings. Several prominent dissidents of proven integrity who had unpleasant encounters with Moroz in Soviet prisons and labour camps transmitted to the West warnings about his egotism, arrogance and caddishness. But these messages were not publicized in time.11

The aftermath is common knowledge. Released to the West in April 1979 as part of a Soviet-American exchange of political prisoners for Soviet spies, Moroz was given a hero’s welcome by the entire Ukrainian diaspora. Very soon, however, he created universal dismay by his bizarre and scandalous behavior. Politically, he at first allied himself with the most reactionary and obscurantist émigré faction, the so-called World Ukrainian Liberation Front, but soon fell out even with them. Furthermore, since his expatriation Moroz’s writings and public pronouncements have displayed an abysmal intellectual vacuity.

Thus, two prominent Ukrainian dissidents, Ivan Dziuba and Valentyn Moroz, each proceeding along his own tragic route, have come to a dead end. Their failure cannot be ascribed simply to personal frailties; it is rather of a broader symptomatic significance. Dziuba and Moroz represented a revival within Ukrainian dissent of two powerful currents—‘national’ communism and integral nationalism—that dominated the Ukrainian political scene during the inter-war era. Dziuba’s and Moroz’s
disgrace illustrates the bankruptcy of these two currents in modern Ukrainian political thought.

Although standing at opposite poles and fiercely hostile to each other, Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism have shared many common characteristics. They both have extolled revolutionary violence and the dictatorship of a single party acting in the name of the masses; both have been illiberal and have rejected civil rights, a pluralistic order of the body politic, the rule of law, and Western-type representative government; both have been motivated by an exclusive ideology and a Manichean vision of society, with all the psychological hallmarks of a militant, quasi-religious secular faith. A historian will have no difficulty in identifying them as the Ukrainian variants of the two great, world-wide totalitarian movements of the twentieth century, communism and fascism. This is not the place to discuss the origins and development of Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism (fascism). Let it be said, however, that I acknowledge the indigenous character of both trends in Ukraine, and that I do not deny that in the past they have made some positive contributions to their nation. But I also think that both totalitarian trends were essentially historical aberrations and that they have led the Ukrainian people into cul-de-sacs. The experience of Stalinism, on the one hand, and of the Nazi occupation during World War II, on the other, exploded the foundations on which Ukrainian “national” communism and integral nationalism were built.

Still, it was in the nature of things that the unfreezing of Ukrainian political thought in the 1960s brought forth these throwbacks to the prevalent ideologies of the inter-war period. The lesson to be learned from the falls of Dziuba and Moroz is that “national” communism and integral nationalism have ceased to be, philosophically and politically, viable alternatives for the Ukrainian people in search of a better future.

The mainstream of Ukrainian dissent has been represented by the samvydav journal Ukrainskyi visnyk (Ukrainian Herald), eight issues of which appeared between 1970 and 1974, and the Ukrainian Public Group to Promote the Implementation of the Helsinki Accords (in simpler terms, the Ukrainian Helsinki Group), which was formed in 1976. The difference between these two exponents of the Ukrainian opposition is that the Ukrainian Herald was an underground publication, with anonymous or pseudonymous editors and contributors, whereas the Ukrainian Helsinki Group acted overtly. But there are reasons to assume that the Ukrainian Herald originated within the same circle as that to which the founders and members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group belonged. In terms of ideas, there is an evident continuity between the Herald and the subsequent documents of the Helsinki Group.
In trying to define the political philosophy of contemporary Ukrainian dissent, a quotation from the memoirs of its veteran, Danylo Shumuk, may serve as a suitable introduction:

Only democracy can save mankind from the dangers of the rightist as well as of the leftist brands of tyranny. Only the unrestricted right, guaranteed by law, for all citizens to express, advertise, and defend their ideas will enable the people to control and direct the policy of the government. Without such a right, there can be no talk of democracy and of democratic elections to a parliament. Where there is no legal opposition endowed with equal rights in the parliament and among the people, there is no democracy. Where an opposition does not exist, there can be no control over government policy. I have reached these conclusions after many years of thinking, stock-taking, and analysis, and they have led me... to adopt a critical attitude to both communists and Dontsovian nationalists.14

Shumuk, a man of the older generation (born in 1914), has himself passed through a communist and an integral-nationalist stage. He was a member of the Communist Party of Western Ukraine in pre-war Polish Volhynia, and he joined the nationalist Ukrainian Insurgent Army during the period of the German occupation. Most of his life has been spent in Polish and Soviet prisons. He declared his adherence to the Ukrainian Helsinki Group in 1979, while in a Soviet labour camp. His dearly won democratic convictions are also those of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group as a whole.

The platform of the contemporary Ukrainian resistance can, therefore, be fairly described as democratic patriotism. (I would say “nationalism” if that term had not become ambiguous because of its fascist connotations.) Its most characteristic feature is the linking of the struggle against national oppression with the struggle for democratic human rights. This signifies a return, in a rejuvenated form, to the noblest traditions of the nineteenth- and early twentieth-century Ukrainian liberation movement, whose basic orientation was democratic and humanist, as well as a return to the tradition of the independent, democratic Ukrainian state of 1917–20. This does not imply a total rejection of the achievements of Ukrainian communism and integral nationalism, but rather their sublimation, cleansed of totalitarian perversions. For instance, the dissidents have shown the greatest respect for the heroic struggle of the wartime Ukrainian Insurgent Army, which was a creation of the OUN, while rejecting the latter’s addiction to dictatorship and one-party rule.

Ukrainian dissidents have formulated as their immediate objective the implementation in their country of the civil liberties contained in the Uni-
universal Declaration of Human Rights of 1948 and in the Final Act of the Conference on Security and Co-operation in Europe (Helsinki, August 1975). Their long-range goal is the “decolonization” of the USSR through free elections to be conducted in Ukraine under the supervision of the United Nations. In contrast to the “national” communists, contemporary Ukrainian dissidents do not oppose a “good” Lenin to a “bad” Stalin. They assert that Lenin’s hypocritical policy toward Ukraine was in essence identical with the Soviet armed interventions in Hungary in 1956 and in Czechoslovakia in 1968, which also were disguised as “brotherly help” to the respective peoples. “The Ukrainian people did not want to follow the Russian Bolsheviks in 1917 and demonstrated a strong will to build their own state.”

In contradistinction to the xenophobic nationalism of the OUN, the ardent patriotism of contemporary Ukrainian dissent does not imply hostility to other peoples, even the Russians. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group has maintained friendly co-operation with the Moscow Helsinki Group and democratic Russian dissidents. Petro Grigorenko (Hryhorenko), a former Soviet Army major-general and a founding member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, has become internationally renowned for his defence of the national rights of the Crimean Tatars. The 1980 programmatic declaration of the Ukrainian Patriotic Movement, the most recent offshoot of the Ukrainian opposition, states:

... freedom for Ukraine will bring freedom for the Russian and other nations enslaved by the existing regime. A free Ukraine guarantees all rights to all peoples living in Ukraine: Russians and Poles, Jews and Tatars, Romanians and Hungarians. We understand what it means to live under colonial oppression and therefore proclaim: the people who live in our country will be assured the broadest political, economic, and social rights. All the rights of national minorities and various religious associations will be guaranteed unconditionally.

Another significant aspect of the Ukrainian dissidents’ thinking is its legalistic colouring. In fact, Ukrainian dissent is known under the self-chosen name of the “movement for the defence of right” (pravozakhysnyi rukh). One might be inclined to view this as merely a tactical device, an attempt to take shelter under the nominal civil liberties that the Soviet constitution and laws grant to citizens on paper. Without denying that such tactical considerations also play some role, one can be sure that the manifest legalism of the Ukrainian dissidents is for them a matter of principle. All of their writings and pronouncements are permeated by the idea of the rule of law. This is a novel phenomenon in the history of Ukrainian political thought. The pre-revolutionary Ukrainian national
movement was undoubtedly libertarian, but because of its populist orientation, its legalistic sense was underdeveloped. (Mykhailo Drahomanov, with his strong interest in constitutional problems, was an exception, and in this respect he founded no school.) It seems that long experience with a regime based on lawlessness and the perversion of legality has imbued contemporary Ukrainian freedom fighters with the conviction that liberty can exist only under the rule of law. 20 Thus, while they are intellectual rebels in regard to the present system, they are at the same time also partisans of law and order. I would not hesitate to call this a conservative strand—in the positive meaning of the term—in the ideology of Ukrainian dissent.

One should note certain philosophical divergences within Ukrainian dissent. On the one hand, Leonid Pliushch and Iurii Badzo profess an allegiance to humanist democratic Marxism. 21 (I personally think that "democratic Marxism" is a contradiction in terms. Because of this, I view Pliushch's and Badzo's profession of Marxism as a symptom of intellectual confusion. This complex problem would require a separate discussion.) On the other hand, there are symptoms of a religious revival among segments of the contemporary Ukrainian intellectual elite. 22 The poems of Mykola Rudenko, the leader of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, reveal his newly rediscovered Christian faith. 23 Another founding member of the group, Oles Berdnyk, has been influenced by Teilhard de Chardin's evolutionary spiritualism. These differences in world-view do not detract from the unity of political commitment to the double goals of pluralistic democracy and national independence. It is fitting to round off this brief survey of the ideas of the Ukrainian opposition by quoting two of its recent programmatic documents:

My social position is socialist, my political position is democratic. I formulate it as a concept of democratic socialism. . . . [There ought to be] ideological, cultural, and political pluralism. The working class and the peasantry should have separate class representations in the organs of state power. There should be freedom under law to establish democratic parties. . . . Only then will the Party be a party, and not the dominant stratum in society. 24

The so-called government of Ukraine has now been implementing a policy of national genocide for sixty years. . . . For this reason, we, the victims of political repression in Ukraine, proclaim to our nation, to the governments of all the countries of the world, and to the United Nations our desire to secede from the USSR, to lead our people out of communist slavery. 25

In trying to assess the strengths and weaknesses of Ukrainian dissent, it is helpful to compare it with its Russian counterpart. Russian dissidents are
divided into several irreconcilable factions, and the communist reformers, Western-type liberals, and neo-Slavophiles do not speak the same political language. In contrast, the Ukrainian opposition appears much more united. The common denominator of all Ukrainian dissidents is, undoubtedly, the national factor. One can also assume that Ukrainian dissent possesses a much stronger potential popular appeal than Russian dissent. In Russia, patriotism or nationalism works basically in favour of the present regime, which has elevated the Russian state to a pinnacle of power and prestige. Russian popular nationalism is likely to become divorced from the Soviet regime only in the event of serious setbacks internationally. In Ukraine, which suffers from manifest national discrimination and oppression, patriotic sentiment tends to be spontaneously oriented against the status quo. This gives Ukrainian dissent a powerful potential constituency. The regime is well aware of this danger, and this explains why it has been more ruthless in the persecution of the Ukrainian than of the Russian dissidents.

An area in which Ukrainian dissent is markedly inferior to the Russian is intellectual sophistication. 26 We do not find among Ukrainian dissidents such world-renowned figures as Solzhenitsyn and Sakharov. On the average, the intellectual level and range of the Ukrainian dissidents’ writings is comparatively lower and narrower, despite some very respectable individual achievements, such as the works of Ivan Dziuba, Helii Snehirov, Mykhailo Osadchy, Leonid Pliusch, Iurii Badzo, Vasyl Lisovy, and a few others. This state of affairs reflects the general provincialism of contemporary Ukraine’s cultural life: the lack of contacts with the outside world, the insufficient knowledge of foreign languages, and the limited access to non-Soviet books. Furthermore, because of continual purges directed primarily against elite elements of Ukrainian society, present-day Ukraine’s intelligentsia is sociologically very young and hence culturally immature. In examining the family backgrounds of Ukrainian dissidents, one finds in most cases that they are first-generation intellectuals. This causes a cultural handicap that even gifted individuals find difficult to overcome.

Mykola Rudenko’s Ekonomichni monolohy (Economic Monologues) may serve as an illustration of the preceding remarks. 27 Rudenko is perhaps the archetypical Ukrainian dissident: a coal miner’s son from the Donets Basin region, a Communist Party member since his youth, a decorated veteran of the Soviet army and a war invalid; later a popular novelist, editor of the Kiev literary monthly Dnipro, secretary of the party organization of the Writers’ Union of Ukraine; and finally, a member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, condemned in 1977 to a term of seven years of imprisonment and five years of post-prison exile. The first part of Rudenko’s book is a moving autobiographical account of the
quest that turned him from an establishment man into a dissident. The second part is a critique of Marxist economics, and it reads as if it were written by an intellectual Robinson Crusoe. For instance, Rudenko comments on Marx’s value theory without the slightest awareness that the topic has been discussed by economists for the past hundred years and that this debate has generated a mountain of scholarly literature. One wonders about the reasons for this embarrassing ignorance. A different impression is created by the book’s conclusion, where Rudenko suggests practical remedies for the Soviet Union’s economic impasse. He proposes a return to the New Economic Policy (NEP) of the 1920s, that is, the restoration of market relations and the unleashing of private initiative. These sound recommendations derive not from Rudenko’s naive theorizing but from his personal observations and common sense. They have been endorsed by the author of the book’s preface, a fellow member of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group, Petro Grigorenko.

Let us ask, in conclusion, what the chances are of Ukrainian dissent being transformed from a movement of ideas (composing and circulating samvydav literature, writing letters of protest to authorities, engaging in “subversive” talk and correspondence) into an actual political force. Here we leave the realm of the past and the present, which can be studied empirically. Historians are reluctant to prognosticate because they are conscious of the large part the contingent plays in human affairs. Still, one can venture some cautious predictions while guarding against wishful thinking.

The exact number of Ukrainian dissidents is unknown, but in any case, it is microscopic in proportion to Ukraine’s population of fifty million. Bohdan Krawchenko has compiled a list of 975 individuals known to have taken part in dissident activities in the Ukrainian SSR between 1960 and 1972. The Ukrainian Helsinki Group had thirty-seven members. The tiny numbers are compensated by the persistence of dissent, which continues to assert itself against tremendous odds, and by the fact that in the movement various occupational groups and all geographical sections of Ukraine, from Transcarpathia to the Donets Basin and from Kharkiv to Odessa, are represented. As noted above, we have the right to assume that the potential constituency of the Ukrainian opposition is vast. But these potential forces are immobilized by a system in which outlets for autonomous civic action do not exist, communications among individuals are restricted to a minimum, and the entire society is kept in check by fear and universal surveillance—whoever steps out of line exposes himself to swift retribution.

To break this deadlock, the first impulse would probably have to come from the outside, for instance, in the form of a divisive power struggle within the Kremlin oligarchy or a major setback for the Soviet Union in
its relations with other socialist-bloc countries. The second step would have to be the creation of an organizational structure capable of channeling the now atomized forces of popular discontent. It seems likely that such a structure would not consist initially of a political party, but, rather, of associations representing the social interests of various strata of society. Some tentative moves in this direction have already occurred. Thus, in 1977, the Donets Basin miner Vladimir Klebanov organized an independent trade union that, prior to its suppression, had a membership of several hundred workers.30 In November 1980, an imprisoned Kiev worker, Mykola Pohyba, circulated an open letter calling for the formation of free trade unions based on the Polish model.31 Circumstances permitting, such tendencies could easily escalate, because in the Soviet Union there exist widespread socio-economic grievances which in Ukraine and other non-Russian republics are compounded by national frustrations.

While it is impossible to predict when and how these potentialities could become actualities, the testimonial significance of the Ukrainian dissidents is beyond doubt. The sacrifice of these courageous men and women bears witness to the unbroken spirit of the Ukrainian nation. Their struggle for human and national rights conforms with the tendency of mankind’s progress in the spirit of freedom. The Ukrainian dissidents have faith that the truth of freedom will prevail. It would be shameful for those whose good fortune it is to live in free countries to be of lesser faith.

Notes

11. See the excerpts from the letters of V. Chornovil, Mykhailo Osadchy, Iryna Kalynets and Zynovii Antoniuk in “The Valentyn Moroz Saga: A Conspiracy of Silence,” *Student*, no. 61 (February 1980), 11.
18. Ibid., 47.
26. The intellectual shortcomings of the Ukrainian dissidents have been discussed by J.-


29. Biographical data on all members of the Ukrainian Helsinki Group can be found in *The Human Rights Movement in Ukraine*, 251–65.


31. Pohyba’s letter has been reprinted in *Ukrainskyi robitnyk*, no. 1 (New York and Munich 1981). It has also appeared in several Ukrainian newspapers in the West and in English in *The Ukrainian Weekly* (Jersey City), 7 June 1981.
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